Colgan 3407 afterthoughts

$100 that super critical wing caused them to do that.
ORDinarily said:
This may be true, but last year at ORD a GoJets CRJ quite easily pulled onto 28R at F while an envoy flight was on the takeoff roll. Envoy was too fast to stop, drifted off centerline to avoid them, rotated shortly after. Captain estimated 20' from collision. When I brief our taxi I refer to the hotspot on the airport diagram there as the GoJet hotspot. Stay vigilant, even when the job seems easy.
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trafficinsight said:
If you're talking about the dangers of outsourced maintenance Alaska 261 is a bad example.

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It's an example of maintenance gone wrong. It was not outsourced, that is true, it is simply an example of an accident where pilot handling skill was not going to save the day. The airplane was uncontrollable, due to a maintenance error. Both the AA and Alaska examples are accidents due to maintenance error. The chance for those types of errors increase with outsourced maintenance.
 
Zapphod Beblebrox said:
It's an example of maintenance gone wrong. It was not outsourced, that is true, it is simply an example of an accident where pilot handling skill was not going to save the day. The airplane was uncontrollable, due to a maintenance error. Both the AA and Alaska examples are accidents due to maintenance error. The chance for those types of errors increase with outsourced maintenance.
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Data to support this assertion?
 
Zapphod Beblebrox said:
It's an example of maintenance gone wrong. It was not outsourced, that is true, it is simply an example of an accident where pilot handling skill was not going to save the day. The airplane was uncontrollable, due to a maintenance error. Both the AA and Alaska examples are accidents due to maintenance error. The chance for those types of errors increase with outsourced maintenance.
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Actually, in AA191, the aircraft was flyable even with the engine missing and leading edge slats damaged. The procedure the crew followed to slow the aircraft to V2 (slower than the speed they already had) brought them to the now-unknown speed (and unknown damage) where they couldn't control the roll.....they were flying in-control up until then. Had they kept the speed they had attained, it's very likely they could've brought the plane back to a landing. They were following a procedure that unfortunately in that particular event, killed them.

To your point, all of this did indeed stem from a company-created maintenance shortcut designed to save time during engine changes; a shortcut specifically advised against by the manufacturer.
 
Blackhawk said:
The super critical wings on the CRJs are not very forgiving. Being able to land an airplane well is hardly a good indication. This is the kind of statement that worries me. As an old CW4 once told me, "The person who will have the next accident is person who says they won't have the next accident."
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It's ironic...the FO from 3407 said that very thing to me during our ALPA organizing drive. She wasn't in favor of joining ALPA due to the fact she had amassed thousands of accident free hours and didn't see the need for a union...a few months later, that would no longer be the case, sadly.
 
Cruise said:
It's ironic...the FO from 3407 said that very thing to me during our ALPA organizing drive. She wasn't in favor of joining ALPA due to the fact she had amassed thousands of accident free hours and didn't see the need for a union...a few months later, that would no longer be the case, sadly.
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Well. In a sense she was correct. She had no need of a union after that accident.
 
Blackhawk said:
Data to support this assertion?
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https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/defau...Carriers_Outsourced_Maintenance_AV2008090.pdf

FAA Still Does Not Have Comprehensive Data on How Much and Where
Outsourced Maintenance Is Performed In 2003, we recommended that FAA determine what type of repairs air carriers send to repair stations and which repair stations carriers use the most. In response,FAA implemented a system in FY 2007 for both air carriers and repair stations to submit quarterly utilization reports. These reports are supposed to show carriers’
or repair stations’ maintenance providers that have the highest volume of maintenance activity and perform the most critical maintenance. We are concerned, however, about the completeness and accuracy of the data submitted because FAA does not require air carriers to (1) report all high-volume repair stations or (2) consistently categorize all repair stations that provide maintenance of critical components as “substantial maintenance providers” (e.g., landing gear repair facilities).
 
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[QUOTE="MikeD said:
Actually, in AA191, the aircraft was flyable even with the engine missing and leading edge slats damaged. The procedure the crew followed to slow the aircraft to V2 (slower than the speed they already had) brought them to the now-unknown speed (and unknown damage) where they couldn't control the roll.....they were flying in-control up until then. Had they kept the speed they had attained, it's very likely they could've brought the plane back to a landing. They were following a procedure that unfortunately in that particular event, killed them.

To your point, all of this did indeed stem from a company-created maintenance shortcut designed to save time during engine changes; a shortcut specifically advised against by the manufacturer.
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Actually it was unflyable at just about any speed. The DC-10 slat system is cable actuated. A big drum in the center E&E bay drives cables that are attached to a series of actuators that move the slats. When the engine and pylon departed the aircraft it took the the slat drive cables for the left wing with them also. When that happened, aerodynamic forces essentially forced the left wing slats to the retracted position with the resultant loss of camber and thus lift. Couple that with the loss of thrust from the missing engine you have the uncontrollable roll to the left. There may and I say may have been a "sweet spot" airspeed where the the aircraft may have been controllable but with the time allotted to the crew I doubt they ever would have found it. As far as they knew, they were dealing with nothing more that an engine failure. I'm pretty sure as soon as the engine and pylon left the aircraft the roll commenced.
 
JetDoc said:
Actually it was unflyable at just about any speed. The DC-10 slat system is cable actuated. A big drum in the center E&E bay drives cables that are attached to a series of actuators that move the slats. When the engine and pylon departed the aircraft it took the the slat drive cables for the left wing with them also. When that happened, aerodynamic forces essentially forced the left wing slats to the retracted position with the resultant loss of camber and thus lift. Couple that with the loss of thrust from the missing engine you have the uncontrollable roll to the left. There may and I say may have been a "sweet spot" airspeed where the the aircraft may have been controllable but with the time allotted to the crew I doubt they ever would have found it. As far as they knew, they were dealing with nothing more that an engine failure. I'm pretty sure as soon as the engine and pylon left the aircraft the roll commenced.
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The crew of 191 was following company SOP for engine failure after takeoff, specifying climbout at V2 until obstacle clearance altitude is reached or 800AGL (whichever is higher). Granted, the crew had no idea of the damage the left wing had sustained following separation of the #1 engine. But at the time of failure past V1, as shown by the FDR, they were able to liftoff at V2+6, and accelerate to 172 kts (V2 +19) in a stable, 1100fpm climb, maintaining aircraft control with rudder and bank into the good engine; even with the damage to the left wing slats. V2 was 153kts. The crew began to slow from 172kts, down to 153kts, per their SOP. However due to the wing/slat damage, at 159 kts (V2+6) the left wing stalled and a left roll developed to which the crew could not recover with the low altitude, since they were not aware that 159 was the "new" VMC due to damage (nor is there any way they could've known that without a formal controllability check at altitude).

If the crew had been given the flexibility of not slowing and giving up any speed that they had attained.... when getting airborne in an engine out scenario, in VMC, where obstacle clearance is not an issue..... especially when climbing out under control and with an 1100fpm climb; things would likely have been different. Whatever speed you have, you accept, so long as you can still climb and avoid obstacles.....speed is life at this point. The crew followed the SOP they trained on, and sadly, that SOP killed them. Had the crew maintained the speed they had, the accident may possibly not have occurred. It's very likely that they could've continued climbout to a safe altitude to where they could perform their checklists, perform a controllability check of the jet, and vector back around for a safe two-engine landing. But alas, we will never know.

Following that accident, AA changed that SOP & checklist in an Operations Bulletin to make climbout for obstacle clearance to be V2+10 minimum if speed attained at time of failure is in excess of that, and if obstacle clearance is still required.
 
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BobDDuck said:
My google-fu is weak right now and I can't find it, but John Goglia cited a study in one of his AIN columns last year that show the after heavy check acceptance flight writeups where much, much higher for international outsourced shops than for US based MX facilities.
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I don't have a fight in this one way or the other. Just curious to see specifics.
As for write ups after heavy checks they will always be there due to the Waddington Effect. I saw this in the military where a perfectly good airplane would go into phase and come out a piece of junk.
 
Zapphod Beblebrox said:
https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/defau...Carriers_Outsourced_Maintenance_AV2008090.pdf

FAA Still Does Not Have Comprehensive Data on How Much and Where
Outsourced Maintenance Is Performed In 2003, we recommended that FAA determine what type of repairs air carriers send to repair stations and which repair stations carriers use the most. In response,FAA implemented a system in FY 2007 for both air carriers and repair stations to submit quarterly utilization reports. These reports are supposed to show carriers’
or repair stations’ maintenance providers that have the highest volume of maintenance activity and perform the most critical maintenance. We are concerned, however, about the completeness and accuracy of the data submitted because FAA does not require air carriers to (1) report all high-volume repair stations or (2) consistently categorize all repair stations that provide maintenance of critical components as “substantial maintenance providers” (e.g., landing gear repair facilities).
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Thanks. I'll have to go through it and read it. My comment was not necessarily a criticism. As I wrote earlier I don't have a dog in this fight as far as my job goes. The examples previously given as to examples of why we don't want outsourced maintenance were actually done "in house", so both sides are subject to human error.
 
Blackhawk said:
I saw this in the military where a perfectly good airplane would go into phase and come out a piece of junk.
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We just had one last week. Not a perfect bird, but it went to depot for an overhaul and came out worse off than when it went in. :)
 
MikeD said:
We just had one last week. Not a perfect bird, but it went to depot for an overhaul and came out worse off than when it went in. :)
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I couldn't for the life of me figure out why we did not go to conditional based maintenance.
 
MikeD said:
We just had one last week. Not a perfect bird, but it went to depot for an overhaul and came out worse off than when it went in. :)
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Story of every Phase bird the ASB does or Theatre depot reset ever.


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ClarkGriswold said:
How about increased paranoia and inflated sense of piloting skills. I've only met 1 type of pilot who likes to talk about their "supercritical" wing type like they're flying the space shuttle. Guess what they fly? It was quite prominent from one side of PINNAcolaba.
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Hi, I move my airplane.
 
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