Possible new FAA duty time rules...

[Stone Cold]

ppragman,

I have much respect for you, being a freight dawg and all, but there is a lot more 135 than just Alaska. To say that it is mostly small equipment and VFR is doing a disservice to 135 operators down in the Lower 48.

 

[ppragman]

ppragman,

I have much respect for you, being a freight dawg and all, but there is a lot more 135 than just Alaska. To say that it is mostly small equipment and VFR is doing a disservice to 135 operators down in the Lower 48.

Touche, most of the accidents then, are under things under 12,500. Its not mostly VFR, I don't recall saying that, I might have, did not mean that though, 121 is pretty much strictly IFR is the point I was trying to get across, whereas you have the option to VFR 135.

 

[BajtheJino]

It's apples and oranges. Comparison doesn't really work.

Which is why you can argue/debate until youre blue in the face and never convince the members of this board of anything. They have the backing the union and the "moral high ground". I'd say this will never touch 135 or 121 freight. Fred will see to that.

 

[SteveC]

I talked to one of the FAA higher-ups at the meeting today.

135 will be handled separately from 121 rewrites. They originally planned on doing both together, but have since backed off on that stance. It appears that my earlier post had good intel:

...I just received this in an Aviation Week dated 7/27/09:

"FAA ADMINISTRATOR Randy Babbitt and Margaret Gilligan, associate administrator for aviation safety, reassured the National Air Transportation Association board of directors last week that the newest review of flight and duty time standards will remain focused on Part 121. NATA board members have been concerned that the review would encompass on-demand Part 135 operations, which would endanger recommendations developed by the Part 125/135 ARC specifically for Part 135."

 

[kellwolf]

Steve, man. Why you gotta go mucking up the thread with acurate info?

 

[TUCKnTRUCK]

If you're making the case that their judgment was skewed by lack of rest, I can buy that. However, I'm not sure that that accident wouldn't have happened even if the crew was rested. The guy held the stick in his gut when he stalled. For me anyway, its doubtful that a good nights sleep would have changed that.

Again, you have no idea what the systems in this aircraft do, or how the aircraft responds. Quick run down.

As speed bleeds, the trim will roll back, the only issue is that below 150 knots the trim moves at high speed, so trim movement is very quick, and not continuous. The trim needs to be moving for 3 seconds before a warning horn sounds. It will trim to nearly FULL nose up before hitting the shaker and kicking off the autopilot if you configure while slowing.

The buffer between the shaker and pusher is very minimal at this point.
( I think it's 1.05 Vso shaker, .95Vso pusher) Shaker hits, it takes the crew a moment to recognize whats going on in the airplane. Power is applied, sending the nose up, as well as putting a whole lot of "nose up" feel on the yoke, aka pushing it into his lap. Pusher activates, returning the yoke to the "normal" position as it over rides the elevator feel, as soon as .95Vso is exceeded, pusher turns off and once again the yoke slams back. At this point they are in a deep stall, in an aicraft which supposedly handles like a swept wing in a stall. He has now had the yoke move multiple directions, and while this is happening the FO reconfigures the aircraft on him... You keep trying to pin the crash on the crews recovery, but you yourself have no idea what it would actually have been like in the airplane. It does not stall, nor handle like a 206.

I don't mean to be mean, but, I honestly doubt that many of us on the boards would have been able to do it any better.

There is still a lot of data not public, but "hinted" at by the faa, and their required additional training. The video that you see only shows the position of the controls, not where the forces that put them there are coming from. The FDR actually supplies this data.

Had the crew been rested, and well trained, they hopefully never would run into the situation that they did. Had they seen ANYTHING like this in training, they would have known that it take a TON of forward pressure to keep the nose from shooting 30+deg nose up. They also would have known, and hopefully used standard call outs. If we had free access to a sim that had real data, and represented the airplane appropriately, I would be more than happy to hop in and let you try your hand at it.

Give yourself a similar situation. Imagine your cruising along, suddenly the auto pilot kicks off, the yoke shakes. your first response is to slam the power in. Now the nose shoots up, and the yoke slams back. Right after that, the yoke pops forward, the nose stops climbing... and then suddenly again it slams back, nose comes up... except this time, the flaps come up, the airplane breaks to 90+deg bank. most people would prob. grab onto that yoke and hold it, not really knowing what the hell was going on.

Recovery from a roll excursion of 110 deg. in the Q takes close to 3000 feet, and you over speed by nearly 100 kts. As soon as that thing broke, the game was over.

Rest, Fatigue, training all played MAJOR rolls in this accident. Would they have missed the speed if they were well rested? who knows. Would the FO have yanked the flaps from 15 to 0 if she was thinking clearly? again, we will never know.

What we do know, is the effect of fatigue has on the human body. We know that fatigue is a slippery beast that can strike at any moment. Taking steps to prevent fatigue is important, as the FAA is finally moving forward to change regulation to enhance safety.

I would ask you not to state your beliefs in the crash of 3407 in such a manner as to imply that you have solid evidence. You do not know if the captain did, or did not pull back on the yoke. The only thing that you do know about the crash is what was said on the cvr, and presented in the animation. Lumping it on them as a couple of weak sticks that shouldn't have been in the airplane is in bad taste. It means you are jumping to assumptions about the crash, and admittedly have no real knowledge or data to back it up. There is a reason why those of us who have been through our SPOT training come back very critical of prior training and procedure. Yes, I agree that the crew failed to protect their airspeed, and that they failed to recover from the stall. The important issue is why did they fail? If the pilot does not know how the aircraft will respond, where was training? If a pilot doesn't know profiles/callouts, why? I doubt this all happened because he yanked back.

135 is a hard fish to catch, as most planes that crash don't have a CVR, FDr or otherwise. They don't have the trail of blood to highlight key equipment, and training issues. Beyond that, MANY events go unreported. in the 121 enviroment, it is much much harder to sweep something under the rug. a barron goes off the end of a runway by 10 feet. odds are it taxis back on, and nobody says a word. An 757 overruns by a foot, and it gets stuck, makes the 7 o'clock news... and the FAA gets involved. I've written the op specs for a small on demand 135 when i was instructing/ramping. the regs are old. they need to be updated...

 

[Boris Badenov]

a barron goes off the end of a runway by 10 feet. odds are it taxis back on, and nobody says a word.

Heh, this is true, as I've seen it happen, cept it was a 210. I've said too much!

Good post, although while I do think the 135 rules need a slight makeover, I don't think it's reasonable to have "one level of safety"...the missions are simply too disparate.

 

[jtrain609]

Heh, this is true, as I've seen it happen, cept it was a 210. I've said too much!

Good post, although while I do think the 135 rules need a slight makeover, I don't think it's reasonable to have "one level of safety"...the missions are simply too disparate.

One level of safety would mean that all paying passengers lives are equally worthwhile to the FAA. By having two levels of safety, you're really saying that the lives of those that charter 135 flights are worth less than those that fly on 121 companies. Both 121 and 135 companies hold out to the public, so therefor shouldn't all lives be worth the same as far as the rules are concerned?

Now I don't know if I can make this contention, because those that charter 135 flights are rich, and therefor, should be sacrificed in the coming glorious revolution, but YOU, a capitalist, wouldn't think that would you?

 

[granlistillo]

Realistically if 121 type regulation was pushed on small 135 type operators, a lot would fold up (I am postulating here). Not saying there should be two distinct levels of safety, but cost benefit analysis will still come into play.

 

[jtrain609]

See I don't agree with that. Our goal should be safety, not profits.

Now part 91? Private corporations can do what they please, but when you're talking about the public trusting you to not get them killed when they on your airplane, I think safety should be the primary concern.

But I also think we need reregulation.

 

[minitour]

2. Switching clocks. When I was at the 'Net, I was a floater. I was "on call" during my 8 days on. We normally flew at night, and then weekends we would normally fly days. So, during the week, I would stay up at night if I wasn't called, and then the weekends would be all messed up. There was one weeknight they called me at 0500 for a 5 leg, 7 hour flight time day. Unfortunately I missed the call. When I called dispatch back, they had found some other poor soul to do the flight. This is the way a lot of charter ops work, whether legal or not. On call 24/7.

I never experienced that as a floater at the net.

...not the switching clocks, the being "on call". I was always given very specific times to be available for duty (ahem...not in rest) and then other times I was in rest and not available for duty.

Not having a rest period previously known and a time completely free from the responsibility for duty is illegal. There are several legal interpretations on this. Having not gone through this thread start to finish, these may already be posted...I just don't have time to read through 100+ posts. Too much pron, so little time.

-mini

 

[ppragman]

Again, you have no idea what the systems in this aircraft do, or how the aircraft responds. Quick run down.

As speed bleeds, the trim will roll back, the only issue is that below 150 knots the trim moves at high speed, so trim movement is very quick, and not continuous. The trim needs to be moving for 3 seconds before a warning horn sounds. It will trim to nearly FULL nose up before hitting the shaker and kicking off the autopilot if you configure while slowing.

The buffer between the shaker and pusher is very minimal at this point.
( I think it's 1.05 Vso shaker, .95Vso pusher) Shaker hits, it takes the crew a moment to recognize whats going on in the airplane. Power is applied, sending the nose up, as well as putting a whole lot of "nose up" feel on the yoke, aka pushing it into his lap. Pusher activates, returning the yoke to the "normal" position as it over rides the elevator feel, as soon as .95Vso is exceeded, pusher turns off and once again the yoke slams back. At this point they are in a deep stall, in an aicraft which supposedly handles like a swept wing in a stall. He has now had the yoke move multiple directions, and while this is happening the FO reconfigures the aircraft on him... You keep trying to pin the crash on the crews recovery, but you yourself have no idea what it would actually have been like in the airplane. It does not stall, nor handle like a 206.

I don't mean to be mean, but, I honestly doubt that many of us on the boards would have been able to do it any better.

There is still a lot of data not public, but "hinted" at by the faa, and their required additional training. The video that you see only shows the position of the controls, not where the forces that put them there are coming from. The FDR actually supplies this data.

Had the crew been rested, and well trained, they hopefully never would run into the situation that they did. Had they seen ANYTHING like this in training, they would have known that it take a TON of forward pressure to keep the nose from shooting 30+deg nose up. They also would have known, and hopefully used standard call outs. If we had free access to a sim that had real data, and represented the airplane appropriately, I would be more than happy to hop in and let you try your hand at it.

Give yourself a similar situation. Imagine your cruising along, suddenly the auto pilot kicks off, the yoke shakes. your first response is to slam the power in. Now the nose shoots up, and the yoke slams back. Right after that, the yoke pops forward, the nose stops climbing... and then suddenly again it slams back, nose comes up... except this time, the flaps come up, the airplane breaks to 90+deg bank. most people would prob. grab onto that yoke and hold it, not really knowing what the hell was going on.

Recovery from a roll excursion of 110 deg. in the Q takes close to 3000 feet, and you over speed by nearly 100 kts. As soon as that thing broke, the game was over.

Rest, Fatigue, training all played MAJOR rolls in this accident. Would they have missed the speed if they were well rested? who knows. Would the FO have yanked the flaps from 15 to 0 if she was thinking clearly? again, we will never know.

What we do know, is the effect of fatigue has on the human body. We know that fatigue is a slippery beast that can strike at any moment. Taking steps to prevent fatigue is important, as the FAA is finally moving forward to change regulation to enhance safety.

I would ask you not to state your beliefs in the crash of 3407 in such a manner as to imply that you have solid evidence. You do not know if the captain did, or did not pull back on the yoke. The only thing that you do know about the crash is what was said on the cvr, and presented in the animation. Lumping it on them as a couple of weak sticks that shouldn't have been in the airplane is in bad taste. It means you are jumping to assumptions about the crash, and admittedly have no real knowledge or data to back it up. There is a reason why those of us who have been through our SPOT training come back very critical of prior training and procedure. Yes, I agree that the crew failed to protect their airspeed, and that they failed to recover from the stall. The important issue is why did they fail? If the pilot does not know how the aircraft will respond, where was training? If a pilot doesn't know profiles/callouts, why? I doubt this all happened because he yanked back.

135 is a hard fish to catch, as most planes that crash don't have a CVR, FDr or otherwise. They don't have the trail of blood to highlight key equipment, and training issues. Beyond that, MANY events go unreported. in the 121 enviroment, it is much much harder to sweep something under the rug. a barron goes off the end of a runway by 10 feet. odds are it taxis back on, and nobody says a word. An 757 overruns by a foot, and it gets stuck, makes the 7 o'clock news... and the FAA gets involved. I've written the op specs for a small on demand 135 when i was instructing/ramping. the regs are old. they need to be updated...

Fair nuf, that being said, even though the regs are old, I don't particularly think that we're thinking the right way about updating them. We need to think smarter, not harder. As for 3407, I wasn't there (thank god) and don't know the specifics as such, but by that logic, no one does. I'm not going to hold my opinions on the matter at hand because of, "poor taste." I think that training, as well as judgment played an incredibly important role in this accident. I also have a little understanding on how slightly bigger machines work, I flew the 1900 on a couple of stall-warning calibration flights, and knew how high you had to be to even think about being able to get out of the stall, and your point is probably valid that had this happened to anybody else, we all probably would have failed to act appropriately. That being said, I don't buy that this accident and accidents in the future like it can be solved by changing flight and duty regs. I tend to think that if the FAA aggresively persues flight and duty reg updates, but misses the boat on pilot training, experience requirements, education, judgment mentoring, etc. then they will have died in vain. No amount of required rest will prevent crews who shouldn't be in the airplane from climbing in. That's all judgment, training, and experience. I don't really blame the crew, or consider them to be "bad people" for what happened, they call it an accident for a reason. That being said, I don't think that lack of rest is the sole reason this airplane crashed, and thus I don't think that this should be our primary concern right now. Remember, these are all opinions as only the crew knew exactly what happened, and they aren't exactly around to answer questions. All we have to go off of are CVR and FDR. That's it. My monday morning quarterbacking is just as valid as anyone elses who's seen the data. Not maintaining a sterile cockpit is another one of the things that might have contributed to the accident. The list goes on and on, but really, all of these things are a lack of "flight discipline." (Great book btw)

I have come around to the idea that duty days are exceedingly long in many cases, and that it probably won't hurt my paycheck too much for things to change. That being said, I don't think we can regulate our way out of this one by changing flight and duty regs. I think a positive approach is to require more experience for crews to start at 121 carriers, I think that having more emphasis placed on decision making and the decision making process early on is important. I think changing the corporate culture in many places from "It's OK to turn around (but not really)" to "It's actually OK if you do a 180 and head back to home base." I know for one that I've heard on multiple occasions from multiple pilots in different sections of the industry, "Man I can't believe <Airline X> went missed, it still above mins at the field!" It should be, "Man, it must suck out there." But culture is something that cannot be regulated, and cannot really be changed without active participation by people who are in it.

Saying that we should have one level of safety is a little ridiculous too because it compares operations that are inherently incomaprable. How can you compare VFR 135 Pax and Freight in Bethel with IFR 135 Cargo in Manassas, or those same two types of flying with 121 Carriers providing scheduled service from Tampa to Tempe? The missions are different. The equipment is different, the environment is different. You can't have a required dispatcher at some 135 ops, because there is no ticket, you're not going to an airport, and there is no approach. On top of that, a reroute through another city to pick up another passenger who called while you were in the air isn't something you could expect a 121 carrier to do. These two types of flying are different. What's safe at a 121 carrier would kill people 135, and vice versa. If we were required to IFR everywhere around Alaska for example, especially if we were driving Known Ice 210s or Barons, or even Caravans, there would be a significantly higher quantity of accidents. I guarantee it, the approaches are too high, the weather changes to fast, the ice comes on too strong. The 1900 handles it great, but you can't take a 1900 on scheduled service from Juneau to Hoonah, or Bethel to Kasigluk. Just my $.02.

As my perspective is somewhat skewed by my location and experience (just as is everyone elses) I'd appreciate feed back on this. And Tuck, I do appreciate your informative response in regards to Q400 ops and systems info, it makes the incident clearer in my eyes.

 

[minitour]

Saying that we should have one level of safety is a little ridiculous too

No, it isn't.

because it compares operations that are inherently incomaprable. How can you compare VFR 135 Pax and Freight in Bethel with IFR 135 Cargo in Manassas, or those same two types of flying with 121 Carriers providing scheduled service from Tampa to Tempe?

The "public" is still paying for something or someone to go from A to B on your airplane. Whether it's VFR at 800' AGL or in the back of a 757 at FL360, safety is safety.

The missions are different.

Pay, a to b, public, safely. Missions are the same.

The equipment is different,

Obviously.

the environment is different.

Which is a big chunk of the problem, IMO.

You can't have a required dispatcher at some 135 ops,

Why? If you're going to have "dispatchers" or "flight followers" they should be certificated dispatchers or at least private pilots with instrument ratings.

because there is no ticket,

Irrelevant for having a dispatcher. Wait. Do you mean "ticket" like "ticket's please?" or "ticket" like "I got mah new piletz ticket today!"?

you're not going to an airport, and there is no approach.

Also irrelevant to having a qualified dispatcher.

On top of that, a reroute through another city to pick up another passenger who called while you were in the air isn't something you could expect a 121 carrier to do.

And? So you don't do it. How hard is that? That's not a problem with the regs, that's a problem with the customers that the company needs to deal with. We don't do that and we're 135.

These two types of flying are different.

Rudders, wings, power plants, pilots.

...nope. It's still flying.

What's safe at a 121 carrier would kill people 135,

Que?

and vice versa.

Que?

Safe is safe, sir.

If we were required to IFR everywhere around Alaska for example, especially if we were driving Known Ice 210s or Barons, or even Caravans, there would be a significantly higher quantity of accidents. I guarantee it, the approaches are too high, the weather changes to fast, the ice comes on too strong.

You aren't required to go IFR under air carrier regulations. Some companies don't get a VFR op spec, but that's up to them. You can certainly operate VFR under 121 and 135.

The 1900 handles it great, but you can't take a 1900 on scheduled service from Juneau to Hoonah, or Bethel to Kasigluk. Just my $.02.

Will it meet the required performance numbers? If so, then yes you can. If not, then no you can't. Is it financially smart? That's another discussion.

As my perspective is somewhat skewed by my location and experience (just as is everyone elses) I'd appreciate feed back on this.

Since you asked...

I can't wait for the FAA to combine 121 and 135 regs, to be quite honest. There are a few things that could be done to make it work under one set of rules and it would work very well, IMO.

It's still flying. It's still transporting the public or their goods for compensation from A to B. You're still using aircraft crewed by "qualified" crews, some made of one single pilot some made of two or three or ten crewmembers. All of these operations can be conducted safely under the same rules, the rules would just have to be worded properly.

-mini

 

[3enginejock]

No amount of required rest will prevent crews who shouldn't be in the airplane from climbing in. That's all judgment, training, and experience. I don't really blame the crew, or consider them to be "bad people" for what happened, they call it an accident for a reason. That being said, I don't think that lack of rest is the sole reason this airplane crashed, and thus I don't think that this should be our primary concern right now.

Limiting the duty hours to 12 instead of 16 is a huge step IMO to making sure pilots are well rested before getting in the cockpit. You can say pilots need to use their own judgement, but when your making 18k a year and calling in sick means you will have to skip a few meals and possably pay for your own hotel that night you tend to go even if your not 100%.

12 Hour days instead of 14-16 hour days as well as 10 hour rest periods will make sure that pilots have enough time to get their rest. At that point you can place blame on the pilot if he or she is not rested.

As for the Colgan crash. Its common knowledge that when your lacking a good nights rest, sick, or otherwise distracted your scan is not the same as it would be if you would have been well rested. The main cause of the crash was both pilots failing to notice their airspeed dropping due to ice and failing to increase power. This can be directly attributed to both pilots being tired. The FO was tired from commuting cross country and sick. Not only this but had she called in sick she would have had to pay for her own hotel without reimbursement for the night. We can all sit here and say she should have called in sick but who would do that when they are making 18k a year and would have to lose pay for that day as well as pay for their own hotel for the night...

IMSAFE is great and all but it wont give me a free hotel and sick pay when I call in. New duty time regs is only the beginning. New laws to protect people who need to call in sick need to be looked into. If someone is too sick to fly, they shouldnt be afraid of losing pay or paying for their own hotel.

 

[Stone Cold]

I never experienced that as a floater at the net.

...not the switching clocks, the being "on call". I was always given very specific times to be available for duty (ahem...not in rest) and then other times I was in rest and not available for duty.

Not having a rest period previously known and a time completely free from the responsibility for duty is illegal. There are several legal interpretations on this. Having not gone through this thread start to finish, these may already be posted...I just don't have time to read through 100+ posts. Too much pron, so little time.

-mini

Yeah, well they skipped that part while I was in training, and also while I was on the line as a floater. I had no clue. I was a floater for 1 year...things may have changed, but when I was there, they tried to tell you when you were going to be needed, but if a charter run came up at 0530, or whatever time it was that they called, guess what...they called a floater. I wish I had saved that message for times like these. I learned the way it is supposed to be when I was flying charter...and they still didn't abide by it at the charter company.

"It is a gray area, and if you want to fight it, you might want representation." That was what I was told at the charter company.

Ppragman, did you seriously just say it is safer to fly VFR and scud run in Alaska than to fly IFR? You really believe this? I know Alaska is different, but come on. Planes will fall out of the sky if we have to fly IFR? Really? Funny, I did a lot of flying in Barons, Caravans and ever a few hours in 'Jos, and there is no way I would ever say "...especially if we were driving Known Ice 210s or Barons, or even Caravans, there would be a significantly higher quantity of accidents." What makes you say that? Lack of experience in icing, since most pilots fly "VFR"? I honestly can't think of another reason to say that, so please enlighten me...I really am curious.

 

[deadstick]

I talked to one of the FAA higher-ups at the meeting today.

135 will be handled separately from 121 rewrites. They originally planned on doing both together, but have since backed off on that stance. It appears that my earlier post had good intel:

DFW was a yawner for most 135 folks. At the end, the FAA guy said that 135 would be changing, too, though. One person mentioned that the 135 rewrite (2006-7?) is still missing after millions invested, and it was to have addressed many issues.

Did they break into groups (121, 135 HEMS), Steve? That was one suggestion at the end.

 

[cmill]

Heres a lil more 135 perspective; just my thoughts.

Ive flown 135 for 2 different companies, one scheduled, one non scheduled.

My first 135 gig was non-scheduled, haulin checks all over LA. A typical day was about 6 flight hours, with about 10 hours of duty time, 5 days a week. I personally loved it, wouldnt have traded it for anything. Yes, it was a demanding flight day, especially single pilot with no AP, but i did enjoy it.

Current gig operates under scheduled 135 haulin boxes, typical freight schedule. Usually 7-9pm, then 530am to 8am. Legally, Im on duty all through the night, and without getting too specific, it isnt always percieved that way by everybody, and ill leave it at that. Yes, 2 hours of flying a day is an easy schedule. The rub comes in when your "rest" is at an out station in BFE and you get your sleep from a lazy boy. Typically i can get 4 hours at night and four hours during the day, although any doctor can tell you four hours of sleep at a time doesnt equall to eight, or even six hours un-interupted, and by the end of the week, it starts to take a toll. Especially when things dont go as planned, and instead of getting in at 9 or 10pm, it turns into 3am, with a 530am showtime. Not a lot of fun.

I can understand where ppragman is comgin from. 14 hours is an easy day when you get to go home to your own bed every night. The story changes tho when you're going home to a motel for four hours of "rest" then going to a lazy boy during the day. I would take a 6am-8pm straight shift anyday over something thats split up like it curently is in the freight world.

That being said, im not bitching or whining, it is what it is. However, there are some changes that need to be made. Our bodies just werent meant to sleep during the day. Yes, the schedule requires it, but i think there have to be some concessions when you consider that you have a pilot thats been flying on the cyrcadian low and sleeping in daylight for 6 days straight.

 

[ppragman]

Yeah, well they skipped that part while I was in training, and also while I was on the line as a floater. I had no clue. I was a floater for 1 year...things may have changed, but when I was there, they tried to tell you when you were going to be needed, but if a charter run came up at 0530, or whatever time it was that they called, guess what...they called a floater. I wish I had saved that message for times like these. I learned the way it is supposed to be when I was flying charter...and they still didn't abide by it at the charter company.

"It is a gray area, and if you want to fight it, you might want representation." That was what I was told at the charter company.

Ppragman, did you seriously just say it is safer to fly VFR and scud run in Alaska than to fly IFR? You really believe this? I know Alaska is different, but come on. Planes will fall out of the sky if we have to fly IFR? Really? Funny, I did a lot of flying in Barons, Caravans and ever a few hours in 'Jos, and there is no way I would ever say "...especially if we were driving Known Ice 210s or Barons, or even Caravans, there would be a significantly higher quantity of accidents." What makes you say that? Lack of experience in icing, since most pilots fly "VFR"? I honestly can't think of another reason to say that, so please enlighten me...I really am curious.

Up here planes would, down south is a different story. Up here we'd be seeing way more accidents if we were always flying IFR. I'd rather scud run up here in a Cherokee 6 or 207 than fly IFR anyday of the winter, there's just simply too much icing on top of that, the wx changes so fast, and the approach minima are so high that you could trapped in it, and have to fight your way in below mins declaring an emergency to make it. This is a wild place. Try to stay out of the clouds unless you're turbine up here in the winter. People have plenty of experience in icing up here, even VFR you get icing and have to turn around. There's no infrastructure for it up here like there is down there. No radar contact below 6k in a lot of places (I don't think you get it below 10) around here. More for later.

 

[surreal1221]

I think it's fair to agree that there is no one single solution.

That said, just because there isn't a single solution doesn't mean that we can't find a good solution to increase safety for our customers no matter if they're taking part in a 135 or 121 environment.

Alaska already has a number of waivers for certain aviation related items. I'm sure that, if it's only one body on board (the pilot), we will never be able to instill the proper amount of respect for the elements (re: weather) to save enough lives. Just the way it is. People are going to take risk.

As, let's be honest,while most of us are not the most risk taking people in the world, we are hurling ourselves through the atmosphere in man made flying devices. We do accept a number of elements of risk every time we ignite an engine, add power, pull back, and pitch, level off for cruise, reduce power, reduce our pitch, approach earth, and land. We like it. We like the thrill of flight. No matter how simple or challenging. That's what keeps us going.

But, we shouldn't allow that minimal (or large) appetite for risk to cloud our judgment. If you're a professional, you're going to do what you think is best. We each can not judge for each other, we can just simply help each other in finding the proper decision making qualities to help keep ourselves safe and returning home to our families (or friends) every night.

 

[ppragman]

I think it's fair to agree that there is no one single solution.

That said, just because there isn't a single solution doesn't mean that we can't find a good solution to increase safety for our customers no matter if they're taking part in a 135 or 121 environment.

Alaska already has a number of waivers for certain aviation related items. I'm sure that, if it's only one body on board (the pilot), we will never be able to instill the proper amount of respect for the elements (re: weather) to save enough lives. Just the way it is. People are going to take risk.

As, let's be honest,while most of us are not the most risk taking people in the world, we are hurling ourselves through the atmosphere in man made flying devices. We do accept a number of elements of risk every time we ignite an engine, add power, pull back, and pitch, level off for cruise, reduce power, reduce our pitch, approach earth, and land. We like it. We like the thrill of flight. No matter how simple or challenging. That's what keeps us going.

But, we shouldn't allow that minimal (or large) appetite for risk to cloud our judgment. If you're a professional, you're going to do what you think is best. We each can not judge for each other, we can just simply help each other in finding the proper decision making qualities to help keep ourselves safe and returning home to our families (or friends) every night.

Very well put. This thread in a lot of ways has become a bit of a CF. If you guys like, I think we should finish this one out, and begin a discussion on how we would prefer the FARs to be, including duty times, etc.