UPS MD-11 RTO incident, Seoul

MikeD

MikeD

Administrator
Staff member
From yesterday.

"A UPS United Parcel Service McDonnell Douglas MD-11, registration N277UP performing freight flight 5X-61 from Seoul (South Korea) to Anchorage,AK (USA) with 4 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Seoul Incheon Airport's runway 33L at about 22:40L (13:40Z) when the crew needed to reject takeoff at high speed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway, broke through the approach lights and the localizer antenna and came to stop about 350 meters past the end of the runway on soft ground, the nose gear collapsed. The crew evacuated the aircraft without injuries. The aircraft received substantial damage."

http://avherald.com/h?article=4996a27a

ups.jpg
 
This is why we are about to publish an Info Notice rewording the RTO section of our FOM, and changing our training curricula too.

RTOs are some of the highest-risk things we do.
 
No doubt, an RTO in a jet aircraft is a risky contingency. In my world, we use the term "max abort speed"…….in other words, up to that speed, you could execute RTO/abort procedures for a serious emergency (normally specified in SOP manual i.e. FOM), use maximum effort braking, and still stop before the end of the runway. It also doesn't assume that you won't have melted fuze plugs, hot brakes, or even brake/wheel fires once you stop……really all those things are pretty much guaranteed on a higher GW takeoff anyway. The max abort number is not tied to any specific emergency, but rather the physics involved, and one's ability to stop on the remaining runway. Is that about correct, or is V1 only tied to single engine failure? Just wondering for my own education. Thanks!
 
///AMG said:
The max abort number is not tied to any specific emergency, but rather the physics involved, and one's ability to stop on the remaining runway. Is that about correct, or is V1 only tied to single engine failure? Just wondering for my own education. Thanks!
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V1 is tied to both. It is (if you have a balanced field length) the speed at which you can initiate a reject and stop within the remaining runway (and clearway) available) or, with one engine not producing power, accelerate to VR, rotate and maintain a climb gradient that clears all obstacles in the charted departure corridor.
 
BobDDuck said:
V1 is tied to both. It is (if you have a balanced field length) the speed at which you can initiate a reject and stop within the remaining runway (and clearway) available) or, with one engine not producing power, accelerate to VR, rotate and maintain a climb gradient that clears all obstacles in the charted departure corridor.
Click to expand...

Got it, thanks! We have a second one, "min go speed", which covers the single engine failure territory.
 
MikeD said:
Agreed. Everytime I think RTO, am reminded of this incident, among a number of others

http://forums.jetcareers.com/threads/when-mr-murphy-rides-in-your-jumpseat.91792/#post-1238803
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That's a good case study.

We've had a rash of high-speed RTOs for inconsequential bird strikes (windscreens, leading edge, etc.) In one case the RTO was initiated at 135 knots for a large bird that flew BY the aircraft and didn't hit anything. In each case, the captain has said that the runway was long, it was safer to reject, etc. etc. Or the worst thing I've heard, "I'll do it exactly the same next time, even though I know it's not SOP."

Every time I hear that I think:
1. This guy doesn't understand risk, or how risky a high-speed RTO is.
2. He also doesn't understand that the procedures are designed to eliminate or discourage the need for a captain to have to evaluate the risk in that moment.

There's no time to evaluate the relative risk as you near V1. Long runway/short runway/icy runway/wet runway...none of that should be in your thoughts. If you're above 80 knots, you're going flying unless you have a catastrophic engine failure prior to (5 knots before) V1. All the captain needs to know is the 80 knots call and the V1 call.

Doing a risk assessment at 135 knots is a recipe for a runway excursion.
 
PhilosopherPilot said:
That's a good case study.

We've had a rash of high-speed RTOs for inconsequential bird strikes (windscreens, leading edge, etc.) In one case the RTO was initiated at 135 knots for a large bird that flew BY the aircraft and didn't hit anything. In each case, the captain has said that the runway was long, it was safer to reject, etc. etc. Or the worst thing I've heard, "I'll do it exactly the same next time, even though I know it's not SOP."

Every time I hear that I think:
1. This guy doesn't understand risk, or how risky a high-speed RTO is.
2. He also doesn't understand that the procedures are designed to eliminate or discourage the need for a captain to have to evaluate the risk in that moment.

There's no time to evaluate the relative risk as you near V1. Long runway/short runway/icy runway/wet runway...none of that should be in your thoughts. If you're above 80 knots, you're going flying unless you have a catastrophic engine failure prior to (5 knots before) V1. All the captain needs to know is the 80 knots call and the V1 call.

Doing a risk assessment at 135 knots is a recipe for a runway excursion.
Click to expand...

Kinetic energy = 1/2 * mass * velocity^squared

If they can do math they should understand velocity squared gets to be real scary at high speeds, and increasing by a knot every instance makes a huge difference in kinetic energy, which is ultimately what has to be dissipated during the RTO to come to a stop.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
If they can do math they should understand velocity squared gets to be real scary at high speeds, and increasing by a knot every instance makes a huge difference in kinetic energy, which is ultimately what has to be dissipated during the RTO to come to a stop.
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I do a LOT of focusing on RTOs in the sim because so many people don't think of them as a big deal. I hit two things:

A) Many guys have "engine failure, fire, or loss of directional control" as their high speed criteria...but most will abort for many other things if they think they're severe enough, which defeats the whole purpose of setting criteria.

B) As you pointed out, people don't understand just how much energy has to be expended to bring an airplane, especially a heavy airplane, to a stop. I blame sims for a lot of that in professional pilots - a sim rapidly leaning forward to simulate deceleration does not remotely give you an idea of the capability of the brakes on a transport-category airplane in RTO. The one legitimate high-speed abort I've done in an airliner could only be described as violent, and in a business jet was throwing things forward in the cabin. Modern brakes are amazing, but of course have their own after-effects to deal with.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Kinetic energy = 1/2 * mass * velocity^squared

If they can do math they should understand velocity squared gets to be real scary at high speeds, and increasing by a knot every instance makes a huge difference in kinetic energy, which is ultimately what has to be dissipated during the RTO to come to a stop.
Click to expand...

People don't often consider that. As I understand things through osmosis/listening to others around me, and please gents correct me if I'm wrong, the 121/135 world spends a lot of time standardizing things like this…..V speeds, RTO criteria, etc. While that construct certainly creates a simple decision matrix to alleviate the real-time decision making process, it also sounds like (at least based on MikeD's and other's commentary) scenarios other than engine failure become more ambiguous, when it comes to the "book". And that isn't a bad thing IMHO. They are ambiguous in other parts of the flying world too. But there is equally very little time to assess the correct decision at 140-150 knots on takeoff roll regardless of cause. You had better be damned sure that stopping the jet on the runway (or off) would have been better than dealing with it airborne. Based on the mishap reports I've watched over the years, there are many many examples of RTO's that became mishaps because they didn't take it flying. I have yet to read a mishap where the accident could have been averted by aborting. That might seem weird or unlikely, but that is at least my community's truth data. Of course there are differences between aircraft types, and I'm not speculating on what happened in this one, but I think it should be very clear in any pilot's mind that a high speed abort in a high performance/jet aircraft is perhaps the most risky emergency anyone is likely to encounter.
 
///AMG said:
People don't often consider that. As I understand things through osmosis/listening to others around me, and please gents correct me if I'm wrong, the 121/135 world spends a lot of time standardizing things like this…..V speeds, RTO criteria, etc. While that construct certainly creates a simple decision matrix to alleviate the real-time decision making process, it also sounds like (at least based on MikeD's and other's commentary) scenarios other than engine failure become more ambiguous, when it comes to the "book". And that isn't a bad thing IMHO. They are ambiguous in other parts of the flying world too. But there is equally very little time to assess the correct decision at 140-150 knots on takeoff roll regardless of cause. You had better be damned sure that stopping the jet on the runway (or off) would have been better than dealing with it airborne. Based on the mishap reports I've watched over the years, there are many many examples of RTO's that became mishaps because they didn't take it flying. I have yet to read a mishap where the accident could have been averted by aborting. That might seem weird or unlikely, but that is at least my community's truth data. Of course there are differences between aircraft types, and I'm not speculating on what happened in this one, but I think it should be very clear in any pilot's mind that a high speed abort in a high performance/jet aircraft is perhaps the most risky emergency anyone is likely to encounter.
Click to expand...

The Allegiant one recently with the severely misrigged elevator/stabilizer that aborted above V1. Apparently if they had taken it in the air, they would have crashed.

But in general, you are correct though that there are extremely few things a RTO is worth doing for. Far too many examples of RTOs gone bad whereas taking it in the air would have (most likely) been a non-event. Even in the corporate world, like Travis Barker's LearJet at CAE airport. A blown tire can initially sound like an engine problem, especially with the noise and the aircraft pulling in one direction. It takes discipline and training to keep a scan at the engine gauges and realize it wasn't the engines and keep continuing.

Recently here we had a literal V1 cut and the CA took it in the air and came back to land. Textbook example. Great CA, plenty of experience here in the US, flew an A330 at Emirates, and then came to current Co. There are several guys I can think of that would have sprung to reject. Engine failure is a reject, but almost every FCOM out there has some wording that approaching V1, it's probably best to continue and that by the time the decision is made after analyzing what happened, you'd be above V1. That's why at current Co. the V1 callout is actually made by the PM at V1 minus 5 kts.


Not a whole lot of things out there that can prevent your airplane from at least flying a circuit and landing. Even in most jets, leveling at 1,500 agl and doing a traffic pattern back means you could be on the ground in a New York minute (almost). Bird strike? Get outta town, we're goin airborne. Unless both engines fail at which point the airplane isn't climbing anyway and the abort is forced.
 
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