Lawman
Well-Known Member
I should hope that no combatant commander ever agreed to that plan. I probably don't want to know if they did.
To your point about ISIS post OIR, I don't know if it was really them manning up. I recovered right behind the first jet to drop a bomb in that little war. He was a JO in a different squadron. After that, they got night and day air support, and more importantly, a lot of US non-uniformed three letter agency guys without names or faces on the ground, doing the lords work. Eventually the tide turned, i.e. we bombed them into the dirt, and the Iraqis figured out that they should root for a different team......Iraqis always root for the winning team it seems. Not saying they don't have normal human levels of courage, just that decades of blind followership towards a strong man had lasting effects. ISIS was almost a replacement for Saddam, had we not convinced them otherwise. I remember the early days when Iraqi soldiers were deserting regularly for ISIS death squads. They very much did almost take Baghdad.
The crucible of fighting Isis changed a lot of leadership and mindsets amongst the professional Iraqi military/gov cadre. I was there in 21-22 and it was a wholly different place from 16-17. Still a lot of infighting amongst factions, but an agreed cooperation to continue to kill Isis whenever found led by Iraqi air and ground now now just hiding behind us.
As for the Afghan evacuation, there are a couple guys on Baseops.net (me and MikeD are there as well) who were in positions to speak truth to power and see it first hand that have shared a lot. Big surprise the State Department F’d it away with their normal failure to red team a plan and then when it all came crashing down slapped the big red button to activate the GRF. The combatant commanders were left in begrudging positions of damned if you do and should have resigned in protest. Milley waited until after retiring to finally admit and talk to some of the failures of that whole ordeal.
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