Seriously people, it isn't that hard

I respect that. That is a problem when someone says "it can't happen to me." I've only seen one person say that on this thread though. And, once again, I don't care enough to go back and look to see if it were more. The point I was arguing is that you said it's really easy to land at the wrong airport. If one realizes it can happen to them, they follow company procedures and possibly go above and beyond (like adding a 5 mile ring, or using the visual in the box, etc) to mitigate that threat. Can it still happen? Yes. But it's not "really easy." I just read your post last night as "it's a friggin miracle airlines don't land at the wrong airport way more often. We should be applauded for landing at the right airport because it's so easy to land at the wrong airport." Internet context though, so, yea.

Different note. What could be taught differently/better at the regional level in reassess to CRM? What do you want to see improved?

I dunno, maybe some basic threat and error management.

And one of those basic tenants is that error is inevitable. You're arguging that with strict adherence to company policy you can stomp out error, but that misunderstands the point; even when you're doing your absolute best to follow the book, mistakes will happen, and it's easy to make mistakes.

Some errors have small consequences, and some have really huge consequences. But no matter what you do, errors will happen. Giving people the tools to trap and remedy those errors helps us increase safety. Saying, "hey guys you should suck less and we already fixed all the problems that could ever occur with this perfect book written by perfect people doing perfect things" does nothing for our collective safety.

I feel like you're basically saying "suck less," but hey, it's the middle of the night and I've been up for a while, so maybe I'm reading what you're saying wrong.
 
I'm biased in my argument. I haven't been in situations like that yet. Every situation where I've screwed up, I look back and say "yea. That's on me. I became complacent and wasn't doing my best." Which is why I say it's easy to be complacent. I've been there. Never have I experienced a situation where I was at my best, things got a little skewed, and I couldn't do much about it. I have always found somewhere I could've done better. So I revert to blaming myself as being complacent at the time.

Probably my upbringing though. Whenever I talk to my dad the last thing he says before we hang up is "have fun flying. Don't be complacent." I just assume that if I screwed up then I wasn't at my best. There's somewhere to improve for next time.

I get what you're saying, but this is also an out of date CRM/TEM concept. It's our systems of operation and training that lead us to errors, not individual performance. Most of us are so out of control standard already that it's errors in our operations that drive us toward certain unsafe outcomes.

So we change the book to mitigate the most common errors, and then watch the data and change the system again.

I've seen PLENTY of systemic problems over three air carriers that lead to certain errors, and I always send in an ASAP when I see them.
 
I dunno, maybe some basic threat and error management.

And one of those basic tenants is that error is inevitable. You're arguging that with strict adherence to company policy you can stomp out error, but that misunderstands the point; even when you're doing your absolute best to follow the book, mistakes will happen, and it's easy to make mistakes.

Some errors have small consequences, and some have really huge consequences. But no matter what you do, errors will happen. Giving people the tools to trap and remedy those errors helps us increase safety. Saying, "hey guys you should suck less and we already fixed all the problems that could ever occur with this perfect book written by perfect people doing perfect things" does nothing for our collective safety.

I feel like you're basically saying "suck less," but hey, it's the middle of the night and I've been up for a while, so maybe I'm reading what you're saying wrong.
Nah man. I suck. No one here sucks as bad as I do. Even you, hack. This I have no grounds to tell people to suck less. That would be like the guy who sleeps through class telling the validictorian to do better. I like being the bottom of the totem pole. You get asked less questions.

Error is inevitable. Yes there are procedures in place to help mitigate threats and errors. Do they catch them all? Nope! Like I said, I just had issue with the "it's really easy" to land at the wrong airport. I think it's really damn hard to. But I can see how it could happen.

Basically, if I were part of a crew that landed at the wrong airport, I would've realized a half dozen things, both company and personal, that I do that I became complacent on and didn't do for that one flight. And yes, that's all it takes. One flight.
 
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Nah man. I suck. No one here sucks as bad as I do. Even you, hack. This I have no grounds to tell people to suck less. That would be like the guy who sleeps through class telling the validictorian to do better. I like being the bottom of the totem pole. You get asked less questions.

Error is inevitable. Yes there are procedures in place to help mitigate threats and errors. Do they catch them all? Nope! Like I said, I just had issue with the "it's really easy" to land at the wrong airport. I think it's really damn hard to. But I can see how it could happen.

Basically, if I were part of a crew that landed at the wrong airport, I would've realized a half dozen things, both company and personal, that I do that I became complacent on and didn't do for that one flight. And yes, that's all it takes. One flight.

So, check this out.

Imagine the zombie apocolypse happens and they eat through the ILS system and the GPS satellites (somehow, zombies got into space), so you're left with shooting the VOR-A into LAX landing west (I don't even know if this exists, work with me).

You break out and see the runway. It looks a little short and maybe you're a tiny bit high, but you figure that you haven't been to LAX in a while and maybe one of the zombies bit you, so you could be hallucinating.

So you say what the hell. Chop. Drop. Shut 'em down, open up shop, and make that runway.

Only it's Hawthorne.

You had course guidance, you even knew it was there. It's an honest mistake; but is it your fault or the fault of a poorly designed approach with threats everywhere?
 
I dunno, maybe some basic threat and error management.

And one of those basic tenants is that error is inevitable. You're arguging that with strict adherence to company policy you can stomp out error, but that misunderstands the point; even when you're doing your absolute best to follow the book, mistakes will happen, and it's easy to make mistakes.

Bingo!

Lets put it this way. LUS has been teaching TEM for decades. It was such a good program and model that the nAAtives adopted it over their own CRM program.
 
I dunno, maybe some basic threat and error management.

And one of those basic tenants is that error is inevitable. You're arguging that with strict adherence to company policy you can stomp out error, but that misunderstands the point; even when you're doing your absolute best to follow the book, mistakes will happen, and it's easy to make mistakes.

Some errors have small consequences, and some have really huge consequences. But no matter what you do, errors will happen. Giving people the tools to trap and remedy those errors helps us increase safety. Saying, "hey guys you should suck less and we already fixed all the problems that could ever occur with this perfect book written by perfect people doing perfect things" does nothing for our collective safety.

I feel like you're basically saying "suck less," but hey, it's the middle of the night and I've been up for a while, so maybe I'm reading what you're saying wrong.

We should throw out all existing manuals and write this instead:

"Don't break the rules or do anything stupid. Oh, and don't crash."

Done!
 
So, check this out.

Imagine the zombie apocolypse happens and they eat through the ILS system and the GPS satellites (somehow, zombies got into space), so you're left with shooting the VOR-A into LAX landing west (I don't even know if this exists, work with me).

You break out and see the runway. It looks a little short and maybe you're a tiny bit high, but you figure that you haven't been to LAX in a while and maybe one of the zombies bit you, so you could be hallucinating.

So you say what the hell. Chop. Drop. Shut 'em down, open up shop, and make that runway.

Only it's Hawthorne.

You had course guidance, you even knew it was there. It's an honest mistake; but is it your fault or the fault of a poorly designed approach with threats everywhere?

The big "TESLA" PAPI should have been a good indicator that you were aimed at the right piece of pavement.

I hate long drawn out briefs, hit the required items, and anything else important - uh I mean threats - for the particular scenario. The more someone talks, the less I'm paying attentions. I got into this talk with a colleague, told him it's not required to nor will I'll never brief what kind of approach lights the runway has or if it's a PAPI or VASI and on what side. Don't get me wrong, if the approach lights are inop, no visual guidance, or if it's a nonstandard 3.5 degree, of course we'll talk about that.

He seemed to take offense, that you absolutely must brief those things; one more way to confirm you're lined up for the correct runway.

Shooting an approach to mins, in the last seconds before touching down the las thing going on in my mind is remembering what kind of approach lights I briefed 30 minutes earlier.

You can get all worked up over EVERY possible threat, and then you're going to forget about other basics and end up filing an ASAP every leg. And sometimes it all adds up and you just have to say no; my story is pretty much your example too, minus the zombies.

Middle of the night headed toward Saltillo, Mexico, new high mins captain, a GPS with no moving map, and an equally worthless terrain warning system. About to cross the border I get the weather, it's down to mins, and our only shot is a full ILS 17 circle to land 35. We've don that approach in visual conditions many times - which is why we know most of the circle is done in a valley over rapidly rising terrain, and the circling altitude is ~500 ft off the ground, with much much more terrain towering above you a few more miles away.

Without saying anything to each-other, all three of us began working on a diversion to Laredo. (textbook CRM there, seriously, not a word we all just knew what to do). We could have gone, it was legal, but no way.
 
Actually I brief which side the PAPI will be on for visual approaches; that way I know which runway I'm lined up on.

It's saved me once or twice when I said "hey, isn't it supposed to be on the other...*looks down at HSI* OH •!!!!"
 
Actually I brief which side the PAPI will be on for visual approaches; that way I know which runway I'm lined up on.

It's saved me once or twice when I said "hey, isn't it supposed to be on the other...*looks down at HSI* OH !!!!"

Certainly doesn't hurt to have that as part of the "what do we expect to see on final" portion of a brief. Especially at fields with taxiways that are as wide as the runway, and with an inoperative approach lighting system or REILs, or none for that runway.
 
Certainly doesn't hurt to have that as part of the "what do we expect to see on final" portion of a brief. Especially at fields with taxiways that are as wide as the runway, and with an inoperative approach lighting system or REILs, or none for that runway.

Yup. Basically my briefs consist of things that will kill or violate me, or maybe you could say that I brief threats. How we're going to get there, and what we may hit on the way in or out: inbound course, frequency, marker altitude, missed altitude if we're doing an approach, what we're expecting to see if we break out, where we're going if we don't.

You could brief everything on the chart, but like @Adler said, guys stop listening pretty quickly, so hit the highlights and move on.
 
I've seen pilots on a visual into MFE try to land at Reynosa across the border. That's fun to sort back out.
 
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