Paper Relating to Aviation Psychology
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pilotmg1501
Well-Known Member
Any of the dangerous attitudes?........a study on get-home-itis?
z987k
Well-Known Member
It's normal to stare at whatever bad is happening. Target fixation has crashed more motorcycles then probably anything.
Number1atNumber2
Tries to keep it fun.
Yeah, I could easily see that. When I first learned to ride not the long ago I was amazed how it seemed like target fixation produced every bit as bad results (and maybe even worse) on a bike vs an airplane. But that one thing I LOVE about riding - focus on what you want not what you don't.
Autothrust Blue
“If you jump on my shift, that’s just rude, man.”
Safety cultures. Normalization of deviance. Plan continuation bias.
(stolen from Orange Anchor - who sent me a bunch of recommendations for books to read on this topic. and I did.)
(stolen from Orange Anchor - who sent me a bunch of recommendations for books to read on this topic. and I did.)
RICHARD5
Well-Known Member
Those are excellent topics.
RICHARD5
Well-Known Member
Yes, we all are familiar with the phenomena but I for one would like a clear clinical study on the mechanisms, etc. Ground traffic is different than being in the cockpit. In the cockpit, one is more confined and has a more narrowly defined scope of duties. However, how is that focus upset by task saturation and other unusual aspects of flight management? That would be a good paper.
Orange Anchor
New Member
One problem is that the field is SO large you may wind up wrestling with a monster too large.
One thing that has interested me is how expert pilots perform like novices and this is explored in a paper done years ago by a safety guy at Southwest, Capt Steve Swauger.
http://www.faa.gov/library/online_libraries/aerospace_medicine/sd/media/ISAP_162.pdf
Swauger's paper is an excellent staring point. Then you can explore things like confirmation bias where we look for information that CONFIRMS out decisions rather than challenges our choices (also known in the made up word DIS-CONFIRM).
Then you can look at 'satisficing' which is where we do not look for the BEST solution but rather most of the time we choose the first solution that seems to work and then we continue to sample the outcome, modify our next step and work from there. The problem is that we often become so engrossed in making it work that we don't stop and see the need to abandon the solution we are continually having to patch and begin again. For example, hot and high.... we pull the speed brakes. That helps but doesn't solve the problem. Next comes the gear. Helps but we are still hot and high. How about flaps and more flaps (here is where many pilots who have not learned the basics will LOWER the nose instead of pulling the nose up for a high drag profile to get a greater sink rate). And finally, maybe an S-turn or two. The problem is 'making it work' just shows how locked in the pilot/crew is. Power up, pull up, flaps up, gear up, flaps up and go around.
One thing that has interested me is how expert pilots perform like novices and this is explored in a paper done years ago by a safety guy at Southwest, Capt Steve Swauger.
http://www.faa.gov/library/online_libraries/aerospace_medicine/sd/media/ISAP_162.pdf
Swauger's paper is an excellent staring point. Then you can explore things like confirmation bias where we look for information that CONFIRMS out decisions rather than challenges our choices (also known in the made up word DIS-CONFIRM).
Then you can look at 'satisficing' which is where we do not look for the BEST solution but rather most of the time we choose the first solution that seems to work and then we continue to sample the outcome, modify our next step and work from there. The problem is that we often become so engrossed in making it work that we don't stop and see the need to abandon the solution we are continually having to patch and begin again. For example, hot and high.... we pull the speed brakes. That helps but doesn't solve the problem. Next comes the gear. Helps but we are still hot and high. How about flaps and more flaps (here is where many pilots who have not learned the basics will LOWER the nose instead of pulling the nose up for a high drag profile to get a greater sink rate). And finally, maybe an S-turn or two. The problem is 'making it work' just shows how locked in the pilot/crew is. Power up, pull up, flaps up, gear up, flaps up and go around.
Orange Anchor
New Member
Just wondering.. how have you used the info? And not stolen at all. I'm just glad to have been able to share some resources and pique interest.
Orange Anchor
New Member
RICHARD5
Well-Known Member
I'm just started into Swauger's paper and have some comments.
The 'decision tree' used to resolve the "safe and manageable" problem is is deficient because the pilot's recognition of the problem is always reactionary to the perception of the severity of the problem? What I'm trying to say is the pilot makes corrective action to the extent of how he perceives the problem. As the problem exacerbates, so too does the pilot's response. But in all cases, the corrective action could be characterized as 'too little, too late'.
To wit:
trouble. (Klein, 1998, p. 280).
Then,
The initial decision was of low consequence.
It seems to me a 'strong' initial perception would overcome that problematic 'decision tree'. Don't use a garden hose, use a fire hose. Don't dawdle with mild measures, go straight to the perception which allows an overwhelming force to resolve the problem. Yet that perception probably creates it's own set of problems, I guess.
The 'decision tree' used to resolve the "safe and manageable" problem is is deficient because the pilot's recognition of the problem is always reactionary to the perception of the severity of the problem? What I'm trying to say is the pilot makes corrective action to the extent of how he perceives the problem. As the problem exacerbates, so too does the pilot's response. But in all cases, the corrective action could be characterized as 'too little, too late'.
To wit:
Once decided, they did not access other
sources of information to validate their path. This
supports Klein’s findings that experts focus on a
strong sense of typicality and miss subtle signs of
sources of information to validate their path. This
supports Klein’s findings that experts focus on a
strong sense of typicality and miss subtle signs of
trouble. (Klein, 1998, p. 280).
Then,
The initial decision was of low consequence.
These
pilots started with a familiar and common decision
that was flawed.
Then,
The Goal was viewed as familiar and successful.
Accepting this, the pilots were strongly motivated to
continue along the chosen decision path.
It seems to me a 'strong' initial perception would overcome that problematic 'decision tree'. Don't use a garden hose, use a fire hose. Don't dawdle with mild measures, go straight to the perception which allows an overwhelming force to resolve the problem. Yet that perception probably creates it's own set of problems, I guess.
ppragman
No pasa nada.
Mission mentality, and how cultures of non-compliance crop up is interesting. Consider the dirtbag operators of the world, where busting regs is a game against the government to increase profits and "make it in" more often. How does this get started, how does this become "OK" in the eyes of the crew members who "tow the line," and "get'er dunnnnnnnn" for the company? There was an economist from UAA who's done lot's of work on "the commons" and talked about how these sorts of things get started in regards to poaching, overfishing, overgrazing of cattle, and other scenarios where the letter of the law became what he calls a game against the government. Here's a paper he wrote about this sort of thing: http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/jmurphy/papers/CommReg.pdf
Its a little heavy on the economics, but the general point remains. I personally think there's a huge connection between how pilots organize themselves and how they comply with and think about regulation and how people organize themselves in general. We really don't do what's rational a lot of the time, or we comply because there is a legal imperative rather than because a particular course of action is safer. There are those on the other side of the fence that cheat, or view the regulatory requirements as something that they have to work around, but its more complicated than that. I find it fascinating, but that's just me.
Its a little heavy on the economics, but the general point remains. I personally think there's a huge connection between how pilots organize themselves and how they comply with and think about regulation and how people organize themselves in general. We really don't do what's rational a lot of the time, or we comply because there is a legal imperative rather than because a particular course of action is safer. There are those on the other side of the fence that cheat, or view the regulatory requirements as something that they have to work around, but its more complicated than that. I find it fascinating, but that's just me.
Orange Anchor
New Member
Looking at how we make decisions is a completely different study. No doubt, action depends on perception and we can use any of the many acronyms to go through and sample the decision, its implementation and outcome. But to take your metaphor, how many of us grab a garden hose when confronted with life problems instead of getting a fire hose? Sounds simple enough.
One decision tree is quite simple but takes training and discipline (what doesn't?) and that is "Is it safe and prudent to continue?" Yes or no.
I also am a firm believer that many learn the WRONG lesson from events. Hot and high again for example. The pilot makes a hot, high approach and gets it stopped within the confines of the runway. Unless there is an epiphany and a real hard debrief, one is likely to come away with the feeling, "I made it work." Of course, this discounts the runway, runway surface, winds, aircraft weight, activation and condition of systems (brakes, spoilers, tires) etc. It is possible to log the event and the next time one sees a similar event to try the same solution. With different results.
But you bring up good points and this thread had provoked thought which is very good. Very good. Thanks.
Pilotforhire587
Lycra Man
I think that would be an awesome read
Orange Anchor
New Member
Dekker and Vaughan discuss this 'normalizing deviance' and 'work arounds'. Others use the metaphor of red, yellow and green light rules. Red you never violate. Green is a go rule and yellow light rules are those you are not supposed to violate but are routinely violated with cause. ie.. the work takes 25 man/hours. There are only 20 man/hours available before scheduled departure. So the crew takes short cuts or 'work-arounds'. Why? Because they want to be good team players and they want to get the job done. All is fine until something happens and then the inquisitors ask, "Why did you take short cuts?" You are left holding the bag, so to speak.
Then you have the rogue cultures where non-compliance is a badge of honor. Who was it in the NE a decade or so ago flying Beechs that prided itself on always getting in regardless... until they took out some trees going into Portland (as I remember) and killing a bunch of people. Everyone knew they were busting mins and going around at 200ft was a sure sign of a wus, someone who couldn't really hack it. Real men didn't go around, etc... Those cultures still exist although many not with such a high profile.
Aviation Psychology is way too broad. How long does the paper have to be? I can write a 300 page book on Aviation Psychology...
Also, does the topic of your paper need to be approved? If it does, you need to select a category first and think about honing it down to one selected topic.
For the Graduate Capstone Project for my Master of Aeronautical Science degree, I started with:
a) The Impact of Automation on Situational Awareness - topic denied, too broad
b) The Impact of Automation on Situational Awareness in Multi-Crew Operations - topic denied, still too broad
c) The Impact of Automation on Situational Awareness in Multi-Crew Air Carrier Flight Operations - topic approved!
You also need to realize that the general "accepted" theories in the flying community may not be accepted in the "academia world". What you consider common knowledge, might be a new theory to your professor, if he/she is not a pilot. Good luck with your paper.
Also, does the topic of your paper need to be approved? If it does, you need to select a category first and think about honing it down to one selected topic.
For the Graduate Capstone Project for my Master of Aeronautical Science degree, I started with:
a) The Impact of Automation on Situational Awareness - topic denied, too broad
b) The Impact of Automation on Situational Awareness in Multi-Crew Operations - topic denied, still too broad
c) The Impact of Automation on Situational Awareness in Multi-Crew Air Carrier Flight Operations - topic approved!
You also need to realize that the general "accepted" theories in the flying community may not be accepted in the "academia world". What you consider common knowledge, might be a new theory to your professor, if he/she is not a pilot. Good luck with your paper.
