Three Dead in Houston Cirrus Crash

No matter what happens, if you feel pressured by ATC, or a customer, or your company or even the voices in your head…

MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT
I don't have the data to point fingers, but your best tools as pilot-in-command of an aircraft are your parking brake, "Squawking 7700, proceeding to (whatever)" and "Unable".
 
No matter what happens, if you feel pressured by ATC, or a customer, or your company or even the voices in your head…

MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT
I don't have the data to point fingers, but your best tools as pilot-in-command of an aircraft are your parking brake, "Squawking 7700, proceeding to (whatever)" and "Unable".

This! The most powerful safety tool you have is "no."
 
This! The most powerful safety tool you have is "no."

Yup, I'm sure some dispatchers can't stand seeing me on their flight plan, some controllers know my voice and cringe when they're working my flight, I'm probably on some "Cap'n Candy Ass" list on copilotchat.com but that's alright.

If I was looking for glory, I'd be flying mercenary down in Central America in a Tucano with hardpoints.
 
What's graphic about this video?

That light colored object that ends up near the passenger side a-pillar of the car sure looks like a body to me.

Main cause here seems to be the fact that she was in way over her head at a much busier airport than she should have been at it and then it just cascaded from there.
 
Controller was a freaking saint IMO, and I don't like hearing criticism of ATC in this situation.

As a flight instructor, I'm just gonna say that it's our damn job not to turn out a student like this. We have the ultimate power of the signoff here, and we ultimately control what sort of pilot we create. It sucks, but it's also our job to deny further signoffs if a pilot fails to demonstrate competence OR if they appear to have an attitude or mindset that will result in them being an unsafe pilot and it's something we can't correct.

I have an incredibly dear friend of mine who wants me to teach him to fly, but I've observed him in other situations enough to know that while I can absolutely teach him to fly—and he'd probably be a pretty good stick—I cannot teach him the judgment or responsibility aspect because he has an anti-authority and invulnerability streak a mile wide, and doesn't do well with stress. I felt awful about it, but I gave him "the talk" and said exactly that.

As to another point being made, you can do almost anything to an unloaded wing.... flight instructors also need to be pilots enough to understand that a steep-banked, low-speed descending turn is ok and sometimes ideal... as long as that yoke doesn't come back before the speed is increased. Elevators stall airplanes, not ailerons or throttles.

-Fox

May I play "devil's advocate and contradict one point you made? Hypothetically, "WHAT IF" this were your student who was only 25 months a licensed pilot? How would you THEN explain the actions that resulted in this accident? Presently, no one knows anything about the pilot's flight history, hours, time in aircraft, what aircraft the pilot did the checkride, etc. etc. Too many intangibles not known to make any assumptions about her flight prowess. Oh yes. . .woulda/shoulda/coulda done a lotta things differently. Who knows how comprehensive her flying prowess was after she received her certificate. Given that hypothetical, how would THEN explain how/why her skills quite possibly deterioriated to the point leading up to the accident? Just a thought?
 
Whew... they hit HARD. I'm curious if the CAPS rocket was triggered intentionally or by the impact.

That's a stall/spin accident right there... look at the rotation and angle of the shadow before they hit.

Oversaturated and inexperienced (clearly without even seeing the history) pilot in a busy airport having difficulty flying and managing their airplane. How sad, and unfortunately neither the first nor the last time this is going to happen.
 
One thing I always try to remind the newer guys (well actually everyone) is if you're thinking about declaring an emergency, you have already got yourself into a situation that is an emergency.
No. Absolutely not. Just because things are going wrong - perhaps several critical things - doesn't mean it's an emergency, nor does it justify declaring.
 
Oversaturated and inexperienced (clearly without even seeing the history) pilot in a busy airport having difficulty flying and managing their airplane. How sad, and unfortunately neither the first nor the last time this is going to happen.

Looks like her PPL was barely two years old and that was all she had. You can imagine how many hours she had. She had no business flying into that airspace with those qualifications.
 
Yeah, the "whole situation" of pilots not knowing how to cut the power downwind somewhere between midfield and the numbers and glide on in. I do believe power off landings and short field landings are both still part of the PPC PTS.
IMO, there was WAY too much jabbering going on here. If I was ATC, the second I had the impulse to switch runways on a GA pilot during a busy period, I'd take that impulse as my personal directive to either clear the area or waive off the GA plane on a delay vector until I could get around to giving them something more, er, standard. But that's just me based on my very extensive experience with many, many GA pilots. That said, ATC is not to blame here. Anyone flying an airplane should have the capacity to deal with this kind of situation (and that capacity might be simply the judgement to get the heck out of Dodge for a few minutes and come back a little later). The unfortunate reality is that many do not, and some -like this one- pay a heavy price for their lack of capacity.
RIP. Condolences to the families and friends involved.


If I ask a pilot to make a short approach and then have to send them around or they go around, I am not going to ask them to attempt another short approach again, let alone 2-3 more times. Right traffic to RY35 when the wind is 090-100 at 15 is only going to make the short approach that much more difficult to execute with a tailwind on base turn. I looked closer at the airport diagram, and will concede LAHSO may not have been an option (no LAHSO lines on the diagram).
 
That light colored object that ends up near the passenger side a-pillar of the car sure looks like a body to me.

Main cause here seems to be the fact that she was in way over her head at a much busier airport than she should have been at it and then it just cascaded from there.

The white-ish substance in the back upon impact seems to be the chute right when the ballistic system fired (or upon impact). The white-ish in the front near the A-pillar would appear to be a white tshirt of a victim, and yeah it looks like a body. You really have to look hard to see it. The video is sad to see, but I wouldn't say it's graphic per say. If you want graphic, look up google images of the Jane Wicker crash. But I'd suggest ya don't.
 
That light colored object that ends up near the passenger side a-pillar of the car sure looks like a body to me.

Main cause here seems to be the fact that she was in way over her head at a much busier airport than she should have been at it and then it just cascaded from there.


Agreed. Sorta reminds me of those pilots who do the minimum Class B/C/D tower interactions and never bother with it either out of fear, no requirement/operational need, etc. etc. Looked as if it was a VFR flight. . .flight following? Reminds me of my first flight into DC SFRA. Thought I was fully prepared/trained. . .even flight simulated the route. Still overly intimidating. My experienced DC SFRA transitioned me through it with a few bumps and bruises. That was five years ago. Wonder how I'd do today?
 
The white-ish substance in the back upon impact seems to be the chute right when the ballistic system fired (or upon impact). The white-ish in the front near the A-pillar would appear to be a white tshirt of a victim, and yeah it looks like a body. You really have to look hard to see it. The video is sad to see, but I wouldn't say it's graphic per say. If you want graphic, look up google images of the Jane Wicker crash. But I'd suggest ya don't.

Yeah, the more I watch it, the person that ends up near the a-pillar was definitely in one of the front seats(the right seat, maybe?).

Not sure I'd call it graphic either, violent maybe.
 
No. Absolutely not. Just because things are going wrong - perhaps several critical things - doesn't mean it's an emergency, nor does it justify declaring.

I'll disagree right here. It's just a word. And even if the reason is my fault, due to poor training/spatial disorientation/getting up on the wrong side of the bed, it doesn't make the situation any less dire. Once it is clear that the safe outcome of the flight has any doubt, treat the situation as such, and contemplate the repercussions from the safety of someplace on the ground.
 
High performance aircraft (particularly turbocharged ones) require you to be ahead of them, specially on power reductions. They're usually heavy enough that the inertia they have takes longer to counter, resulting in the temptation to reduce power even more untill suddenly you're way behind the aircraft. Natural correction to this is to add power, but they take longer to accelerate, so being behind causes you to add too much power and the cycle repeats itself.

This is basically what happened to thr Asiana 777 in KSFO. They were highh, they chopped the power (and thought the autopilot would take care of it). To arrest a descent at the point thhey needed to, they should have applied power some time BEFORE they needed it. In other words, STAY FURTHER AHEAD OF THR AIRCRAFT.

A common procedure on High Performance A/C is Power setting profile, where you know what setting you need for take off, cruise, landing, and stick to it and let the plane catch you, not the other way around.

I'm no CFI but This is he technique I was taught and I find it to be the best option so far.

Take Care

To borrow a term I'm used to, I always have a throttle(s) "no further than aft" point during an approach/on final. It is something I learned behind the boat in the F/A-18 (where you will become one with ramp if you go back to flight idle for really any amount of time at all)……..but as my experience has grown to other aircraft, I think the same idea is still applicable in most aircraft, and every bit as much during land based flying. It's a different muscle memory position for every aircraft, but the takeaway for those who are not familiar with the idea or the term, is that you have to limit yourself from making big power corrections that you aren't going to reasonably be able to recover from. If I'm super high, I will take the throttles as far back as my "no further than aft" point, and if that still isn't fixing the problem, I just either go around (ashore/normal flying), or "take my bolter like a man" in the shipboard environment. It's a simple concept that often gets folks in trouble when ego rears its ugly head. Just a thought I figured I'd submit to the peanut gallery.
 
I'll disagree right here. It's just a word. And even if the reason is my fault, due to poor training/spatial disorientation/getting up on the wrong side of the bed, it doesn't make the situation any less dire. Once it is clear that the safe outcome of the flight has any doubt, treat the situation as such, and contemplate the repercussions from the safety of someplace on the ground.


. . .and I'll respectfully disagree with you as well. . .simply because of the semantics of the word. So, educate me, please. If there's a possible "threat to life or limb," doesn't THAT constitute an emergency vice being in a stressful/difficult situation?
 
At what point during the stall/spin can you see the pilot heroically maneuvering the aircraft away from the propane tanks?

. . .the point where "devine intervention" and the laws of physics set in; yep, I am inclined to belief there was no human intervention.
 
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