Cherokee_Cruiser
Bronteroc
Vanity Fair? Seriously? That's where you go for information on aviation?
Vanity fair's articles on AF 447 and the GOL/Legacy collision are extremely well done and worth the read.
Vanity Fair? Seriously? That's where you go for information on aviation?
That would be pretty hard to not get a secondary. In every checkride I've done a secondary stall is a fail.
Is this true? Are you just saying this or did you know her?
It is true. It was said to him.
Schedule with SafetyShe had some pretty bizarre logic if that's what she actually thought.
Regardless of if one is philosophically for or against unionism, the impact on industry safety that ALPA has had is big enough so as to be observed from the moon.
Is this true? Are you just saying this or did you know her?
It is true. It was said to him.
No doubt that what is being taught now is much better than what was being taught then (emphasis on reducing angle of attack versus minimal altitude loss). That being said, this was totally recoverable, even with the recovery procedures of the day. There's a difference between a little bit of back pressure and the abrupt pull on the yoke that induced the stall.I can tell you right now end of 2007 at a regional, for sim training, approach to stall in the landing configuration HEAVILY focused on "minimizing altitude loss." Which means we were taught to kinda "hold the yoke and ride the stick shaker" , max thrust / spoilers in , and even a *little* back pressure to ride the stick shaker and power out of the stall.
THAT is what the industry was teaching.
Absolutely insane, completely stupid, but you cooperate to graduate and do what they tell you.
At the first hint of a stick shaker, you need to do the max thrust / spoiler in (or whatever your callout is), but then reduce your angle of attack: push the damn nose down. #$%^ the altitude loss.
It doesn't matter if you're at 2,300 ft outside Buffalo or at FL350 northeast of Brazil over the Atlantic. You stall the wing, minimizing altitude loss doesn't mean jack when you fly a stalled wing all the way to the ground because airline training never emphasized nose down immediately.
It still gives me the chills to know I was taught in an airline environment to ride the stick shaker with slight back pressure and power my way out of a stall in a landing configuration.
And more recently Air Asia 8501.
No doubt that what is being taught now is much better than what was being taught then (emphasis on reducing angle of attack versus minimal altitude loss). That being said, this was totally recoverable, even with the recovery procedures of the day. There's a difference between a little bit of back pressure and the abrupt pull on the yoke that induced the stall.
Oh boy, here we go again. I sure hope I'm with you when the poop hits the fan...you know, since you're clearly the ace of the base!
I didn't realize that knowing something as fundamental how to recover from a stick shaker made me an ace. Thanks.Oh boy, here we go again. I sure hope I'm with you when the poop hits the fan...you know, since you're clearly the ace of the base!
She had some pretty bizarre logic if that's what she actually thought.
Regardless of if one is philosophically for or against unionism, the impact on industry safety that ALPA has had is big enough so as to be observed from the moon.
She wasn't the only one who thought that.
It was AMAZING, the ones who were most antiALPA, needed ALPA's help the most.
Vanity fair's articles on AF 447 and the GOL/Legacy collision are extremely well done and worth the read.
Yes, it's absolutely true. I remember it very clearly during the organizing drive. This particular day, we were buying pizza for the crews in EWR. I think at the time it was Famous Famiglia, in terminal C somewhere around 109-111 (I believe it's something different today... @Seggy ). She and I were talking about ALPA and the benefits provided by joining. As stated previously, she disagreed.
Now in her defense, she was based in ORF and flew with a bunch of very senior, anti-union guys pumping her head full of silly rhetoric. So I was working to overcome those misguided ideas. I have no idea how she voted in the end. But for obvious reasons, I'm very glad the majority saw the benefit ALPA provided considering our need for the ALPA support structure a few short months later.
I guess I'm just questioning the statement of "don't need a union because I've amassed thousands of accident-free hours" comment. Was this comment really made, because at her age and stage in career, it was barely 2,000 hrs total.
I actually feel bad for her. Poor girl was only 24.... what does one know at 24 when it comes to this career in terms of ALPA and what not? Unless you've done the research in terms of pilot history, I don't think the average 24 yr old knows much about ALPA. I can't fault her for her views, especially as you just said the ORF CAs she flew with probably pumped some anti-ALPA rhetoric into her head.
I feel bad for her considering she was so young, married with a husband, and the CVR had many comments on how Colgan was steam rolling her. Not allowing her vacation swap, shorting her on the 2nd anniversary pay, and she even commented that "Colgan just walks all over me." She didn't deserve this.
All that having been said, I still take exception to ALPA's over-protection of pilots who shouldn't be pilots. Per the duty and definition of representation, they have to defend someone with training issues. But 3407's CA had multiple failures at every. single. checking. point. after the private. Instrument, bust. Commercial/Single, bust. Multi, bust. Initial Saab FO type, bust (TTP), recurrent PC bust, upgrade Saab bust. I mean at some point the umbilical cord needs to be cut and a pilot SHOULD be told.... "hey, you aren't cut out for this job, and our passengers deserve better." And pink slip the multiple-failure CA.
Now, yes, ALPA wasn't around to do anything about 3407's CA failures and training issues, but I have known ALPA represent some guys for training issues and after knowing them, they shouldn't even be behind the wheel of a car let alone an airplane. This type of thing should be stopped.
Now, legitimate training issues / bad instructor / check guy out to get someone in the sim.........? Sure, get ALPA involved and get appropriate remedial training / re-check with a different check pilot.
But repetitive failures from primary, advanced flight training, and then continuing failures at the 121 world? ALPA should stand next to management when they pink slip the pilot.
The fact that you think this was the cause of the accident shows you still have no clue what you're talking about and shows you know nothing about human factors and that side of the crash.I didn't realize that knowing something as fundamental how to recover from a stick shaker made me an ace. Thanks.![]()
I understand human factors just fine. Read the report, inappropriate response to a stick shaker is what caused the aircraft to stall. I understand the comments regarding fatigue and and training, and in some ways were contributing factors.The fact that you think this was the cause of the accident shows you still have no clue what you're talking about and shows you know nothing about human factors and that side of the crash.
I am not making excuses, I am pointing out facts that you are missing and you clearly don't understand human factors, it was late they both were tired it was a very uneventful flight (low brain activity). Now the shaker goes off 8-10 KTS above Vref, read that a few times. They more than likley had no idea why the shaker was going off and had no idea if it would go to the pusher next. Understanding what was going on in the brain at the second the shaker started and how it played into what happen after the shaker is what human factors is about.I understand human factors just fine. Read the report, inappropriate response to a stick shaker is what caused the aircraft to stall. I understand the comments regarding fatigue and and training, and in some ways were contributing factors.
Fact is though, he wasn't to tired to chat below ten, and maybe if he wasn't chatting, he would've remembered to add some power as he brought the props forward, thus preventing the low speed in the first place. Prop flying 101.
Also, had he applied even the recovery techniques of the day, at the shaker, the plane would've kept flying just fine.
I guess another human factor to consider was him lying on his application about his checkride failures. Had the company known about those he might not of been hired in the first place.
But you go on making excuses for him, I'm in the wrong for expecting an airline pilot to be able to appropriatly react to an approach to stall, regardless of how tired he is.
He had no idea why the shaker was going off, so he pulled back on the yoke? You're trying to tell me the brain activity was so low, that he could no longer understand that continuously pulling back would stall the aircraft? Come on man. Go back and read the report and you'll see this guy had multiple failures, some citing basic aircraft handling deviations, and one specifically for an approach to stall in the landing configuration. Then he lied about it. So up you want to cite human factors start there.I am not making excuses, I am pointing out facts that you are missing and you clearly don't understand human factors, it was late they both were tired it was a very uneventful flight (low brain activity). Now the shaker goes off 8-10 KTS above Vref, read that a few times. They more than likley had no idea why the shaker was going off and had no idea if it would go to the pusher next. Understanding what was going on in the brain at the second the shaker started and how it played into what happen after the shaker is what human factors is about.