Captain Toolbox (WARNING! LONG RANT!)

[TonyC]

I'm open to comments, so please, blast away. What would you have done? What could I have done better? How do you handle guys like that when you fly with them?

Are you sure? OK, here goes...

I ... dipped below glideslope once the field was assured to make the most of the runway, ...

If you can't fly the glideslope and safely land in the remaining runway, you don't need to be landing. When you dip below the glideslope, you negate obstacle clearance, you compromise the margin of safety that puts the landing gear on concrete, and you change the physics of the touchdown. A lower descent gradient results in a touchdown which absorbs less kinetic energy and usually occurs at a higher airspeed with the engines spooled up more than a normal touchdown from the glidepath.

I would critique it, too.

... and carried about 5 extra knots to account for the gusts and the fact that he had set my target speed just under the top of the white arc.

If you briefed that you would be 5 knots fast, and why, he'd be part of the decision-making process. A two-man cockpit is no place to keep secrets. If you were 5 knots fater than the briefed speed, I would critique it, too.

... , as the nosewheel is coming down, HE GRABS THE CONTROLS AND YANKS THEM BACK FULL AFT AS THOUGH HE'S "SAVING MY LANDING". I was furious.

I'd be concerned, but not furious. Perhaps he, being the Captain, responsible for the airplane, and possessing a bit more experience in the airplane than you, saw something that prompted him to assume control.

So, don't relinquish the controls, but announce "You have the airplane" (or whatever phraseology is standard at your airline). He will either take control, at which time you relinquish the controls, or he'll remove his hands and communicate to you that YOU have the airplane.

When the dust is settled, and the jet is parked at the gate, debrief. "Hey, what did you see about my landing?" is a good way to begin the discussion. "This is what I saw," is a good way to add your perspective. Resolve the discrepancies between the two perspectives. It's likely that you'll both learn a bit from the process.

If you can't resolve the crew problem, make arrangements for someone else to fly - - don't carry a dangerous crew communication deficiency back into the air. The next leg might not be as uneventful.

... I look at him flatly and say, "Is that all?"

I knew damn good and well the reason for every decision I made on every second of my approach, but there was no point in arguing- his ego was the problem, not my flying, and there was clearly no way that he would be willing to discuss it.

There were two egos in the cockpit. I mentioned it before, but it bears repeating. A two-man cockpit is no place to keep secrets. Tell him what you're doing ahead of time. That gives him the opportunity to "bless" the non-standard procedure, or disapprove of it ahead of time.

I had a First Officer brief that he would fly slightly below the glideslope. We discussed it. He decided to fly the glideslope. Had he not briefed it, and then flown low, we would have both been uncomfortable -- me with where he was trying to fly, and him from the corrections I would have been giving. Talking about it ahead of time prevented the problem altogether.

Does he ever call for a go-around, like he should have? Nope.

Did you? At my airline, any crewmember can call a Go-Around.

Did he ever call for the landing checklist? Nope.

At my airline, it's the FO's job to back up the Captain. Did you? (I think you did - - good job. If you didn't, shame on you.)

I actually had to interrupt his non-stop stream of blather to tell the poor flight attendant to be seated for landing, or else it wouldn't have been done.

Good job - - backing up the Captain is part of your job description, just as backing you up is part of his.

I should have radioed the tower and announced a go-around, nullifying our landing clearance and our dangerous condition. I'll know better next time.

Don't you dare. That's not how to precipitate a go-around. Positive, direct suggestions are a good place to start. "I think we should go-around" is a good place to start. A more forceful, stern, "Go Around!" may become necessary if conditions warrant. Finally, assuming control of the airplane and initiating the procedure would be appropriate if the Captain appears incapacitated or you deem it essential to continued safe flight.

Calling the tower is NOT the way to initiate a Go-Around.

And when I upgrade, I'll also know the extent that CRM directly affects saftey of flight.

There's no need to wait until you upgrade - - it's a critical element of a safe cockpit every day, and for every crew member. An extra stripe on the sleeve doesn't magically change that.

Take your lessons learned and apply them the next time, and every time, you step into the office.

 

[SteveC]

Excellent thread.




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[Callous]

This has been very interesting reading. Reading the original post, while the author is waiting to see how badly the PF will screw up reminded me of the phrase, "the kind of thinking that fills graveyards." This is a long way out of my experience envelope. Very scary.

 

[Kingairer]

About the 5 knots, In the ERJ its not a big deal, infact at some companies 0-10 above the desired speed is considered a normal condition and should not be called out. Minus anything warrants a call out. However, if it was gusty on the atis and you intended to fly faster certainly discuess it as you are reviewing the landing speeds and see if he agrees, If so bump those bugs up.

I agree with the glideslop deviation, you really shouldnt have. This also goes back to a good appr briefing, this way you get all the rough edges worked out before you get to that point. If you really felt the need for a go-around you should have called it out "Lets go around", pretty easy non panicky = not a big deal. For some reason this capt felt the need to try to fly the airplane for you through his actions and words. Holding the nose wheel off is much smoother, but it also doesnt help braking.
Also, If he is calling out that you are deviating from the norm, below GS, a "Yup" answer isnt good. That doesnt tell the other guy that you are correcting what he is calling out as incorrect. He should have never taken or touched the controls if safety wasnt an issue, and it was only trying to soften the landing, not a good idea for many reasons.

In hindsight, if you see yourself flying with one of these dudes again and you have a fed on board or a non company JSeater, just see if the capt wants the leg, thatll help him relax some if he is one of "those guys" that is uncomfortable in his own shoes.

 

[A300Capt]

Thanks, TonyC . You saved me a lot of typing and I agree with your post 100%.

 

[CapnJim]

A guy dosen't post something like this unless he's prepared for answers running the gamut from "Call the Feds! That Captain is a menace!" to "Nevermind the Captain, Jim you're a dangerous fool who has no business on the flight deck!!"

So this is all good stuff guys! Some of it I can take with me, some of it I can discard as rubbish, but all of it is appreciated!

 

[DE727UPS]

"don't carry a dangerous crew communication deficiency back into the air. The next leg might not be as uneventful"

To play devils advocte. Calling in sick at an outstation because you're too pissed off to work with a Captain is really gonna make the crap hit the fan. Would be much easier for me if it were someplace with reserves. I know it shouldn't matter, but it would make the decision easier for me if I ever got that mad.

"Finally, assuming control of the airplane and initiating the procedure would be appropriate if the Captain appears incapacitated or you deem it essential to continued safe flight"

I don't know. That's tough one. A grey area in my book. Let's say the the Capt is off profile and struggling (his leg). The F/O calls out deviations. The Capt says "No, I got it". The F/O says "Go around". The Capt says "No, I got it". Now, who's the F/O to be taking the airplane away? The Capts got more experience (probably) and he's PF. Yeah, he's screwing up by being off profile and worse by not going around with the call. But for an F/O to take an airplane away that low to the ground with a Capt that's already proven he's gonna land the thing. It would have to be pretty cut and dried that we were not gonna just bend mental, but were gonna die, before I'd take the airplane away from a guy with more experience on the jet than me. And that's the thing...these things are rarely that cut and dried. I think I'd be more likey to be begging him to go around on the tape before I'd be taking the plane away. But that's just me.

Of course, that's why on profile at 1000 AGL and stabilized approach critera came about. It's supposed to take the judgement and experience out of the decision to go around, so to speak, and force a go around if you aren't on profile. It's a wise philosphy that is especially helpful when you are new to the equipment. Gives you some solid things to shoot for and more room for error.

I don't disagree with anything you say, TonyC, but I see taking an airplane away from a Capt who's flying pilot as an extreme measure and one where the danger imposed by doing so could be worse than the danger of his landing.

Just food for thought...

 

[B767Driver]

If you can't fly the glideslope and safely land in the remaining runway, you don't need to be landing. When you dip below the glideslope, you negate obstacle clearance, you compromise the margin of safety that puts the landing gear on concrete, and you change the physics of the touchdown. A lower descent gradient results in a touchdown which absorbs less kinetic energy and usually occurs at a higher airspeed with the engines spooled up more than a normal touchdown from the glidepath.

Under any normal operating circumstance I'd agree with you. However, there may be certain situations which warrant a deviation below glideslope once the main gear is assured of touching down on concrete.

My company's performance analysis of landing distance on a contaminated runway assumes landing 1000' down the runway. Flying a 3 degree glideslope to touchdown takes you what...1800' or so down....then a normal flare...maybe another 500'. Most normal landings occur 2300' beyond the landing threshold. Add a few knots fast and now you are pushing the 3000' end of touchdown zone...and 2000' past the contaminated landing distance performance charts.

My bet is that this is what got SWA in trouble at MDW. They used their normal ops landing charts and specifications on a contaminated runway.

So, on a short, contaminated runway...I'd definitely brief the technique to be used to touchdown at 1000'. Many MD88 pilots used this technique on short/wet runways because it braked so terribly.

Doug? What do you do in the -88 on a wet runway?

 

[Alchemy]

I've had captains give me control inputs on several occasions when it was, in my opinion, totally unecessary. Then again, there's been two times so far when I was glad they did it.

With the recent news, it looks like a lot of these new captains might be FO's once again......

 

[B767Driver]

I've had captains give me control inputs on several occasions when it was, in my opinion, totally unecessary. Then again, there's been two times so far when I was glad they did it.

With the recent news, it looks like a lot of these new captains might be FO's once again......

I can't think of one time in 7000 hours of airline flying where I as a captain, or a captain to me as a first officer ever touched the controls when the other person was flying. This also includes a couple of years where I was an instructor and check airman doing a lot of OE's.

What's going on out there? Captain's should leave the F/O alone to fly the airplane...unless it is apparent that they are about to bend metal. First officers...you should never have the airplane in a position for the captain to intervene. If this is the case...people need to be taken back to the simulator for more work or never released from OE to begin with.

I don't like some of what I'm hearing here. Does this have anything to do with guys being hired with no experience? Possibly,the 6 month captain upgrade?

I think maybe we've got captains out there that don't know how to be captains and first officers who don't know how to fly. It may not be the norm...but if it fits 10% of the population...that's a heck of a lot of this stuff going on.

 

[Alchemy]

The only time I specifically recall being glad I recieved control input from a captain was on my 2nd or 3rd trip off IOE.....we were climbing out and were going to level off at 4000 in a very light Aircraft, we were probably climbing at 3500 fpm+. I was trying to make the level off but it was fairly obvious that I was not going to get the nose down in time, so the captain helped me push the nose over a bit more agressively than I would've on my own.

At that point in time I was probably at about 900 hours total time and it was my 5th or 6th flight in a jet, first time in one that light. I was definitely not about to bend metal, but I might've overshot my altitude by a 100 ft or so.

I'd say, in over a year of flying here, I've had captains touch the controls during my legs maybe 3 or 4 times. It's pretty rare but it happens. Honestly if there's something that needs to be done immediately that I don't see, I don't mind. It's the same situation with captains on the ground that brief you to "step on the brakes if you see anyting".....sometimes there just isn't time to talk about it.

 

[jonnyb]

I don't like some of what I'm hearing here. Does this have anything to do with guys being hired with no experience? Possibly,the 6 month captain upgrade?

I think maybe we've got captains out there that don't know how to be captains and first officers who don't know how to fly. It may not be the norm...but if it fits 10% of the population...that's a heck of a lot of this stuff going on.

You're not the only one who doesn't like what you're hearing. I think all of the above are factors to an extent. I really can't believe this is what's happening (probably more often than we'd like to think about) and these are the skills and behaviors being demonsrated by "professionals".

 

[TonyC]

"don't carry a dangerous crew communication deficiency back into the air. The next leg might not be as uneventful"

To play devils advocte. Calling in sick at an outstation because you're too pissed off to work with a Captain is really gonna make the crap hit the fan.

I didn't say anything about calling in sick. That would be a lie, and subject an employee to dismissal at most companies. I'm talking about not flying with a Captain/FO with whom there is an obvious CRM conflict. It might be my problem, or it might be his problem, or it might be both our problem, but it's a problem, and it's dangerous.

And it's that important. If it means calling the Chief Pilot and informing him there is a CRM issue between the other crewmember and me, then so be it. It's gonna get very uncomfortable until the issue is resolved. But it's just that important to resolve it. I would like to hope that the vast majority of us could resolve the situation with an adult conversation before it gets to this point.

It would have to be pretty cut and dried that we were not gonna just bend mental, but were gonna die, before I'd take the airplane away from a guy with more experience on the jet than me. And that's the thing...these things are rarely that cut and dried. I think I'd be more likey to be begging him to go around on the tape before I'd be taking the plane away. But that's just me.

...

I don't disagree with anything you say, TonyC, but I see taking an airplane away from a Capt who's flying pilot as an extreme measure and one where the danger imposed by doing so could be worse than the danger of his landing.

Just food for thought...

I think we're on the same page.








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[TonyC]

Under any normal operating circumstance I'd agree with you. However, there may be certain situations which warrant a deviation below glideslope once the main gear is assured of touching down on concrete.

How do you judge that "main gear is assured of touching down on concrete"? What's the manufacturer's guidance on that?

My company's performance analysis of landing distance on a contaminated runway assumes landing 1000' down the runway. Flying a 3 degree glideslope to touchdown takes you what...1800' or so down....then a normal flare...maybe another 500'. Most normal landings occur 2300' beyond the landing threshold. Add a few knots fast and now you are pushing the 3000' end of touchdown zone...and 2000' past the contaminated landing distance performance charts.

This sounds to me more like an issue of landing technique. A normal glideslope should put the airplane about 1,000' down the runway. If you're trying to flare and hold it off to get a smooth, passenger-compliment-inducing-greaser touchdown, you might be looking at 2,300' beyond the threshhold. But if I use the manufacturer recommended method of landing, I get a firm touchdown much sooner. This results in the dissipation of more kinetic energy, and it allows for more effective braking.

If I can't use the manufacturer recommended method of landing and have sufficient distance to stop, I need to be going somewhere else.

My bet is that this is what got SWA in trouble at MDW. They used their normal ops landing charts and specifications on a contaminated runway.

This is conjecture, and I believe it's best not to comment.

So, on a short, contaminated runway...I'd definitely brief the technique to be used to touchdown at 1000'. Many MD88 pilots used this technique on short/wet runways because it braked so terribly.

Doug? What do you do in the -88 on a wet runway?

I guess you guys are smarter than I (no revelation there ). I'd feel very uncomfortable sitting on the end of the long green table (the end without the glass of water) trying to explain the technique that "many pilots" use to deviate from the manufacturer's recommendation.

"Tell us how you do this, Airman Jones. What cockpit indications do you use to ensure your main landing gear will hit the concrete, and not the approach lights? Does this technique work for all airports and all conditions, or only where the terrain on the approach is level or rising? Are you familiar with the height of the approach lights and Airport X? Why did you taxi to the gate after you clipped the approach lights?"





The stakes are too high - - my family likes to eat.



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[B767Driver]

How do you judge that "main gear is assured of touching down on concrete"? What's the manufacturer's guidance on that?




"Tell us how you do this, Airman Jones. What cockpit indications do you use to ensure your main landing gear will hit the concrete, and not the approach lights? Does this technique work for all airports and all conditions, or only where the terrain on the approach is level or rising? Are you familiar with the height of the approach lights and Airport X? Why did you taxi to the gate after you clipped the approach lights?"





The stakes are too high - - my family likes to eat.



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Well, I'd feel very well represented at the table by the fact that my flight crew training manual has 48 pages of text and charts giving guidance on this issue. 17 charts alone that state glidepath angle, body attitude, pilot eye height, main gear height, main gear touchdown point, aim point, for various weights and flap settings.

One set of charts gives data for VASI/PAPI/ILS guidance for a touchdown point at 1800' assuming no flare. It says the typical flare will add 1000' to 2000' to the landing distance.

Another set of charts gives the same data for a visual landing and a 1000' aiming point, again assuming no flare.

For all except a Cat III approach...I have to see something to land. If, by performance analysis, I have to touchdown at the 1000' point, it may be necessary for me to readjust my aim point and glidepath once I have the runway visually in sight.

By the book data, I can visually align to the 1000' aim point and know that on a 767-300ER the main gear will be 25' over the threshold with a pilot eye height of 48' and a body attitude of 2.2 degrees and the mains touching down at 650' (assuming no flare). Does this require a destabilization of the approach? Not at all. It simply requires a .3 degree change in the glidepath and a .2 degree change in pitch attitude.

All pilots should be able to land on a designate spot given no electronic or visual guidance. During training, my company requires this to be demonstrated. It's actually one of the tougher maneuvers to accomplish satisfactorily...but probably why it's on the curriculum.

So, to answer your questions, 1) "By following the guidance in my flight crew training manual of establishing an aiming point at 1000' the data assures that I will touchdown on the runway at 650'from the landing threshold. 2) I am confident I will not hit the ALS because the main gear will be 25' over the threshold, and I'm certain that the ALS does not rise above that level. I have practiced this type of approach in the simulator for the past 8 years and was found proficient in the maneuver each time. 3) Unless specifically stated in the engineering analysis for the performance charts for the runway, I'll assume that the glidepath angle for this aim point is sufficient. I have no guidance to suggest to me otherwise. Furthermore, the contaminated runway analysis states that I must touchdown at the 1000' point to ensure an adequate stopping distance. I am confident that I followed the proper guidance and established the proper aim point to ensure this happened.

So if I hit something after executing this approach by the book data, somebody explain to me why the performance analysis did not work."


How'd I do?


Anyway...the point is...following the glide path to touchdown does not always ensure an adequate stopping distance. This must be considered when contemplating an approach...especially in less than good braking conditions.

Is it permissable and safe to fly below the glideslope once the landing is assured? Yes it is...but the situation needs to be briefed and executed with precision. After all, CAT I ILS's aren't checked below DH for glideslope accuracy. Below DH it is the pilot's responsibility to establish a visual aim point with the runway and land visually.

Now, don't misunderstand me....if the runway analysis does not show the runway to be of critical distance...I would never advocate flying below the glideslope before touchdown. But there may be unique circumstances that require it.

The other option is to find an airport that more accomodates your personal minimums, which I see no shame in.

 

[B767Driver]

"
"Finally, assuming control of the airplane and initiating the procedure would be appropriate if the Captain appears incapacitated or you deem it essential to continued safe flight"

I don't know. That's tough one. A grey area in my book. Let's say the the Capt is off profile and struggling (his leg). The F/O calls out deviations. The Capt says "No, I got it". The F/O says "Go around". The Capt says "No, I got it". Now, who's the F/O to be taking the airplane away? The Capts got more experience (probably) and he's PF. Yeah, he's screwing up by being off profile and worse by not going around with the call. But for an F/O to take an airplane away that low to the ground with a Capt that's already proven he's gonna land the thing. It would have to be pretty cut and dried that we were not gonna just bend mental, but were gonna die, before I'd take the airplane away from a guy with more experience on the jet than me. And that's the thing...these things are rarely that cut and dried. I think I'd be more likey to be begging him to go around on the tape before I'd be taking the plane away. But that's just me.

...

There are these episodes called "mini-strokes" that will briefly incapacitate a guy. Definitely something to think about. Also something called "micro-sleep". If the body is extremely tired...it basically takes a nap for a second or two. Can't imagine a situation where a fully checked out airline pilot is about to put the bird into a crash...although there have been several MD11 crashes after touchdown...New York and Memphis, I think.

My company has clear guidance here. It's called the "two communication rule". If the flying pilot does not acknowledge the non flying pilot after two attempts at communication...the non flying pilot is to take the controls away. Helps to clarify the decision making process for the NFP.

 

[TonyC]

Another set of charts gives the same data for a visual landing and a 1000' aiming point, again assuming no flare.

For all except a Cat III approach...I have to see something to land. If, by performance analysis, I have to touchdown at the 1000' point, it may be necessary for me to readjust my aim point and glidepath once I have the runway visually in sight.

There is a significant difference between a 1,000' aiming point - - which is normal for an ILS glideslope, and normal for a VGSI (PAPI, VASI, etc.) - - and a 1,000' touchdown point.

The landing data we use assumes a touchdown point 1,500' beyond the runway threshold. This allows for a normal descent on the glidepath, and a normal flare and touchdown.

Furthermore, the contaminated runway analysis states that I must touchdown at the 1000' point to ensure an adequate stopping distance.

Not to dispute what you say, but rather to confirm what you've just said... You discussed aimpoint, and data based on an aimpoint, etc., and now you use the terminology "touchdown point" again. Does your contaminated runway analysis stipulate a touchdown point, or an aimpoint?

I am confident that I followed the proper guidance and established the proper aim point to ensure this happened.

So if I hit something after executing this approach by the book data, somebody explain to me why the performance analysis did not work."


How'd I do?

I'm sure you did well, but I'm still not on board with your concepts.

Is it permissable and safe to fly below the glideslope once the landing is assured? Yes it is...

CFRs are replete with the phrase, "normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers," as in, "[N]o pilot may continue an approach below the authorized DH unless ... [t]he aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers and where such a descent rate will allow touchdown to occur within the touchdown zone of the runway of intended landing." It would be my position that the glideslope signal broadcast by the ILS system would be "normal," and the angle projected by the VGSI (PAPI, VASI, etc.) would be "normal." It would be my position that a 1,000' aimpoint using a 3 degree descent gradient is "normal." It would be my position that going below any of these would not be normal.

CFR 91.129 Operations in Class D airpsace includes the following:

(e) Minimum Altitudes. When operating to an airport in Class D airspace, each pilot of--
(2) A large or turbine-powered airplane approaching to land on a runway served by an instrument landing system (ILS), if the airplane is ILS equipped, shall fly that airplane at an altitude at or above the glide slope between the outer marker ... and the middle marker; and
(3) An airplane approaching to land on a runway served by a visual approach slope indicator shall maintain an altitude at or above the glide slope until a lower altitude is necessary for safe landing.
Paragraphs (e)(2) and (e)(3) of this section do not prohibit normal bracketing maneuvers above or below the glide slope that are conducted for the purpose of remaining on the glide slope.

Now, I suppose you could argue that this leaves room to duck under the glidepath once reaching the middle marker (for an ILS) or upon reaching the point where "a lower altitude is necessary for safe landing" for a visual, but I don't think this is what you're talking about.

Apart from these perspectives I must return to the issue of the geometry and physics of the landing. Ducking under the glidepath to land shorter will result in a shallower angle, more power on landing, and less energy dissipated during touchdown. All of these can amout to an overall disadvantage to the stopping distance problem.

The other option is to find an airport that more accomodates your personal minimums, which I see no shame in.

On this we agree. I must point out, though, that in no case are my "personal minimums" lower than the published minimums. The landing data I use is based on a touchdown at 1,500 feet, and I'm not going to invent data based on a special technique that will have me touching down at 1,000'.

I'll plan on a normal rate of descent (using the 3 degree glidepath) and normal maneuvers (aimpoint 1,000', touchdown 500' beyond that) and my landing data is valid. If I can't do that, CFR 121 requires that I must execute a Missed Approach (under IFR).




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[wheelsup]

Ya'll need to come to DCA one day and watch the US Air 737's plant it on the numbers. Dipping below the GS? You bet!

~wheelsup

 

[Maximilian_Jenius]

Thanks, TonyC . You saved me a lot of typing and I agree with your post 100%.

I agree TonyC...finally you know what your talking about.You'll get no arguements from me this time!

-Matthew

 

[B767Driver]

Not to dispute what you say, but rather to confirm what you've just said... You discussed aimpoint, and data based on an aimpoint, etc., and now you use the terminology "touchdown point" again. Does your contaminated runway analysis stipulate a touchdown point, or an aimpoint?


Now, I suppose you could argue that this leaves room to duck under the glidepath once reaching the middle marker (for an ILS) or upon reaching the point where "a lower altitude is necessary for safe landing" for a visual, but I don't think this is what you're talking about.



.

That's exactly right. The threshold crossing height data and main wheel contact point is now based on an aim point of 1000'. The contaminated analysis is based on touchdown point of 1000'. Definitely a difference between aim point and touchdown point and one I definitely meant to distinguish between.

Absolutely no "duck under" going on here. I would never use those words at any time under any situation. The verbage is "runway in sight" "taking over visually".

I believe the CFR's you quoted give the latitude to maneuver as I described. It is now necessary to land...I will be leaving the electronic glideslope for a visually performed landing. There is nothing unusual or unsafe about maneuvering for a new aim point to acheive the required touchdown point objective. Especially when you are given approved data for such a maneuver.

AS a matter of fact, such manuevering is required to acheive the necessary stopping distance as stated in the engineering analysis.