UPS MD-11 RTO incident, Seoul

JeppUpdater said:
Air France 4590?
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My B……I should have been more specific, I meant USN/USMC mishaps. You are absolutely right about that one, and in either case, there are of course some exceptions/outliers.

That being said, I think if you knew nothing other than the fact that there was a problem at your decision speed (not the nature of it for this thought experiment), or even somewhat under it, statistically, most guys would fare better just getting airborne. A few really critical emergencies would speak otherwise, but those are also pretty low probability of occurrence (like 4590 for example).
 
You have to know your specific aircraft and what kind of EPs are ones that you'd high speed abort for, even past V1 if the aircraft just is not flyable, or will only get you airborne long enough to get you to the crash site. As stated in the accident synopsis link discussion of NASA 712, I discuss a few emergencies specific to my former jet, where in certain conditions, you go airborne, you're likely guaranteed a nylon letdown, or riding it in. As it won't be a matter of if, but when, you will crash. For other aircraft, those specific issues would be no problem.
 
The Omega KC707 mishap at NAS Pt Mugu is a good example of a great decision to abort well above V1, actually beyond getting airborne. No chance that jet would have done anything other than cartwheel across the ocean had they not put it back down. That burned out hulk was laying off the left side of the departure end of the runway for a while (at least long enough for me to overfly it), and they all walked away. Burn up an engine to save an aircraft, and burn up an aircraft to save the crew/people……seems like a good hierarchy if the situation requires.
 
///AMG said:
The Omega KC707 mishap at NAS Pt Mugu is a good example of a great decision to abort well above V1, actually beyond getting airborne. No chance that jet would have done anything other than cartwheel across the ocean had they not put it back down. That burned out hulk was laying off the left side of the departure end of the runway for a while (at least long enough for me to overfly it), and they all walked away. Burn up an engine to save an aircraft, and burn up an aircraft to save the crew/people……seems like a good hierarchy if the situation requires.
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Generally speaking, if one can turn an air emergency into a ground emergency, they're better off. And there are times too where its prudent to keep a ground emergency, a ground emergency. Those times will vary by aircraft, as well as be situational dependent....much like a departure brief is.
 
///AMG said:
People don't often consider that. As I understand things through osmosis/listening to others around me, and please gents correct me if I'm wrong, the 121/135 world spends a lot of time standardizing things like this…..V speeds, RTO criteria, etc. While that construct certainly creates a simple decision matrix to alleviate the real-time decision making process, it also sounds like (at least based on MikeD's and other's commentary) scenarios other than engine failure become more ambiguous, when it comes to the "book". And that isn't a bad thing IMHO. They are ambiguous in other parts of the flying world too. But there is equally very little time to assess the correct decision at 140-150 knots on takeoff roll regardless of cause. You had better be damned sure that stopping the jet on the runway (or off) would have been better than dealing with it airborne. Based on the mishap reports I've watched over the years, there are many many examples of RTO's that became mishaps because they didn't take it flying. I have yet to read a mishap where the accident could have been averted by aborting. That might seem weird or unlikely, but that is at least my community's truth data. Of course there are differences between aircraft types, and I'm not speculating on what happened in this one, but I think it should be very clear in any pilot's mind that a high speed abort in a high performance/jet aircraft is perhaps the most risky emergency anyone is likely to encounter.
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There are some examples of RTOs that were the best possible outcome, but they typically don't get a lot of press. Allegiant had one in LAS that likely would've been a catastrophe if they hadn't rejected.

I have a technique to help mentally prevent myself from rejecting when startled, such as a bird strike. Below 80 knots I'm pretty much ready to reject. But above 80 knots I change the position of my hand on the thrust levers, and I think to myself, "we are going." It's kind of silly, but I've read so many reports where the captain is startled by a sparrow hitting the windscreen, and he rejects right at V1. I don't want that to happen to me.

Not too long ago I damn near ingested a Sandhill Crane walking across the runway in Orlando while doing about a buck 30. That SOB could do some damage! He seemed very nonchalant as he strolled in front of the plane.

Edit---I now see Cherokee's post about the Allegiant flight. Sorry to duplicate!
 
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MikeD said:
From yesterday.

"A UPS United Parcel Service McDonnell Douglas MD-11, registration N277UP performing freight flight 5X-61 from Seoul (South Korea) to Anchorage,AK (USA) with 4 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Seoul Incheon Airport's runway 33L at about 22:40L (13:40Z) when the crew needed to reject takeoff at high speed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway, broke through the approach lights and the localizer antenna and came to stop about 350 meters past the end of the runway on soft ground, the nose gear collapsed. The crew evacuated the aircraft without injuries. The aircraft received substantial damage."

http://avherald.com/h?article=4996a27a

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High speed below V1??
 
///AMG said:
People don't often consider that. As I understand things through osmosis/listening to others around me, and please gents correct me if I'm wrong, the 121/135 world spends a lot of time standardizing things like this…..V speeds, RTO criteria, etc. While that construct certainly creates a simple decision matrix to alleviate the real-time decision making process, it also sounds like (at least based on MikeD's and other's commentary) scenarios other than engine failure become more ambiguous, when it comes to the "book". And that isn't a bad thing IMHO. They are ambiguous in other parts of the flying world too. But there is equally very little time to assess the correct decision at 140-150 knots on takeoff roll regardless of cause. You had better be damned sure that stopping the jet on the runway (or off) would have been better than dealing with it airborne. Based on the mishap reports I've watched over the years, there are many many examples of RTO's that became mishaps because they didn't take it flying. I have yet to read a mishap where the accident could have been averted by aborting. That might seem weird or unlikely, but that is at least my community's truth data. Of course there are differences between aircraft types, and I'm not speculating on what happened in this one, but I think it should be very clear in any pilot's mind that a high speed abort in a high performance/jet aircraft is perhaps the most risky emergency anyone is likely to encounter.
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I think it boils down to knowing your aircraft and its peculiarities. There are a couple aircraft in which I brief a non-standard to the standard calls and aborts. "If we have a tire blow out above 80, but below V1, we continue the TO and take the problem into the air."
 
PhilosopherPilot said:
That's a good case study.

We've had a rash of high-speed RTOs for inconsequential bird strikes (windscreens, leading edge, etc.) In one case the RTO was initiated at 135 knots for a large bird that flew BY the aircraft and didn't hit anything. In each case, the captain has said that the runway was long, it was safer to reject, etc. etc. Or the worst thing I've heard, "I'll do it exactly the same next time, even though I know it's not SOP."

Every time I hear that I think:
1. This guy doesn't understand risk, or how risky a high-speed RTO is.
2. He also doesn't understand that the procedures are designed to eliminate or discourage the need for a captain to have to evaluate the risk in that moment.

There's no time to evaluate the relative risk as you near V1. Long runway/short runway/icy runway/wet runway...none of that should be in your thoughts. If you're above 80 knots, you're going flying unless you have a catastrophic engine failure prior to (5 knots before) V1. All the captain needs to know is the 80 knots call and the V1 call.

Doing a risk assessment at 135 knots is a recipe for a runway excursion.
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Lol. How much thinking can you do in 2 seconds? 'Cause while you're doing it, you're covering almost 500 ft of runway! ;)
 
Crop Duster said:
I think it boils down to knowing your aircraft and its peculiarities. There are a couple aircraft in which I brief a non-standard to the standard calls and aborts. "If we have a tire blow out above 80, but below V1, we continue the TO and take the problem into the air."
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Yeah, agree with both of you. It is (as was mentioned previously), quite specific to what you are flying. In my little world, most of the time we have a pretty good single engine climb rate even at normal takeoff gross, and with an airplane that historically has more trouble on the runway than it does airborne (most things are very redundant, but it can be downright scary on deck if something is going on with the gear/tires), for me, I'll prioritize taking it flying unless something really crazy happens that isn't going to let me get airborne and stay there. For the heavy/transport category guys, I'm sure you have a lot more considerations, as your aircraft are heavier, crewed, and much more complex. Didn't mean to make a "one size fits all" type of statement.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Engine failure is a reject, but almost every FCOM out there has some wording that approaching V1, it's probably best to continue and that by the time the decision is made after analyzing what happened, you'd be above V1. That's why at current Co. the V1 callout is actually made by the PM at V1 minus 5 kts.
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Curious. If you look at the FAR 1 definition of V1 and V2, it factors in the engine failure occuring at a speed below V1, defined as Vef. I guess it's not wrong to make your decision slightly earlier, but the ground roll distance following the engine failure will be greater than published if the failure occurs in that window below Vef.
 
PhilosopherPilot said:
There are some examples of RTOs that were the best possible outcome, but they typically don't get a lot of press. Allegiant had one in LAS that likely would've been a catastrophe if they hadn't rejected.

I have a technique to help mentally prevent myself from rejecting when startled, such as a bird strike. Below 80 knots I'm pretty much ready to reject. But above 80 knots I change the position of my hand on the thrust levers, and I think to myself, "we are going." It's kind of silly, but I've read so many reports where the captain is startled by a sparrow hitting the windscreen, and he rejects right at V1. I don't want that to happen to me.

Not too long ago I damn near ingested a Sandhill Crane walking across the runway in Orlando while doing about a buck 30. That SOB could do some damage! He seemed very nonchalant as he strolled in front of the plane.

Edit---I now see Cherokee's post about the Allegiant flight. Sorry to duplicate!
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I do the same thing.

And here's something terrifying; what if you hit Vr, pull back, and nothing happens? Do you fly the plane off the runway using trim? Or do an abort at V1+20 and go off the end of the runway?

It happened to a republic crew in an EMB-145 that had a severed elevator control cable. Thankfully they were in JFK and not Ashville and they stayed on the runway.
 
gotWXdagain said:
Curious. If you look at the FAR 1 definition of V1 and V2, it factors in the engine failure occuring at a speed below V1, defined as Vef. I guess it's not wrong to make your decision slightly earlier, but the ground roll distance following the engine failure will be greater than published if the failure occurs in that window below Vef.
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At our shop, the powers that be decided that the risk of an RTO past V1 is worse than making the "go decision" a hair earlier. After all, but the time you experience the failure, realize the failure, decide to reject, and actually perform the reject, you're past V1 if you wait until the last possible second to call V1. In the vast majority of the cases it's better to just continue anyway, so our procedures bias us towards taking the aircraft flying, including making the V1 call 5 knots prior.
 
Derg said:
If V1 is say, 140 knots, my hand is usually off the thrust lever by about 130 (-ish) knots.
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That gives me a warm fuzzy. I get real antsy when that hand stays there for a few seconds after V1. There's a magical 20'ish knots where I'm just a passenger.
 
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