Tommay85
Well-Known Member
Ooooooo! Is that a system that automatically feeds me Mountain Dew when I get thirsty!!!???
Landing Incident @ SFO
- Thread starter BEEF SUPREME
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Bumblebee
Commodore
that's called a flight attendant.Ooooooo! Is that a system that automatically feeds me Mountain Dew when I get thirsty!!!???
PhilosopherPilot
Well-Known Member
And as you've demonstrated previously, if YOU understand it, clearly it isn't a problem, and anyone who did have a problem was just a stupid/weak pilot. You know, because you could never make the same mistake.
There but by the grace of God go I...
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
A statement about signs and markings, based on my own observations, supported by the NTSB investigation and evidence admitted in multiple civil suits, invites criticism?
By your post history I'm guessing you're from KY as well, and have quite a bit of experience at LEX. I may get down there a couple times a month, at the very most, and I still have to remind myself to be cautious about where I am if I'm going to 22, and this is after the changes they've made. Now take someone who maybe flies to LEX a couple times a YEAR (speculation, yes, but not outside the realm of possibility for an airline guy), throw in some fatigue, and I can see how an accident chain would have come to a head there.
I try not to fall into the "meh, they were idiots" category because it's too easy to discount anything you might learn from an accident. I'm a low time guy still, but lord knows I've had moments where I thought "I can't believe I almost did that", or "welp, that was a brainfart." Most of the time they don't cause anything serious, but that one time is the kicker.
z987k
Well-Known Member
That's an interesting read.
Something that piqued my interest was mentioned twice, separately.
In reference to a royally screwed up visual into SFO(p12-13) -
"The crew must be aware that once a visual approach is accepted by the crew,
the most important instruments on the approach on a wide body jet are the WINDOW and
the VSI."
Page 14
"Crew must make more use of visual cues in VMC conditions. For the visual approach, the
two most important "instruments" are the window and the VSI. Monitoring the VSI is
extremely important on wide body jets and is largely ignored by Korean crew. Crews tend
to stay head down for the entire visual approach. Look up and look out."
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Fair enough. I'm admittedly biased to some extent. A relative was the controller and friends died in the crash. Now, to try to be objective. If you are flying a jet out of an airport with a long main runway and a short GA runway, you want the long one. Everything else being equal, if you have a choice between the open runway and the closed runway, choose the open one. If you find yourself prepared to depart and you see thousands of feet of dark runway, you might give this some thought. Confused? Maybe there is some signage or markings. Still confused? Maybe you can talk to somebody on your radio. Is this airport a little confusing? Maybe if you hadn't been running your mouth for twenty minutes and planned your flight, your airmanship wouldn't be questioned. The funny thing is, I have a bigger problem with the behavior of Polehinke after the crash. Until all the civil suits were over, his traumatic brain injuries kept him from testifying in proceedings years after the crash, yet it was well understood that his brain trauma was situational, becoming especially acute when subpoenaed. Once all the cases were resolved, his recovery progresses dramatically and he is able to appear in a documentary. And his words to the families?
ahw01
Well-Known Member
Interesting notes on LHR-PHX. I thought BA went direct vs via JFK. They also fly to San Diego. You would require a 3rd party to give up a slot for another countries' airline to be able to do such a thing I guess? They should bring back more of these in my opinion.
You used to get a lot. I can't wait for Emirates to fly into the US via other hubs, Delta/Virgin is the best the US/UK has to offer the others are poor, AA/BA am afraid aren't good enough. The soverign airlines have to look out, there aren't the overheads in the middle/far east.
You used to get a lot. I can't wait for Emirates to fly into the US via other hubs, Delta/Virgin is the best the US/UK has to offer the others are poor, AA/BA am afraid aren't good enough. The soverign airlines have to look out, there aren't the overheads in the middle/far east.
Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
After all the hullaballoo, they still haven't done a very good job on the signage out there, just sayin'.
I'm fond of:
"During descent FO confused aircraft call signs the crew responded to a radar vector given to another aircraft. FE picked up something was wrong and said nothing. FO was also not happy but said nothing. AC took up new heading. Despite visual conditions crew did not look out and see that the current heading would not take aircraft to the airfield. Radar picked up 70 degree heading error and corrected. Captain hit FO with the back of his hand for making the error. The incident caused by similar sounding call signs, lack of situational awareness, crew not looking out, crew not speaking up, incorrect radio procedures and implicitly trusting ATC."
RedBaron2000
Well-Known Member
Yeah I read that part too. I just thought it was odd that since of all the factors that could have contributed to the accident, I think the culture/CRM one is a complex and interesting one, and one that is DEFINITELY on the table. Yet he just dismissed it completely. And for a guy whose whole premise in the article was to not speculate and not believe the media, for him to go and dismiss something that most of us on here believe could be a major factor, it just kind of discredited everything he said, especially since it was the last thing he said.
Hacker15e
Who am I? Where are my pants?
Regarding the Kentucky accident, why are people so resistant to just saying that the pilot made a mistake? Every aviator, at every end of the experience and professionalism spectrums, is at risk of making a mistake in judgment at any given time. Obviously, the range of impacts of that mistake and the severity of the error itself can vary widely, but this is the crux of the whole idea of airmanship and judgment/decisionmaking -- finding the point at which an "innocent error" starts turning into carelessness, recklessness, neglect, etc. That is not a binary point on the spectrum -- in fact, it is quite the opposite.
Seems that in some cases, pilots are very willing to "burn the witch" even when there is evidence of other outside factors' involvement in their decisionmaking process. In other cases -- especially ones where someone knows or has some professional relation to the pilot in question -- pilots find every possible other scapegoat to explain the incident, rather than just accepting that errors were made in the pilot's own personal risk management, decisionmaking, judgment, airmanship, etc.
In the fighter business, we accept that mistakes of varying magnitudes are made on every flight on every day. Furthermore, we identify and analyze those mistakes as a matter of professional criticism and not personal criticism. In other words, the identification, analysis, and critique are of the action and not the person. Making an error in judgment while flying does not automatically make one a terrible aviator, and it especially does not make one a bad person. One pilot critiquing another pilot's decision does not result in butt-hurtedness and purse-swinging afterward -- they all go slap each other on the back at the bar afterward and recall what a great day to be an aviator it is.
Why is it that so many civilian pilots I interact with cannot disconnect that criticism of actions from criticism of the individual?
Seems that in some cases, pilots are very willing to "burn the witch" even when there is evidence of other outside factors' involvement in their decisionmaking process. In other cases -- especially ones where someone knows or has some professional relation to the pilot in question -- pilots find every possible other scapegoat to explain the incident, rather than just accepting that errors were made in the pilot's own personal risk management, decisionmaking, judgment, airmanship, etc.
In the fighter business, we accept that mistakes of varying magnitudes are made on every flight on every day. Furthermore, we identify and analyze those mistakes as a matter of professional criticism and not personal criticism. In other words, the identification, analysis, and critique are of the action and not the person. Making an error in judgment while flying does not automatically make one a terrible aviator, and it especially does not make one a bad person. One pilot critiquing another pilot's decision does not result in butt-hurtedness and purse-swinging afterward -- they all go slap each other on the back at the bar afterward and recall what a great day to be an aviator it is.
Why is it that so many civilian pilots I interact with cannot disconnect that criticism of actions from criticism of the individual?
Seggy
Well-Known Member
No doubts mistakes were made.
But let's look at the system that caused the mistake to prevent it from happening again. This cycle of accidents (Colgan 3407, Air France 447, and Asiana 214) ALL appear to have been caused by speed control issues. That points more to a systemic problem worldwide rather than an individual pilot mistake.
But let's look at the system that caused the mistake to prevent it from happening again. This cycle of accidents (Colgan 3407, Air France 447, and Asiana 214) ALL appear to have been caused by speed control issues. That points more to a systemic problem worldwide rather than an individual pilot mistake.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Recently, I read an article on the Boeing site about efforts to reduce overruns. One of the measures mentioned was having the instruments specifically warn of an unstable approach. Is this type of warning implementated on any aircraft?
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2012_q3/3/
SlumTodd_Millionaire
Most Hated Member
The amount of conversation on that flight was the same (probably less) than the typical flight.
So you're mad because he had a good lawyer who gave him good advice?
His words to the families were sincere and heartbreaking. He keeps pictures of every single victim of the crash in the seat of his wheelchair. He looks at them all the time. He knows their names and faces from memory. He says he thinks about it constantly. And how couldn't he? He's a paraplegic with an amputated leg to constantly remind him. And all because of something that could have happened to any us. Yes, including you. In fact, especially you, since those with such arrogant attitudes about flying are the most prone to making such serious mistakes.
PhilosopherPilot
Well-Known Member
Some airlines have implemented a post- approach analysis that prints out after block-in. Apparently United witnessed a significant decrease in the number of unstable approaches after implementing the program. Essentially, it's a feedback mechanism so the pilot gets an immediate and objective critique of the approach.
In any case, other than the "glide slope" and "sink rate" aural alerts, none of our aircraft at JetBlue have an unstable approach warning. I think it would be a good idea, but it would probably cost a lot to implement.
PhilosopherPilot
Well-Known Member
My problem isn't with your statement that the signage was correct, it's with the implication that only bad pilots would mistake the signage.
Yes, it was correct, but maybe it was confusing? There are plenty of examples where things are technically correct, but not adequate in terms of human factors.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Other than the self-serving documentary, what has he communicated with the victims' families? I know, unlike you.
There's not a lawyer out there that can talk me into lying. There is nothing honorable about his post-crash behavior. Even after being offered unconditional immunity by the plaintiffs, he refused to appear as a witness claiming medical infirmity.
You know nothing about my piloting. I am my worst critic and invite every opportunity to make myself a better pilot. What we do isn't that special, when bus drivers are negligent and kill people we don't pull punches. However, when pilots kill people, we dance. We have a hard time even stating that a pilot killed anybody. That's the extent of out collective delusion. Unless we are willing to honestly and candidly evaluate the facts, we really aren't making the situation better.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Although it was FAA compliant, it could (and can) be improved. There is a lot of poorly designed signage and markings out there that is still compliant. Not a month goes by that I don't have a WTF moment regarding signage.
SlumTodd_Millionaire
Most Hated Member
I can't even imagine, nor can you, what level of courage it would take to communicate face to face, or even over the phone, with the child of someone whose death that you live with the nightmare of having caused. I could never judge someone for not having that level of courage, because I can't even begin to imagine what it's like to live with that hell every moment of every day.
I've never met a lawyer who tried to talk someone into lying. But keeping your mouth shut isn't a lie.
My biggest problem with your attitude is your continual use of the word "negligent." There was no negligent behavior in this crash. There were mistakes. Mistakes that any of us could have made. I flew in and out of that airport many times during my tenure on the CRJ, and I lost track of the amount of pilots I flew with who made the comment "this runway configuration is an accident waiting to happen." We all knew it was dangerous. So when you start throwing complicating factors at it, like fatigue, last minute aircraft swaps and getting in a rush, etc., the danger finally catches up with you.
We study crashes not to affix blame, but to learn from them and find ways to avoid them in the future. Changes were made following the LEX accident. Every airline added a procedure to cross-check heading, runway markings, and FMS programmed runway to ensure that you're on the right pavement. My carrier wasn't doing that as a matter of procedure prior to the accident. Neither were many others. The FAA also instituted new procedures for ATC. And so on. That's why we study accidents. Not so you can get your jollies attacking fellow aviators and calling them negligent.
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