System knowledge

[Autothrust Blue]

Great article @seagull. Coming out of the school house recently I was never so prepared from an operational/procedural standpoint but I've also never known so little about the airplane I'm flying. There's a pretty large gap in knowledge between the experienced captains trained the old way and the fresh FOs trained the new way. I can spot the errors when he jumbles up his flow but when a light comes on my right hand immediately reaches behind me for the QRH. The internet is great for research but it all falls under the dreaded title of "gouge" in my goodreader app on my company iPad.

When I upgraded to "that" airplane which I hadn't flown before, I made something of an effort to look at the caution and warning list, and have at least some idea of what this beast was trying to tell me. It seemed responsible.

 

[mikecweb]

When I upgraded to "that" airplane which I hadn't flown before, I made something of an effort to look at the caution and warning list, and have at least some idea of what this beast was trying to tell me. It seemed responsible.

I was in the cooperate and graduate mindset.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

I was in the cooperate and graduate mindset.

Indeed. Note also that sitting through a new hire FO class is not necessarily the best use of a 4-year-Captain's time in terms of giving us the right information.

(I suppose I was bored.)

 

[ppragman]

Great article @seagull. Coming out of the school house recently I was never so prepared from an operational/procedural standpoint but I've also never known so little about the airplane I'm flying. There's a pretty large gap in knowledge between the experienced captains trained the old way and the fresh FOs trained the new way. I can spot the errors when he jumbles up his flow but when a light comes on my right hand immediately reaches behind me for the QRH. The internet is great for research but it all falls under the dreaded title of "gouge" in my goodreader app on my company iPad.

You’ve had a varied career and seem like a smart dude, in you mind, is this philosophy detrimental to safe operations or just different?

 

[mikecweb]

You’ve had a varied career and seem like a smart dude, in you mind, is this philosophy detrimental to safe operations or just different?

I’m a Riddle B student at best but IMHO day one at the jet I didn’t feel like I was hanging from the tail. We pushed early, I never felt rushed, everything felt like I’d done it before. 27 times as a matter of fact between FTDs and Sims.
Now if we had some odd combination of level 2 alerts after takeoff how much could I bring to the discussion, not much from a system stand point but I would be perfectly capable of managing the automation and talking on the radio while the captain sorted out the problem consulting the QRH, dispatch, MX, and/or Tech. pilots. There would never be a rush where my knowledge level would save the day. The only thing to rush for in an airplane is if you’re on fire and my bull terrier could tell you if we were on fire.
I think it was @z189k or someone else that brought up that more systems knowledge helps in the 135 environment because of the direct relationship to the wrenches, I could see the value in that.
Where 91/135 fails is teaching procedures and automation. FSI/CAE spend 8 days on systems and then rarely touch on FMS work or in depth automation usage. So same day different operation if something crappy happens on day one, first you and the captain probably aren’t on the same sheet of music because of the lack of standardization. The fresh meat in the right seat will know stick and rudder skills hopefully but managing the automation under duress might be lacking because of the overarching motto from those schools that “you’ll learn that on the line”. The only thing I had to “learn on the line” was how to bid and where the coffee was at the outstations.

Your quest and desire to know everything about the airplane you fly is admirable and you should strive for that but a couple extra days in the classroom probably isn’t going to bridge that gap if the desire isn’t there in the first place.

 

[jtrain609]

I’m a Riddle B student at best but IMHO day one at the jet I didn’t feel like I was hanging from the tail. We pushed early, I never felt rushed, everything felt like I’d done it before. 27 times as a matter of fact between FTDs and Sims.
Now if we had some odd combination of level 2 alerts after takeoff how much could I bring to the discussion, not much from a system stand point but I would be perfectly capable of managing the automation and talking on the radio while the captain sorted out the problem consulting the QRH, dispatch, MX, and/or Tech. pilots. There would never be a rush where my knowledge level would save the day. The only thing to rush for in an airplane is if you’re on fire and my bull terrier could tell you if we were on fire.
I think it was @z189k or someone else that brought up that more systems knowledge helps in the 135 environment because of the direct relationship to the wrenches, I could see the value in that.
Where 91/135 fails is teaching procedures and automation. FSI/CAE spend 8 days on systems and then rarely touch on FMS work or in depth automation usage. So same day different operation if something crappy happens on day one, first you and the captain probably aren’t on the same sheet of music because of the lack of standardization. The fresh meat in the right seat will know stick and rudder skills hopefully but managing the automation under duress might be lacking because of the overarching motto from those schools that “you’ll learn that on the line”. The only thing I had to “learn on the line” was how to bid and where the coffee was at the outstations.

Your quest and desire to know everything about the airplane you fly is admirable and you should strive for that but a couple extra days in the classroom probably isn’t going to bridge that gap if the desire isn’t there in the first place.

Hey Mike,


Just wanted to let you know someone hacked your account and wrote a concise and thoughtful post that nailed everything important to the discussion at hand.

Toodles,


The Train

 

[ppragman]

I’m a Riddle B student at best but IMHO day one at the jet I didn’t feel like I was hanging from the tail. We pushed early, I never felt rushed, everything felt like I’d done it before. 27 times as a matter of fact between FTDs and Sims.
Now if we had some odd combination of level 2 alerts after takeoff how much could I bring to the discussion, not much from a system stand point but I would be perfectly capable of managing the automation and talking on the radio while the captain sorted out the problem consulting the QRH, dispatch, MX, and/or Tech. pilots. There would never be a rush where my knowledge level would save the day. The only thing to rush for in an airplane is if you’re on fire and my bull terrier could tell you if we were on fire.
I think it was @z189k or someone else that brought up that more systems knowledge helps in the 135 environment because of the direct relationship to the wrenches, I could see the value in that.
Where 91/135 fails is teaching procedures and automation. FSI/CAE spend 8 days on systems and then rarely touch on FMS work or in depth automation usage. So same day different operation if something crappy happens on day one, first you and the captain probably aren’t on the same sheet of music because of the lack of standardization. The fresh meat in the right seat will know stick and rudder skills hopefully but managing the automation under duress might be lacking because of the overarching motto from those schools that “you’ll learn that on the line”. The only thing I had to “learn on the line” was how to bid and where the coffee was at the outstations.

Your quest and desire to know everything about the airplane you fly is admirable and you should strive for that but a couple extra days in the classroom probably isn’t going to bridge that gap if the desire isn’t there in the first place.

Solid thought process, and a good post. I like it.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

The AF447 accident was hardly that. They knew how to fly, they didn’t recognize the stalll. Few would. Read my article on high altitude stalls. You should also read my book!

I guess I suck at humor. See, I reckoned my quip about the falling leaf maneuver kinda, sorta indicated I understood they didn't recognize the stall. When you've gotta explain the joke... it just isn't funny anymore.

I guess I suck at reasoning, too. I kinda, sorta thought that not recognizing a stall in an airplane one's flying would be an evidentiary gimme in support of my statement that the crew lacked basic airmanship.

 

[seagull]

I kinda, sorta thought that not recognizing a stall in an airplane one's flying would be an evidentiary gimme in support of my statement that the crew lacked basic airmanship.

That is where you are incorrect, but it is a common misconception.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

That is where you are incorrect, but it is a common misconception.

With all due respect, how is that incorrect?

It's an honest question; I'm not an Airbus pilot, and there are many things about the Airbus I don't understand. (And, apparently at least some things some of its pilots don't understand. )

But, not recognizing a stall?? Do Airbi lack all feedback? Given the fact that they did a 30000 ft falling leaf, maybe they do! Then again, it's my understanding that when the Captain came back on deck he almost instantly recognized the situation. Maybe that's incorrect. But if it is correct, why could he do it while the others couldn't? Did he look around and assess the big picture while the others were task focused and so saturated they lost SA?

That said, it's still an airplane.

At the very least, if you're flying along in a perfectly good airplane and you see random changes in the instruments that you don't understand, the last thing you want to do is start changing things. You don't yet know what to change or in what way. What you do know is that the airplane was flying just fine with known engine settings and known trim. Unchanged, that alone - especially in an airplane as stable as the Airbus must be, given what happened - should give you enough time to observe, assess and integrate what you're seeing, hearing, and feeling. Then, if you have a good reason to change things and a high confidence that the change will result in the desired outcome, then, and only then, should you begin changing things.

Key Donald Sutherland: "Sometimes, not doing something is just the thing to do."

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

That's exactly what NW did when they had the identical malfunction in the weather in China.

Just held the same pitch and power, and tada... they flew out of it and everything was restored on its own.

Pulling back is rarely the correct answer, but it has been a common theme among the "button pusher" training internationally reacting to events like this.

 

[ahw01]

Push roll power stabilize

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

seagull, you have a book to sell, but please stop with the AF447 stuff could have happened to anybody and that they knew how to fly and didn't realize they were in a stall. As mentioned above, NW had a similar situation losing airspeed indications and they basically just flew straight through it. The PF of AF447 had ~2,900 hrs as a ab-initio pilot which meant most of his flight time was spent baby sitting the AP on the Airbus in the cruise levels. The PM FO was a management role and doing his one trip in 90 days just for currency. Their overall flight experience for flying a widebody was very low in comparison to US widebody standards. I don't think you would have seen an AF447 loss of control with an American crew, and NWA is just one example. The Air Asia A320 is yet another example of a clueless low time FO yanking the sidestick left/right and then full back.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

seagull, you have a book to sell, but please stop with the AF447 stuff could have happened to anybody and that they knew how to fly and didn't realize they were in a stall. As mentioned above, NW had a similar situation losing airspeed indications and they basically just flew straight through it. The PF of AF447 had ~2,900 hrs as a ab-initio pilot which meant most of his flight time was spent baby sitting the AP on the Airbus in the cruise levels. The PM FO was a management role and doing his one trip in 90 days just for currency. Their overall flight experience for flying a widebody was very low in comparison to US widebody standards. I don't think you would have seen an AF447 loss of control with an American crew, and NWA is just one example. The Air Asia A320 is yet another example of a clueless low time FO yanking the sidestick left/right and then full back.

I haven't yet read the book. But, in fairness, I'm not sure that's ALL Shem is saying. That's why I asked above. That the crew flying didn't recognize the stall speaks for itself. I want to know what it is about the Airbus that caused this lack of recognition. I've never flown a plane in which stall recognition was not possible without instruments. In most airplanes, stalls -even high altitude stalls- have been quite obvious. But if someone with Shem's background says it's possible for a good pilot not to recognize a stall, I'm certainly willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and listen attentively. I really want to know why not. Frankly, it's pretty damned disconcerting that it could be the case.

 

[tizzizzailslf04]

seagull, you have a book to sell, but please stop with the AF447 stuff could have happened to anybody and that they knew how to fly and didn't realize they were in a stall. As mentioned above, NW had a similar situation losing airspeed indications and they basically just flew straight through it. The PF of AF447 had ~2,900 hrs as a ab-initio pilot which meant most of his flight time was spent baby sitting the AP on the Airbus in the cruise levels. The PM FO was a management role and doing his one trip in 90 days just for currency. Their overall flight experience for flying a widebody was very low in comparison to US widebody standards. I don't think you would have seen an AF447 loss of control with an American crew, and NWA is just one example. The Air Asia A320 is yet another example of a clueless low time FO yanking the sidestick left/right and then full back.

I haven't yet read the book. But, in fairness, I'm not sure that's ALL Shem is saying. That's why I asked above. That the crew flying didn't recognize the stall speaks for itself. I want to know what it is about the Airbus that caused this lack of recognition. I've never flown a plane in which stall recognition was not possible without instruments. In most airplanes, stalls -even high altitude stalls- have been quite obvious. But if someone with Shem's background says it's possible for a good pilot not to recognize a stall, I'm certainly willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and listen attentively. I really want to know why not. Frankly, it's pretty damned disconcerting that it could be the case.

If I remember correctly, one of the main issues with this is that the AOA was so extreme that flight computers deemed the data to be invalid and threw it out, thus ending the stall warning horn. So when the stick was pulled back, the warning horn disappeared (because it was throwing the data out). When they lowered the nose, this brought the AOA back into a range that the plane was programmed to measure, thus sounding the stall warning horn once more. So you're sitting in that cockpit in pitch black conditions/IMC...all this other stuff is failing and going wrong, and you're just trying to make sense of it all...You lower the nose (like we are trained to do), and you get a stall warning horn, so you pull back on the stick and horn stops...you lower again...the horn sounds...etc

It's very easy to sit at a keyboard with the benefit of hindsight and opine about how great of an aviator we are and how this would never happen to us, but if you actually take some time and dig into this particular accident data and the subsequent report, I think any reasonable person would have to admit that this isn't as cut and dry as "they lacked basic airmanship and couldn't get out of a stall."

 

[tcco94]

I thought after the AF447 crash they had realized a lot of pilots there didn't understand the flight control law protections on the Airbus? Is there truth to that?

 

[Deleted member 27505]

If I remember correctly, one of the main issues with this is that the AOA was so extreme that flight computers deemed the data to be invalid and threw it out, thus ending the stall warning horn. So when the stick was pulled back, the warning horn disappeared (because it was throwing the data out). When they lowered the nose, this brought the AOA back into a range that the plane was programmed to measure, thus sounding the stall warning horn once more. So you're sitting in that cockpit in pitch black conditions/IMC...all this other stuff is failing and going wrong, and you're just trying to make sense of it all...You lower the nose (like we are trained to do), and you get a stall warning horn, so you pull back on the stick and horn stops...you lower again...the horn sounds...etc

It's very easy to sit at a keyboard with the benefit of hindsight and opine about how great of an aviator we are and how this would never happen to us, but if you actually take some time and dig into this particular accident data and the subsequent report, I think any reasonable person would have to admit that this isn't as cut and dry as "they lacked basic airmanship and couldn't get out of a stall."

Yes, you're right about keyboard opining. I'm sure it was very confusing. See my comments above, which are all the more poignant given what you've said.
That's the reason not to start doing random stuff... especially in an electric jet, especially before you've integrated the data available.
Attitude + Power = Performance. FBW/EFIS/or any other machine that goes ping doesn't change basic aerodynamics. It's my understanding that the attitude indicators and the engine gauges were working just fine. I could be wrong about that.
In any case, your own statement makes it clear my original post on this was spot on; The crew didn't understand how their airplane worked. That said, IMHO if an airplane can hang in the air and steadily drop out of the sky with no tactile feedback to give the pilots a reality check that it's stalling, that stall horn should sound at any time the wings aren't flying.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

If I remember correctly, one of the main issues with this is that the AOA was so extreme that flight computers deemed the data to be invalid and threw it out, thus ending the stall warning horn. So when the stick was pulled back, the warning horn disappeared (because it was throwing the data out). When they lowered the nose, this brought the AOA back into a range that the plane was programmed to measure, thus sounding the stall warning horn once more. So you're sitting in that cockpit in pitch black conditions/IMC...all this other stuff is failing and going wrong, and you're just trying to make sense of it all...You lower the nose (like we are trained to do), and you get a stall warning horn, so you pull back on the stick and horn stops...you lower again...the horn sounds...etc

It's very easy to sit at a keyboard with the benefit of hindsight and opine about how great of an aviator we are and how this would never happen to us, but if you actually take some time and dig into this particular accident data and the subsequent report, I think any reasonable person would have to admit that this isn't as cut and dry as "they lacked basic airmanship and couldn't get out of a stall."

Yes the stall warning cut out, and came back once they lowered the AOA (nose down) and then he pitched back up. Who knows what they were thinking. They aren't around so we'll never truly know. His comment about we've entered a crazy speed regime is a clueless type. He legitimately didn't know and thought they were perhaps too fast. As mentioned above, the entire time the engine instruments and the attitude/heading indicators were accurate. Pitch+power settings would have kept them safe but it's highly doubtful they knew them. Some guys just don't pay attention and are clueless about what pitch angle and power setting gets them level flight in cruise at an average-type cruise speed.

Nose held high, attitude indicator showing 15 degree pitch up, and the altimeter and vertical speed are rapidly winding down. What else could it be but a stall? There is literally no other scenario that would cause this.

 

[tizzizzailslf04]

Yes, you're right about keyboard opining. I'm sure it was very confusing. See my comments above, which are all the more poignant given what you've said.
That's the reason not to start doing random stuff... especially in an electric jet, especially before you've integrated the data available.
Attitude + Power = Performance. FBW/EFIS/or any other machine that goes ping doesn't change basic aerodynamics. It's my understanding that the attitude indicators and the engine gauges were working just fine. I could be wrong about that.
In any case, your own statement makes it clear my original post on this was spot on; The crew didn't understand how their airplane worked.

Here is your original post...

Prophylactic caveat: I didn't read one word of your book. No dis, just no time right now.

That said, my understanding of the Air France debacle was that it was based not a lack of systems knowledge, but rather, on a lack of knowledge of: A. basic airmanship, and B. a lack of applicable understanding of the modes of operation of the equipment the pilots were entrusted to understand how to operate; That, in a very literal sense, they didn't know what they were doing as they did things. In other words, it wasn't a so much a systems knowledge issue, but more of a "what does the red button do?" issue, which is more operational than systems, imo.

And that said, did they ever get in Guinness for the world record falling leaf maneuver?

I think my initial post sufficiently covers your point A. As to your point B...I highly doubt that the crew was entrusted to know that the flight computers throw out data past a certain AOA. I would be shocked if they even mentioned that in Airbus school and I wouldn't be surprised if that information isn't even available in a pilot manual.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

Here is your original post...



I think my initial post sufficiently covers your point A. As to your point B...I highly doubt that the crew was entrusted to know that the flight computers throw out data past a certain AOA. I would be shocked if they even mentioned that in Airbus school and I wouldn't be surprised if that information isn't even available in a pilot manual.

I'm just trying to understand this. I fully admit I don't know all the details. So please explain with a bit more detail.

My point A. was lack of basic airmanship... to wit, they did not recognize that their plane's wings were no longer flying. Are you saying they did and screwed up the recovery? Or are you saying they didn't, and held the plane in a stall to the surface? Either way my point A. remains valid... at face value, either of those scenarios represents a lack of basic airmanship.

If it was not a lack of basic airmanship, then what was it that caused them to be unaware that their plane's wings were no longer flying? Is there something about the Airbus that makes it possible not to recognize a stall while the plane is stalling? Were the engine gauges, altimeters, ASIs, and AIs not functioning? Is there zero tactile or aural feedback in an Airbus? What?

As to your point B. OK, fair enough. Maybe they weren't taught this. But they sure as heck were entrusted to know it. As @seagull's blog's latest article states, there's a lot of training that should be done but isn't, so it's incumbent upon us as pilots to close that gap. What are you going to tell the deceased Pax survivors, "Oh, sorry folks, the guys who were entrusted to fly your dead relative's plane didn't really understand how the plane worked?"

Finally, to circle back to the thread title... if THIS Charlie Foxtrot can be the result of a lack of communication/training/insight about AOA info and how the computers work in the Airbus, that info sure as chit should be communicated/trained/learned!