PSA CRJ-700 AA midair collision

I 100% believe if it came down to doing something knowingly unsafe, or having massive delays, FAA leadership will chose the unsafe operation every time.

They literally do this every day at EWR. We get into arguments with them every day because HQ and Command Center tried to micromanage our operation without having any clue how it works. Even freaking TMU puts out staffing triggers with a rate based on us having 6 positions open when we don’t even have 6 CPC’s on the shift. Eventually we wind up calling the individual center sectors that feed us and give them in trail or holding
 
So you are saying its the circling maneuver that is the problem here? Because to me it looks like unsafe helicopter procedures in an overly congested area that is the problem. If the military needs to conduct this training they can do it at 3 am, not while the evening push is still ongoing.

The helo lateral route isn’t an issue, it’s the complete lack of procedural vertical separation with that route specifically when RW 33 arrivals are occurring. That’s the issue. Last time I flew that route a good number of years back, arrivals to 33 were occurring and tower pushed us up to 1500 MSL for the route, giving about 1000+ feet separation from landing traffic to 33 crossing underneath me. Worked out fine. One of my coworkers the day prior was told to orbit north of the 33 centerline for landing traffic, then cleared to continue down-route when that traffic passed.

I still think the altitude separation is the way to go. A 100’ altitude separation between helo route traffic normal altitudes, and 33 landing traffic at normal altitudes, where the two intersect, definitely doesn’t check the safety box.

While the visual separation and instruction to cross behind the RJ would’ve worked out also, it was dependent on the helo crew seeing the correct traffic. Had a climb for vertical separation been issued to the helo, it also would’ve worked out fine whether traffic was seen or not.
 
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A moment of zen (and/or levity) from today's hearing regarding ADS equipage.

Chairwoman Homendy is seriously crushing it this week.

Man, there's a lot of angry "do better" coming from the Board toward the FAA, even today. The specific ire of Member Inman using that expression just now was due to noncompliance with the FAA's own internal rules for post-event drug and alcohol testing of controllers.

Now getting into the SMS and 'systemic risk' panel, which is a perfect cue for me to get lunch and settle into a gentle food coma, aided by the sleep aid that is any discussion of SMS.



I don’t buy any of this. They know. They’ve always known. People just got too comfortable post 2009 Colgan. The cracks have been visible to anyone with eyes, for years. YEARS.
 
Pretty sure the FAA could have acted on either or both of the elements.

Disagree. The mil would have played the reverse Uno trump card and the FAA would have gotten spanked for making a scene and the mil would have gotten their way anyway. I grant you that maybe they should have made a scene anyway, but here we are.

The FAA can’t repel firepower of that magnitude. They might as well be a little flight school complaining about how constant TFRs are killing their business. Nobody in the FAA cares and even if they did there is 0.0 they can do about it.
 
They literally do this every day at EWR. We get into arguments with them every day because HQ and Command Center tried to micromanage our operation without having any clue how it works. Even freaking TMU puts out staffing triggers with a rate based on us having 6 positions open when we don’t even have 6 CPC’s on the shift. Eventually we wind up calling the individual center sectors that feed us and give them in trail or holding
We were in 45+ minute delays today, although I am sure some of it had to do with marginal VFR conditions and our runway closure, but they actually allowed us to use staffing as the cause (which of course is always the cause).
 
Disagree. The mil would have played the reverse Uno trump card and the FAA would have gotten spanked for making a scene and the mil would have gotten their way anyway. I grant you that maybe they should have made a scene anyway, but here we are.

The FAA can’t repel firepower of that magnitude. They might as well be a little flight school complaining about how constant TFRs are killing their business. Nobody in the FAA cares and even if they did there is 0.0 they can do about it.

All that has to be done is to require a higher altitude on that route segment when 33 arrivals are in use. Even the route chart states something to the effect that the route segment altitudes are as published, or as assigned by ATC. So that flexibility is already there, just a matter of using it.

None of the above drama would have to occur.
 
All that has to be done is to require a higher altitude on that route segment when 33 arrivals are in use. Even the route chart states something to the effect that the route segment altitudes are as published, or as assigned by ATC. So that flexibility is already there, just a matter of using it.

None of the above drama would have to occur.
That’s fine until an airliner has to go around. Then you’re right back into altitude conflicts. Better and easier for everyone just to not use that route when landing 33, or get rid of it entirely.
 
That’s fine until an airliner has to go around. Then you’re right back into altitude conflicts. Better and easier for everyone just to not use that route when landing 33, or get rid of it entirely.

no airliner is climbing like an F-15 on a go around. And even so, “Airline 123 go around, at or below 1000 until midfield then climb to 1500. Make left downwind for runway 1”. Or something similar. Still easily handled if there’s a traffic conflict above.
 
no airliner is climbing like an F-15 on a go around. And even so, “Airline 123 go around, at or below 1000 until midfield then climb to 1500. Make left downwind for runway 1”. Or something similar. Still easily handled if there’s a traffic conflict above.
There’s too much variety in where and when a go around could be initiated by the crew or ATC to rely on that for separation. Why not just close the route down when landing 33? Nothing the military is doing is THAT time critical that they can’t wait a few minutes for an aircraft to land. Why not go with a safer, simpler, and more sure-fire option for de conflicting?
 
Disagree. The mil would have played the reverse Uno trump card and the FAA would have gotten spanked for making a scene and the mil would have gotten their way anyway. I grant you that maybe they should have made a scene anyway, but here we are.

The FAA can’t repel firepower of that magnitude. They might as well be a little flight school complaining about how constant TFRs are killing their business. Nobody in the FAA cares and even if they did there is 0.0 they can do about it.
You’re probably right, looking at the reaction of several mil folks right here.
 
There’s too much variety in where and when a go around could be initiated by the crew or ATC to rely on that for separation. Why not just close the route down when landing 33? Nothing the military is doing is THAT time critical that they can’t wait a few minutes for an aircraft to land.

Closing the route down during 33 ops or rerouting it somewhere else is certainly a viable option, or at a minimum allowing passing helo traffic only when there are very large gaps in 33 arrivals to where there is no conflict and traffic would never meet. No issues with that.

my only point was that if it did remain open, there are work arounds that just require the tower to be doing their tower stuff, is all. Higher altitude go around would be farther out from the route confluence anyway, the helo route is 0.5 or so miles from the runway. An airliner doing a go around from that altitude or near it would be 4 or 5 miles out on final.
 
Your classic passive aggressiveness aside, I’ve been giving very viable options that are quite simple to execute. If pilots pilot, and controllers control. It’s not rocket science in the least,
I imagine all of your options have been thought of and possibly even used in other situations, but none of them solve the underlying problem of reducing risk and reducing controller workload.
 
There’s too much variety in where and when a go around could be initiated by the crew or ATC to rely on that for separation. Why not just close the route down when landing 33? Nothing the military is doing is THAT time critical that they can’t wait a few minutes for an aircraft to land. Why not go with a safer, simpler, and more sure-fire option for de conflicting?

I was thinking the same thing, just didn't know how to articulate it.
 
I imagine all of your options have been thought of and possibly even used in other situations, but none of them solve the underlying problem of reducing risk and reducing controller workload.

Procedural Altitude separation of more than a meager 100 feet, would indeed reduce controller workload, what procedural items are designed to do, pending the pilots are following it and are where they should be. Again, the helo route chart allows for deviations from the assigned altitudes by ATC, assign the higher altitude for 33 in use. Problem solved.

I was thinking the same thing, just didn't know how to articulate it.

Again, not rocket science. With an airliner below at 300’ and traffic above at 1500’ where the routes converge and traffic 90 degrees in direction from one another, ain’t no go around is going to be a factor by the time 500 foot separation is reached, the low go around can be capped in altitude too until midield. A high go around at or near the same altitude as 1500’ traffic, is going to be 4 or 5 miles from the runaway, with the helo less than 0.5 miles from the runway. Again, climbing away.

Procedural deconfliction works fine, it’s why the concept exists. What doesn’t work, are procedures where there is only 100 feet of separation built in IF everyone is doing everything right, as we had here in this case and that should have been known. Not to mention the one mitigation of visual separation depending on the correct aircraft being seen, which doesn’t seem to be the case here.
 
Procedural Altitude separation of more than a meager 100 feet, would indeed reduce controller workload, what procedural items are designed to do, pending the pilots are following it and are where they should be. Again, the helo route chart allows for deviations from the assigned altitudes by ATC, assign the higher altitude for 33 in use. Problem solved.



Again, not rocket science. With an airliner below at 300’ and traffic above at 1500’ where the routes converge and traffic 90 degrees in direction from one another, ain’t no go around is going to be a factor by the time 500 foot separation is reached, the low go around can be capped in altitude too until midield. A high go around at or near the same altitude as 1500’ traffic, is going to be 4 or 5 miles from the runaway, with the helo less than 0.5 miles from the runway. Again, climbing away.

Procedural deconfliction works fine, it’s why the concept exists. What doesn’t work, are procedures where there is only 100 feet of separation built in IF everyone is doing everything right, as we had here in this case and that should have been known. Not to mention the one mitigation of visual separation depending on the correct aircraft being seen, which doesn’t seem to be the case here.

What he was getting at that I also was thinking about is there's too many variables between tower and crew initiated go-arounds to have the time to utter "stay below 1500, do this or that" every time there's a go around to reply on that being a failsafe option. Controller may be talking fast, be dealing with another matter, can off by another transmission, etc. To me, makes more sense to shut down the route when 33 is being used,plus have published floors for the helicopter route.
 
What he was getting at that I also was thinking about is there's too many variables between tower and crew initiated go-arounds to have the time to utter "stay below 1500, do this or that" every time there's a go around to reply on that being a failsafe option. Controller may be talking fast, be dealing with another matter, can off by another transmission, etc. To me, makes more sense to shut down the route when 33 is being used,plus have published floors for the helicopter route.

First off, go arounds are fairly rare. And as I pointed out, the chance of one even becoming an issue separation wise is nil if the crossing traffic remains procedurally high, only due to the flight paths being 90 degrees off or so, and the expanding lateral distances between aircraft as the altitudes get closer during go around initiation. It’s really not that difficult, if you’ve ever seen these work. And these controllers aren’t novices. A 1500 MSL altitude floor for a crossing helo is around 1300 feet of separation if the crossing and landing traffic were on top of one another. There’s no way they are going to be a conflict, as the airliner isn’t making its go around climbing like an F-15. Capping them at “cross midfield at 1000’” is just an added measure.

Regards giving instructions to maintain X altitude, this also happens all the time, especially at any joint use field or mil field. TUS and DMA for instance, has an overhead standard jet pattern at 1500 AGLfor the ANG, with a regular 1000 AGL pattern for non-jets . Anyone who does a go around from a traffic pattern, from a straight in, does a touch and go, or anyone on initial takeoff, is given the instruction “remain below 3700 (1000 AGL) until departure end” as they climb out, to avoid the overhead pattern. It’s simple to do and is done all the time. It’s really no different than flying a SID on takeoff, where there is a low crossing altitude restriction or being assigned same on takeoff from tower.

I see no risk to any of this. I do see risk to how things were being done, as it appears that when the route altitude was built, the deconfliction from runway 1 was taken into consideration, but not from 33. When I flew this route, my assumption was that I was automatically placed high on the route when 33 was in use, as I’m not based there, but it worked out fine…….crossing traffic was well below wouldn’t have been any factor anywhere on the approach had their been a go around. But Apparently that high altitude wasn’t the norm.

Procedural rules for deconfliction exists to ease controller workload, radio comms, and pilot workload, but they have to make sense. This one on this accident, appears to have been overlooked.

Personally, I wonder if DCA itself is long in the tooth for existence congestion-wise, even without these route issues.
 
First off, go arounds are fairly rare.

No, go arounds for pilots as individuals are rare. They happen multiple times a day at every major airport though even on a clear windless day. Spacing issue, someone taking their time getting off the runway, Brickyard being Brickyard, passenger decided they couldn’t wait to use the lav, lots of reasons for go around when everything else is normal.
 
No, go arounds for pilots as individuals are rare. They happen multiple times a day at every major airport though even on a clear windless day. Spacing issue, someone taking their time getting off the runway, Brickyard being Brickyard, passenger decided they couldn’t wait to use the lav, lots of reasons for go around when everything else is normal.

Makes sense. And shouldn’t be an issue traffic wise in this case, if the route traffic is up high. The circling from 1 to 33 is only 700 msl or so, so if the crew does a go around either initially level, or with a slight climb and given say a 1000 msl altitude until reaching the approach end of the runway, it’ll work fine. Especially if they remain with tower and enter a traffic pattern, but even if they are changed to departure for radar vectors back around. My time flying south down this route, I had two RJs circling and descending from 1 to 33 beneath me, and it felt like I was in the stratosphere from where tower had parked me. I wasn’t on the same freq as them, but was on a separate helo freq with DCA tower. However it was the same controller just simulcasting on both tower and the helo freq, so I only couldn’t hear the RJ response. The controller called the RJs out as traffic passing beneath for 33, as well as letting them know I was above them at 1500 msl down the river. Seemed to work out fine, and on this particular day and time, the tower controller didn’t seem overloaded or anything, at least nothing that would be remembered. It all seemed routine,
 
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