Spoiler alert, Allegiant is under the microscope.

Bring cake:
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MikeD said:
In the same way that people were afraid to fly DC-10s post Chicago/1979. That was the fault of both the NTSB chairman's idiotic comments in a news conference, and the news running away with it. DC-10s, due to the scrutiny, were one of probably one of the safest planes to fly at that point, with regards to the airline fleet.
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It's off-topic, but I'd have to disagree with you on the safety of the DC-10. I refused to fly them before the Chicago crash, and insisting on a change in flights subsequently saved my honeymoon when they were grounded post-Chicago back in '79. As for their safety record, it was bad even before Chicago — Turkish Airlines flight 981 being one example.

Good read: The Rise and Fall of the DC-10 by John Godson, written pre-Chicago.
 
RDoug said:
It's off-topic, but I'd have to disagree with you on the safety of the DC-10. I refused to fly them before the Chicago crash, and insisting on a change in flights subsequently saved my honeymoon when they were grounded post-Chicago back in '79. As for their safety record, it was bad even before Chicago — Turkish Airlines flight 981 being one example.

Good read: The Rise and Fall of the DC-10 by John Godson, written pre-Chicago.
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Problem was, the chairman spoke out of turn and way too early, with information that had nothing to do with the airplane itself when it came to the Chicago crash, and turned out to be a maintenance issue entirely. That certainly didn't help the reputation of an airplane that indeed had a few accidents/incidents under its belt already. But Chicago isn't one that should've been charged to the airplane, due to the NTSBs negligence in a news conference. That pretty much sealed the fate of the DC-10 in terms of its reputation, and sadly that was probably undeserved. Look at the USAF KC-10 fleet for instance, only one ever lost in a maintenance ground accident at Barksdale, in the history of that program. One of the most successful aircraft the USAF has.

I agree that the DC-10 had a rough start in its life in the '70s. But Chicago wasn't a bill it should've had to pay for in that respect.
 
MikeD said:
Problem was, the chairman spoke out of turn and way too early, with information that had nothing to do with the airplane itself when it came to the Chicago crash, and turned out to be a maintenance issue entirely. That certainly didn't help the reputation of an airplane that indeed had a few accidents/incidents under its belt already. But Chicago isn't one that should've been charged to the airplane, due to the NTSBs negligence in a news conference. That pretty much sealed the fate of the DC-10 in terms of its reputation, and sadly that was probably undeserved. Look at the USAF KC-10 fleet for instance, only one ever lost in a maintenance ground accident at Barksdale, in the history of that program. One of the most successful aircraft the USAF has.

I agree that the DC-10 had a rough start in its life in the '70s. But Chicago wasn't a bill it should've had to pay for in that respect.
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United 232 also showed the 'roughness' of the DC-10 program and that was well after these incidents...
 
Seggy said:
United 232 also showed the 'roughness' of the DC-10 program and that was well after these incidents...
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And that is an accident that definitely highlighted a major flaw with the DC-10 series, far more than anything with the Chicago accident which was all maintenance. 232 can definitely be held up as a viable example. Much in the same way USAir 427 highlighted the previously unknown rudder hardover problems with the 737. Still, the DC-10 has had an overall succesful career, taken as a whole. Especially with the KC-10.
 
We'll just have to agree to disagree, Mike. In my book, while maintenance may have contributed to the the Chicago accident it was a design flaw that made it worse than it should have been — bundling the primary and both back-up hydraulic lines together and then compounding that issue by running them along the leading edge of the wing, an area of the wing most susceptible to damage. That design flaw of bundling together primary and back-up hydraulic lines reared its ugly head again in the United Sioux City crash, although the hydraulics in that case were taken out by an uncontained failure of engine #2.

That plane was riddled with design flaws far beyond just the hydraulics, including structurally weak cabin floors through which the control cable ran to poorly designed cargo doors that blew under pressurized conditions in flight.
 
RDoug said:
We'll just have to agree to disagree, Mike. In my book, while maintenance may have contributed to the the Chicago accident it was a design flaw that made it worse than it should have been — bundling the primary and both back-up hydraulic lines together and then compounding that issue by running them along the leading edge of the wing, an area of the wing most susceptible to damage. That design flaw of bundling together primary and back-up hydraulic lines reared its ugly head again in the United Sioux City crash, although the hydraulics in that case were taken out by an uncontained failure of engine #2.

That plane was riddled with design flaws far beyond just the hydraulics, including structurally weak cabin floors through which the control cable ran to poorly designed cargo doors that blew under pressurized conditions in flight.
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If you only knew how many "gotcha's" there is amongst the entire fleet of aircraft flying in the US, you never even allow an airplane to fly over your house.
 
mshunter said:
If you only knew how many "gotcha's" there is amongst the entire fleet of aircraft flying in the US, you never even allow an airplane to fly over your house.
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Could be, Mike, but those "gotchas" haven't killed nearly as many people as the ones on the DC-10. ;)
 
RDoug said:
We'll just have to agree to disagree, Mike. In my book, while maintenance may have contributed to the the Chicago accident it was a design flaw that made it worse than it should have been — bundling the primary and both back-up hydraulic lines together and then compounding that issue by running them along the leading edge of the wing, an area of the wing most susceptible to damage. That design flaw of bundling together primary and back-up hydraulic lines reared its ugly head again in the United Sioux City crash, although the hydraulics in that case were taken out by an uncontained failure of engine #2.

That plane was riddled with design flaws far beyond just the hydraulics, including structurally weak cabin floors through which the control cable ran to poorly designed cargo doors that blew under pressurized conditions in flight.
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191 was flyable though. It was the speed portion of the engine failure procedure that (unknown that it would), killed the crew. Had maintenance at AA and even other airlines not been using a procedure on their end that was specifically forbidden by the manfacturer, just so they could save time and money, 191 would've never occurred.

I agree that 232 is a much better example of the design issues coming to light with hydro lines that met at potentially critcal points, which had to be immediately corrected. Potentially critical, which became definitely critical due to the #2 engine location were there to ever be an uncontained failure, which unfortunately finally occurred.

The DC-10 had some serious growing issues, I fully agree. I don't deny that and history supports that. Whether due to rapid design or build to compete with the L-1011 or what, but I think that taken overall as a grand picture, the life of the jet can be considered successful. Even still being around today as the MD-10/11 and KC-10. Just one viewpoint.

Ultimately it comes to what measurements are used I guess. Making one opinion no more or less right/wrong than the other. I do see your points about the rough early life and some of the design issues.
 
Beefy McGee said:
What is this hydraulic pump gotcha you are referring to?
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Switchology with the two number 3 pumps. Crew in preflight accidentally switched both the 3A and 3B pump on at the same time, which blew out the accumulators. The force of the blowout took the fuel lines to both engines with it.

In flight, that would have left them with no hydraulics, no engines, and no IDG's.
 
gotWXdagain said:
Switchology with the two number 3 pumps. Crew in preflight accidentally switched both the 3A and 3B pump on at the same time, which blew out the accumulators. The force of the blowout took the fuel lines to both engines with it.

In flight, that would have left them with no hydraulics, no engines, and no IDG's.
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Ah. Thanks! I never heard sbout this incident. Do you know any more details (flight number etc) that would help me find a report on it?
 
gotWXdagain said:
Switchology with the two number 3 pumps. Crew in preflight accidentally switched both the 3A and 3B pump on at the same time, which blew out the accumulators. The force of the blowout took the fuel lines to both engines with it.

In flight, that would have left them with no hydraulics, no engines, and no IDG's.
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I too am curious about more info about this particular incident. Always want to learn what's not in the books.
 
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