Trans States D.O. in Hot Water...

I HATE micromanagers. I about pee myself with excitement when a captain starts out with "you know what you're doing, so start the other engine when you think its right, just let me know if you're doing anything non standard before you do it, etc".

We don't have any pilots flying who have less than 2.5 years here, so I would hope by now everyone has figured out when its bout time to spool up the other one. In my opinion its better to do it early and get stuck behind something you weren't expecting than to get close to the end and say "actually, we're not ready yet".

And that's not even mentioning the fact that I have a lot of other stuff I have to do that usually captain micromanager doesn't feel he needs to help me with if I happen to get behind.


The sad part about the 'micromanagers' that I know is that they're often very weak when it comes to procedure and systems knowledge. I think they micromanage to compensate for a lack of confidence in their abilities.
 
I can't speak on the ERJ, but with the CRJ, you've got red and amber caution messages, and it won't give you a "T/O CONFIG OK" status message. If you takeoff single engine in the CRJ, you're ignoring more than a few messages on the EICAS. However, we're not talking CRJs. I got no clue what kind of failsafes are in place with the ERJ.

Those failsafes don't exist.

T/O config will not give you anything, as it just checks parking brake, trim, flaps and...something else? No the engines.

No EICAS warnings, just "Check A1P perf" in blue.

It's a lot easier than you'd think.
 
The sad part about the 'micromanagers' that I know is that they're often very weak when it comes to procedure and systems knowledge. I think they micromanage to compensate for a lack of confidence in their abilities.

Same with guys who can quote page and verse from the OM. I had a guy point out out that "standard reserve is 2000 lbs" had the page tabbed and everything. It was hard to convince him that the number listed next to RESERVE FUEL:1843 LBS on the release is the amount we were ACTUALLY planned with. So he puts 2000 lbs into the FMS, which in essence "steals" it from somewhere else in the flight plan.

Not related to that, one of the worst captains I've EVER flown with.
 
Those failsafes don't exist.

T/O config will not give you anything, as it just checks parking brake, trim, flaps and...something else? No the engines.

No EICAS warnings, just "Check A1P perf" in blue.

It's a lot easier than you'd think.

No "L/R GEN OFF", "L/R ENG HYD PRESS", or anything else? Damned Brazilians! Or was it a Canadian jet?
 
No "L/R GEN OFF", "L/R ENG HYD PRESS", or anything else? Damned Brazilians! Or was it a Canadian jet?

Nope, and Brazilian. I don't think you got those things popping up on the EICAS because everything was automated; we wouldn't manually take a gen offline unless you had an abnormal.

At the same time, every time you got an amber or of red item pop up on the EICAS, you'd get an associated caution or warning, so you spent a lot of time mashing those two buttons. I think the worst was on landing; during rollout you'd get a *DING* and something about checking the perf data for the FADEC, because you didn't have any loaded in and the airplane had no idea you were landed and on the ground.

The real problem being when you get a real abnormal, and hopefully it didn't happen when you were expecting a normal abnormal. One captain said she was flying with a guy who got a ding at some normal time, didn't really look at the EICAS too hard, punched the button and said whatever it was, then the FO snapped his head back to the EICAS and was like, "OH CRAP BLEED LEAK!"
 
No "L/R GEN OFF", "L/R ENG HYD PRESS", or anything else? Damned Brazilians! Or was it a Canadian jet?

FWIW, you wouldn't get that on the CRJ either. The l/r gen off message only comes on if you have it selected on and its not doing anything. And on taxi out once the flaps are out of 0 the Hyd B pumps would be working, thus giving you pressure.
 
You know come to think of it, I don't think you got an EICAS message when the hydraulic pumps turned on automatically, like when you were taxing around on number 2. If you've ever heard that annoying whining in the back of an ERJ, it's that pump, and it means the captain went out on 2 and hates everybody in the back.

But frankly, it's been almost 3 years since my last PC in the thing so I'm having trouble remembering details.
 
I don't remember, offhand, which cues that the 757/767 and the mad dog give that you've only got one running, but it's relatively conspicuous.

Here, let me ask this.

Do you guys think it's more of a problem with the way the aircraft were designed and/or procedures... OR:

Just another crew combination that made a mistake that are looking to blame it on the 'system' rather than just a basic screw up?

You know, an average line pilot has a tail strike, there's retraining, slaps on the wrists, special checkrides, etc.

A check airman has a tail strike, well, there's procedural changes, memos, etc?
 
No "L/R GEN OFF", "L/R ENG HYD PRESS", or anything else? Damned Brazilians!

Hrmm... same plane where the LGCIU (or whatever it is) sends a command to a servo, waits a couple of seconds and then gives you a couple of green lights (and, maybe later, a disgree message).
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Nope, and Brazilian. I don't think you got those things popping up on the EICAS because everything was automated; we wouldn't manually take a gen offline unless you had an abnormal.

At the same time, every time you got an amber or of red item pop up on the EICAS, you'd get an associated caution or warning, so you spent a lot of time mashing those two buttons. I think the worst was on landing; during rollout you'd get a *DING* and something about checking the perf data for the FADEC, because you didn't have any loaded in and the airplane had no idea you were landed and on the ground.

The real problem being when you get a real abnormal, and hopefully it didn't happen when you were expecting a normal abnormal. One captain said she was flying with a guy who got a ding at some normal time, didn't really look at the EICAS too hard, punched the button and said whatever it was, then the FO snapped his head back to the EICAS and was like, "OH CRAP BLEED LEAK!"

Damn jtrain, you remember way more than I do about ERJ stuff. I basically remember that I was based in Houston and that you could press a button and someone would hand you coffee. ;)
 
You know come to think of it, I don't think you got an EICAS message when the hydraulic pumps turned on automatically, like when you were taxing around on number 2. If you've ever heard that annoying whining in the back of an ERJ, it's that pump, and it means the captain went out on 2 and hates everybody in the back.

Right on. The only thing that would have been up on the EICAS per our SOP when they took the runway with 1 engine running is CROSS BLD OPEN in blue. The CHECK A1 PERF wouldn't be there, depending on the EICAS revision.

The whining is what tipped our deadheaders off, because the whine never went away. The backup pump was running the entire time indicating he never spun the second engine.


Here, let me ask this.

Do you guys think it's more of a problem with the way the aircraft were designed and/or procedures... OR:

I think that there should be more EICAS messages, or tying in the takeoff config button to two indications of N2 or N1 or something. I smell another possible EICAS revision.

Just another crew combination that made a mistake that are looking to blame it on the 'system' rather than just a basic screw up?
It's a tough call. With this one, the DO rarely does any flying , however the checkairman that was with him is flying all the time. The last item(s) on our taxi checklist is FINAL ENGINE START - COMPLETE I could speculate to what was going on up there, but it's just that, pure speculation and no where based on fact.

You know, an average line pilot has a tail strike, there's retraining, slaps on the wrists, special checkrides, etc.

A check airman has a tail strike, well, there's procedural changes, memos, etc?
Exactly. He's still in his position whereas a regular line pilot would be toast by now...ESPECIALLY since this story has made the WSJ...twice.
 
Hrmm... same plane where the LGCIU (or whatever it is) sends a command to a servo, waits a couple of seconds and then gives you a couple of green lights (and, maybe later, a disgree message).
yourfile.gif
What brazilian maniac though up that system? I remember reading about that incident and going...WTF? How does the system give you 3 greens for gear not just unlocked, but still in the frikkin wheel wells?
 
Call me crazy but I don't think you need any Eicas messages or TO config buttons to verify that you've started your second engine. If you've made it to the runway, advanced the thrust levers with only 1 running, you've skipped over plenty of checklist items and are not situationally in the game. Now at this point PRESUMABLY pilots are checking engine instruments during the TO roll and within 2 seconds abort...I don't see it getting to the plane past 100kts with only 1 up and nobody noticing.
 
I don't remember, offhand, which cues that the 757/767 and the mad dog give that you've only got one running, but it's relatively conspicuous.

Here, let me ask this.

Do you guys think it's more of a problem with the way the aircraft were designed and/or procedures... OR:

Just another crew combination that made a mistake that are looking to blame it on the 'system' rather than just a basic screw up?

You know, an average line pilot has a tail strike, there's retraining, slaps on the wrists, special checkrides, etc.

A check airman has a tail strike, well, there's procedural changes, memos, etc?

I think that this is a situation that the design of this aircraft can lead to. I think that there are procedures in place that are designed to mitigate the possibility of this situation from occurring, though I don't think they're fool proof. I think there are some design defects in the EMB-145 series of aircraft that were, in large part, and as I understand them, fixed in the EMB-170/175/190/195 series of aircraft.

But with all that being said, I think the true mistake that's occurred here is that the D.O. is trying to cover it up. These kinds of things happen, and should be expected to happen on occasion with the way this aircraft was designed. He should have just admitted such and moved on like the other crews that have made this same mistake, and as I understand it, this happens a few times a year at a lot of carriers that operate this aircraft.
 
So was this a regular scheduled passenger-carrying flight?

How does an incident like this get to the point of an enforcement investigation?

For example, say a private pilot either tries to takeoff with a stuck wheel brake or it is suspected that he didn't take his foot off a pedal ... how would that lead to the FAA-be-good van?

But with all that being said, I think the true mistake that's occurred here is that the D.O. is trying to cover it up. These kinds of things happen, and should be expected to happen on occasion with the way this aircraft was designed. He should have just admitted such and moved on like the other crews that have made this same mistake, and as I understand it, this happens a few times a year at a lot of carriers that operate this aircraft.

It's thinking like that that got Armando Galarraga a new Corvette and probably kept umpire Jim Joyce from getting a lot of unwanted late night phone calls. :)
 
What brazilian maniac though up that system? I remember reading about that incident and going...WTF? How does the system give you 3 greens for gear not just unlocked, but still in the frikkin wheel wells?


The LGEU "le-goo" was completely jacked- sent a non-programmed erroneous signal. No other EICAS indications that should correspond with a gear problem were indicated. All else appeared normal...

... Jet Blue sat and watched them do it...

.. and then the FO went.. "Hey, this ain't right.."

... and that's how you get the world's only successful gear up touch-and-go. :D

At least that's how they tell the story in the school house.
 
We were told in initial that they DID have an EICAS message indicating a problem, told us which one it was, and said that just because the EICAS indicates gear down and three green does not mean it's true when associated with the above mentioned EICAS message.

That may or may not be correct, but it's what we were told, and I got the impression EMB went bat crazy sending that information along to every EMB-145 operator out there so the same mistake wouldn't happen again.
 
We were told in initial that they DID have an EICAS message indicating a problem, told us which one it was, and said that just because the EICAS indicates gear down and three green does not mean it's true when associated with the above mentioned EICAS message.

That may or may not be correct, but it's what we were told, and I got the impression EMB went bat crazy sending that information along to every EMB-145 operator out there so the same mistake wouldn't happen again.

Maybe I recall incorrectly. I think there was a gear/lever disagree, but it indicated 3 green, and all other indications appeared normal.

I ferget. Either way, the point I recall was that the malfunction was completely outside the logic tree- it was something the crew kind of had to just interpolate. They interpolated incorrectly, but based on the scenario, the LGEU should have never given a 3 Green indication. That's what they let lead them astray.

The part that hurts is the aircraft sitting short of 22R that just sat and watched... LOL
 
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