Continental 1404 Denver Crash

CaptBill

Well-Known Member
I just finished up a 4 day trip. My First Officer was the working First Officer on Continental Flight 1404 which crashed while taking off in Denver en route to Houston on 20 December, 2008.

I had a wonderful opportunity to gain valuable perspective on how difficult a situation like that can be. He mentioned many things I had never thought about and some things that I thought I knew, I really didn't.

In the coming days, I will share things here that we should all stop and consider. This thread is not about who or what was at fault; rather, some compelling facts that should create some good discussion and learning.

I came away from that trip with him promising myself that I would never again adopt the attitude of "that can't happen to me."

More to come.......
 
I just finished up a 4 day trip. My First Officer was the working First Officer on Continental Flight 1404 which crashed while taking off in Denver en route to Houston on 20 December, 2008.

I had a wonderful opportunity to gain valuable perspective on how difficult a situation like that can be. He mentioned many things I had never thought about and some things that I thought I knew, I really didn't.

In the coming days, I will share things here that we should all stop and consider. This thread is not about who or what was at fault; rather, some compelling facts that should create some good discussion and learning.

I came away from that trip with him promising myself that I would never again adopt the attitude of "that can't happen to me."

More to come.......

Tease! :)
 
Tease x 3.
You owe us some good stories Mr. Big Time Airline Captain. :p

Serious note...looking forward to hearing about the FO's experience and your thoughts on the matter.
 
Perhaps he's not a tease...but just too old to post the whole story at that late hour...:D
 
Can't wait to read what he has to say. Hope the wait isn't going to be too long, I'm not the most patient person.
 
Come on guys...give him a break - he is probably verifying some important last minute details...like "Did the crew help toss bags just prior to the incident?"

Seriously - looking forward to this thread.
 
Perhaps he's not a tease...but just too old to post the whole story at that late hour...:D


You know me well.


For obvious reasons I can't quote the FO (let's call him Bob), nor make any statements on his behalf. This is MY take on things and nothing more.

The direction I want to take on this is: What can we learn from another persons experience? In deference to the flight crew, if this thread gets nasty and ugly I will request that it be closed so please behave.

The night of December 20, 2008 was a cold one in Denver. Preflight activities were typical with nothing abnormal noted. There was a fairly strong crosswind out of the West but nothing to raise any alarms. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data is published for those who might want to reference it.

The aircraft was cleared to push from Terminal A for a Northbound taxi. Push was uneventful as were the engine starts. Taxi to Rwy 34R was also uneventful. By the way, the captain was flying the leg to IAH, making Bob the monitoring pilot. The winds at the time were out of the Northwest 25 to 30 MPH, with gusts close to 40.

Takeoff roll was typical for a crosswing takeoff with appropriate inputs (rudder and aileron). FOs make a 100 knot verbal call simply to get a crosscheck with the other pilot. Bob looked down at the airspeed indicator and noted it was close to reaching 100 and then brought his eyes up and saw that they were on runway centerline. Within a second of that moment, the aircraft nose was pointing 30 to 40 degrees off centerline to the left in a very abrupt fashion. When Bob instinctively put his right foot on the rudder, he noted that the rudder pedal was already pushed to the floor by the captain.

I suppose the NTSB will likely be focusing on the next series of events to make their conclusions. When did they reject and when should they have rejected?

I recall my thought process in simulators after V1 cuts and the like fighting to get the airplane back where it needed to go. If the airplane was drifting right or left, it is not my instinct or that of most pilots to reject without at least trying to get the airplane back where it belongs. I think that this crew did not want to simply accept early on that a runway exit was inevitable. The left mains left the runway at 22 degrees off centerline at near 115 knots. The reject was initiated at that time.

My question to Bob: What were your initial thoughts when you realized you were off the runway? His first thoughts were anger and frustration that he was likely going to be seeing his chief pilot and have some paperwork to fill out. After the first big impact which really hurt, his thoughts turned to perhaps not surviving this and thoughts about his family. Bob had the luxury of holding on to various things allowing him to brace himself somewhat. The captain was still on the controls and therefore was hurt considerably worse than Bob. The airplane came to a stop and it was totally dark inside the flight deck. A what the hell just happened tone permeated the cockpit. The sounds of evacuation were heard in the back. Bob felt that egress from the cockpit door would not be possible due to the twisted state of the airframe so he opened his side window and threw his escape rope out. He looked out the window and saw that the right side of the airplane was on fire so he abandoned that idea. The deadheading captain entered the flight deck at about that time and assisted both pilots in getting out of the airplane. Bob was the last person off the airplane. He did mention that it took fire and rescue crews a while to get to the airplane as they had a hard time finding the wreckage. Passengers and crew were divided into who was hurt and who was not and the on scene activities were handled well both before and after the rescue crews arrived.

I will continue in a subsequent post.....
 
You're right about trying to salvage the take-off. We're talking such split second decisions that you'd probably try to correct and within a second be off the RWY aborting the TO.

I think we all get in the mentality that we're going to do a successful abort, but maybe that's not possible given certain conditions.

The rudder may not have the authority to overcome the crosswind forces, combined with a contaminated RWY and you have yourself a bad scenario.

Does the older 737's at CAL have a Windshear detector operable while on the ground? I want to say we recently saw changes in our manuals (ERJ) regarding lack of windshear warnings while on the ground, I think previously we were taught the windshear would go off at any point but this is not the case...it doesn't function till you're airborne.
 
Interesting post, thanks! I was there on the ramp minutes after the accident as a passenger on another flight that night, and the amount of ice on the ramp and around the terminal sticks out in my memory.
 
I assured Bob on our trip that I was more interested in his mental take on this accident more so than what or who was to blame. He is a very stand up guy and his past performance with me at least has been impeccable.

I was very interested in his take on certain elements of this crash from the standpoint of me putting myself in his shoes and wondering what I would have done or be thinking about.

I asked if any call was made to Tower after the crash? He remarked that the airplane was black and unpowered. I had never considered that as we train in such a sterile environment as to allow us the luxury of telling tower or ground to roll the equipment. No evacuation order was given from the front as well. I just assumed that they would do that but for obvious reasons it wasn't. Those in the back obviously knew that an evacuation was necessary and did not depend on someone telling them so to initiate it. The checklist seemed pretty worthless at that point as well. We are so accustomed to picking up the checklist, but in this case it would have accomplished virtually nothing.

I asked if he had any interaction with the passengers after he left the airplane? Aside from a young military guy who asked him "did we lose an engine?" everybody pretty much stayed quiet and to themselves. It seemed very surreal to him.

I asked him about his injuries and he just recalls being almost nauseous at the sight that was before him. He was transported to the hospital and left later that night to the privacy and sanctity of a hotel. He called his family early on to let them know he was OK. As he left the hospital he was told that a local media photographer was outside and would likely be taking his picture. He shrugged and just accepted that not wanting to exit the hospital with a jacket over his head or something similar.

He did mention that he was disappointed that he was not administered any kind of a drug test or alcohol test that night. It was not done until later the next day and he has heard rumors since then about the FO being unavailable for a drug test that night, inferring he had something to hide which is anything but the truth.

To be continued after lunch.....
 
Thanks Cal. This is a great thread. We are all human and capable of getting into these situations, no matter our skill level or experience. It also shows us that there IS life after an incident/accident, and such "blemishes" heal over time.

Thanks again!
J.
 
Great thread! For several months after the crash the wreckage of the 735 was sitting right next to the CO hanger, every time I'd fly into DEN and we'd land next to it, I'd wonder how everyone got out. It was pretty badly mangled. Can't wait to hear more!
 
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