Well then show me the language.
If you send me your email address, I'll be happy to send you copies of our old and current contract.
Successorship clauses shouldn't cause the current parent company anything, so using routes as a bargaining chip is unacceptable.
That's an incredibly simplistic way of looking at things. To a company and its management team, scope is the
most valuable thing, even though it doesn't have a strict dollar value assigned to it. Why? Because to a business, flexibility is money. It may not matter today, but a year from now, or five years from now, that flexibility could be exactly what the company needs to stay in the black, or even to avoid bankruptcy. Therefore, giving up that flexibility is seen by company managements (and their boards of directors) as having an immense cost. This is why scope negotiations are so difficult, because what is most valuable to managements is also what is most valuable to labor.
Why is a successorship clause a flexibility issue? The SWA/ATN merger is the perfect example. As part of the merger agreement between Southwest and AirTran (the companies, not the unions), Southwest management had to agree to be bound by the labor contracts that AirTran had with its labor groups. In this situation, that's not really a problem, but imagine a situation where an airline was in financial trouble. Let's say an airline is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, and it's become clear that the company can no longer survive as a stand-alone entity. So, the company goes out to find buyers. The company is able to find interested parties, but all of those companies aren't willing to assume the obligations of the labor contracts as part of the purchase. The company's management is now in a bind. They need scope relief, or they'll have a liquidated company. They may not have time to negotiate the changes to the labor contracts before running out of operating cash, or the unions may refuse to bargain the concessions, and the company would have to go through the courts to get an 1113(c) ruling to void the contract. All of that takes time, and sometimes management doesn't have time.
That's why companies fight tooth and nail before giving up any scope to unions. Scope concessions on the part of the company represent flexibility concessions to them. They know that they are reducing their options at some point down the road, and they don't like it. On the other hand, we need those scope protections, because just as scope represents a lack of flexibility to the company, it represents security and bargaining strength to us.
In bargaining, sometimes the things that don't have a direct cost written next to them are seen as the most expensive items on the term sheet to your bargaining opponent.
I guess my question is - did they scope out flying?
Even your terminology isn't correct. Pilots never "scope out" flying. Pilots scope "in" flying, and what isn't "scoped in" in the contract is flexibility for management. No pilot group has ever negotiated to
not fly certain types of aircraft, or certain numbers of aircraft. They have only agreed to give management the flexibility to do certain things if management so chooses. The Delta contract doesn't state that Delta pilots
won't fly 50-seat CRJs, it just says that management
can outsource that flying.
In our new contract, in exchange for an incredible number of scope protections that were far more important (especially in light of the merger), we agreed to give management the flexibility to outsource a tiny number of large RJs. Now, has management actually done that? Absolutely not. And we didn't think that they would, either, which is part of the analysis that went into the decision of whether to accept that in bargaining. But management wanted that flexibility "just in case we ever need it." It was important flexibility for them, and in exchange, they were willing to trade away some of their flexibility in other areas that were more important to us. That's called smart bargaining. What you propose isn't bargaining, it's demands, and it doesn't get you anywhere. If we had taken the strategy that you advocate, refusing to even consider any seat limit increases, in spite of the other improvements, then we would be sitting here today with no merger protections, no holding company scope, no limitations on asset transfers, etc. In short, we would be completely screwed. Sorry, but your strategy represents a lack of experience and a lack of critical thinking.