Safety Culture at Middle Eastern Carriers

Some will, some won't, I imagine. Only thing I've found available to flight crews is a training publication for the 777 where's it's discussed, but nothing necessarily procedural in a formal manner

Which is too bad, because structural damage can happen to any aircraft, for any reason; not just something that happens in combat or being shot at or not. But the 777 training publication had it under "Situations beyond the scope of non-normal checklists" section, which presented it not as a procedure, but as a guideline or conventional wisdom; where judgement, airmanship, and experience play large parts. Good stuff, don't know why it's not part of normal training, as every pilot should be made aware of this kind of information. Stating, in part:


"Damage Assessment and Airplane Handling Evaluation

Unless circumstances such as imminent airplane breakup or loss of control dictate otherwise, the crew should take time to assess the effects of the damage and/or conditions before attempting to land. Make configuration and airspeed changes slowly until a damage assessment and airplane handling evaluation have been done and it is certain that lower airspeeds can be safely used. In addition, limit bank angle to 15° and avoid large or rapid changes in engine thrust and airspeed that might adversely affect controllability. If possible, conduct the damage assessment and handling evaluation at an altitude that provides a safe margin for recovery should flight path control be inadvertently compromised. It is necessary for the flight crew to use good judgment in consideration of the existing conditions and circumstances to determine an appropriate altitude for this evaluation.

The evaluation should start with an examination of flight deck indications to assess damage. Consideration should be given to the potential cumulative effect of the damage. A thorough understanding of airplane systems operation can greatly facilitate this task. If structural damage is suspected, attempt to assess the magnitude of the damage by direct visual observation from the flight deck and/or passenger cabin. While only a small portion of the airplane is visible to the flight crew from the flight deck, any visual observation data can be used to gain maximum knowledge of airplane configuration and status and can be valuable in determining subsequent actions.

The flight crew should consider contacting the company to inform them of the situation and use them as a potential source of information. In addition to current and forecast weather, and airfield conditions, it may be possible to obtain technical information and recommendations from expert sources. These expert sources are
available from within the company as well as from Boeing.

If controllability is in question, consider performing a check of the airplane handling characteristics. The purpose of this check is to determine minimum safe speeds and the appropriate configuration for landing. If flap damage has occurred, prior to accomplishing this check, consider the possible effects on airplane control should an asymmetrical condition occur if flap position is changed. Accomplish this check by slowly and methodically reducing speed and lowering the flaps. Lower the landing gear only if available thrust allows. As a starting point, use the flap/speed schedule as directed in the appropriate NNC. If stick shaker or initial stall buffet are encountered at or before reaching the associated flap speed, or if a rapid increase in wheel deflection and full rudder deflection are necessary to maintain wings level, increase speed to a safe level and consider this speed to be the minimum approach speed for the established configuration.

After the damage assessment and handling characteristics are evaluated, the crew should formulate a sequential plan for the completion of the flight. If the airplane is very difficult to control, as a last resort consider disconnecting the primary flight control computers. Once disconnected, leave them disconnected for the remainder of the flight unless the disconnect makes the situation worse.

If airplane performance is a concern, use of the alternate flap or gear extension systems may dictate that the check of airplane handling characteristics be done during the actual approach. Configuration changes made by the alternate systems may not be reversible. The crew must exercise extreme caution on final approach with special emphasis on minimum safe speeds and proper airplane configuration. If asymmetrical thrust is being used for roll control or pitch authority is limited, plan to leave thrust on until touchdown."

The bold is my emphasis. You should be training for the higher probabilities of scenarios, not the rarity where something like the airplane is damaged once it becomes airborne.

Yes, it should be discussed, absolutely, but to waste time in the highly unlikely event you have substantial damage once airborne isn't smart. Now, for @mikecweb this does not include military aircraft. Clear there?
 
First quote: Are you alluding that not having a union, pilots are incapable of maintaining safety?

No.

Second quote maintains his blanket opinion of ME carriers. Don't try to back peddle and say your only talking specifically about Emirates.

Where am I back peddling? Are you imagining things? I wouldn't put my family on any of the ME Carriers. How is that?

I get it @Seggy , you embrace safety. Guess what: thousands of pilots around the world embrace safety without a union.
Having a union is a good thing, but I can point to many accidents where the pilots were members of a union, which didn't amount to a hill of beans when they died.

At the end of the day, it's a pilot sitting in the cockpit. Not an organization. Despite the collective approach, safety is an individual responsibility.

This shows you have a lack of understanding about just safety cultures, responsibility, and the organizations role.

Yes, at the end of the day it usually is the responsibility of the individual. But, if they work in a system where intimidation and a lack of a just safety culture thrives (think Colgan Air 2008) then it is the organization that has failed to give the individual the proper support they need.
 
The bold is my emphasis. You should be training for the higher probabilities of scenarios, not the rarity where something like the airplane is damaged once it becomes airborne.

Yes, it should be discussed, absolutely, but to waste time in the highly unlikely event you have substantial damage once airborne isn't smart. Now, for @mikecweb this does not include military aircraft. Clear there?
I don't disagree at all, Seg. I just think training to take off from the actual runway - as opposed to, say, the overrun - might be a good thing for training to emphasize.
Checklist item: "Take off from the runway." ;)
 
And good work they did in QF32. Yes, with researching this across the aviation spectrum, in military aircraft a structural damage / controllability check appears to be standard as a checklist. In civil aircraft, it can run the gamut between one and/or the other appearing as a checklist, a procedure, a recommendation, or seemingly nothing.

To me, this is something applicable to all pilots, as this something that is universal.......an airplane doesn't care where it got it's damage from: whether shot at, midair collision with an object, a shed engine component, or hitting something on takeoff. This kind of potential runs the gamut of aviation, not just mil or civil.

Considering the incidents that have occurred in history, as well as the high potential for aircraft structural damage to occur while airborne or getting airborne, I'd think it be something important to cover in training in terms of the Boeing excerpt I posted, in the absense of formal procedure for this kind of check. Anything from minor/moderate damage, all the way to a UA232 style scenario, or any scenario where aircraft damage is suspected, this kind of check applies and is paramount in come cases. To hear that guys haven't even heard anything about it, which isn't their fault, is a disservice to them, as the information is available from Boeing, where I got that excerpt from. Would suck to be in a scenario like this, without ever even having had exposure to existing manufacturer recommendations.

Seriously @MikeD ??? Really???

There is a LOW probability you have structural damage once airborne.

I am sure Boeing has the statistics of this probability happening and know it would be a waste to devote training resources on this. Yes, discuss it, but it would be wasting time to simulate it.

Also, what you found is just a Boeing lawyers statement so they can cover themselves. Not guidance or real specifics.
 
I don't disagree at all, Seg. I just think training to take off from the actual runway - as opposed to, say, the overrun - might be a good thing for training to emphasize.
Checklist item: "Take off from the runway." ;)

The NTSB disagrees :)
 
The bold is my emphasis. You should be training for the higher probabilities of scenarios, not the rarity where something like the airplane is damaged once it becomes airborne.

Yes, it should be discussed, absolutely, but to waste time in the highly unlikely event you have substantial damage once airborne isn't smart. Now, for @mikecweb this does not include military aircraft. Clear there?

Agreed it's definitely worth touching on in training, at least in a classroom format, so people know what it is and why it's done. Important enough that Boeing would publish information on it. Its obviously not a checklist item, but it's an important concept to cover because aircraft damage can happen airborne from any number of things.

For those not familiar, essentially, if your aircraft is not the same as when you got airborne: that is, something is bent, dented, smashed, broken off, or missing......that wasn't when you took off; you now may not be flying the same airplane you did when you got off the ground in terms of normal ops. One has to at least be familiar with what is recommended regarding how to determine what possible new flyable, and more importantly, landable, speeds/configurations are.

This isn't something that that requires long hours of training on or even any sim time spent on, but it's good to have it covered as part of classroom training, since you never know what you might end up with at any given time. Anyone could very well be the next Al Haynes or Dave Cronin, and it's good to at least have a basic familiarization with this. A free card to have in one's SA and safety bag of tricks (especially since it's not a checklist item), and it costs nothing to have the knowledge of.

That it isn't a checklist item, and is more a best practice-type discussion item by Boeing, is very likely due to the fact of it's liklihood of occurance being low. Good info.
 
They wanted procedures in place to verify runways.
Oh, that! Yup, that's true.
I was talking about not taking off from the overrun, or the field beyond the overrun. That's a different pony.
 
Seriously @MikeD ??? Really???

There is a LOW probability you have structural damage once airborne.

I am sure Boeing has the statistics of this probability happening and know it would be a waste to devote training resources on this. Yes, discuss it, but it would be wasting time to simulate it.

Also, what you found is just a Boeing lawyers statement so they can cover themselves. Not guidance or real specifics.

Yes really.

You don't want to be the next Al Haynes, and not have a working knowledge of this. It doesn't take a major amount of brain bytes to learn it, and it increases safety. Why would you have a problem with it?

And I didn't say simulator. I said classroom. Time doesn't need to be spent simulating it. What is there to simulate? It's a basic guidance for how to do a controllability check, which is the same for anytime there is a question of aircraft controllability.

And yes, it is guidance. It tells you what you need to do in order to perform a controllability check. Lawyers didn't write that.
 
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Agreed it's definitely worth touching on in training, at least in a classroom format, so people know what it is and why it's done. Important enough that Boeing would publish information on it. Its obviously not a checklist item, but it's an important concept to cover because aircraft damage can happen airborne from any number of things.

For those not familiar, essentially, if your aircraft is not the same as when you got airborne: that is, something is bent, dented, smashed, broken off, or missing......that wasn't when you took off; you now may not be flying the same airplane you did when you got off the ground in terms of normal ops. One has to at least be familiar with what is recommended regarding how to determine what possible new flyable, and more importantly, landable, speeds/configurations are.

This isn't something that that requires long hours of training on or even any sim time spent on, but it's good to have it covered as part of classroom training, since you never know what you might end up with at any given time. Anyone could very well be the next Al Haynes or Dave Cronin, and it's good to at least have a basic familiarization with this. A free card to have in one's SA and safety bag of tricks (especially since it's not a checklist item), and it costs nothing to have the knowledge of.

That it isn't a checklist item, and is more a best practice-type discussion item by Boeing, is very likely due to the fact of it's liklihood of occurance being low. Good info.
Heck, Mike, no one who's trained with me has to discuss it. Anyone who's trained with me has scads of actual broken airplane time. Pretty much every trainer I ever sat in was broken and unairworthy... of course all the paperwork differed with my opinion. ;)
 
I don't know Mark, call me crazy, but the below sure seems like guidance to me. Not lawyer-speak.

And it's from a Boeing 777 training manual.



"Make configuration and airspeed changes slowly until a damage assessment and airplane handling evaluation have been done and it is certain that lower airspeeds can be safely used. In addition, limit bank angle to 15° and avoid large or rapid changes in engine thrust and airspeed that might adversely affect controllability. If possible, conduct the damage assessment and handling evaluation at an altitude that provides a safe margin for recovery should flight path control be inadvertently compromised. It is necessary for the flight crew to use good judgment in consideration of the existing conditions and circumstances to determine an appropriate altitude for this evaluation."

"Accomplish this check by slowly and methodically reducing speed and lowering the flaps. Lower the landing gear only if available thrust allows. As a starting point, use the flap/speed schedule as directed in the appropriate NNC. If stick shaker or initial stall buffet are encountered at or before reaching the associated flap speed, or if a rapid increase in wheel deflection and full rudder deflection are necessary to maintain wings level, increase speed to a safe level and consider this speed to be the minimum approach speed for the established configuration.
After the damage assessment and handling characteristics are evaluated, the crew should formulate a sequential plan for the completion of the flight. If the airplane is very difficult to control, as a last resort consider disconnecting the primary flight control computers. Once disconnected, leave them disconnected for the remainder of the flight unless the disconnect makes the situation worse."

If airplane performance is a concern, use of the alternate flap or gear extension systems may dictate that the check of airplane handling characteristics be done during the actual approach. Configuration changes made by the alternate systems may not be reversible."
 
@MikeD

I think we are saying the same thing. I thought you were implying to develop sim scenarios based on this or even checklists which would be impractical. Talking about it is great in a classroom or presim briefing.

The information from the manual is common sense stuff. Good to know, but broad in the sense that if you have damage, every situation will be different. You can take 99% of that manual and use it for an Airbus.
 
@MikeD

I think we are saying the same thing. I thought you were implying to develop sim scenarios based on this or even checklists which would be impractical. Talking about it is great in a classroom or presim briefing.

The information from the manual is common sense stuff. Good to know, but broad in the sense that if you have damage, every situation will be different. You can take 99% of that manual and use it for an Airbus.

I too believe we are saying the same thing, that's why I agreed with your post about why it should be touched on in classroom training, but isn't a sim scenario item or even a checklist. That being so a guy is at least familiar with the concept, but time/effort/$$ isn't spent trying to incorporate it into a simulator when it really can't be simulated scenario-wise and there's no major gain in doing that: because all it really is, is methodically setting up a plane for landing configuration, and seeing if the numbers still work for making a landing. And some basics from Boeing for how they they think the best way it is to do it.

I agree with you.
 
Just listened to the Live ATC tape.

They were cleared for T1 by the tower and acknowledged it as such.
They sounded perfectly normal and calm when told to contact departure.
ATC did not say a word about hitting antennas.

So we still need to wait for information on when they were informed, if at all, during the flight. Also if anybody in the aircraft felt or heard anything unusual.

I know if I was that low off the departure end of the runway I'd be pretty nervous, but again, barring any information from the EICAS; ATC; or cabin crew what would you have the crew do?

Oh, and Seggy in this "just safety culture" of yours it's okay to assume numerous faults about an incident before facts are verified?






Typhoonpilot
 
So there was an incident in 2008 where fatigue played a factor in almost putting an A350 in the ground. Has much changed?

http://www.wsj.com/articles/pilot-workload-at-emirates-under-question-1428587945

See @Nark, with a union, you have an avenue to correct these issues. How do pilots at nonunion airlines change these issues?
Unions wouldn't help the ME airlines. These are countries that essentially still allow slaves. If they allowed unions the government wouldn't help them. The only way for a union to work is for the government to actually support them when they are right.

Qatar still has tons of issues with their labor rules and UAE isn't any different. The lack of safety for everyone working in those countries is so bad that I don't see them ever making headway without a full government shift.
 
Just listened to the Live ATC tape.

They were cleared for T1 by the tower and acknowledged it as such.
They sounded perfectly normal and calm when told to contact departure.
ATC did not say a word about hitting antennas.

So we still need to wait for information on when they were informed, if at all, during the flight. Also if anybody in the aircraft felt or heard anything unusual.

I know if I was that low off the departure end of the runway I'd be pretty nervous, but again, barring any information from the EICAS; ATC; or cabin crew what would you have the crew do?

Oh, and Seggy in this "just safety culture" of yours it's okay to assume numerous faults about an incident before facts are verified?

Typhoonpilot

I am just pointing out well known issues with these ME3 airlines.
 
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