System knowledge

[PeanuckleCRJ]

And I got a flaps-stuck-at-1 on approach the first leg after OE.

They could have at least written in the OE guide to expect that.

I had one CA in the simulator during a recurrent checkride that when he got to the Status page, he kept looking at it... looking at the FO... looking at it... looking at the FO.. then went "APPR SPEED: VREF+25". What the # does that mean?!?

He did a good job cleaning it up with the QRH, so he (and the FO, who agreed with his exclamation) got debriefed on what the # it means.

 

[MikeD]

.
2. Nobody is dismissing anything. For example, when I co-presented a paper on Asiana 214 with NTSB, FAA and Boeing in attendance it was well received by most the entire teams. Like the AF447, we found many more causal factors than the official report had. They welcome peer review. They know me as a “real” investigator. I have been working “real” accident investigations for over 20 years. This is not conspiracy theory stuff.
.

As in on an NTSB go-team or evidence analysis section of same? Or company stuff? Just curious which accidents you've worked in your time. Mine have all been military accidents, as IO and PM of the board. Top notch investigative workers in mil, but an investigation system that sadly has some built-in flaws.

 

[seagull]

As in on an NTSB go-team or evidence analysis section of same? Or company stuff? Just curious which accidents you've worked in your time. Mine have all been military accidents, as IO and PM of the board. Top notch investigative workers in mil, but an investigation system that sadly has some built-in flaws.

I’ve worked as a party member to the NTSB for the pilot association and company in domestic investigations and as an advisor to the accredited rep on International.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

1. Yes, VF article got a lot wrong. BEA did a pretty good job but they missed some things. The BEA people don’t argue that, by the way.

2. Nobody is dismissing anything. For example, when I co-presented a paper on Asiana 214 with NTSB, FAA and Boeing in attendance it was well received by most the entire teams. Like the AF447, we found many more causal factors than the official report had. They welcome peer review. They know me as a “real” investigator. I have been working “real” accident investigations for over 20 years. This is not conspiracy theory stuff.

3. You assume they knew that those things were happening. You also underestimate what we know of their skill sets.

Some of these Asian carriers are well known and documented for their "issues." It's a lot better now, but there are still carriers that have their own issues. Look at the recent engine vibration issue caused by a blade failure and the CA asked the passengers to pray.


What did you say about Asiana at SFO? You said "we found..." who is that we?

I'm sure there will be some SJW answer to that crash, but the crux of the matter is they got high on a visual, already set the Go around altitude, and the guy wanted to get down faster. As highly dependent automation pilots do, he pushed buttons to fix his rapidly degrading flight situation. So he hits FLCH to get a thrust idle descent down. But GA alt has been set so the plane climb thrusts to the 3,000 ft set. He counters that by AP off pushing the nose down and slapping the thrust levers to idle. The thrust levers going to idle here and entering hold mode then set the stage for the rest of the disaster that ensued. Now we can find (or make) all sorts of excuses for why or how the rest of the picture came together, but the guys own words in his interview was he thought the power should have kept the speed at Vref and it should have kicked in. Who knows what they were looking at, with the speed going from 137 Vref to 105ish. Not to mention the nearly constant 1,400-1,500fpm VS rate below 1,000AGL. The G/A was called way too late.

Sounds like from your post above, you are a party member for ALPA towards the NTSB hearings? If that's the case, isn't it your job to back the pilots and try and take their side, or at show the aspects from a pilot perspective? At least, that's the feeling I get reading a couple ALPA submissions on crashes that are attached as part of the accident docket. I don't mean to dismiss your experience and background - you definitely have an impressive resume. You just don't seem to fault any of the pilots when it comes to AF447.

 

[seagull]

Some of these Asian carriers are well known and documented for their "issues." It's a lot better now, but there are still carriers that have their own issues. Look at the recent engine vibration issue caused by a blade failure and the CA asked the passengers to pray.


What did you say about Asiana at SFO? You said "we found..." who is that we?

I'm sure there will be some SJW answer to that crash, but the crux of the matter is they got high on a visual, already set the Go around altitude, and the guy wanted to get down faster. As highly dependent automation pilots do, he pushed buttons to fix his rapidly degrading flight situation. So he hits FLCH to get a thrust idle descent down. But GA alt has been set so the plane climb thrusts to the 3,000 ft set. He counters that by AP off pushing the nose down and slapping the thrust levers to idle. The thrust levers going to idle here and entering hold mode then set the stage for the rest of the disaster that ensued. Now we can find (or make) all sorts of excuses for why or how the rest of the picture came together, but the guys own words in his interview was he thought the power should have kept the speed at Vref and it should have kicked in. Who knows what they were looking at, with the speed going from 137 Vref to 105ish. Not to mention the nearly constant 1,400-1,500fpm VS rate below 1,000AGL. The G/A was called way too late.

Sounds like from your post above, you are a party member for ALPA towards the NTSB hearings? If that's the case, isn't it your job to back the pilots and try and take their side, or at show the aspects from a pilot perspective? At least, that's the feeling I get reading a couple ALPA submissions on crashes that are attached as part of the accident docket. I don't mean to dismiss your experience and background - you definitely have an impressive resume. You just don't seem to fault any of the pilots when it comes to AF447.

I also was with the company teams on accidents.

The problem with your analysis is that you miss the contextual factors of why it made sense at the time to do what they did. The fact that the same thing (in Asiana 214) almost happened to an engineering test pilot for Boeing should give you some pause. Here is the paper: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/Thomas-Malmquist-ISASI.pdf

 

[seagull]

Some of these Asian carriers are well known and documented for their "issues." It's a lot better now, but there are still carriers that have their own issues. Look at the recent engine vibration issue caused by a blade failure and the CA asked the passengers to pray.


What did you say about Asiana at SFO? You said "we found..." who is that we?

I'm sure there will be some SJW answer to that crash, but the crux of the matter is they got high on a visual, already set the Go around altitude, and the guy wanted to get down faster. As highly dependent automation pilots do, he pushed buttons to fix his rapidly degrading flight situation. So he hits FLCH to get a thrust idle descent down. But GA alt has been set so the plane climb thrusts to the 3,000 ft set. He counters that by AP off pushing the nose down and slapping the thrust levers to idle. The thrust levers going to idle here and entering hold mode then set the stage for the rest of the disaster that ensued. Now we can find (or make) all sorts of excuses for why or how the rest of the picture came together, but the guys own words in his interview was he thought the power should have kept the speed at Vref and it should have kicked in. Who knows what they were looking at, with the speed going from 137 Vref to 105ish. Not to mention the nearly constant 1,400-1,500fpm VS rate below 1,000AGL. The G/A was called way too late.

Sounds like from your post above, you are a party member for ALPA towards the NTSB hearings? If that's the case, isn't it your job to back the pilots and try and take their side, or at show the aspects from a pilot perspective? At least, that's the feeling I get reading a couple ALPA submissions on crashes that are attached as part of the accident docket. I don't mean to dismiss your experience and background - you definitely have an impressive resume. You just don't seem to fault any of the pilots when it comes to AF447.

As for AF47, it doesn’t surprise me that you want to cast some blame to the pilots. With what they actually had (not what people think they had) far more pilots would have succumbed than is probably comfortable for you.

 

[z987k]

I also was with the company teams on accidents.

The problem with your analysis is that you miss the contextual factors of why it made sense at the time to do what they did. The fact that the same thing (in Asiana 214) almost happened to an engineering test pilot for Boeing should give you some pause. Here is the paper: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/Thomas-Malmquist-ISASI.pdf

Hmmm, but if you think the auto throttles are controlling airspeed in FLCH, then, to bring back the point of this thread, you don't have the required systems knowledge to fly the airplane.
A significant part of learning to fly the automation is, what is controlling the airspeed, the elevator of the auto throttles. And if at any given point you can't answer that, you need to not be flying. It's extraordinarily basic thing. That power alone is not responsible for airspeed. If it's the training's fault, that's fine, but we still cannot put a human behind the automation that doesn't understand how airplanes fly, and how the computer is flying the airplane.
If you see the airspeed decay below ref, like asiana or the emirates 777, and don't correct it, it is lack of airmanship. It might be that your training was terrible. And I'd probably agree. But that does not excuse the lack of airmanship. The power levers on a Boeing work no matter what mode they are in. You can push them forward or backwards even if the servos are commanding the opposite. (which is another can of worms. If you're fighting the autothrottles, you don't understand the automation enough to fly.)

 

[seagull]

Hmmm, but if you think the auto throttles are controlling airspeed in FLCH, then, to bring back the point of this thread, you don't have the required systems knowledge to fly the airplane.
A significant part of learning to fly the automation is, what is controlling the airspeed, the elevator of the auto throttles. And if at any given point you can't answer that, you need to not be flying. It's extraordinarily basic thing. That power alone is not responsible for airspeed. If it's the training's fault, that's fine, but we still cannot put a human behind the automation that doesn't understand how airplanes fly, and how the computer is flying the airplane.
If you see the airspeed decay below ref, like asiana or the emirates 777, and don't correct it, it is lack of airmanship. It might be that your training was terrible. And I'd probably agree. But that does not excuse the lack of airmanship. The power levers on a Boeing work no matter what mode they are in. You can push them forward or backwards even if the servos are commanding the opposite. (which is another can of worms. If you're fighting the autothrottles, you don't understand the automation enough to fly.)

Read the paper.

 

[Cessnaflyer]

The instructor mentioned the classic scenario where part of your pitot probe jams and your airspeed read out will start increasing relative to your altitude as you climb. Eventually you'll "overspeed" and normal law will add pitch up (not overridable with stick input) to "slow" the plane down, however that will just increase the speed which will cause more pitch up, until you stall. But we didn't get a chance to demo it.

That sounds incredibly frightening! What's the remedy for this?

 

[trafficinsight]

The instructor mentioned the classic scenario where part of your pitot probe jams and your airspeed read out will start increasing relative to your altitude as you climb. Eventually you'll "overspeed" and normal law will add pitch up (not overridable with stick input) to "slow" the plane down, however that will just increase the speed which will cause more pitch up, until you stall. But we didn't get a chance to demo it.

That sounds incredibly frightening! What's the remedy for this?

Bid a Boeing



Sent from my Moto Z (2) using Tapatalk

 

[BobDDuck]

That sounds incredibly frightening! What's the remedy for this?

Force the plane out of normal law by turning off two computers. I guess. It's not a standardized procedure but (to the topic of this thread) system knowledge would give you that.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

I love these threads. They remind me to never step foot on an Airbus unless absolutely necessary.

Now I’ll wait for the bizarre Airbus nerdfest to to tell me how much they love their tray table.

 

[killbilly]

I love these threads. They remind me to never step foot on an Airbus unless absolutely necessary.

Now I’ll wait for the bizarre Airbus nerdfest to to tell me how much they love their tray table.

I can't speak to the cockpit, but as a regular passenger, I have to say that the airlines (AA and Delta for me lately) are configuring them much better for pax than anything else I've been on lately. I have not been on a 777 or 787 in a few years, but plenty of MD-8x and 737-XXX and the Airbii, for me anyway, have been more pleasant.

 

[trafficinsight]

Before I get crucified by the crowd, anyone who knows me knows I don't actually care. Whatever pays better and has more days off

Even though the 175 is all hype.

Yeah I said it.

Sent from my Moto Z (2) using Tapatalk

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

I can't speak to the cockpit, but as a regular passenger, I have to say that the airlines (AA and Delta for me lately) are configuring them much better for pax than anything else I've been on lately. I have not been on a 777 or 787 in a few years, but plenty of MD-8x and 737-XXX and the Airbii, for me anyway, have been more pleasant.

I suspect it would be less pleasant if you were plunging towards the ocean and one pilot didn’t know what the other pilot was doing with the controls as their inputs cancelled each other out with no tactile feedback.

 

[Karnage]

I can't speak to the cockpit, but as a regular passenger, I have to say that the airlines (AA and Delta for me lately) are configuring them much better for pax than anything else I've been on lately..

Sure, if you're 4ft tall or your legs were amputated above the knee. My last ride in the back of a reconfigured Delta A320 was so cramped that even with three seats to myself I couldn't even stretch my legs turned sideways and quite literally had to turn 90 degrees and put my feet on the seat next to me to get comfortable. Similarly, my last ride on a United A320 my knees spent the entire trip pressed firmly into the hard plastic of the seat in front of me (was full so couldn't turn to the side). It's quite the sorry state of affairs when I have more leg room in a CRJ-200 than the comparable coach seat on a mainline bird.

 

[trafficinsight]

I can't speak to the cockpit, but as a regular passenger, I have to say that the airlines (AA and Delta for me lately) are configuring them much better for pax than anything else I've been on lately..

Sure, if you're 4ft tall or your legs were amputated above the knee. My last ride in the back of a reconfigured Delta A320 was so cramped that even with three seats to myself I couldn't even stretch my legs turned sideways and quite literally had to turn 90 degrees and put my feet on the seat next to me to get comfortable. Similarly, my last ride on a United A320 my knees spent the entire trip pressed firmly into the hard plastic of the seat in front of me (was full so couldn't turn to the side). It's quite the sorry state of affairs when I have more leg room in a CRJ-200 than the comparable coach seat on a mainline bird.

Are you like 6'10"?

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[PeanuckleCRJ]

That sounds incredibly frightening! What's the remedy for this?

In that situation, you should end up with an ECAM message for air data disagreement driving you to swap air data inputs before anything gets too ugly. Otherwise, he's right to drive the plane into Alternate law (which the gentlest method actually is turning off 2 air data computers... choose wisely in this situation)

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

I love these threads. They remind me to never step foot on an Airbus unless absolutely necessary.

Now I’ll wait for the bizarre Airbus nerdfest to to tell me how much they love their tray table.

Do you avoid MD's because of jackscrew issues and the cockpit largely being a square peg shoved rather firmly into a round hole?

Similarly, do you avoid 737s because of rudder hardovers?

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

Do you avoid MD's because of jackscrew issues and the cockpit largely being a square peg shoved rather firmly into a round hole?

Similarly, do you avoid 737s because of rudder hardovers?

Never say anything bad about a Douglas product! Blasphemy! Woe unto you!

I avoid 737s because, well, they suck. But I do tend to get stuck on them a lot since Fort Widget in its vast wisdom somehow thinks it's a swell idea to fly them across the country. I'll go out of my way to ride a 75/6. Once they're retired, it's really going to suck. I think I'm going to need to buy a jet before then.

The issues with the jackscrews and the rudder hardovers are obviously well in the past, but they could have happened to any airplane. The problem with Airbus is the entire design philosophy, not a specific mechanical malfunction. Airplanes should behave like airplanes, not what software engineers think airplanes should behave like.