System knowledge

[ASpilot2be]

So much for trying to continuously improve yourself, eh?

I don't think that comment is really fair. Just because we arent in the books on our days off trying to learn systems, it doesnt mean we arent trying to improve ourselves. Most of my learning comes on the line.

Everybody is different, but I dont want to know every little system in my head. Because, knowing how I work, I might think outside the box and mix something up. But what I do think we should be given is a systems manual and taught the basics of how to look things up. That is the greatest advantage to having the iPad. We can have a crap ton of manuals, and a search feature. I learned more about systems by having things go wrong, trouble shoot it with MX, then later looking it up in the AOM.

Another point is I find systems in new hire ground to be kind of a memorization event, with some understanding. But after a year in the airplane, its amazing how much more you grasp in recurrent. I almost think recurrent should have the bigger systems emphasis.

 

[seagull]

The most recent AQP program I went through consisted of 14 days of sim, which was a hell of a lot, but hey, if they are going to give us the time, we might as well use it. During that 14 day period, both my sim partner and I did EIGHT flap/slat jams each plus god knows how many V1 (and V2... on my checkride) cuts. We did one unknown flight computer failure (which ended with the airspeed being unreliable) and one FM computer failure. Seems... practical.

What type of aircraft?

 

[BobDDuck]

What type of aircraft?

NB Airbus.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

No, I'm saying that virtually no current flying airline pilot in the U.S. would recognize what a stall looks like at altitude, or, more specifically, as we have now finally started EE training, virtually none would have at that time. Most still would not. That is because the real deal is completely outside of what you'd expect. Interestingly, the Boeing and Airbus engineering test pilots I work with are not at all surprised the pilots did not recognize it.

It is certainly not what I would expect. Nor what I had assumed, given the airline pilots I know. That's rather terrifying. How can that be? I'm rendered a tad incredulous. I know the world is going to hell. Every generation gets a bit more self-satisfied, entitled, crowded, and fatuous... but airline pilots who can't recognize a stall?!? Surely the end times are nigh.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

"I haven't read your book, but ..." has got to be the worst way to found a contrarian position. But welcome to the internets.

@seagull great book btw.

It's just full disclosure. Nothing else intended. I have read a bunch of Shem's blog posts.
That said, is a concise precis statement too much to ask for?

 

[Deleted member 27505]

I don't think that comment is really fair. Just because we arent in the books on our days off trying to learn systems, it doesnt mean we arent trying to improve ourselves. Most of my learning comes on the line.

On the line? From whom? All those airline pilots who can't recognize a stall??

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

The most recent AQP program I went through consisted of 14 days of sim, which was a hell of a lot, but hey, if they are going to give us the time, we might as well use it. During that 14 day period, both my sim partner and I did EIGHT flap/slat jams each plus god knows how many V1 (and V2... on my checkride) cuts. We did one unknown flight computer failure (which ended with the airspeed being unreliable) and one FM computer failure. Seems... practical.

That is a fascinatingly strange footprint. The flap/slat malfunction is a bit strange on the bus, but geez... we only do a flaps locked in the lesson before the MV and you get slats locked in the MV.

Was that an Airbus school or HA's?

 

[BobDDuck]

That is a fascinatingly strange footprint. The flap/slat malfunction is a bit strange on the bus, but geez... we only do a flaps locked in the lesson before the MV and you get slats locked in the MV.

Was that an Airbus school or HA's?

I think it was mostly an Airbus thing.

I went through as an N&O crew so that may have had something to do with it. Our footprint was set up to "match" the AQP footprint (we were the last N&O crew... they got the AQP stamp 3 days after we started training), so it's possible the actual AQP footprint was more balanced.

 

[seagull]

I think it was mostly an Airbus thing.

I went through as an N&O crew so that may have had something to do with it. Our footprint was set up to "match" the AQP footprint (we were the last N&O crew... they got the AQP stamp 3 days after we started training), so it's possible the actual AQP footprint was more balanced.

What about handling with degraded flight control laws?

 

[seagull]

It's just full disclosure. Nothing else intended. I have read a bunch of Shem's blog posts.
That said, is a concise precis statement too much to ask for?

Did you read the high altitude stall article?

 

[BobDDuck]

What about handling with degraded flight control laws?

During the stall series, but that was just because you have to enable alternate law to fool the pitch protections. During steep turns you end up outside the roll protections so there is some degradation there. I think we did one double hydraulic failure that ended up with a pretty degraded setup also. But that was pretty much it.

The instructor mentioned the classic scenario where part of your pitot probe jams and your airspeed read out will start increasing relative to your altitude as you climb. Eventually you'll "overspeed" and normal law will add pitch up (not overridable with stick input) to "slow" the plane down, however that will just increase the speed which will cause more pitch up, until you stall. But we didn't get a chance to demo it.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

Did you read the high altitude stall article?

Yes I have previously, and I just went over to your site and reread it.

Upon rereading, my first takeaway is that it is very difficult to recognize a stall in a modern airliner by seat-of-the-pant means. All the stuff you learned - or should have learned - in your first 20 flight lessons lessons (feel, sound, etc) are not present in these remarkable airframes.

My initial-post takeaway remains much the same as it was before rereading the article. To wit, it is possible by several means to recognize a high altitude stall - fairly easily, if you know what to look for.

My most profoundly shocking takeaway is your assertion that high-hour professional pilots are NOT being trained how to do so, or what to look for. You are much closer to it than I, and I defer to your knowledge and experience, but wow, that's hard bite to swallow. If that's true, it's rather terrifying and probably falls somewhere between gross negligence and malpractice.

Still, it comports largely with what I said earlier about a lack of basic airmanship. If you're flying a plane and you are unable to recognize its stall characteristics, I would classify that as a lack of basic airmanship skills/knowledge. I'm not classifying basic airmanship as a function of one's position in the training sequence, one's hour count, the size or shininess of the aircraft one is entrusted to fly, or the type of operation under which the airplane is being operated. I'm classifying basic airmanship as knowing how and why your particular aircraft flies and how and why it doesn't... what makes it fly, what makes it stop flying; AND knowing where to look, and at what to look to assess a given situation and make an informed, cross-checked assessment of the state of the aircraft.

My earlier post referenced recognizing a stall without instruments. So, in a modern airliner, you can't feel anything... I will humbly concur because I haven't been there and don't know what you know. But in the Modern/FBW/EFIS/Pinging Machine/AP Driven/Cockpit-Tray-Table-Equipped airliner, there is still an AOA indicator. Or no? If you've got an AOA indicator or any of several other Tell-Me-The-Truth Indicators, you ought to be able to quickly discern the truth.

Notwithstanding the ebulliently vociferous skepticism of some of my earlier posts, I think we are largely on the same page... with perhaps a tad bit of semantic delta: Pilots need to know their airplanes so they can be aware of what their airplanes are doing at any given point in time.




I have specific question regarding your article:

"Meanwhile, the roll mode went to “direct law”. In “normal” operation the pilot would have become accustomed to the Airbus FBW mode where stick movement commands roll rate and centralizing the stick gives zero roll rate (holds the bank angle). However in direct law stick movement commands roll acceleration and centralizing the stick leaves the pilot with a residual roll rate. To cancel that one must apply opposite stick motion."

Are you saying that in an Airbus under "Normal" Airbus Law centering the stick stops inertial roll moment and no correction is required?!? If so, OH! THE HORROR! It acts like a real airplane in a real world! Seriously, fire all pilots. Let's just go to drones NOW... or hire video gamers to wear epaulets and sit in those cockpit-tray-table-equipped seats. 'Cause that's not how physics works.

On second thought, just shut down airlines and have everyone travel via VR goggles. That would be soooo much easier.

 

[seagull]

Yes I have previously, and I just went over to your site and reread it.

Upon rereading, my first takeaway is that it is very difficult to recognize a stall in a modern airliner by seat-of-the-pant means. All the stuff you learned - or should have learned - in your first 20 flight lessons lessons (feel, sound, etc) are not present in these remarkable airframes.

My initial-post takeaway remains much the same as it was before rereading the article. To wit, it is possible by several means to recognize a high altitude stall - fairly easily, if you know what to look for.

My most profoundly shocking takeaway is your assertion that high-hour professional pilots are NOT being trained how to do so, or what to look for. You are much closer to it than I, and I defer to your knowledge and experience, but wow, that's hard bite to swallow. If that's true, it's rather terrifying and probably falls somewhere between gross negligence and malpractice.

Still, it comports largely with what I said earlier about a lack of basic airmanship. If you're flying a plane and you are unable to recognize its stall characteristics, I would classify that as a lack of basic airmanship skills/knowledge. I'm not classifying basic airmanship as a function of one's position in the training sequence, one's hour count, the size or shininess of the aircraft one is entrusted to fly, or the type of operation under which the airplane is being operated. I'm classifying basic airmanship as knowing how and why your particular aircraft flies and how and why it doesn't... what makes it fly, what makes it stop flying; AND knowing where to look, and at what to look to assess a given situation and make an informed, cross-checked assessment of the state of the aircraft.

My earlier post referenced recognizing a stall without instruments. So, in a modern airliner, you can't feel anything... I will humbly concur because I haven't been there and don't know what you know. But in the Modern/FBW/EFIS/Pinging Machine/AP Driven/Cockpit-Tray-Table-Equipped airliner, there is still an AOA indicator. Or no? If you've got an AOA indicator or any of several other Tell-Me-The-Truth Indicators, you ought to be able to quickly discern the truth.

Notwithstanding the ebulliently vociferous skepticism of some of my earlier posts, I think we are largely on the same page... with perhaps a tad bit of semantic delta: Pilots need to know their airplanes so they can be aware of what their airplanes are doing at any given point in time.

I have specific question regarding your article:

"Meanwhile, the roll mode went to “direct law”. In “normal” operation the pilot would have become accustomed to the Airbus FBW mode where stick movement commands roll rate and centralizing the stick gives zero roll rate (holds the bank angle). However in direct law stick movement commands roll acceleration and centralizing the stick leaves the pilot with a residual roll rate. To cancel that one must apply opposite stick motion."

Are you saying that in an Airbus under "Normal" Airbus Law centering the stick stops inertial roll moment and no correction is required?!? If so, OH! THE HORROR! It acts like a real airplane in a real world! Seriously, fire all pilots. Let's just go to drones NOW... or hire video gamers to wear epaulets and sit in those cockpit-tray-table-equipped seats. 'Cause that's not how physics works.

On second thought, just shut down airlines and have everyone travel via VR goggles. That would be soooo much easier.

It is possible to learn (that's what Jeff Schroeder (FAA chief scientist, flight simulation) has been working on to get part 60 implemented), but it has not been trained up until very recently where some carriers have adopted it (and all are required to by 2019).

No, very few airliner type aircraft have an AoA. Technically you can derive it looking at your path vector indicator and comparing it to the pitch attitude, except that doesn't work with a loss of pitot inputs (convenient, right?). Airbus does have a new system that has been added that provides a replacement indication if you lose pitot inputs now, and the 787 and A350 have a system that shows a "synthetic airspeed" if the normal system fails. To my knowledge, there is nothing equivalent in the other Boeing models. One of the issues with AoA is that you really need to train it, and pretty much nobody does, so even those that have it are not really trained. Like the stall issue, it is not as simple as in a light airplane.

As for the roll control in the Bus in normal vs. direct, yes, it does act like a normal airplane, except, and this is important, BECAUSE it normally is a rate control, the direct control is MUCH more sensitive than what would have been allowed for certification if it was not just part of a failure mode. You've never flown an airplane that is flying outside of what the requirements are, most likely (pretty much only engineering test pilots have). There is a reason those rules are in place!

It is akin to flying an airplane with the CG aft of the CP. Maybe you could handle it, but now put yourself in the thin air of 35,000 feet. Could you still?

So, one could argue it is "basic airmanship", but I am VERY resistant to that as it implies it is somehow the fault of the pilots for not having "it". When there is no way to obtain the skills or knowledge (outside of articles like mine, or my book), how do you blame the pilot for not having those skills? There is a blame implicit in the statement "they lacked basic airmanship", and like calling PIO "pilot INDUCED oscillation" vs. "pilot INVOLVED oscillation" (which is more correct), it is better to stay way from blame, even if it is just implicit -- because it's factually incorrect and misleading.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

It is possible to learn (that's what Jeff Schroeder (FAA chief scientist, flight simulation) has been working on to get part 60 implemented), but it has not been trained up until very recently where some carriers have adopted it (and all are required to by 2019).

No, very few airliner type aircraft have an AoA. Technically you can derive it looking at your path vector indicator and comparing it to the pitch attitude, except that doesn't work with a loss of pitot inputs (convenient, right?). Airbus does have a new system that has been added that provides a replacement indication if you lose pitot inputs now, and the 787 and A350 have a system that shows a "synthetic airspeed" if the normal system fails. To my knowledge, there is nothing equivalent in the other Boeing models. One of the issues with AoA is that you really need to train it, and pretty much nobody does, so even those that have it are not really trained. Like the stall issue, it is not as simple as in a light airplane.

As for the roll control in the Bus in normal vs. direct, yes, it does act like a normal airplane, except, and this is important, BECAUSE it normally is a rate control, the direct control is MUCH more sensitive than what would have been allowed for certification if it was not just part of a failure mode. You've never flown an airplane that is flying outside of what the requirements are, most likely (pretty much only engineering test pilots have). There is a reason those rules are in place!

It is akin to flying an airplane with the CG aft of the CP. Maybe you could handle it, but now put yourself in the thin air of 35,000 feet. Could you still?

So, one could argue it is "basic airmanship", but I am VERY resistant to that as it implies it is somehow the fault of the pilots for not having "it". When there is no way to obtain the skills or knowledge (outside of articles like mine, or my book), how do you blame the pilot for not having those skills? There is a blame implicit in the statement "they lacked basic airmanship", and like calling PIO "pilot INDUCED oscillation" vs. "pilot INVOLVED oscillation" (which is more correct), it is better to stay way from blame, even if it is just implicit -- because it's factually incorrect and misleading.

Sorry if my posts made it sound like I was putting anyone down; That was not my intent. While I'm still blown away that this has not been trained, I am not blaming pilots for not knowing something they were never taught. I explicitly stated that some pilots lacked some basic airmanship. But that explicit statement was not meant to imply they did not have "it".

I do blame operators for not training this subject. I do think they've known about it for a while. I know for certain that at least some knowledge of this subject has been floating around for quite some time. I've had discussions about it with a handful of very experienced and capable airline pilots over the years. (Maybe that's why most of those guys flew non FBW Boeings. ) So one would infer that the operators have known about this.

With no blame attached - except, perhaps to those who are issuing the training - I still see this as a lack of basic airmanship. It's stalls... you know, that thing that happens when the wing stops flying. It doesn't get much more basic than that. We didn't learn all that aerodynamics to sound cool at cocktail parties. We learned it to apply it across virtually every decision we make across the span of our flying careers. That's my definition of basic.

It's for that reason that I do kind of think there's at least some responsibility to know what you don't know and act accordingly. If you understand basic aerodynamics, you uderstand that planes can stall. If you understand that planes can stall, you understand that you've got to be able to recognize stalls and either prevent them or recover from them. If you understand that imperative, and you also understand that you lack the training to know how to accomplish that imperative, then what??

No AOA in most airliners, hmm. That's is surprising to me, too. Especially in FBW/Electric jets in which so much instrumentation is muddled together into a euphoric blender of electronic delight, AOA would seem to be a good old fashioned failsafe. An AOA indicator saved my bacon recently during a total pitot/static failure. But like you said, you've got to know the equipment and how to use it and practice doing so. Thankfully I do practice. It's my 7-UP. The seventh instrument in the 6 pack that keeps me up in the air. It did so that day ... airspeed +/- 5kts ... by AOA, power setting, and the phase of flight.

In any case, I'm glad the HA stall is now going to be required training.

Finally, thanks for the work you do and all the terrific info on your blog!

 

[z987k]

To be clear every airliner has multiple aoa vanes. The designers are unwilling to give aoa information to the pilots. Just the computers.

 

[seagull]

Sorry if my posts made it sound like I was putting anyone down; That was not my intent. While I'm still blown away that this has not been trained, I am not blaming pilots for not knowing something they were never taught. I explicitly stated that some pilots lacked some basic airmanship. But that explicit statement was not meant to imply they did not have "it".

I do blame operators for not training this subject. I do think they've known about it for a while. I know for certain that at least some knowledge of this subject has been floating around for quite some time. I've had discussions about it with a handful of very experienced and capable airline pilots over the years. (Maybe that's why most of those guys flew non FBW Boeings. ) So one would infer that the operators have known about this.

With no blame attached - except, perhaps to those who are issuing the training - I still see this as a lack of basic airmanship. It's stalls... you know, that thing that happens when the wing stops flying. It doesn't get much more basic than that. We didn't learn all that aerodynamics to sound cool at cocktail parties. We learned it to apply it across virtually every decision we make across the span of our flying careers. That's my definition of basic.

It's for that reason that I do kind of think there's at least some responsibility to know what you don't know and act accordingly. If you understand basic aerodynamics, you uderstand that planes can stall. If you understand that planes can stall, you understand that you've got to be able to recognize stalls and either prevent them or recover from them. If you understand that imperative, and you also understand that you lack the training to know how to accomplish that imperative, then what??

No AOA in most airliners, hmm. That's is surprising to me, too. Especially in FBW/Electric jets in which so much instrumentation is muddled together into a euphoric blender of electronic delight, AOA would seem to be a good old fashioned failsafe. An AOA indicator saved my bacon recently during a total pitot/static failure. But like you said, you've got to know the equipment and how to use it and practice doing so. Thankfully I do practice. It's my 7-UP. The seventh instrument in the 6 pack that keeps me up in the air. It did so that day ... airspeed +/- 5kts ... by AOA, power setting, and the phase of flight.

In any case, I'm glad the HA stall is now going to be required training.

Finally, thanks for the work you do and all the terrific info on your blog!

It’s not that pilots don’t know they can stall, it is that they don’t know (and had no reason to suspect) that the characteristics of the stall would be so outside of their experience or expectations.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

NB Airbus.

Aroo? You left the MD95 for the A321NEO, an upgrade to left seat?

Either way, congrats!

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Pretty much wrong on every point, is your source Vanity Fair by any chance? By the way, I don't "have a book to sell". I wrote it after several years of research as an experienced accident investigator, and the reason was because so many people have this accident completely wrong, and so wrong in fact, that they are at real risk of falling victim to an event that is just enough different that they don't recognize it. As someone that distinctly does not enjoy working accidents, it did it out of a sense of duty to an industry I care about. That is why I happily also share my knowledge here and on my blog.

From your previous post, not only did you disagree with the VF article, but also with many parts of the *official* crash investigation report from the BEA.

and here it is again:

we train what we think is the scenario (usually wrong, though, as the investigations are very flawed).

So when you start claiming your 777 CA experience and accident investigating background, and you start off by basically dismissing the other REAL investigators whose full time real job is investigating these accidents and issuing reports and recommendations, you start to lose credibility. You then become no different than the TWA and AA pilots who wrote/published books on the TWA 800 and AA 587 claiming the investigators got it all wrong and that there was a massive coverup.

It’s not that pilots don’t know they can stall, it is that they don’t know (and had no reason to suspect) that the characteristics of the stall would be so outside of their experience or expectations.

Who would have thought pitching 15 degrees nose up in the Flight Levels climbing to FL380 hitting 7,000fpm VS upwards would have led to a stall? Shocking! At least you admit something: outside of their EXPERIENCE. And with 2,900 hrs babysitting an Airbus autopilot for most of that time, he didn't have much in the experience bucket. And the luck bucket was nowhere to be found.

 

[seagull]

From your previous post, not only did you disagree with the VF article, but also with many parts of the *official* crash investigation report from the BEA.

and here it is again:



So when you start claiming your 777 CA experience and accident investigating background, and you start off by basically dismissing the other REAL investigators whose full time real job is investigating these accidents and issuing reports and recommendations, you start to lose credibility. You then become no different than the TWA and AA pilots who wrote/published books on the TWA 800 and AA 587 claiming the investigators got it all wrong and that there was a massive coverup.






Who would have thought pitching 15 degrees nose up in the Flight Levels climbing to FL380 hitting 7,000fpm VS upwards would have led to a stall? Shocking! At least you admit something: outside of their EXPERIENCE. And with 2,900 hrs babysitting an Airbus autopilot for most of that time, he didn't have much in the experience bucket. And the luck bucket was nowhere to be found.

1. Yes, VF article got a lot wrong. BEA did a pretty good job but they missed some things. The BEA people don’t argue that, by the way.

2. Nobody is dismissing anything. For example, when I co-presented a paper on Asiana 214 with NTSB, FAA and Boeing in attendance it was well received by most the entire teams. Like the AF447, we found many more causal factors than the official report had. They welcome peer review. They know me as a “real” investigator. I have been working “real” accident investigations for over 20 years. This is not conspiracy theory stuff.

3. You assume they knew that those things were happening. You also underestimate what we know of their skill sets.

 

[Nick]

That is a fascinatingly strange footprint. The flap/slat malfunction is a bit strange on the bus, but geez... we only do a flaps locked in the lesson before the MV and you get slats locked in the MV.

And I got a flaps-stuck-at-1 on approach the first leg after OE.

They could have at least written in the OE guide to expect that.