Challenger Truckee

This is actually a legit fear. One guy flying the other guy by the horns, just reigning him in to whatever mental model he has. This was cited in the NWA collision at DTW where the FO was basically driving the CA in taxiways, despite himself not knowing where they were really going or at.
 
This is actually a legit fear. One guy flying the other guy by the horns, just reigning him in to whatever mental model he has. This was cited in the NWA collision at DTW where the FO was basically driving the CA in taxiways, despite himself not knowing where they were really going or at.

Perfect example of how the worst SA is unrecognized bad SA. We've all been there, at least low SA, but some people have a unique skill of never being able to admit to themselves when they don't know what's going on. Probably a good skill in soft careers like management, where you can just fake it until you make it.......not in our profession though.
 
In my logbook I have about 50 flights and almost 100 hours with this captain, in CRJ 200s. This was almost 20 years ago, but back then he was super sharp, but almost too laid back sometimes.
I think he was the “FO” on this flight according to the NTSB report (57, 14,000 hours). The “Captain” was a Mexican citizen (43, 5600 hours). Both contract pilots never having flown together.
 
This is the whole Corpie thing (again, not all operators).


But far too often in that world, they are both PICs and alternate legs as such.

Um. What?


To quote John Travolta from Broken Arrow:


“One thing you don’t do, is share command. It’s never. a Good. Idea.”
 
The more proper statement of the probable cause, in my opinion, should say “the flight crew” as opposed to “the FO”, as it appears there’s no actual surety as to who was actually on the controls, or whether a change of controls had been actuated but not verbalized, or whether both pilots were on the controls at end game. To me, that change to the wording would be more appropriate, unless there is more information or evidence than what is written in the narrative.
Unless there is something available in the docket that wasn’t detailed in the probable cause, i agree that it seems sort of speculative to conclude that the FO was trying to salvage the approach. He could just as easily been attempting to initiate a go around but communication had broken down so far by that point that he wasn’t verbalizing. I wonder if something in the docket details their thought process a bit more.
 
I really don't like the speculation in this report. They have no idea who did what, but they attribute the probable cause as if there is certainty. That just seems wrong.

The FO was a full time contractor who was a regular poster on PPW. If I remember right, he flew trips with a few different members over there who all had good things to say about him. I highly doubt that as a contractor, he took control of the airplane. More than likely he was making suggestions and hoping the Captain would correct things. As a contractor, you put a lot of faith in the fact that the other pilot actually knows what he/she is doing. It's one of my bigger fears about picking up trips with companies/crews I don't know personally.
 
I really don't like the speculation in this report. They have no idea who did what, but they attribute the probable cause as if there is certainty. That just seems wrong.

The FO was a full time contractor who was a regular poster on PPW. If I remember right, he flew trips with a few different members over there who all had good things to say about him. I highly doubt that as a contractor, he took control of the airplane. More than likely he was making suggestions and hoping the Captain would correct things. As a contractor, you put a lot of faith in the fact that the other pilot actually knows what he/she is doing. It's one of my bigger fears about picking up trips with companies/crews I don't know personally.

I contract quite a bit on the side and have learned the art of saying "No. We aren't doing that." quite a bit. The vast majority of the operators that I have done some side work for are well ran. But every once in a while you come across a cowboy who hasn't, planned, looked at, or taken anything into consideration. Since I have a full time gig and a salary... I don't mind losing future business for telling someone "so this is what we're aren't going to do..."
 
I contract quite a bit on the side and have learned the art of saying "No. We aren't doing that." quite a bit. The vast majority of the operators that I have done some side work for are well ran. But every once in a while you come across a cowboy who hasn't, planned, looked at, or taken anything into consideration. Since I have a full time gig and a salary... I don't mind losing future business for telling someone "so this is what we're aren't going to do..."
Inversely we've sent some.contractors home mid-trip. Usually the ones "recommended" from another contractor and not ones from an agency. The cowboys are on both sides of the femce.
 
In my logbook I have about 50 flights and almost 100 hours with this captain, in CRJ 200s. This was almost 20 years ago, but back then he was super sharp, but almost too laid back sometimes. He also didn't communicate what his plans was very well, mostly because he was already thinking four or five steps down the road.

I think he was the “FO” on this flight according to the NTSB report (57, 14,000 hours). The “Captain” was a Mexican citizen (43, 5600 hours). Both contract pilots never having flown together.

I really don't like the speculation in this report. They have no idea who did what, but they attribute the probable cause as if there is certainty. That just seems wrong.

The FO was a full time contractor who was a regular poster on PPW. If I remember right, he flew trips with a few different members over there who all had good things to say about him. I highly doubt that as a contractor, he took control of the airplane. More than likely he was making suggestions and hoping the Captain would correct things. As a contractor, you put a lot of faith in the fact that the other pilot actually knows what he/she is doing. It's one of my bigger fears about picking up trips with companies/crews I don't know personally.

From a couple years back:
One of the pilots did some contract work for our Part 91 Challenger about 5 years back...the guy had a strong background.

We seldom used contact pilots, but he did some flying for us when we were between full-time crews. Seemed like a pretty good guy.

Even "pretty good guys" can screw the pooch if they don't recognize when it's time to say no. Reading the report, the voice in the back of my head is screaming at Bret to quit trying to help and just get out of there, regroup, and start over but do it right this time. Instead, he's trying to talk the PF through continuing a maneuver that they were never ready for, and they end up so far into the Swiss cheese it's unbelievable.
 
Inversely we've sent some.contractors home mid-trip. Usually the ones "recommended" from another contractor and not ones from an agency. The cowboys are on both sides of the femce.

I can see your point on that also. I use a lot of contractors on my account. But I only use pilots that I've flown with in the past know are competent. I've never use unknowns. I just don't want to put myself or my clients in that type of jeopardy.

Contracting on the side, I've flown about with about 3 pilots that I can say that I will never fly with them again.
 
My rule for contracting, in either seat, was I either knew the department/airplane well or the other pilot well. The one time i took a trip where i was foreign to both turned out to be a •show of epic proportions. Luckily we managed to stay out of the news but it required a pretty strong "No we're not doing that" at one point. After that I stayed true to my rule 100%. Contract flying is an interesting business and can be very lucrative but you need to watch your back even more than usual.
 
I really don't like the speculation in this report. They have no idea who did what, but they attribute the probable cause as if there is certainty. That just seems wrong.

The FO was a full time contractor who was a regular poster on PPW. If I remember right, he flew trips with a few different members over there who all had good things to say about him. I highly doubt that as a contractor, he took control of the airplane. More than likely he was making suggestions and hoping the Captain would correct things. As a contractor, you put a lot of faith in the fact that the other pilot actually knows what he/she is doing. It's one of my bigger fears about picking up trips with companies/crews I don't know personally.


With all of that said, a single call for a go around was all that was needed multiple times.
 
Exactly. I dunno in what world grabbing a hand full of speed brake below 1000' in full landing config is a good idea

Corpie world?





Joke aside, I don’t get this whole contractor thing. If I just showed up today as a CA into a 737 at DL, UA, or AA, and started doing my shop procedures, those FOs would be confused as heck. It wouldn’t make for a good or even safe environment. I am used to my procedures for the 737, they are used to theirs. Not sure how the corporate world pulls this off.
 
Corpie world?





Joke aside, I don’t get this whole contractor thing. If I just showed up today as a CA into a 737 at DL, UA, or AA, and started doing my shop procedures, those FOs would be confused as heck. It wouldn’t make for a good or even safe environment. I am used to my procedures for the 737, they are used to theirs. Not sure how the corporate world pulls this off.
The short answer is that there are no procedures. You read some junk CAE or FSI gives you, show that you can do 5 different approaches to jfk or anc and off you go. It really is the Wild West.
 
Corpie world?





Joke aside, I don’t get this whole contractor thing. If I just showed up today as a CA into a 737 at DL, UA, or AA, and started doing my shop procedures, those FOs would be confused as heck. It wouldn’t make for a good or even safe environment. I am used to my procedures for the 737, they are used to theirs. Not sure how the corporate world pulls this off.

No matter the company, we all train at the 3 or so different training organizations with all the same instructors. We all train via the manufacturer manuals. That's the difference. Some companies add their own specific items. But there is usually very little difference on how the plane is operated. Insurance companies pretty much dictate that the planes are operated in accordance with the prescribed procedures of the manufacturer.
 
No matter the company, we all train at the 3 or so different training organizations with all the same instructors. We all train via the manufacturer manuals. That's the difference. Some companies add their own specific items. But there is usually very little difference on how the plane is operated. Insurance companies pretty much dictate that the planes are operated in accordance with the prescribed procedures of the manufacturer.


Appreciate that, still, stuff like callouts and operational limits. One thing I hate at my shop, is on an instrument approach the PM only says “approaching minimums” and “minimums”

It’s the PF at minimums that says:

“approach lights in sight, continuing;
runway, landing;
going around.”


My last 2 airplanes, the PM would say “approach lights in sight, or runway, or no contact” and the PF would respond respectively, “continuing, landing, going around.”

I would imagine most 121 airlines do the latter. Not the former.

Then there’s stuff like no flaps 2 at my shop, but at other places it’s common/allowed.


Sure there is manufacture stuff, but some airlines go beyond that. I have no doubt I’d confuse the heck out of a big 3 FO on the 737 with my procedures.
 
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