Emirates A380 Moscow landing incident

ChasenSFO

hen teaser
http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0

Position and Altitude data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder suggest the aircraft was tracking about 190 degrees magnetic when the aircraft initiated the go around at about 1000 feet MSL about 8nm before the runway threshold, which translates to about 400 feet AGL with the aerodrome elevation at 180 meters/592 feet MSL.

Yikes! Imagine living 8nm from the airport and watching a 380 go-around 400 feet over your house. Glad they caught it, will be interesting to wait and read about what lead to the confusion on an instrument landing in VMC.
 
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And as the pilots come back to DXB at HQs, they'll be slided two papers across the table (one for each) asking for their resignation signatures.
 
Never been there, but Could be a QFE/QNH mix up or a feet to meters mistake.

Found these online scroll to page 82.
http://www.uvairlines.com/admin/resources/UUDD.pdf

All the QFE altitudes on the approach are between 1200 and 500 meters

Even if QFE/QNH mixup and/or feet vs meter mixup, the radio altimeter is accurate. It should be unnerving to hear "1000" and "500" when you're over 8 miles from the runway threshold. Reading that article in the OP, they did a second approach in which they intercepted the localizer inbound, but then never descended which caused them to go around the 2nd time. 3rd time was the charm and landed fine.

It'll be real interesting to find out why the first two approaches went missed (especially the first one).
 
Even if QFE/QNH mixup and/or feet vs meter mixup, the radio altimeter is accurate. It should be unnerving to hear "1000" and "500" when you're over 8 miles from the runway threshold. Reading that article in the OP, they did a second approach in which they intercepted the localizer inbound, but then never descended which caused them to go around the 2nd time. 3rd time was the charm and landed fine.

It'll be real interesting to find out why the first two approaches went missed (especially the first one).

No kidding, yea th second approach is a bit of a head scratcher, but after executing a go around at 400' 8 miles from the airport I bet there was some serious "wtf did we do, oh man we are so fired" that I could see their attention being elsewhere and missing something like arming the approach.
 
What, 380 pilots only trust the GS and are afraid to judge a sight picture with eyeballs and brain?? Or am I missing something?
 
EK memo regarding this event:



STANDARDS ON THE LINE

You will be aware that we have experienced some poorly managed events on the line over the last few months; unfortunately we experienced another one last week. In Training we promote the fact that we are driven by evidence, well the evidence indicates that that these events can no longer be viewed as isolated events, therefore it is imperative action is taken to stop the onset of a potential trend. We need to raise the levels of airmanship, awareness, suspicion and professionalism across our pilot community. Let me state that we are of the firm belief that the vast majority of our pilots are professional, proficient, efficient and effective. Unfortunately, the evidence indicates there is still work to be done to bring a small minority of pilots to this standard. The acid test, as always is, if following any training/checking session you would not be confident with the pilot flying your loved ones into some of the demanding destinations, terrain, weather and ATC environments which we operate into, then you have to flag those concerns to Training Management by accurately grading and reporting your observations.

In reviewing the events of the last few months we have asked ourselves what are we doing wrong? What are we missing? What’s the root cause? Why is our training and checking not able to identify those pilots who underperform on the line? Whilst the PFs and PMs in each case demonstrated failures in one or more of the pilot competencies, it was the loss of Situation Awareness and ineffective Pilot monitoring which were so concerning; we therefore need to enhance our training with regards to both. We have already started this in the current round of RTGS, where we present the Flight Data Monitoring playbacks from some of the events in question and then facilitate a discussion on what went wrong and what could have been done to prevent the situation from developing. However it is obvious that we need to do more, therefore in cooperation with Fleet we have decided to introduce the following changes:

· Trainers are to re-emphasize the importance of Pilot Monitoring duties during all Training and Checking events; this is to happen with immediate effect.
· Recurrent training to include a manually flown (Auto Pilot/Auto Throttle off) short sector, focusing on SA and Monitoring. We already cover this on Day 3 on the A380 using NCE; Boeing will introduce something similar on Day 2, this will be effective from 1 Oct this year. Emphasis is to be placed on the Pilot Monitoring making timely exceedance calls and demonstrating a satisfactory level of monitoring throughout the session. Please continue to insert ‘distractors’ during your sessions to mirror the distractions encountered on the line. The PM is to prioritise his workload to ensure his own SA and the safety of the aircraft are never compromised.
· We have re-written the word pictures for the Communication and the Leadership, Teamwork and Support PAMs to include more focus on PM skills. The FCI detailing these changes will be published shortly and will be effective immediately on receipt.
· During a training/checking session should a pilot miss a number of radio or SOP calls which might jeopardise the safety of the flight, or if their attitude or professionalism is called into question then the pilot is to be graded a ‘1’ for Leadership, Teamwork and Support. I accept this is subjective and whilst I would not expect to see a trainee fail because of a ‘few’ missed calls, several missed radio and/or SOP calls could be indicative of capacity or SA issues, so additional training is entirely appropriate.
· Any commander who is graded a ‘1’ or a ‘2’ for any competency during Day 1 or 2 of their recurrent simulator session will continue with their remaining simulator sessions, unless they are removed by a Training Manager. However, on completion of their recurrent training sessions a review of their performance will be conducted by Training/Fleet management prior to the commander being released back to the line; this is effective immediately.
· We will develop learning modules to improve knowledge and understanding of Auto Flight Systems modes. In the interim it is vital that you not only train Automation awareness but also the understanding of the modes.
· 25% of line checks will be planned as ‘No Notice’, this will be effective from the next planned roster. If you are rostered for one of these No Notice line checks, it is important you do not make the rostered crew aware – we are trying to get better visibility over our crews’ standards and level of preparedness – a true No Notice line check will give us that.
· Safety will provide Training with a list of our most challenging destinations and where possible Line Checks will be planned to these destinations going forward.
· There will be an additional 1-week ground school introduced for all new conversion courses to enhance/refresh fundamental ATPL knowledge; date for implementation TBD.
· Starting 1 Feb 2018, Day 3 of the recurrent PPC will be separated from Day 1 and 2. This will give trainees more regular exposure throughout the year to manual flight in the simulator as well as the opportunity to practise their monitoring skills. This initiative will also address the negative feedback we have received relating to 3 x deep night duties in a row and the limited training value gained from the 3rd night.
· We will be working with a third party research team to trial ‘eye tracking’ functionality in the simulator. We will use the results of the trial in the following RTGS phase to demonstrate the effectiveness, or not, of some crews’ scanning techniques during various stages of the flight.

In conclusion, the recent spate of poorly managed events on the line is deeply disappointing. Inaction on our part was simply not an option; as a result I hope you understand why these actions are being taken. It is vital that as trainers we lead by example and we demonstrate the standards others wish to aspire to. We recognise that ‘change’ can lead to uncertainty, especially if that change is introduced quickly. Therefore, if you are faced with a situation during your training and checking sessions over the coming weeks and are unsure of what is expected of you, please call your training management team who will be happy to assist.

As always thank you for your continued support.


SVP Flight Training
 
I had a friend who was a A380 Capt at Emirates leave, within the last year, and start over at SWA. Had issues with being overworked, the schedules, and pay (150K tax free and they paid for his home).

This kinda reminds me of a recent memo where they were upset with "intentional non-compliance". FOQA and line checks were finding a lot of book procedures not being followed. My feeling is THEN STOP CHANGING THE PROCEDURES EVERY SIX MONTHS. I swear, this airplane has been around since the 90's and they keep wanting us to do something a little different all the time. Then get pissed when we do it the old way. I think it's job security for the training management types to keep tweaking things for no reason and the Feds could care less. Argh........
 
Of course, not a single comment on schedules, fatigue, and circadian swaps with day/night shifts mixed into a line. :rolleyes:

Being that's a memo from training/standards, thats probably not within their scope or span of control.

That said though, the factors you cite should be getting addressed in a concurrent memo to the crews from flight safety directed to flight ops/ crew scheduling. In a perfect world at least....
 
Being that's a memo from training/standards, thats probably not within their scope or span of control.

That said though, the factors you cite should be getting addressed in a concurrent memo to the crews from flight safety directed to flight ops/ crew scheduling. In a perfect world at least....
Actually in a perfect world training/standards would address those factors as well. When there’s a moat between training and safety you get events such as this.
 
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