Seggy
Well-Known Member
Once again, he didn't say that.
Safety Culture at Middle Eastern Carriers
- Thread starter Seggy
- Start date
Once again, he didn't say that.
Seggy
Well-Known Member
Didn't know you upgraded...
If one is making a point (which I don't disagree with) based upon what is available in a transport category airplane. One needs to understand what is available to the pilots.
Nark
Macho Superpilot
That's funny, I too have several type ratings, and I believe we share the A320.
There is an expanded checklist for tail strike.
Did you say something about required to think outside the box, because that's what is expected of an aviator?
Seggy
Well-Known Member
The 737 also has a tail strike checklist. But, that wouldn't help in all scenarios with suspected damage to the aircraft. If the tail strike checklist wouldn't fit, than what?
Absolutely, if you don't have checklists or procedures to help figure out what is going on.
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ClarkGriswold
Non Nutritive Cereal Varnish Engineer
Why does everyone keep saying tail strike? These guys took off from a runway that was too short and plowed through some approach lights, could have hit the gear, mid part of the belly, the tail. Who knows but it's not a damn tail strike in the traditional sense and a stupid EICAS message shouldn't dictate how you continue, it's not really applicable here.
Seggy
Well-Known Member
Thank you!
fholbert
Mod's - Please don't edit my posts!
How about a Hit and Run?
Any takeoff you can walk away from is a good takeoff. If you can use the plane again...
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ClarkGriswold
Non Nutritive Cereal Varnish Engineer
Would turning around for suspected damage not end well at one of these carriers for the pilots? Especially if there was not an EICAS present ( that may or may not apply) and there is not a Boeing procedure for Bajaing into some lights?
Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
And SKW pilots as late as 2015*.
* yes, I know nobody cares how we did it on the Brasilia. But it was sort of cool being involved with the process, because when a plainly and obviously incorrect result was arrived at, you went "um," and threw the manifest away and started over.
ClarkGriswold
Non Nutritive Cereal Varnish Engineer
Do you guys have a whiz wheel in the Ejet?
Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
No.
I had our VPFO on the jump seat and had to do a manual manifest. It sucked. I pointed out that whiz wheels are made for this airplane, and there was an abstracted promise about changing this process and getting the wheels, but we use the god-awful Embraer paper form where you count lines and index units.
"NO YOU CANNOT ADD FIVE BAGS"
amorris311
Well-Known Member
That's not what he said and you know it. You know that having another set of eyes and ears looking out for you and your pilot group is better for the overall safety culture. It is very easy to Monday morning quarterback and that's why @Seggy is making his statements regarding unions.
Some will, some won't, I imagine. Only thing I've found available to flight crews is a training publication for the 777 where's it's discussed, but nothing necessarily procedural in a formal manner
Which is too bad, because structural damage can happen to any aircraft, for any reason; not just something that happens in combat or being shot at or not. But the 777 training publication had it under "Situations beyond the scope of non-normal checklists" section, which presented it not as a procedure, but as a guideline or conventional wisdom; where judgement, airmanship, and experience play large parts. Good stuff, don't know why it's not part of normal training, as every pilot should be made aware of this kind of information. Stating, in part:
"Damage Assessment and Airplane Handling Evaluation
Unless circumstances such as imminent airplane breakup or loss of control dictate otherwise, the crew should take time to assess the effects of the damage and/or conditions before attempting to land. Make configuration and airspeed changes slowly until a damage assessment and airplane handling evaluation have been done and it is certain that lower airspeeds can be safely used. In addition, limit bank angle to 15° and avoid large or rapid changes in engine thrust and airspeed that might adversely affect controllability. If possible, conduct the damage assessment and handling evaluation at an altitude that provides a safe margin for recovery should flight path control be inadvertently compromised. It is necessary for the flight crew to use good judgment in consideration of the existing conditions and circumstances to determine an appropriate altitude for this evaluation.
The evaluation should start with an examination of flight deck indications to assess damage. Consideration should be given to the potential cumulative effect of the damage. A thorough understanding of airplane systems operation can greatly facilitate this task. If structural damage is suspected, attempt to assess the magnitude of the damage by direct visual observation from the flight deck and/or passenger cabin. While only a small portion of the airplane is visible to the flight crew from the flight deck, any visual observation data can be used to gain maximum knowledge of airplane configuration and status and can be valuable in determining subsequent actions.
The flight crew should consider contacting the company to inform them of the situation and use them as a potential source of information. In addition to current and forecast weather, and airfield conditions, it may be possible to obtain technical information and recommendations from expert sources. These expert sources are
available from within the company as well as from Boeing.
If controllability is in question, consider performing a check of the airplane handling characteristics. The purpose of this check is to determine minimum safe speeds and the appropriate configuration for landing. If flap damage has occurred, prior to accomplishing this check, consider the possible effects on airplane control should an asymmetrical condition occur if flap position is changed. Accomplish this check by slowly and methodically reducing speed and lowering the flaps. Lower the landing gear only if available thrust allows. As a starting point, use the flap/speed schedule as directed in the appropriate NNC. If stick shaker or initial stall buffet are encountered at or before reaching the associated flap speed, or if a rapid increase in wheel deflection and full rudder deflection are necessary to maintain wings level, increase speed to a safe level and consider this speed to be the minimum approach speed for the established configuration.
After the damage assessment and handling characteristics are evaluated, the crew should formulate a sequential plan for the completion of the flight. If the airplane is very difficult to control, as a last resort consider disconnecting the primary flight control computers. Once disconnected, leave them disconnected for the remainder of the flight unless the disconnect makes the situation worse.
If airplane performance is a concern, use of the alternate flap or gear extension systems may dictate that the check of airplane handling characteristics be done during the actual approach. Configuration changes made by the alternate systems may not be reversible. The crew must exercise extreme caution on final approach with special emphasis on minimum safe speeds and proper airplane configuration. If asymmetrical thrust is being used for roll control or pitch authority is limited, plan to leave thrust on until touchdown."
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Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
Nark
Macho Superpilot
First quote: Are you alluding that not having a union, pilots are incapable of maintaining safety?
Second quote maintains his blanket opinion of ME carriers. Don't try to back peddle and say your only talking specifically about Emirates.
I get it @Seggy , you embrace safety. Guess what: thousands of pilots around the world embrace safety without a union.
Having a union is a good thing, but I can point to many accidents where the pilots were members of a union, which didn't amount to a hill of beans when they died.
At the end of the day, it's a pilot sitting in the cockpit. Not an organization. Despite the collective approach, safety is an individual responsibility.
And good work they did in QF32. Yes, with researching this across the aviation spectrum, in military aircraft a structural damage / controllability check appears to be standard as a checklist. In civil aircraft, it can run the gamut between one and/or the other appearing as a checklist, a procedure, a recommendation, or seemingly nothing.
To me, this is something applicable to all pilots, as this something that is universal.......an airplane doesn't care where it got it's damage from: whether shot at, midair collision with an object, a shed engine component, or hitting something on takeoff. This kind of potential runs the gamut of aviation, not just mil or civil.
Considering the incidents that have occurred in history, as well as the high potential for aircraft structural damage to occur while airborne or getting airborne, I'd think it be something important to cover in training in terms of the Boeing excerpt I posted, in the absense of formal procedure for this kind of check. Anything from minor/moderate damage, all the way to a UA232 style scenario, or any scenario where aircraft damage is suspected, this kind of check applies and is paramount in come cases. To hear that guys haven't even heard anything about it, which isn't their fault, is a disservice to them, as the information is available from Boeing, where I got that excerpt from. Would suck to be in a scenario like this, without ever even having had exposure to existing manufacturer recommendations.
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