Again, you have no idea what the systems in this aircraft do, or how the aircraft responds. Quick run down.
As speed bleeds, the trim will roll back, the only issue is that below 150 knots the trim moves at high speed, so trim movement is very quick, and not continuous. The trim needs to be moving for 3 seconds before a warning horn sounds. It will trim to nearly FULL nose up before hitting the shaker and kicking off the autopilot if you configure while slowing.
The buffer between the shaker and pusher is very minimal at this point.
( I think it's 1.05 Vso shaker, .95Vso pusher) Shaker hits, it takes the crew a moment to recognize whats going on in the airplane. Power is applied, sending the nose up, as well as putting a whole lot of "nose up" feel on the yoke, aka pushing it into his lap. Pusher activates, returning the yoke to the "normal" position as it over rides the elevator feel, as soon as .95Vso is exceeded, pusher turns off and once again the yoke slams back. At this point they are in a deep stall, in an aicraft which supposedly handles like a swept wing in a stall. He has now had the yoke move multiple directions, and while this is happening the FO reconfigures the aircraft on him... You keep trying to pin the crash on the crews recovery, but you yourself have no idea what it would actually have been like in the airplane. It does not stall, nor handle like a 206.
I don't mean to be mean, but, I honestly doubt that many of us on the boards would have been able to do it any better.
There is still a lot of data not public, but "hinted" at by the faa, and their required additional training. The video that you see only shows the position of the controls, not where the forces that put them there are coming from. The FDR actually supplies this data.
Had the crew been rested, and well trained, they hopefully never would run into the situation that they did. Had they seen ANYTHING like this in training, they would have known that it take a TON of forward pressure to keep the nose from shooting 30+deg nose up. They also would have known, and hopefully used standard call outs. If we had free access to a sim that had real data, and represented the airplane appropriately, I would be more than happy to hop in and let you try your hand at it.
Give yourself a similar situation. Imagine your cruising along, suddenly the auto pilot kicks off, the yoke shakes. your first response is to slam the power in. Now the nose shoots up, and the yoke slams back. Right after that, the yoke pops forward, the nose stops climbing... and then suddenly again it slams back, nose comes up... except this time, the flaps come up, the airplane breaks to 90+deg bank. most people would prob. grab onto that yoke and hold it, not really knowing what the hell was going on.
Recovery from a roll excursion of 110 deg. in the Q takes close to 3000 feet, and you over speed by nearly 100 kts. As soon as that thing broke, the game was over.
Rest, Fatigue, training all played MAJOR rolls in this accident. Would they have missed the speed if they were well rested? who knows. Would the FO have yanked the flaps from 15 to 0 if she was thinking clearly? again, we will never know.
What we do know, is the effect of fatigue has on the human body. We know that fatigue is a slippery beast that can strike at any moment. Taking steps to prevent fatigue is important, as the FAA is finally moving forward to change regulation to enhance safety.
I would ask you not to state your beliefs in the crash of 3407 in such a manner as to imply that you have solid evidence. You do not know if the captain did, or did not pull back on the yoke. The only thing that you do know about the crash is what was said on the cvr, and presented in the animation. Lumping it on them as a couple of weak sticks that shouldn't have been in the airplane is in bad taste. It means you are jumping to assumptions about the crash, and admittedly have no real knowledge or data to back it up. There is a reason why those of us who have been through our SPOT training come back very critical of prior training and procedure. Yes, I agree that the crew failed to protect their airspeed, and that they failed to recover from the stall. The important issue is why did they fail? If the pilot does not know how the aircraft will respond, where was training? If a pilot doesn't know profiles/callouts, why? I doubt this all happened because he yanked back.
135 is a hard fish to catch, as most planes that crash don't have a CVR, FDr or otherwise. They don't have the trail of blood to highlight key equipment, and training issues. Beyond that, MANY events go unreported. in the 121 enviroment, it is much much harder to sweep something under the rug. a barron goes off the end of a runway by 10 feet. odds are it taxis back on, and nobody says a word. An 757 overruns by a foot, and it gets stuck, makes the 7 o'clock news... and the FAA gets involved. I've written the op specs for a small on demand 135 when i was instructing/ramping. the regs are old. they need to be updated...
