Skåning
Well-Known Member
I’d love to have access to my own FOQA data. It would be the only way to know the G loading of your landings in the 737.
My friend sent me this, I haven’t tried it yet though
I’d love to have access to my own FOQA data. It would be the only way to know the G loading of your landings in the 737.
The Bus took some menus to go through to get the real good info. The 737 oooi tells even lessIf you print the OOOI it should have it on it. At least it did on the Bus, I haven't bothered to care on the 737 yet.
I wouldn’t rule out a metallurgy issue as a result of manufacturing or overhaul as well.As I was mentioning before, it’s entirely possible that the bird had suffered one or more extra firm landings in the past, and this particular normal landing was just the one that broke some already-fatigued pieces.
Fracture initiation of RH MLG Trunnion Pin of VT-JGD [the 737-900] was due to base metal heat damage as a result of abusive grinding of the chrome plate that likely occurred during the last overhaul. The fracture originated in an area of un-tempered martinsite (UTM) on the outer diameter of the trunnion pin. The crack originated from intergranular separation, a result of hydrogen embrittlement during cadmium plate processing. The crack propagated by Transgranular fatigue mode with ductile separation at final fracture. Multiple cracks were found near the fracture origin.
The LH MLG Trunnion Pin of VT-JGA [the 737-800] had also failed in fatigue originating from black strip which was probably a pre-existing crack. “Chicken wire” cracking was observed over the entire chrome surface of the pin. The fractured aft trunnion pin contained an intergranular crack on the fracture face measuring 0.018 inch from the outer diameter (OD). Fatigue cracking was observed emanating 0.22 inch from the intergranular crack. Fracture initiation occurred by heat induced cracking which propagated during processing by a hydrogen embrittlement mechanism. Once in service, fatigue cracking initiated of the existing crack until final fracture by ductile separation.
Do you know if this is a AS only feature or is this a Boeing/all 73 minus the Max feature?
Did y’all have anyway to measure G load on a typical carrier landing? Or can you estimate?Nice job skipper.....all things considered. Kinda wild that such a massive gear failure would be so imperceptible that the FO just did the after landing flow. Also, if you guys think 1.7 Nz is a lot, it isn't *on the mains at least*. Probably not a "good" landing in PHX on a nice day, but running off the end of the runway is a much worse landing as one fishes for the right ROD. On that note, I'll have the stick in my lap at 7G tomorrow before some of you are even awake. Suck it
We don't even have a way of determining if a landing was "hard" over here. I guess as long as nothing is broken and there were no injuries it's not hard.1.7G on the mains in a place like BUR or SNA is not even remotely crazy BTW. That is a firm landing but not a dangerous landing. Hell, the company threshold that we set as a hard landing I believe, is below what Boeing considers a hard landing on the 737.
We don't even have a way of determining if a landing was "hard" over here. I guess as long as nothing is broken and there were no injuries it's not hard.
It’s like hot brakes. It ain’t a problem until the fuse plugs blow lol.
I just transitioned from the Bus so I have very little time in the 737 but it’s very interesting to see the operational culture of auto brakes and brake usage. Especially with the steel brake 737s. Whenever I am in the back it seems like every time we land in Seattle, the brakes are slammed on the second we touch down and rode super hard until the buckets are stowed. That’s fine on carbon brakes, it’s terrible on steel brakes. It’s also super unnecessary on a long runway.
It’s why we have been having a rash of hot brake issues lately. I’m still blown away that we had a crew cook the brakes on landing in freaking PHX…
There is a really weird culture around what makes a "good" pilot. The only time I gave an airplane back to a captain in 20 years of flying professionally was when I asked to stay on a flight plan to avoid thunderstorms around Montana. From somewhere on the east coast back to Seattle. I came back from a bathroom break and we were direct MLP. I asked why and he said "I saved 200# of gas".
The guy was an instructor. IMO the entire schoolhouse needs to get burned to the ground and completely rebuilt.
It doesn’t help when a large percentage of the schoolhouse has never flown the line. And the ones that do, fly with a company agenda beyond the FH and FOM.
The large hope is that the VX and former Airbus instructors will come in and help that culture a little bit.
I have, one time, made N at SEA off 16R…and it was in an -800. It felt that aggressive to me, that I was just like “nope, not doing that again”I just transitioned from the Bus so I have very little time in the 737 but it’s very interesting to see the operational culture of auto brakes and brake usage. Especially with the steel brake 737s. Whenever I am in the back it seems like every time we land in Seattle, the brakes are slammed on the second we touch down and rode super hard until the buckets are stowed. That’s fine on carbon brakes, it’s terrible on steel brakes. It’s also super unnecessary on a long runway.
It’s why we have been having a rash of hot brake issues lately. I’m still blown away that we had a crew cook the brakes on landing in freaking PHX…
I have, one time, made N at SEA off 16R…and it was in an -800. It felt that aggressive to me, that I was just like “nope, not doing that again”
We have a lot of people that are “Flaps 30/AB’s 3” because that’s what they do in the sim.
I honestly wish we could do AB’s at our discretion, like we could on the E175. (Only ABs for certain runway lengths).
Sadly, lowest common denominator will ensure that won’t be happening.