Paper Relating to Aviation Psychology

[Autothrust Blue]

Just wondering.. how have you used the info? And not stolen at all. I'm just glad to have been able to share some resources and pique interest.

I've actually read some of this material alongside the FAA-mandated FOI and ADM stuff you have to know for CFI. I'm still integrating and digesting it all and I don't think I can really apply it until I get into flight instruction. The side trip into human factors is, at least for now, a not altogether tangential hobby.

My real goal is: I'd like to build some usable human factors training for the weekend warrior/owner-operator crowd. I don't like NoGo biases, which is the bulk of the ADM talk I've been getting...at least in the classroom. "Here's the weather, will you go?" "No!" Each example is rather extreme (1/4 SM FZFG OVC002 is a no-brainer no matter what kind of airplane you're flying, but what about 1SM -RA OVC008 with lousier weather at nearby airports...) It is an overly simplistic approach.

(Airplanes are airplanes in their hangars, but that's not what airplanes are for!)

Vaughan's book was interesting from a management/public administration perspective too — I made a study of STS flight safety for my public administration class and Challenger naturally was a big part of it. It's a somewhat revisionist look at the Go/NoGo decision, and is a good read.

I get to apply some of it at work too — information security and the general IS management field is really in its infancy when it comes to building a safety culture. We suck at disclosure, for instance, and enjoy shooting the messenger. Our rule-based security (PCI compliance) doesn't work.

(look at our lousy record on data breaches if you need to be convinced of this. "Well it's never been a problem before!")

"Fear of Loss of Aircraft Control During Initial Pilot Training."

That would be good. That would go straight to the heart of things.

I have some thoughts cooking on that (thinking back to what I knew in primary vesus what I know now in the pre-CFI days), but they aren't really coherent just yet.

It has to do with positive control and funduh...fundamentals (stick and rudder skill). If they get coherent, I'll let you know.

 

[RICHARD5]

I also am a firm believer that many learn the WRONG lesson from events. Hot and high again for example. The pilot makes a hot, high approach and gets it stopped within the confines of the runway.

Swauger's artilcle addresses that on page 2 in how previous errors are mitigated by achieving the goal (bad approach but good landing). Is this not a mechanism for how we learn? Is not learning the WRONG lessons an influence on how we learn? I ask because I think it finely sliced to separate the HOW and WHY in this instance.

WHY is by mitigation of previous errors. It would seem this begats a new line of HOW. Maybe it's my lack of sleep, I'm not seeing a clear distinction.

 

[Orange Anchor]

Swauger's artilcle addresses that on page 2 in how previous errors are mitigated by achieving the goal (bad approach but good landing). Is this not a mechanism for how we learn? Is not learning the WRONG lessons an influence on how we learn? I ask because I think it finely sliced to separate the HOW and WHY in this instance.

WHY is by mitigation of previous errors. It would seem this begats a new line of HOW. Maybe it's my lack of sleep, I'm not seeing a clear distinction.

The problem as I see it is venturing into the same waters expecting the same results. This is the law of the mutual funds.. past performance MAY be no indication of future results. And focusing on one component such as a nice touchdown may be the wrong focus, especially when the smooth touchdown occurs in the last half of the runway. Good landing? Not really. So then the question becomes what is a good landing. The old joke is one you can walk away from but long ago I adopted the attitude that if there were any challenging variable (contaminated runway, high winds, short runway, challenging approach, etc) the first thing that goes out the window is the hunt for a smooth touchdown. We see it time and time again where crews revert as though it was a day at the park.. long, dry runway with calm winds. And they float and float and float. Air India Express at Mangalore is an example compounded by what seemed to be a no-big-deal memo (no landings harder than 1.65Gs).

IF one learns from the poor approach to recognize it and abandon it early, good. If one takes from the poor approach "I can do it" the lesson has been missed. And does this happen? Ask the simple question. "After making a hot high approach, did you ever land out of another one or did you go around?"

 

[Orange Anchor]

My real goal is: I'd like to build some usable human factors training for the weekend warrior/owner-operator crowd. I don't like NoGo biases, which is the bulk of the ADM talk I've been getting...at least in the classroom. "Here's the weather, will you go?" "No!" Each example is rather extreme (1/4 SM FZFG OVC002 is a no-brainer no matter what kind of airplane you're flying, but what about 1SM -RA OVC008 with lousier weather at nearby airports...) It is an overly simplistic approach.

Good point. "Weather is 100 over with 50kts winds, freezing rain and your engine is badly missing on runup. What is your decision?" The evolution is what some miss but here in ATL a few years ago a Cirrus driver called back to the family and said they were having problems 'knocking the ice off the wings.' DUH!! And then they took off.. or at least tried to. Entire family GONE. In events like that I think there is really no defense. To a normal rational person it would seem that having problems getting ice off the wings would be sufficient to scrub the flt.

The other thing that happens is decisions are made and then abandoned. For example, "I never land with less than 1/4 fuel." Seems like a red light rule but then the tail winds are good, the field is above mins and you are behind on the fuel burn and WILL land with less than 1/4. Many will press on abandoning the rule and then they wind up very low on fuel and the field goes down. Now one has gone from a normal to a min fuel to emergency fuel rapidly. Yes, one can exercise judgment and press on but to do so is just asking for an emergency fuel situation.

 

[ppragman]

<snip> (1/4 SM FZFG OVC002 is a no-brainer no matter what kind of airplane you're flying, but what about 1SM -RA OVC008 with lousier weather at nearby airports...) It is an overly simplistic approach.<more snippy snippy>

Actually, you'd be surprised, same with freezing rain. People successfully launch in it all the time. Its never as simple as "no-brainer" if it was, we'd have been replaced by computers a decade ago.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

Actually, you'd be surprised, same with freezing rain. People successfully launch in it all the time. Its never as simple as "no-brainer" if it was, we'd have been replaced by computers a decade ago.

Yeh, true, and ironic of me to use "no brainer" there. Let me simply say instead that I will be disinclined to launch under those situations

 

[ppragman]

Yeh, true, and ironic of me to use "no brainer" there. Let me simply say instead that I will be disinclined to launch under those situations

Oh me too, I don't launch in freezing rain, no matter what any combination OpSpecs, GOM, or FARs say I can do. There is plenty of permissible to go around, that said, plenty of people do it. That said, back when it was permissible, I was comfortable with, and practiced at "polishing frost," and did so on numerous occasions, so meh, to each his own.