PSA CRJ-700 AA midair collision

very much doubt climbing to 1500’ would solve anything on 33 as that would just put them beak to beak on route 4 with next final traffic on 1 or to people beginning the 33 circle
 
Any situation that sets up something the controller has to watch is going to cause more workload. So even going high, it doesn't change the controllers workload and only marginally increases the safety of the situation. That is why we use visual separation because generally once the pilot accepts the visual separation and the other requirements are met, we can put that situation on the back burner. Not to say we stop watching it completely but it goes to the bottom of duty priorities.

LI don't know the airspace at all, but I imagine there is some sort of institutional reason for not going above with the helicopters, whether it be other traffic, or just operator preference, we don't have the whole picture here.
 
Push the helicopter route inland and east over I-295, require the circle to remain on western shore. Keep altitude for Helos over 295 low which would further deconflict.
 
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MikeD said:
While the visual separation and instruction to cross behind the RJ would’ve worked out also.
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Hold to the north, maintain 1500 on the route, or fly the route. All can be done without visual separation. In the DCA environment, asking anybody to maintain visual separation at night should raise an eyebrow.

I haven’t done a deep dive into the report. I’m curious if there was a meaningful collection of data that looked at how often helicopter traffic flew the route with or without visual separation instruction. I don’t have a sense how much deconfliction was happening with relatively sparse helicopter traffic.
 
bp said:
very much doubt climbing to 1500’ would solve anything on 33 as that would just put them beak to beak on route 4 with next final traffic on 1 or to people beginning the 33 circle
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Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Agreed. That’s not a solution.
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It worked out fine, as the climb to 1500’ was issued to me after launch from 09Y, and was only intended for crossing over 33 final and over any traffic circling from 1 to 33. The circling altitude for the airliners was about 700 or so MSL, well below us for that segment, then DCA sent us back down to at or below 200 MSL once clear of the traffic and to remain there for the rest of the route. I figured that was normal ops for them, as it seemed routine. If no 33 ops were occurring, the 200 MSL would be for the entire route as published.
 
GolfChuck said:
Any situation that sets up something the controller has to watch is going to cause more workload. So even going high, it doesn't change the controllers workload and only marginally increases the safety of the situation. That is why we use visual separation because generally once the pilot accepts the visual separation and the other requirements are met, we can put that situation on the back burner. Not to say we stop watching it completely but it goes to the bottom of duty priorities.

LI don't know the airspace at all, but I imagine there is some sort of institutional reason for not going above with the helicopters, whether it be other traffic, or just operator preference, we don't have the whole picture here.
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Procedural separation seems to me to be a bit more safe, as it’s guaranteed separation (different altitudes, assuming the pilots are where they are supposed to procedurally be). Even if the traffic don’t see one another, they won’t come together. Whereas visual separation…..I get it, it’s shifts the w responsibility to the pilot…..but that assumes the pilot has the right traffic, which in a congested area can be iffy. And if the pilot doesn’t have the correct traffic, the potential for coming together is much higher. I like visual separation just fine, but it seems to have less margin for error than procedural separation.

My experience in that airspace flying that specific Route is, granted, one time. But what DCA had me doing seemed to make sense, and the impression I got from the radio comms was it was routine ops by how smooth they had me and the airliners coexisting in the same area, as they worked their traffic. There was never an opportunity given for visual separation, as while I was advised of the two separate airliners maneuvering to land below me, I was never asked to call one in sight. When the second one passed below with no more behind them, the controller gave the instruction to “descend back down to route altitude and remain there” for the duration. Then it was leaving the surface area and a freq change.

My curiosity is, is there any major time saved or any major gain by circling to 33, versus just allowing approach traffic for runway 1, land on 1?
 
Kingairer said:
Push the helicopter route inland and east over I-295, require the circle to remain on western shore. Keep altitude for Helos over 295 low which would further deconflict.
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That’s workable, would give lateral separation. The big issues would be altitude for helos would have to be raised due to ground obstacles, and there would likely be noise complaints also without an altitude raise.

Is 33 ever the duty runway there? As in, traffic doing straight in’s to 33, versus going from 1 and circling to 33?
 
MikeD said:
Procedural separation seems to me to be a bit more safe, as it’s guaranteed separation (different altitudes, assuming the pilots are where they are supposed to procedurally be). Even if the traffic don’t see one another, they won’t come together. Whereas visual separation…..I get it, it’s shifts the w responsibility to the pilot…..but that assumes the pilot has the right traffic, which in a congested area can be iffy. And if the pilot doesn’t have the correct traffic, the potential for coming together is much higher. I like visual separation just fine, but it seems to have less margin for error than procedural separation.

My experience in that airspace flying that specific Route is, granted, one time. But what DCA had me doing seemed to make sense, and the impression I got from the radio comms was it was routine ops by how smooth they had me and the airliners coexisting in the same area, as they worked their traffic. There was never an opportunity given for visual separation, as while I was advised of the two separate airliners maneuvering to land below me, I was never asked to call one in sight. When the second one passed below with no more behind them, the controller gave the instruction to “descend back down to route altitude and remain there” for the duration. Then it was leaving the surface area and a freq change.

My curiosity is, is there any major time saved or any major gain by circling to 33, versus just allowing approach traffic for runway 1, land on 1?
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It does save a little bit of time because traffic departing runway 1 is already lined up and waiting versus getting a clearance to line up and wait as the plane passes by landing on runway 1. And more often than not, that’s followed by “Cleared for immediate takeoff, traffic is on a mile-and-a-half final.” Single runway ops at DCA can be a bit of a cluster.
 
@MikeD Generally, when there is a will the FAA is pretty decent about local plans and procedures. This problem was definitely already identified and I would imagine if it were as simple as just going over, than that is what they would do. I would bet there is some airspace or security reason for not going over with the helicopters as you describe. To chart it, the route would have to be 500 feet above the crossing altitude of the FAF. It is possible that in your experience, based on the traffic at the time going over worked, but could not be counted on to work. Legal separation in class B airspace between VFR and IFR traffic over 14k lbs MTOW (I think that is the cutoff) is 500ft or 1.5 NM OR Visual Separation. The visual can be tower applied, but it would require reasonable assurance that the tower could maintain visual contact with both aircraft before standard separation is lost and until standard separation exists after the maneuver.

And yes, like @guywhoflies says, if they are circling some of the arrivals to 33 it allows tower to get departures out while approach can still run arrivals 2.5-3NM in trail (depending on their local procedures). If they are up and down on the same runway approach would have to leave gaps large enough for departures in between arrivals because 3 miles is not enough time or space. The delaying effect of doing that snowballs very fast and is one of the reasons EWR was experiencing worse than usual delays during their construction project. @NovemberEcho can tell you all about that.
 
MikeD said:
That’s workable, would give lateral separation. The big issues would be altitude for helos would have to be raised due to ground obstacles, and there would likely be noise complaints also without an altitude raise.

Is 33 ever the duty runway there? As in, traffic doing straight in’s to 33, versus going from 1 and circling to 33?
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Recently when 1/19 was being refurbished after midnight, 15/33 was primary runway.
Outside of those type situations, or extreme winds, it’s always supplemental and mostly used by RJs. Its usage is mainly in the circle from 1 and takeoffs.

I feel like they could do a charted visual with RNAV assist with a tighter pattern and be similar to the River vis 19.
 
Richman said:
While there may be a technical way, usually politics gets involved.

They had redone all the arrivals into NYC to actually make sense, but when the high rollers figured out the routings flew over their palatial estates, politics ended that right quick.
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Politics and noise abatements are why that River corridor is so dense with rotary traffic.

It’s the same reason the Military can’t “just go train at 0300 when nobody needs the airspace.” That tracks for about a month until people with commanding in their email signature start getting phone calls.
 
Saw this article today. I have to admit I'm surprised the US government openly admitted being at fault. It's a bit refreshing.

"The U.S. government admitted liability in an air collision in the skies above the nation’s capital that killed 67 people early this year, opening the door for the families of victims to seek damages for the crash, according to court documents.

In a 209-page document filed in a federal lawsuit brought by the family of one of the victims , the Justice Department said that the Army pilots flying a Black Hawk helicopter the night of Jan. 29 had failed to maintain “vigilance” and “proper and safe visual separation” with a commercial airliner before it crashed into the jet over the Potomac River.

“The United States admits that the accident could have been avoided” if the Army helicopter had been able to see and avoid the jet, according to an admission of liability document filed with the court Wednesday.The crew should have maintained situational awareness, or a constant sense of what was going on around it, during the flight, the government said in its response. It also said that the crew should have been continually scanning, or looking, for traffic that might have intersected its intended route."

www.nytimes.com

U.S. Government Admits Liability in Deadly D.C.-Area Air Collision

A federal court filing says the Army crew piloting a Black Hawk helicopter could have avoided the nighttime accident in January if it had been able to see and avoid a commercial jet.
www.nytimes.com www.nytimes.com
 
As information came out, especially with the visual separation request and acceptance, it was fairly obvious that the collision fault laid with the helo, that the helo ran into the jet, not the other way around. The RJ was literally doing everything right, and was the right-of-way aircraft since it was both the landing aircraft as well as the less maneuverable aircraft, and the helo has requested and been granted visual separation responsibility, to which it maintained with the wrong aircraft apparently.

I’m still curious to read a full transcript of the helo CVR, to understand where/when, and how, the helo crew lost situational awareness, whether there was any confusion of what traffic they had in sight, what the cockpit workload was at that moment, and what, if any, distractions might have been ongoing in the cockpit with that crew. Just to get a better understanding on when the SA breakdown began happening and why.

ATC-wise, it’s indeed normal for ATC when calling out traffic and either assigning or accepting visual separation from that traffic, to then advise the other aircraft that the first aircraft has them in sight and is maintaining visual separation on them. Does it always happen? Not always. And in a situation where tower is talking to two aircraft on two separate VHF freqs, but is simulcasting to where both crews can hear ATC talking to the other aircraft, but just can’t hear one another’s responses to ATC, it’s fairly easy to understand the conversation from the one side of ATC and know what’s going on, without ATC having to explicitly tell you. My question for ATC would be more on the staffing and workload side of the equation as it came to management of that ATC facility as well as the FAA, and why one singular controller only was on duty and having to manage multiple frequencies. Did that facility have staffing issues? Lack of facility-qualed personnel? Or what that angle was.
 
arkavgal said:
Saw this article today. I have to admit I'm surprised the US government openly admitted being at fault. It's a bit refreshing.

"The U.S. government admitted liability in an air collision in the skies above the nation’s capital that killed 67 people early this year, opening the door for the families of victims to seek damages for the crash, according to court documents.

In a 209-page document filed in a federal lawsuit brought by the family of one of the victims , the Justice Department said that the Army pilots flying a Black Hawk helicopter the night of Jan. 29 had failed to maintain “vigilance” and “proper and safe visual separation” with a commercial airliner before it crashed into the jet over the Potomac River.

“The United States admits that the accident could have been avoided” if the Army helicopter had been able to see and avoid the jet, according to an admission of liability document filed with the court Wednesday.The crew should have maintained situational awareness, or a constant sense of what was going on around it, during the flight, the government said in its response. It also said that the crew should have been continually scanning, or looking, for traffic that might have intersected its intended route."

www.nytimes.com

U.S. Government Admits Liability in Deadly D.C.-Area Air Collision

A federal court filing says the Army crew piloting a Black Hawk helicopter could have avoided the nighttime accident in January if it had been able to see and avoid a commercial jet.
www.nytimes.com www.nytimes.com
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This is only a partial answer. Yes they called it insight and bore the responsibility for visual separation.


BUT


At no point is it SAFE to have a system where a Part 121 jetliner circling to land 33 would cross just 75 ft vertical separation from a helicopter going about in its corridor just below short final. And that’s assuming a perfect 2 white, 2 red PAPI descent. God forbid if that plane is 3 red 1 white or even 4 red. It was an accident waiting to happen.

If an aircraft is landing 33, there should be no route 4 ops southbound. Have the heli hold in a hover at some point in space until the aircraft has been confirmed as landed.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
This is only a partial answer. Yes they called it insight and bore the responsibility for visual separation.


BUT


At no point is it SAFE to have a system where a Part 121 jetliner circling to land 33 would cross just 75 ft vertical separation from a helicopter going about in its corridor just below short final. And that’s assuming a perfect 2 white, 2 red PAPI descent. God forbid if that plane is 3 red 1 white or even 4 red. It was an accident waiting to happen.

If an aircraft is landing 33, there should be no route 4 ops southbound. Have the heli hold in a hover at some point in space until the aircraft has been confirmed as landed.
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The route appears to have been planned for 1/19 runways ops by jets there at DCA, where it was clear of both final traffic, but wasn’t considered for 33 ops. All kinds of things could be done that might not even require closing the route, such as leave the helo high and have it turn southwest to pass over the center of the airport southwest bound. Keep it remaining west of the 1 final approach course, south of 15/33 and west of 1/19. Not sure why it has to remain over the ricer aside from the very low altitude, which again can be waived. That way it’s out of everyone’s way, even if there is a go around by a 33 final traffic. No one would be required to have to visually separate from anyone as they are already separated. This essentially “closes” that river route, by merely modifying its ground track and altitude to avoid all 33 traffic. ATC just has to give the instruction.

This simple route modification when 33 ops are happening and a helo wants to go down or up that route. No need for ATC to keep to such tight route parameters and not allow or order any deviation from it route/altitude wise.

Unfortunately, visual separation maintenance is fully dependent on the aircraft maintaining visual separation, to actually be seeing the correct aircraft they are supposed to be maintaining separation from. Which didn’t happen in this case.
 
The military has ZERO business on route 4. Just eat it and • off actually if you think that is an appropriate use of the airspace, because it • isn’t! 😡 Route 4 shouldn’t have ever been a thing. 😡
 
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