Dash 8/Q400 Stall Recovery stats...

[jtrain609]

You're probably right. I just thought it was worthwhile to examine this. I can't help but feel that ground proximity played some sort of role in his control inputs, and the sequence of flap extension/retraction may have played into that. Probing the mindset of both pilots is something I'm very interested in.

Maybe I'm barking up the wrong tree again, but barring pure panic, I can't help but wonder why he'd respond that way.

Occam's razor probably gets us all the explanation we need.. but still.

Truth be told, I'm looking for flaws in the process that we can use as leverage for change.
Something more specific than "humans make mistakes" would be good material.
I suppose the given "tired humans make worse mistakes" is a start, but something more specific would be helpful.

My opinion? Bro didn't know what was happening. I'm honestly willing to bet that things happened so suddenly and out of the typical order of things that he wasn't able to process the data quick enough, or pull his head out far enough in front of the airplane to realize, "Holy crap, I don't know how this happened, or why, but we're in a stall and I need to forget EVERYTHING that has just happened and recover, NOW."

Panic/fear/fatigue will do that to you. I mean I think we've all been there; you're tired, it's oh dark thirty for your body clock, there's ice, you have something completely out of the blue happen and you're unable to really wrap your head around what's happening very quickly. You're stuck thinking, "WTF?" while you need to be thinking, "OH CRAP I HOPE I CAN PUT THE THRUST LEVERS THROUGH THE EICAS!!!!!"

While pilots would love to deny the fact, there is simply a limit to how quickly we can process data. SHOULD this guy have been able to see the situation for what it was? A standard arrival stall? Sure. But did he? Obviously not.

Was he just a crappy pilot? I dunno, I go back and forth with that one in my head. I think at one point, "Man, who in their right mind would respond to the pusher like that?" At the same time I think to myself of a few situations that we probably shouldn't have flown out of, and reflect on simpler situations that much better pilots than me have crashed because of.

In the end my analysis (thus far) leads me to believe that, like always, there is a huge chain with this accident and there were multiple exit points to avert disaster. None were obviously taken, and we have the end result here.

Could it have happened to me? My pilot ego likes to say I'd NEVER let something like this happen, but if I let my guard down and I'm honest, I have to say "Well man if I was really tired and had 100 hours in type and didn't see this coming, who knows. Better pilots than me have put airplanes into the ground for simpler things than this, so I'm probably capable of the same actions and thus, result."

 

[Firebird2XC]

Could it have happened to me? My pilot ego likes to say I'd NEVER let something like this happen, but if I let my guard down and I'm honest, I have to say "Well man if I was really tired and had 100 hours in type and didn't see this coming, who knows. Better pilots than me have put airplanes into the ground for simpler things than this, so I'm probably capable of the same actions and thus, result."

So very true.. This is why I think understanding how he arrived at that point is important.

I think considering the scrutiny on his training record and how readily Colgan threw him under the bus, we should be just as diligent in examining all other aspects of things, including crew interaction between CA and FO.

I just know in my experience with the CJC/Pinnacle organization that things may not always been 100% as they should be. Letting them slide on that for even an instant, regardless of circumstance, would be a huge mistake.

Until the NTSB report is out, read, and understood, I'm not budging an inch on that.

 

[kellwolf]

The Q has a trend vector, but using it would be like trying to follow a bouncy ball down a flight of stairs. You end up playing with the power so much chasing it that everything else goes to crap.

Man, that's odd. The trend vector is the best thing in the CRJ IMO. It shows you just what you'd think: trends. It actually KEEPS me from chasing airpseeds since I can see it trending up or down.

 

[Alchemy]

What strikes me about the video is how slow the aircraft was with a minimal flap setting. That Low speed awareness tape should absolutely be jumping out of the PFD at you. Even so, 130 knots seems pretty high for the shaker, (granted it doesn't depict the load factor, but I figured the Q could fly slower than that with it's relatively straight wing). I have to admit, I think of colgan almost every time I call for full flaps and slow to Vapp nowadays.....

Comair 5191 had the same effect on me personally, and that accdient even resulted in an additional checklist item at my company (although I disagree in the manner in which that one was implemented).

 

[EDUC8-or]

We used to retract the flaps during stall recovery at a positive trend of airspeed, thing is you could be sinking 3000 FPM and the airspeed trend would definitely be positive. We now wait for a positive trend of airspeed AND a positive rate of climb before we retract the flaps to 8 and bring the gear up.

 

[granlistillo]

Not for a flaps anywhere from 0 to 15 stall recovery. At least not at my airline.

I Don't fly any flavor of the Dash 8, but taking out a notch of flaps at low settings seems nonsensical to me. Go a notch up from 35 degrees makes sense, but not 10 degrees, at least to me.

 

[SpiraMirabilis]

Not for a flaps anywhere from 0 to 15 stall recovery. At least not at my airline.

Ah, it is at Horizon on the 400. Which is same procedure at Mesa on the 200.

 

[Firebird2XC]

Originally Posted by Snuggle
Not for a flaps anywhere from 0 to 15 stall recovery. At least not at my airline.

Ah, it is at Horizon on the 400. Which is same procedure at Mesa on the 200.

Now we're getting somewhere. Why the difference in procedure?

I wish we had somebody from Horizon to sound off on this.

 

[SpiraMirabilis]

I'm not sure. The person I talked to had moved to the CRJ at Horizon so that information about the stall recovery procedure there is like a year old but I don't think they change it, almost exact same callouts as Mesa, which was based on De Havilland's manuals.

Here's the YV procedures:

At shaker, hold pitch, add power: "Set Max Power, flaps 0." (in the sim you're trained to just quickly push the power levers up approximately and let PNF set actual max power)

PM adds power; at 100kts calls, "Positive rate." PF: "Gear up"

PM calls: "Through VFR." PF: "Flaps up."
PM calls: "130kts." PF: "Set low cruise; configuration checks (or whatever, low cruise is used in the sim.)"

The only difference between the departure stall (gear down, flaps 15, 15-30' bank) is at shaker you roll wings level and instead of flaps 0, you say flaps 5. And the difference on the approach stall (flaps 35') is you say flaps 15'. Basiclly you go one notch above, then wait until you hit the flap retraction speed (vfr) and then bring all the rest up.

I'm curious what Colgan's stall recovery is. It is interesting that we're taught to hold pitch and power out of the stall, basically.

 

[Tangodelta29]

Wouldn't the flaps being down to a certain extent lower the stall speed a bit?

 

[granlistillo]

Wouldn't the flaps being down to a certain extent lower the stall speed a bit?

Yes

 

[granlistillo]

I'm curious what Colgan's stall recovery is. It is interesting that we're taught to hold pitch and power out of the stall, basically.

What is the pitch tendency in a DH8, particularly the Q400 when you throw in the power? Pitch Up or Down moment? I am guessing nose up?

In the CRJ with rear mounted engines, it is nose down. I know with engines under the wings it is nose up.

I wonder if that played any role in pulling his nose up so high.

 

[SpiraMirabilis]

I'm not sure exactly where the center of gravity on the dash but maybe slightly nose up, any pitch changes are not super noticable on the 200. Maybe more noticable on the megawhacker as it is longer. If I recall about 8' pitch up is the sweet spot in the sim after a flaps 15' stall to lose no altitude.

 

[5hrsit]

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/avia...afety/safo/all_safos/media/2006/safo06016.pdf
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulator...b0b733862862573d2005e7151/$FILE/AC 91-74A.pdf section of approach and landing

Just wondering if anyone else learned in primary training that an approach and landing with icing should be flown at a higher speed. May be put the gear down later instead of when the companies profile calls for. May be dont use flaps at all. (Using ADM for the situation instead of always doing the same thing) I dont know much about turbine aircraft or companies SOP's, but I would have rather seen the aircraft fly a faster approach and roll off the runway ( I think it was a sufficient runway length not to), than to have seen the real ending result. Just my $.02 Any thoughts?

 

[SpiraMirabilis]

Yes, we have speed cards with ref speeds then ref icing speeds, which are higher. I'm sure everyone else has similar procedures.

 

[SurferLucas]

[/QUOTE]Now we're getting somewhere. Why the difference in procedure?

I wish we had somebody from Horizon to sound off on this.[/QUOTE]


Well, you do have someone from Horizon. I flew the Q400 for 2 and a half years with Horizon (1200 hrs in type).

Our books call for us to first recover from an impending or actual wing stall condition by increasing airspeed and airflow across the wing. (Increase Power/Decrease Pitch). Available altitude is a resourse and should be used as required to increase airspeed. Maintaining altitude in a stall recovery is only required if proximity to terrain or other traffic is a factor. Flas and gear configuration is NOT changed until after a safe airspeed is established. Transition to a missed approach or applicable flight regime is accomplished after the stall recovery. Flight Director pitch guidance may not be appropriate and should not be used until stall recovery is accomplished.

Our books also state that use of the HGS (Heads Up) should be used to evalutate the energy state of the aircraft.

The stall procedure for a "Stick Shaker" recovery got changed around alittle bit after the Cologan crash, it changed 2 times before my Pro Check, and I'm sure there's a new version out (I'm currently on furlough).

This is the basic "operation" for Horizon on the Q400 for stall recovery.

PF:
"Stall Warning, Condition Levers MAX"
"Set Power" (advance power levers to detent), do not push TO/GA button.
Simultaneously with power:
-Reduce Pitch (level flight max)
- Roll Wings Level
If stall recovery is not immediate:
- Lower pitch attitude further to increase airspeed (altitude permitting).
- After recovery from stall, accelerate to safe airspeed (IAS Low Speed Cue +10 kts minimum) and gradually raise pitch to level flight.
AVOID SECONDARY STALL.

When at safe airspeed:
- If on Approach: Call "Missed Approach" and execute MAP.
- Otherwise: Reestablish appropriate flight regime.

PM:
Ensure Condition Levers to MAX and Power SET.
Monitor Airspeed and Proximty to ground.
Assist PF as required.
Guard Controls. Be prepared to assist PF with pitch or power control if required.
Ensure Safe Airspeed is attained.

 

[Firebird2XC]

Now we're getting somewhere. Why the difference in procedure?

I wish we had somebody from Horizon to sound off on this.[/QUOTE]


Well, you do have someone from Horizon. I flew the Q400 for 2 and a half years with Horizon (1200 hrs in type).

. Flaps and gear configuration is NOT changed until after a safe airspeed is established. Transition to a missed approach or applicable flight regime is accomplished after the stall recovery. Flight Director pitch guidance may not be appropriate and should not be used until stall recovery is accomplished.

[/QUOTE]

Ya see? This is what I'm looking at. We've got a wide variety of flap configuration change requirements during a stall series.

 

[SurferLucas]

At Horizon, atleast on the FO side, we have a Pro Check every other year...with Training in Lieu the other. During Training in Lieu, we always do stalls...even during my Pro Check this year, we did a full stall series.

During my initial training for the aircraft, my instructor had me take the airplane all the way to stick pusher and try to fight it. We got the airplane down to roughly 70 KIAS (Gear and Flaps down)...on the recovery we lost about 1000ft of altitude, but the airplane flew out of it.

 

[derg]

Wouldn't the flaps being down to a certain extent lower the stall speed a bit?

Absolutely, to a large extent.

If you're stalling out at "flaps 11" in an MD-88 and you select flaps/slat retract, you're going on "Mr. Toad's Wild Ride"

Unless I'm mistaken and have been flying strange aircraft, you don't even attempt a configuration change until after you've fully recovered from the stall condition.

 

[georgetg]

The mighty Brasilia has the "Comair" box:
A low speed alarm activated when ice protection is on...

Does Colgan show the NASA tailplane icing video in Q400 ground school?
Bombardier says the Q400 is not suceptible to tailplane icing...

I'm still convinced the crew erroneously though they had a tailplane stall based on the CVR conversation leading up to the upset and the reaction of both to the upset.

Cheers
George