Thunderstorm At Your Destination

Personally when I see that there is going to be a situation where we have to hold for weather I try to find it out early. Then I talk to the capt and offer my suggestion. Let's slow down to save fuel and preclude holding. Before we even get to the airport I like to establish our "personal" minimum fuel. That way we don't get into the trap of saying "Just one more turn and I think it will clear out." That's the kind of stuff that gets you into trouble. Not to mention that if you have an airport as an alternate, there are probably quite a few other people that have that airport as an alternate. In this situation delay vectors and holds from ATC are going to further cut into your minimum fuel.

Some people call me overly conservative. I just like to think of myself as overly passionate about being able to work until I'm 60 (65) as an airline pilot, at a real airline.
 
I should add something to clarify my position also.

It's not that I don't care about the pax. not getting to their destination, but I don't care about that as much I care about not running out of gas. I might not have a ton of experience, but I've flown around a handful of thunderstorms and I've seen what can happen when they're blowing past an airport. What if we planned on arriving with 1,800 lbs. of gas and we get a windsheer alert on final? Ignore it and possibly run the plane into the ground because you're out of gas? This was not an isolated cell (I should have clarified that) and there was a reason we needed all that gas to be legal. What if we get unstabalized on final and we've gotta go around? Those 1,800 lbs. of gas are gone FAST and if you don't make it right back into the airport you are in some serious trouble.

There's no reason for that. The whole purpose of dispatch, decision fuel and all the other rules we operate within are to mitigate risk to the maximum extent possible within the realm of operating efficiently and on time. Personally? I don't like the idea of killing all our options on a hunch that the field will clear. Our rules are there to protect ourselves from our hunches, as greaper said.
 
jtrain609 said:
It's not that I don't care about the pax. not getting to their destination, but I don't care about that as much I care about not running out of gas....

.....but I've flown around a handful of thunderstorms and I've seen what can happen when they're blowing past an airport....


The whole purpose of dispatch, decision fuel and all the other rules we operate within are to mitigate risk to the maximum extent possible within the realm of operating efficiently and on time. Personally? I don't like the idea of killing all our options on a hunch that the field will clear. Our rules are there to protect ourselves from our hunches, as greaper said.
Click to expand...




You know John, you talk as if you have a patent on thinking a flight should be operated safely. Do you really think that the captain in your example wanted to get to your destination more than he cared about running out of fuel? Additionally, most captains have also seen their fair of thunderstorms and have probably had years of experience dealing with weather.
If the captain you so badly want to label as an idiot is in fact that bad, it says something about your system that would put him in a position to make all those horrible decisions. Have you talked to professional standards about this specific captain?

I would propose to you that most 121 captains don't make decisions on hunches or rolling the dice. In situations that become challenging, I gather as much information as I can. Some things are hard numbers and others are gathered from having seen this happen before. I may analyze 20 pieces of information before I make a decision that I think is best. On the surface a new FO may not understand, but I personally try to share with him/her some of my thinking so they feel more comfortable, but ultimately it is my decision. And by the way, some decisions I make might be seen as overly conservative to someone who would prefer to see us press on. In your original post, and with the little information I was able to contemplate, I elected to not divert right away and give it some time. Other similar situations may have me diverting not willing to hold at all. A situation like that is so unique at different times, you can't make one answer fit all scenarios.

To be perfectly honest with you John, you seem to have this attitude that reflects arrogance and an inability or unwillingness to learn from others that may know something you don't. A willingness to learn is not just reserved for the right seat either. I learn so many things from my FOs it is amazing. The reason I do is because I am willing to put the "I am captain" attitude aside and open up my ears and be willing to consider the thoughts and ideas of others. I know I have a long way to go before I am comfortable knowing all I should. In my opinion, a little humble pie on your part will take you much further than you are apt to go with your current attitude.
 
Check it out.

I could continue to defend my thinking, cite examples in the past when I was tasked with making decisions at my last company as a captain and how it relates to what I'm dealing with now and how I try to lean on my past experience while gaining knowledge from the crews I'm flying with, but I'm going to get called a know it all FO that doesn't want to listen to anybody else.

I could roll over and say, "You're right, I'm a complete idiot with no decision making skills of my own, I need to listen to everything a captain says even when it's wrong" and look like a panzy FO who would let a captain run me into a mountain because it was the captains decision to do so.

I'm damned if I do, and damned if I don't in this discussion. You've made your judgment of what you think about my attitude, decision making skills, experience, CRM skills and rational on a few paragraphs and instead of asking some questions to get some common ground and try to share some information you've decided to lecture. Congrats.

If you'd like to continue to discuss this one calcapt, and I'd love to, send me a PM because I'm done with this thread. This has gone from a discussion to a lecture and I'm not really sure what the point is because you seem to assume I haven't thought about any of the same factors that you're discussing above with the assumption that I'm unable to do so.

Also I apologize if this comes across as condescending, but I'm not really sure if I have better works to try to explain myself. Again, if you'd like to continue to discuss this, and if you'd like to try to actually impart some wisdom, feel free to send me a PM.
 
jtrain609 said:
Check it out.

I could continue to defend my thinking, cite examples in the past when I was tasked with making decisions at my last company as a captain and how it relates to what I'm dealing with now and how I try to lean on my past experience while gaining knowledge from the crews I'm flying with, but I'm going to get called a know it all FO that doesn't want to listen to anybody else.

I could roll over and say, "You're right, I'm a complete idiot with no decision making skills of my own, I need to listen to everything a captain says even when it's wrong" and look like a panzy FO who would let a captain run me into a mountain because it was the captains decision to do so.

I'm damned if I do, and damned if I don't in this discussion. You've made your judgment of what you think about my attitude, decision making skills, experience, CRM skills and rational on a few paragraphs and instead of asking some questions to get some common ground and try to share some information you've decided to lecture. Congrats.

If you'd like to continue to discuss this one calcapt, and I'd love to, send me a PM because I'm done with this thread. This has gone from a discussion to a lecture and I'm not really sure what the point is because you seem to assume I haven't thought about any of the same factors that you're discussing above with the assumption that I'm unable to do so.

Also I apologize if this comes across as condescending, but I'm not really sure if I have better works to try to explain myself. Again, if you'd like to continue to discuss this, and if you'd like to try to actually impart some wisdom, feel free to send me a PM.
Click to expand...

No apologies necessary John and no PMs are on the way. You have been subjected to the last of my lectures since I am quite certain we will never fly together, at least not at CAL.
 
I'd say so, I won't be applying to CAL. Commuting from Salt Lake to Newark, Houston or Cleveland isn't a ton of fun I've found and unless we're moving somewhere a little closer to one of those hubs, I don't expect to be at CAL.

Check your PM's, I just sent you something to try to clarify myself a little bit more.
 
Absolutely, as no PMs have been sent to John and no additional lectures are planned. BTW, welcome to the discussion which appears to be over.
 
SkyCougar said:
Interesting, apparently your reply disappeared. I was wondering how CAL would have felt about reading that, if they hadn't already.
Click to expand...

What is it you are searching for Sky? You waltz uninvited into the middle of a discussion that doesn't concern you and act like someone owes you answers. If you need drama, go turn on the TV.
 
I'm thinking that this thread has wandered far enough off-topic. PMs work well for snipping back and forth if anyone is still interested in doing so. I'd like to see any further posts in this thread directed more or less at the original topic.

That's cool, isn't it?

Oh, and I like eggs. Especially for breakfast.

:bandit:
 
jtrain609 said:
Remember that United DC-8 that crashed in Portland because they ran outta gas while troubleshooting a problem? The engineer and FO knew they were running on fumes, but because of an intimidating captain they couldn't, or wouldn't speak up. .
Click to expand...

train, if you're going to cite individual accidents, you should know what you're talking about.

This one had nothing to do with intimidation, it had everything to do with a Captain who was deathly afraid of fire. He was bound and determined to land with empty tanks and he did just that.

Unfortunately it was 10 miles short of the runway.

BTW, there was no post crash fire.
 
That's interesting, because I don't think that was mentioned in our CRM course at all. In fact the thing we talked about almost the entire time was the intimidation factor. Do you have anything I can read about that accident, either online or in a book?
 
calcapt said:
What is it you are searching for Sky? You waltz uninvited into the middle of a discussion that doesn't concern you and act like someone owes you answers. If you need drama, go turn on the TV.
Click to expand...

I'm going to honor Steve's request about this thread going off topic, so this will be my last post on this thread, but <...stopping right there works just fine.>
 
Ok I hate to continue to throw stuff into this thread, but this is what the NTSB had to say about United Flight 173, but I hate misinformation more.

"The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the captain to monitor properly the aircraft's fuel state and to properly respond to the low fuel state and the crewmember's advisories regarding fuel state. This resulted in fuel exhaustion to all engines. His inattention resulted from preoccupation with a landing gear malfunction and preparations for a possible landing emergency.

Contributing to the accident was the failure of the other two flight crewmembers either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate their concern to the captain."
 
jtrain609 said:
That's interesting, because I don't think that was mentioned in our CRM course at all. In fact the thing we talked about almost the entire time was the intimidation factor. Do you have anything I can read about that accident, either online or in a book?
Click to expand...

When I taught this accident in Navy CRM, the keys we emphasized were "Captain culture" and lack of assertiveness on the part of the F/E.

The F/E knew they were short of gas and mentioned it a couple times, but wasn't very assertive, using too many lingual qualifiers in his statements.

Back in those days, "Capt. culture" was pretty common. It still is in the Asian airlines. That's why you see Korean flying into the ground in places like Guam and Tunisia. The Capt. is determined to bust mins and the crew is so conditioned that the Capt. is God, they just sit there and let it happen.

Here's the report. What it doesn't address is the Capt's aversion to fire. The Navy had that info from other sources.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19781228-1
 
So if the Navy had it from other sources, why didn't the NTSB get a hold of that information? Wouldn't it be a factor in the accident?

I'm not necessarily doubting you, but I was taught one account of that accident in my CRM course (which was taught by a very good friend of mine who has an aviation degree in human factors) and the NTSB account seems to follow, so why hasn't it been mentioned in multiple sources?
 
SlantG said:
Has the airport been officially closed?
Click to expand...

There really is no such thing as "officially" closing an airport for thunderstorms. Airports get "closed" for thunderstorms when captains refuse to make approaches or takeoff into thunderstorms. That's why flying through thunderstorms during landing and takeoff is still a common occurrence.

Given the conditions as stated and with the caveat that what I can see and paint is what counts the most, I would probably move into my reserve fuel and wait to land at destination. I've done it in the past with no problems. I've also been the first to divert in thunderstorm conditions, which paid off handsomely when 10 planes divert behind me and I'm the first one hooked up to a fuel truck at the alternate.

It's a dynamic situation. Just make sure that no matter what, you do not penetrate a thunderstorm while less that 1500' AGL on takeoff or landing. Follow that rule your whole career and you won't become a micro-burst statistic.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top