UPS MD-11 crash at SDF

It will be interesting to see how this plays out. I wouldn't lay money either way. For the companies it really is the devil and the deep blue sea. If there's a fix, it's going to be expensive, time-consuming, and now you're pouring money into an airframe that probably should have been retired 10 years ago. OTOH, what choice do they have? 76s are already at a premium and there don't seem to be any extras laying around. Maybe FedEx can find some triples, but UPS doesn't have that option.

I'm sure Boeing wants out from under right now, but I'll bet management is threatening to never buy a Boeing again if Boeing hangs then out to dry.

Add to that the circus of shameless corruption in Trump's DC ("oh, a propos to nothing, I happen to be the boss of the guy who runs the FAA and I'm soliciting donations for my ball-room...")and we definitely live in Interesting Times.
 
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From the NTSB site. The pylon was still attached to the engine when it ended up in the infield grass. That at least preserved the pylon from the post-crash conflagration of a fire off the departure end of the runway, Galling marks on the aft wing/pylon lug appear to indicate securing pin movement that could possibly have created one or more fatigue fractures, with the lug finally letting go on this takeoff. Why any pin movement was occurring, is the next question to be answered.

View attachment 86877
Where are you seeing galling marks mentioned, or is that your analysis? The pin doesn’t ride directly in the fatigued lugs, they have a press fit bearing in them. To me some more likely possibilities include damage during the process of pressing in the bearing (or pressing it out if it has ever had to be removed for inspection or replacement), or simply a faulty fatigue analysis on the part leading to premature failure. Those bores look pretty clean to me, not corroded and I don’t see anything that looks like galling unless maybe on the portion that stayed attached to the pulling, but to me that looks more like contamination from the fire and impact. What this reminds me most of is Caravan wing strut lugs, where you had to remove the bolts every 1200 hours and your biggest risk in the process was adding a stress riser to the hole in the process of taking the bolt in and out. No idea however if the MD11 plying bearings would ever have had to be removed previously. But the metallurgy geeks at NTSB are pretty good and we will see what they come up with.
 
Indeed pilots are cheap. Sort of. My grandpa had a beer fridge in the shop. Stocked with Old Milwaukee, Hams, Busch, or whatever other cheap beer was on sale. So, he would spend money on multiple antique airplanes, tractors and other implements of destruction to maintain the runway in his backyard, and tools for his hanger and shop. Plus his children and Grandkids were not exactly like orphans in Oliver Twist ...but by God we'd get whatever beer was on sale.
 
From the NTSB site. The pylon was still attached to the engine when it ended up in the infield grass. That at least preserved the pylon from the post-crash conflagration of a fire off the departure end of the runway, Galling marks on the aft wing/pylon lug appear to indicate securing pin movement that could possibly have created one or more fatigue fractures, with the lug finally letting go on this takeoff. Why any pin movement was occurring, is the next question to be answered.

View attachment 86877

I'd agree but doing a thorough inspection of those mounts with any sort of NDT, in this case I'd suspect it would be either x-ray or eddy current is going to be some hard work. Visual inspections aren't appropriate in this situation. So now we have whatever number of airplanes sitting wherever around the world and they're all going to need the outboard engines and pylons removed for access. The DC-10/MD-11 fleet is fairly small and I suspect the availability of the required equipment to accomplish the work is limited. If you're going to take something off an airplane you have to have a place to set it down and store it. I don't know if UPS or Fedex has that capacity. Reminds me of a time when I was working with some folks removing a G-IV rudder, I was driving the forklift and I started asking about where we were going to set it down. We got it worked out but sometimes people get so focused on a task they stop thinking about the big picture.

Where are you seeing galling marks mentioned, or is that your analysis? The pin doesn’t ride directly in the fatigued lugs, they have a press fit bearing in them. To me some more likely possibilities include damage during the process of pressing in the bearing (or pressing it out if it has ever had to be removed for inspection or replacement), or simply a faulty fatigue analysis on the part leading to premature failure. Those bores look pretty clean to me, not corroded and I don’t see anything that looks like galling unless maybe on the portion that stayed attached to the pulling, but to me that looks more like contamination from the fire and impact. What this reminds me most of is Caravan wing strut lugs, where you had to remove the bolts every 1200 hours and your biggest risk in the process was adding a stress riser to the hole in the process of taking the bolt in and out. No idea however if the MD11 plying bearings would ever have had to be removed previously. But the metallurgy geeks at NTSB are pretty good and we will see what they come up with.

I didn’t post this earlier because I didn’t want to speculate, but the FAA/NTSB has this excellent page on the AA191 accident lessons learned, which goes into depth on the design of the DC-10/MD-11 engine 1 and 3 pylon:

To be honest I was a little surprised to learn how the DC-10/MD-11 pylon attachment works, because it’s a relatively uncommon load path compared to Boeing and Airbus pylons which use a more truss strut-braced style.

On the DC-10/MD-11 pylon, the forward attach fitting is a single integral frame/bulkhead that penetrates up into the wing box and picks up a sort of triangular shaped fitting that bolts into the forward wing spar. This presumably reacts vertical loads and side loads and moments. There looks to be a fwd-aft oriented linkage that presumably takes thrust loads from the engine, but it only shows up in one picture. The aft attach fitting is a lug and clevis style fitting, with the lug on the pylon side and the clevis on the wing side. The way it’s oriented, it would primarily be taking vertical load and reacting the pitching moment due to engine thrust along the spanwise axis of the wing.

Pylon attach cutaway:
1763926183121.jpeg


Stand alone pylon structure:
1763926227002.jpeg


Pylon attach details with a crudely drawn aircraft coordinate system. Looks to me like point C takes thrust load (force in the X-direction, Fx), A and B and their associated bolts on the wing side to the forward spar take forces in the y and z directions (Fy, Fz) and moments Mx (B probably takes most of the load with A being there to couple out Mx), and the aft attach fitting can take forces in the y and z directions (Fy, Fz) which working together with the forward fitting reacts moments My, Mz. My educated guess would be that aft fitting is primarily loaded in the Fz direction and couples out the My moment due to the thrust line of the engine offset from the wing:

1763926534226.jpeg


Finally, the lessons learned document has this view of the aft lug and clevis attach fitting, noting that the forward and aft surfaces of the lug need to be inspected for cracks:
1763927293067.jpeg


These forward and aft faces of the aft attach lug on the pylon side are exactly where the failure occurred on both the AA DC-10 and the UPS MD-11! To me, this seems a bit like lightning striking the same place twice…

Note that lug and clevis fittings are extremely common in aerospace on everything from control surface hinges to main landing gear trunnions. The lug side of the fitting gets a spherical bearing to allow for some misalignment in the assembly without transferring bending moments:
1763927588597.png


Note that simply pulling the bolt and putting a borescope or eddy current probe in the hole is NOT ENOUGH, because the spherical bearing is in the way. The two halves of the assembly must be physically separated to be able to fully inspect the faces of the lug for cracks or damage. This means unless the gaps were large enough (which I find highly doubtful), the pylon had to physically be removed from the airplane to fully inspect the lug surfaces. Further, there could be cracks in the bore between the spherical bearing and the lug that you would only be able to see by pressing out the spherical bearing and replacing it, which causes further opportunity to inadvertently damage the lug. It sounds like this is what happened with AA191 - they replaced the spherical bearing on the aft pylon attach lug, then accidentally caused damage to the freshly repaired lug while re-installing the engine/pylon with the forklift, and weren’t able to inspect the area and see the problem after installation.

Finally lugs fail in a couple common ways. The failure shown in the NTSB photos from the UPS accident is text book net-section (net-tension) failure, likely due to cracks that originated at the edge of the hole and worked their way to the edges of the lug.
1763928066434.png


I think @Roger Roger is right on with his questions. Is this going to end up being another case of inadvertent damage caused during removal and replacement of the lug spherical bearing similar to AA191, or is this aft pylon attach lug truly undersized in MD/Boeing’s fatigue analysis, requiring a re-design of the part? Either way, I find it HIGHLY suspicious that the same part failed in exactly the same way in 1979 and 2025. Design for inspectability and maintainability are both important factors in addition to fatigue. Quoting @knot4u for his past NDT inspection experience, it really looks to me like the upper faces of the lug sandwiched inside the wing clevis are in an uninspectable region, unless that gap is large enough to get a borescope or NDT probe in.

Given the extreme prevalence of lug and clevis designs in aerospace, this DC-10/MD-11 pylon design seems to be an outlier in a bad way, and I would be highly suspicious of all of them until we get more information on the status of the whole fleet. Thinking through some possible solutions, you could thicken the lug to increase the fatigue life, but this would cause a redesign of the clevis and a very costly retrofit of the wing structure to remove and replace the clevis fitting in addition to retrofitting the pylon. You could change to a higher strength material on the lug (from aluminum to titanium or steel for example), paying a weight penalty. This would require removal of the engine and pylon and retrofit of the pylon. Or you could increase the frequency of inspection, possibly resulting in an AD that removes the engine and pylon and potentially presses out the spherical bearing to inspect the bearing surface in the lug, with increasing frequency. None of this bodes well for the continued operation of the MD-11 fleet, but I guess we’ll wait and see.
 
I didn’t post this earlier because I didn’t want to speculate, but the FAA/NTSB has this excellent page on the AA191 accident lessons learned, which goes into depth on the design of the DC-10/MD-11 engine 1 and 3 pylon:

To be honest I was a little surprised to learn how the DC-10/MD-11 pylon attachment works, because it’s a relatively uncommon load path compared to Boeing and Airbus pylons which use a more truss strut-braced style.

On the DC-10/MD-11 pylon, the forward attach fitting is a single integral frame/bulkhead that penetrates up into the wing box and picks up a sort of triangular shaped fitting that bolts into the forward wing spar. This presumably reacts vertical loads and side loads and moments. There looks to be a fwd-aft oriented linkage that presumably takes thrust loads from the engine, but it only shows up in one picture. The aft attach fitting is a lug and clevis style fitting, with the lug on the pylon side and the clevis on the wing side. The way it’s oriented, it would primarily be taking vertical load and reacting the pitching moment due to engine thrust along the spanwise axis of the wing.

Pylon attach cutaway:
View attachment 86905

Stand alone pylon structure:
View attachment 86906

Pylon attach details with a crudely drawn aircraft coordinate system. Looks to me like point C takes thrust load (force in the X-direction, Fx), A and B and their associated bolts on the wing side to the forward spar take forces in the y and z directions (Fy, Fz) and moments Mx (B probably takes most of the load with A being there to couple out Mx), and the aft attach fitting can take forces in the y and z directions (Fy, Fz) which working together with the forward fitting reacts moments My, Mz. My educated guess would be that aft fitting is primarily loaded in the Fz direction and couples out the My moment due to the thrust line of the engine offset from the wing:

View attachment 86907

Finally, the lessons learned document has this view of the aft lug and clevis attach fitting, noting that the forward and aft surfaces of the lug need to be inspected for cracks:
View attachment 86908

These forward and aft faces of the aft attach lug on the pylon side are exactly where the failure occurred on both the AA DC-10 and the UPS MD-11! To me, this seems a bit like lightning striking the same place twice…

Note that lug and clevis fittings are extremely common in aerospace on everything from control surface hinges to main landing gear trunnions. The lug side of the fitting gets a spherical bearing to allow for some misalignment in the assembly without transferring bending moments:
View attachment 86909

Note that simply pulling the bolt and putting a borescope or eddy current probe in the hole is NOT ENOUGH, because the spherical bearing is in the way. The two halves of the assembly must be physically separated to be able to fully inspect the faces of the lug for cracks or damage. This means unless the gaps were large enough (which I find highly doubtful), the pylon had to physically be removed from the airplane to fully inspect the lug surfaces. Further, there could be cracks in the bore between the spherical bearing and the lug that you would only be able to see by pressing out the spherical bearing and replacing it, which causes further opportunity to inadvertently damage the lug. It sounds like this is what happened with AA191 - they replaced the spherical bearing on the aft pylon attach lug, then accidentally caused damage to the freshly repaired lug while re-installing the engine/pylon with the forklift, and weren’t able to inspect the area and see the problem after installation.

Finally lugs fail in a couple common ways. The failure shown in the NTSB photos from the UPS accident is text book net-section (net-tension) failure, likely due to cracks that originated at the edge of the hole and worked their way to the edges of the lug.
View attachment 86911

I think @Roger Roger is right on with his questions. Is this going to end up being another case of inadvertent damage caused during removal and replacement of the lug spherical bearing similar to AA191, or is this aft pylon attach lug truly undersized in MD/Boeing’s fatigue analysis, requiring a re-design of the part? Either way, I find it HIGHLY suspicious that the same part failed in exactly the same way in 1979 and 2025. Design for inspectability and maintainability are both important factors in addition to fatigue. Quoting @knot4u for his past NDT inspection experience, it really looks to me like the upper faces of the lug sandwiched inside the wing clevis are in an uninspectable region, unless that gap is large enough to get a borescope or NDT probe in.

Given the extreme prevalence of lug and clevis designs in aerospace, this DC-10/MD-11 pylon design seems to be an outlier in a bad way, and I would be highly suspicious of all of them until we get more information on the status of the whole fleet. Thinking through some possible solutions, you could thicken the lug to increase the fatigue life, but this would cause a redesign of the clevis and a very costly retrofit of the wing structure to remove and replace the clevis fitting in addition to retrofitting the pylon. You could change to a higher strength material on the lug (from aluminum to titanium or steel for example), paying a weight penalty. This would require removal of the engine and pylon and retrofit of the pylon. Or you could increase the frequency of inspection, possibly resulting in an AD that removes the engine and pylon and potentially presses out the spherical bearing to inspect the bearing surface in the lug, with increasing frequency. None of this bodes well for the continued operation of the MD-11 fleet, but I guess we’ll wait and see.

I’d remembered the DC-10 pylon design from the 191 accident, but I wasn’t sure if the MD-11 may have possibly had an updated or otherwise different design; which as you mention, it apparently does not. The damaged bearing that was discovered, am not sure what form of damage that would have allowed either to the internal or external of the aft mount; whether that bearing failure allowed direct contact inside the fitting. That will obviously have to be analyzed, as well as how that damage could have occurred; normal operation, or some kind of human caused? Be interesting to see. But yeah, this doesn’t seem to bode well for the MD fleet.
 
It will be interesting to see how this plays out. I wouldn't lay money either way. For the companies it really is the devil and the deep blue sea. If there's a fix, it's going to be expensive, time-consuming, and now you're pouring money into an airframe that probably should have been retired 10 years ago. OTOH, what choice do they have? 76s are already at a premium and there don't seem to be any extras laying around. Maybe FedEx can find some triples, but UPS doesn't have that option.

I'm sure Boeing wants out from under right now, but I'll bet management is threatening to never buy a Boeing again if Boeing hangs then out to dry.

Add to that the circus of shameless corruption in Trump's DC ("oh, a propos to nothing, I happen to be the boss of the guy who runs the FAA and I'm soliciting donations for my ball-room...")and we definitely live in Interesting Times.
Is leasing an option for UPS or FedEx?
 
Leasing what?

Judging by the ramp the last time I was in SDF, it looks like leasing whatever ATI, ABX, Amerijet, etc. can scrape together. Saw a couple of CargoJet 75s on the ramp, too. I hope the Cannuckistanis are charging OUTRAGEOUSLY, given the recent geopolitical climate.
 
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