Alaska landing incident SNA

I’d love to have access to my own FOQA data. It would be the only way to know the G loading of your landings in the 737.

My friend sent me this, I haven’t tried it yet though

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If you print the OOOI it should have it on it. At least it did on the Bus, I haven't bothered to care on the 737 yet.
 
As I was mentioning before, it’s entirely possible that the bird had suffered one or more extra firm landings in the past, and this particular normal landing was just the one that broke some already-fatigued pieces.
I wouldn’t rule out a metallurgy issue as a result of manufacturing or overhaul as well.

I was looking into the aft trunnion pin because I was curious about the material, and it’s evidently 4340M alloy steel heat treated to 275-300ksi (pretty dang strong!), with chrome plating.

More interesting was the fact that this same failure mode has happened to a couple of 737s in India relatively recently - a 737-900 in 2016 and a 737-800 in 2015:

Fracture initiation of RH MLG Trunnion Pin of VT-JGD [the 737-900] was due to base metal heat damage as a result of abusive grinding of the chrome plate that likely occurred during the last overhaul. The fracture originated in an area of un-tempered martinsite (UTM) on the outer diameter of the trunnion pin. The crack originated from intergranular separation, a result of hydrogen embrittlement during cadmium plate processing. The crack propagated by Transgranular fatigue mode with ductile separation at final fracture. Multiple cracks were found near the fracture origin.

The LH MLG Trunnion Pin of VT-JGA [the 737-800] had also failed in fatigue originating from black strip which was probably a pre-existing crack. “Chicken wire” cracking was observed over the entire chrome surface of the pin. The fractured aft trunnion pin contained an intergranular crack on the fracture face measuring 0.018 inch from the outer diameter (OD). Fatigue cracking was observed emanating 0.22 inch from the intergranular crack. Fracture initiation occurred by heat induced cracking which propagated during processing by a hydrogen embrittlement mechanism. Once in service, fatigue cracking initiated of the existing crack until final fracture by ductile separation.
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Nice job skipper.....all things considered. Kinda wild that such a massive gear failure would be so imperceptible that the FO just did the after landing flow. Also, if you guys think 1.7 Nz is a lot, it isn't *on the mains at least*. Probably not a "good" landing in PHX on a nice day, but running off the end of the runway is a much worse landing as one fishes for the right ROD. On that note, I'll have the stick in my lap at 7G tomorrow before some of you are even awake. Suck it :)
 
Nice job skipper.....all things considered. Kinda wild that such a massive gear failure would be so imperceptible that the FO just did the after landing flow. Also, if you guys think 1.7 Nz is a lot, it isn't *on the mains at least*. Probably not a "good" landing in PHX on a nice day, but running off the end of the runway is a much worse landing as one fishes for the right ROD. On that note, I'll have the stick in my lap at 7G tomorrow before some of you are even awake. Suck it :)
Did y’all have anyway to measure G load on a typical carrier landing? Or can you estimate?
 
1.7G on the mains in a place like BUR or SNA is not even remotely crazy BTW. That is a firm landing but not a dangerous landing. Hell, the company threshold that we set as a hard landing I believe, is below what Boeing considers a hard landing on the 737.
 
1.7G on the mains in a place like BUR or SNA is not even remotely crazy BTW. That is a firm landing but not a dangerous landing. Hell, the company threshold that we set as a hard landing I believe, is below what Boeing considers a hard landing on the 737.
We don't even have a way of determining if a landing was "hard" over here. I guess as long as nothing is broken and there were no injuries it's not hard.
 
I just transitioned from the Bus so I have very little time in the 737 but it’s very interesting to see the operational culture of auto brakes and brake usage. Especially with the steel brake 737s. Whenever I am in the back it seems like every time we land in Seattle, the brakes are slammed on the second we touch down and rode super hard until the buckets are stowed. That’s fine on carbon brakes, it’s terrible on steel brakes. It’s also super unnecessary on a long runway.

It’s why we have been having a rash of hot brake issues lately. I’m still blown away that we had a crew cook the brakes on landing in freaking PHX…
 
I just transitioned from the Bus so I have very little time in the 737 but it’s very interesting to see the operational culture of auto brakes and brake usage. Especially with the steel brake 737s. Whenever I am in the back it seems like every time we land in Seattle, the brakes are slammed on the second we touch down and rode super hard until the buckets are stowed. That’s fine on carbon brakes, it’s terrible on steel brakes. It’s also super unnecessary on a long runway.

It’s why we have been having a rash of hot brake issues lately. I’m still blown away that we had a crew cook the brakes on landing in freaking PHX…

There is a really weird culture around what makes a "good" pilot. The only time I gave an airplane back to a captain in 20 years of flying professionally was when I asked to stay on a flight plan to avoid thunderstorms around Montana. From somewhere on the east coast back to Seattle. I came back from a bathroom break and we were direct MLP. I asked why and he said "I saved 200# of gas".

The guy was an instructor. IMO the entire schoolhouse needs to get burned to the ground and completely rebuilt.
 
There is a really weird culture around what makes a "good" pilot. The only time I gave an airplane back to a captain in 20 years of flying professionally was when I asked to stay on a flight plan to avoid thunderstorms around Montana. From somewhere on the east coast back to Seattle. I came back from a bathroom break and we were direct MLP. I asked why and he said "I saved 200# of gas".

The guy was an instructor. IMO the entire schoolhouse needs to get burned to the ground and completely rebuilt.

It doesn’t help when a large percentage of the schoolhouse has never flown the line. And the ones that do, fly with a company agenda beyond the FH and FOM.

The large hope is that the VX and former Airbus instructors will come in and help that culture a little bit.
 
It doesn’t help when a large percentage of the schoolhouse has never flown the line. And the ones that do, fly with a company agenda beyond the FH and FOM.

The large hope is that the VX and former Airbus instructors will come in and help that culture a little bit.

I had an instructor in the jumpseat. A retired guy who seemed very cool. I let him know the issues I am seeing on the line. Most notably a go around at about 3000' when the altitude selector is set at 2000' for SEA 16R. When the FO is flying these don't go well and I recall not doing them very well when I was an FO. He seemed very open to suggestions.
 
I just transitioned from the Bus so I have very little time in the 737 but it’s very interesting to see the operational culture of auto brakes and brake usage. Especially with the steel brake 737s. Whenever I am in the back it seems like every time we land in Seattle, the brakes are slammed on the second we touch down and rode super hard until the buckets are stowed. That’s fine on carbon brakes, it’s terrible on steel brakes. It’s also super unnecessary on a long runway.

It’s why we have been having a rash of hot brake issues lately. I’m still blown away that we had a crew cook the brakes on landing in freaking PHX…
I have, one time, made N at SEA off 16R…and it was in an -800. It felt that aggressive to me, that I was just like “nope, not doing that again”

We have a lot of people that are “Flaps 30/AB’s 3” because that’s what they do in the sim.

I honestly wish we could do AB’s at our discretion, like we could on the E175. (Only ABs for certain runway lengths).

Sadly, lowest common denominator will ensure that won’t be happening.
 
I have, one time, made N at SEA off 16R…and it was in an -800. It felt that aggressive to me, that I was just like “nope, not doing that again”

We have a lot of people that are “Flaps 30/AB’s 3” because that’s what they do in the sim.

I honestly wish we could do AB’s at our discretion, like we could on the E175. (Only ABs for certain runway lengths).

Sadly, lowest common denominator will ensure that won’t be happening.

I am only speaking from logic, not experience here as I am brand new to the 737 but I wish Flaps 40, AB 2 was the norm. It would solve so many issues most of the time. For the most part you can do AB your discression. I sometimes keep them off, I sometimes choose whatever number I want unless dictated by a special airport procedure or QRH.
 
It helps if pilots know that AB 1, 2, or 3 is a deceleration rate. Not a force application.

AB 3 with full TRs barely applies brakes initially. As the deceleration from the TRs make up for the majority of the deceleration.

Yes you are allowed per our flying manual to disengage ABs by either stowing the speed brake, applying manual brakes or reaching up and turning the ABs off.

Idle the TRs at 100 and by 60 they will be at 19-21% N1, or idle power and you won’t add more energy into the equation.


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Yup. You can tell that lots of people don't understand the deceleration rate or they simply are used to stomping on brakes really quickly. On steel brakes, when you stomp on them touching down at 140kts it heats them up like nobody's business and the deceleration hasn't even started yet.

It makes the landing super uncomfortable AND it really cooks the brakes for no reason. Now if the runway is short, you gotta do what you gotta do, but why are we doing this in SEA, LAX, PHX? Lol...
 
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