It is easy to allow this to happen when both pilots are heads down in the charts, or fatigued. In the Q400, it is quite quiet in the cockpit, it is possible that the signs of a degrading speed were masked by the lack of sound. A lot of the E170 guys have voiced their concern with leveling off and letting the speed bleed off...but remember guys- we (TP and RJ) have to use our brains and help the autopilot fly the airplane. We manage our own speed. I don't see the experience correlation.
I have about 3000 or so in the E170, the E145 about 3000, and a handful of hours in the 747-400, all of which are "dark and quiet" cockpits.
I will say, that as I gained
experience in the embraers, especially with the E170, incorporating the autothrottles into the mix, I was well aware of my energy management. Personally, I think glass airplanes with the low speed awareness on the tapes and the "mustache" or pitch angle indicators are HUGE improvements from the SWAGS and airspeed bug method of the steam gauges.
However, as you said, both heads down in the charts represents more cockpit mis-management, allowed by, yes, the PIC. If you get a change,
someone needs to be flying the plane.
Fatigue is obscured in higher workload times, such as preflight and takeoff. It manifests itself at cruise a low workload enviornment. We have all experienced the need to sleep at cruise. It's nothing we can control. Fatigue management is so difficult because you never really know you're fatigued until you get into the airplane at cruise. If you really feel that you are that tired, then by all means you SHOULD NOT FLY THE AIRPLANE or allow your crew to fly the airplane.
Really? What about all the human factors training we do? All the aeromedical modules in about every course I've taken?
An experienced pilot will know when conditions are set up to be fatiguing. As a matter of fact, one of our pilots called in fatigued 4 days ahead of time, because he saw how the schedule was set up. No one quesitoned him.
I don't personally believe this relates to experience as much as it directly relates to professionalism. This accident I guarantee will make a lot of crews much more dilligent about sterile cockpit...industry wide- not just here at Colgan Air.
That's an intersting point. It is absolute professionalism to maintain sterile below 10k, not just a rule.
What is the purpose of that rule? To make sure the airplane has the crew's undivided attention in a high-workload environment.
At some point, experience and good decision making would tell an experienced pilot that they are entering a high workload environment far before 10k. At night, at the end of a long day, in the ice, should all add up pretty well for high workload.
I agree completely. It seems at Colgan that if you get your name on the radar your career progression will be hindered. This is the idea, not necessarily fact.
By career progression, I assume you mean an upgrade to Captain. By you qualifying it as an idea, and not necessarily fact, this is purely hypothetical, in which case can't be used in a fact-finding investigation.
I've heard all the anecdotal evidence, and can say I've
heard similar stories you have, but unless there is absolute proof, it can't be used.
I am in no way vindicating this crew. They were CERTAINLY at fault. But I am arguing that FLIGHT experience isn't the cause of this accident.
But it was, at least, probably will be on the list of contributing factors. If you can't see why, you need to step back.
I'm not trying to piss on anyone's grave, but the way the facts are shaping up, it seems, as MikeD said, a root cause.
I am however faulting those who compare Capt. Marvin Renslow to Capt. Chelsea Sullenberger because these accidents were completely different circumstances. I believe that Capt. Renslow could have landed on the Hudson and today he would have been proclaimed an experienced hero. It didn't happen this way, obviously- but we all as professional aviators need not to say "This crew was bad, they failed checkrides!" but ultimately realize the situation this crew was in. It will happen again, even to the experienced guys.
There were completely different circumstances. However, in one, the plane was flown to the landing, in the other, at least from the DFDR animation, it seems lack of flying casued the accident.
While it
HAS already happened (think Palm90) to experienced crews, this kind of accident, where two relatively inexperienced pilots flying under the commuter rules had been hypothesized for years. I heard it all the time when I was a 3 year upgrade....
Certainly not trying to argue with you whatsoever.
I see it as a discussion.
), the captain's check ride, and a LOFT. Then IOE which again exceeded FAA minimums.
. Seriously though if your comments are directed at me personally, you are barking up the wrong tree. I made more money with 3 phone calls in 2008 in my business, than I made as a FO. If you actually made a "Captain's brief" to me as described in your post I would have laughed in your face son. 
