All occupants survived the impact but cause of death was post crash fire.
CFR only had 1 set of keys for the crash gate kept in one of the three vehicles. Gate access was delayed by 1 minute, EDIT: it was over 5 minutes from phone call to foam. Occupants most likely died in 90 seconds.
It was difficult for CFR to fight the fire due to the AC being surrounded by cars in a parking lot.
Crazy.
Definite debrief item that needs to be changed yesterday, regarding one set of keys for an extry/exit perimeter gate located within the response area. All CFR/ARFF (Brits call it RFFS) vehicles should have complete sets of keys/keycards/codes for all applicable gates/fences/access points, that exist within their area of responsibility.
If you arrive at a gate during a critical emergency response and cannot get through it....no keys, code/card doesn't work after two or three tries, there's
always the universal master key that can be used: driving straight through it. Response should never be unduly delayed by a factor such as a normal gate.
EGLK itself is an ICAO/RFFS Class 2 airfield in terms of ARFF capability. The US equivalent to that is ARFF Index A, the lowest protection category under 14 CFR 139. Which isn't surprising, given that EGLK is a GA field with no scheduled or unscheduled airline service. In the US, Part 139 only requires ARFF assets at airports that have scheduled/unscheduled air carrier service of varying size aircraft, to which the ARFF Index is tied to a combination of the length of the largest aircraft that operate at the field, and whether or not they average greater or less than 5 departures/day. Hence why many GA airports with only 14 CFR 91 ops in the USA have no ARFF trucks, as there is no requirement to. ICAO, however, requires some form of ARFF at all airports; which is why ICAO up to class 6, is still considered equivalent to FAA ARFF Index A.
As it is, EGLK has only 3 small ARFF vehicles totalling less than probably 900 gals of water/foam, and likely the same, or close to, amount of dry chemical stocks onboard, amongst the 3 vehicles. Aside from the gate situation, there were definitely a number of other issues that combined, made the post-crash fire one of sufficient size and intensity, that could not be controlled by the 3 vehicles and their available onboard agent, all of which was used. Looking at where the jet went down, it would've almost been better had it gone through the chain link fence surrounding the parking lot; at least that would've allowed a path for the ARFF trucks to proceed through. As it was, the jet hopped over a fence into a parking lot, causing the ARFF trucks to have to travel a fair distance just to get into the parking lot fence, after managing to pass through the perimeter gate, before being able to attack the fire.
With the jet in the parking lot and having lost a wing after impacting numerous cars, depending on the amount of fuel remaining and assuming a fairly level ground, there'd be serious leakage and pooling of fuel underneath the aircraft wreckage, that once it ignited almost immediately after the jet came to rest, would be burning intensely right underneath the fuselage. Combine that with the fuel in the impacted cars....along with other burning materials that burn on cars....fuel which itself likely was leaking; and you have a fire of such large size and intensity, that there's no way to control it or even attempt to cover the cabin exit(s)....much less even remotely attempt to extinguish it......with small ARFF vehicles and their stocks, whether applied by turret or handline(s). At least not until it mostly begins burning its fuel off. With the wreckage strewn in and amongst the cars in the parking lot (also burning), reaching the wreckage to perform any kind of rescue is simply not possible with that fire intensity.
From where the bodies were found all near the main cabin door, after they'd survived the crash itself and managed to get out of their seats, they likely expired quickly due to a combination of the intense fire that immediately or very quickly engulfed the cabin interior due to post-impact breaks in the fuselage once the fire started. The nearly complete destruction by fire of the fuselage didn't to allow for a clear reason of why the exit couldn't or wasn't opened. Fuselage deformation, improper/untrained in opening the door, mechanism issues; none could be determined, and will never be known.
In this video here, it can be seen how the fire size/intensity was just too large for the RFFS department of the airport. Too much fire for the finished foam to even begin to suppress or begin to form a blanket over.
