Oh Lufthansa….or Oh SFO controllers?

but my specific annoyance with this particular incident is the apparent unwillingness to provide an EAT.
I’m assuming EAT is the same as EFC? The simple explanation is probably that he didn’t know. Lots of times I’ll put center in a hold and they ask me how long and the only answer I can give them is until I can take them. Especially if I’m the one feeding the final and it depends on them. Ironically the only time I’ve had an aircraft ask me for an efc when I haven’t given one was when they’re the ones who asked to hold. I was like uh whenever you say you’re ready?
 
The procedures Lufthansa have are literally what the FAA suggested to foreign carriers do after the Asiana crash but okay this isn’t worth the energy or time. You are right and we are all wrong.

Got a source?

You can't say "you are right and we are all wrong" without a supporting link. I'm not aware of IMC separation for a visual backed up by an ILS as a mitigation for Asiana under "Recommendations" part of the accident report. I've copy/pasted it for your reference.



Sure, they were brought in a little high, but at the end of the day they DID get on the path, and then completely effed it up when the PF thought the power would come alive from throttle hold mode (at idle) and hold the airplane in speed mode. Vref of 137 and no one is watching the airspeed go to 130. Then 125. Then 120. Then 115. Then 110.






Here is the recommendation section................



4. Recommendations
As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the
following new safety recommendations:

To the Federal Aviation Administration:
Require Boeing to develop enhanced 777 training that will improve flight crew
understanding of autothrottle modes and automatic activation system logic
through improved documentation, courseware, and instructor training. (A-14-37)

Once the enhanced Boeing 777 training has been developed, as requested in
Safety Recommendation A-14-37, require operators and training providers to
provide this training to 777 pilots. (A-14-38)

Require Boeing to revise its 777 Flight Crew Training Manual stall protection
demonstration to include an explanation and demonstration of the circumstances
in which the autothrottle does not provide low speed protection. (A-14-39)

Once the revision to the Boeing 777 Flight Crew Training Manual has been
completed, as requested in Safety Recommendation A-14-39, require operators
and training providers to incorporate the revised stall protection demonstration in
their training. (A-14-40)

Convene an expert panel (including members with expertise in human factors,
training, and flight operations) to evaluate methods for training flight crews to
understand the functionality of automated systems for flightpath management,
identify the most effective training methods, and revise training guidance for
operators in this area. (A-14-41)

Convene a special certification design review of how the Boeing 777 automatic
flight control system controls airspeed and use the results of that evaluation to
develop guidance that will help manufacturers improve the intuitiveness of
existing and future interfaces between flight crews and autoflight systems.
(A-14-42)

Task a panel of human factors, aviation operations, and aircraft design specialists,
such as the Avionics Systems Harmonization Working Group, to develop design
requirements for context-dependent low energy alerting systems for airplanes
engaged in commercial operations. (A-14-43)

Conduct research that examines the injury potential to occupants in accidents with
significant lateral forces, and if the research deems it necessary, implement
regulations to mitigate the hazards identified. (A-14-44)
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
131
Conduct research to identify the mechanism that produces high thoracic spinal
injuries in commercial aviation accidents, and if the research deems it necessary,
implement regulations to mitigate the hazards identified. (A-14-45)

Analyze, in conjunction with slide/raft manufacturers, the information obtained in
this accident investigation and evaluate the adequacy of slide and slide/raft
certification standards and test methods specified in Federal Aviation
Administration regulations and guidance materials. If appropriate, modify
certification standards and test methods for future slide and slide/raft design based
on the results of this evaluation. (A-14-46)

Work with the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Working Group and equipment
manufacturers to develop and distribute more specific policies and guidance about
when, how, and where to use the high-reach extendable turret’s unique
capabilities. (A-14-47)

Once the minimum staffing level has been developed by the Aircraft Rescue and
Firefighting (ARFF) Working Group, as requested in Safety Recommendation
A-14-60, amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations 139.319(j) to require a
minimum ARFF staffing level that would allow exterior firefighting and rapid
entry into an airplane to perform interior firefighting and rescue of passengers and
crewmembers. (A-14-48)

Work with the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) Working Group to
develop and distribute policy guidance and training materials to ensure that all
airport and mutual aid firefighting officers placed in command at the scene of an
aircraft accident have at least a minimum level of ARFF training. (A-14-49)

Issue a CertAlert to all Part 139 airports to distribute the information contained in
the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) legal interpretation of 14 Code of
Federal Regulations 139.319 that requires all personnel assigned to aircraft rescue
and firefighting duties to meet the initial and recurrent training and live-fire drill
requirements and clarify how the FAA will enforce this regulation. (A-14-50)

Conduct a special inspection of San Francisco International Airport’s emergency
procedures manual and work closely with the airport to ensure that the airport
meets its obligations under Part 139.325. (A-14-51)

To Asiana Airlines:
Reinforce, through your pilot training programs, flight crew adherence to standard
operating procedures involving making inputs to the operation of autoflight
system controls on the Boeing 777 mode control panel and the performance of
related callouts. (A-14-52)

NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
132
Revise your flight instructor operating experience (OE) qualification criteria to
ensure that all instructor candidates are supervised and observed by a more
experienced instructor during OE or line training until the new instructor
demonstrates proficiency in the instructor role. (A-14-53)

Issue guidance in the Boeing 777 Pilot Operating Manual that after disconnecting
the autopilot on a visual approach, if flight director guidance is not being
followed, both flight director switches should be turned off. (A-14-54)
Modify your automation policy to provide for more manual flight, both in training
and in line operations, to improve pilot proficiency. (A-14-55)


To Boeing:
Revise the Boeing 777 Flight Crew Operating Manual to include a specific
statement that when the autopilot is off and both flight director switches are
turned off, the autothrottle mode goes to speed (SPD) mode and maintains the
mode control panel-selected speed. (A-14-56)

Using the guidance developed by the low energy alerting system panel created in
accordance with Safety Recommendation A-14-43, develop and evaluate a
modification to Boeing wide-body automatic flight control systems to help ensure
that the aircraft energy state remains at or above the minimum desired energy
condition during any portion of the flight. (A-14-57)

To the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Working Group:
Work with the Federal Aviation Administration and equipment manufacturers to
develop and distribute more specific policies and guidance about when, how, and
where to use the high-reach extendable turret’s unique capabilities. (A-14-58)
Work with medical and medicolegal professional organizations to develop and
distribute guidance on task prioritization for responding aircraft rescue and
firefighting (ARFF) personnel that includes recommended best practices to avoid
striking or rolling over seriously injured or deceased persons with ARFF vehicles
in a mass casualty situation. (A-14-59)

Develop a minimum aircraft rescue and firefighting staffing level that would
allow exterior firefighting and rapid entry into an airplane to perform interior
firefighting and rescue of passengers and crewmembers. (A-14-60)

Develop and distribute, in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration,
guidance and training materials to ensure that all airport and mutual aid
firefighting officers placed in command at the scene of an aircraft accident have at
least a minimum level of aircraft rescue and firefighting training. (A-14-61)
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
133


To the City and County of San Francisco:
Routinely integrate the use of all San Francisco Fire Department medical and
firefighting vehicles in future disaster drills and preparatory exercises. (A-14-62)

Implement solutions to the communications deficiencies identified in ICF
International’s after-action report as soon as practicable. (A-14-63)

Acting Chairman Hart and Members Sumwalt, Rosekind, and Weener filed the
following statements.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
CHRISTOPHER A. HART ROBERT L. SUMWALT
Acting Chairman Member
MARK R. ROSEKIND
Member
EARL F. WEENER
Member
Adopted: June 24, 2014
 
I’m assuming EAT is the same as EFC? The simple explanation is probably that he didn’t know. Lots of times I’ll put center in a hold and they ask me how long and the only answer I can give them is until I can take them. Especially if I’m the one feeding the final and it depends on them. Ironically the only time I’ve had an aircraft ask me for an efc when I haven’t given one was when they’re the ones who asked to hold. I was like uh whenever you say you’re ready?

Whoops, I forgot that EAT is just navy lingo. "Expected Approach Time", one of the things they read to you whilst holding in Marshall prior to commencing a night/case 3(IMC) recovery. Yes, similar to EFC, i.e. when you would normally expect to leave holding, however perhaps a nuanced difference in what happens after, depending on circumstance. Your last comment is :bounce: F'ing pilots, man :)
 
This is exactly my point. They would have been cleared to intercept a 28 localizer and cleared for the visual. Just clear them for the ILS. Norcal always leaves you high and tight regardless if it is a visual or ILS so what does it matter? It is really confusing...

Even on the FMS Bridge Visual, you are basically flying an RNAV approach in, you just don't need the IFR spacing but you don't need IFR spacing if it is VMC...

I think it's because the runways are too close together to get the separation for an ILS approach?
 
The amount of times I have to repeat myself has gone up 20x in the last 2 years. Several times a day I literally have to make every transmission 2-3 times to multiple aircraft. And not just at times you’d expect a pilot to be busy with other things, I mean like approach clearances. 3 miles from the localizer on base is not the time to stop listening.
I feel like I’ve either noticed an uptick in controllers calling me the wrong airline or the wrong number frequently too, so that doesn’t help. I’ve had guys get snippy when I didn’t respond because they called me American or something. Similarly had a guy in FLL get snippy with me because I asked him to verify the landing clearance three times, because he messed the numbers up every time.
 
I think it's because the runways are too close together to get the separation for an ILS approach?
Am I crazy or did SFO used to have PRM approaches for the 28s? I feel like I remember them there, but after going to an airline that goes there I was surprised the charts for it are either gone, or they never existed in the first place and I’m misremembering.
 
Am I crazy or did SFO used to have PRM approaches for the 28s? I feel like I remember them there, but after going to an airline that goes there I was surprised the charts for it are either gone, or they never existed in the first place and I’m misremembering.
They did during your TFAYD days. They got phased out in early 2021 if I recall correctly.
 
Am I crazy or did SFO used to have PRM approaches for the 28s? I feel like I remember them there, but after going to an airline that goes there I was surprised the charts for it are either gone, or they never existed in the first place and I’m misremembering.

Yeah I was surprised when they went away. But I trained on them every year for nearly two decades. That and PHL? I think they still have them there.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Whoops, I forgot that EAT is just navy lingo. "Expected Approach Time", one of the things they read to you whilst holding in Marshall prior to commencing a night/case 3(IMC) recovery. Yes, similar to EFC, i.e. when you would normally expect to leave holding, however perhaps a nuanced difference in what happens after, depending on circumstance. Your last comment is :bounce: F'ing pilots, man :)

EAT is EAC in civil terms, expect approach clearance.
 
Develop a minimum aircraft rescue and firefighting staffing level that would
allow exterior firefighting and rapid entry into an airplane to perform interior
firefighting and rescue of passengers and crewmembers. (A-14-60)

Don’t go to KLUF then……them and a few other AFBs permanent NOTAM:

ARFF CPBLTYS RDCD FOR KC135 & LRGR. WKEND & HOL FURTHER RDCD FOR C-37 GULFSTREAM 5 & LRGR. SVR RISK LOSS; ARFF NOT EXPD TO EXTINGUISH INTERIOR FIRE OR SUCCESSFUL RESCUE OPS. LTD EXTERIOR ARFF PERFORMED
 
Don’t go to KLUF then……them and a few other AFBs permanent NOTAM:

ARFF CPBLTYS RDCD FOR KC135 & LRGR. WKEND & HOL FURTHER RDCD FOR C-37 GULFSTREAM 5 & LRGR. SVR RISK LOSS; ARFF NOT EXPD TO EXTINGUISH INTERIOR FIRE OR SUCCESSFUL RESCUE OPS. LTD EXTERIOR ARFF PERFORMED

Safety third!!!


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Don’t go to KLUF then……them and a few other AFBs permanent NOTAM:

ARFF CPBLTYS RDCD FOR KC135 & LRGR. WKEND & HOL FURTHER RDCD FOR C-37 GULFSTREAM 5 & LRGR. SVR RISK LOSS; ARFF NOT EXPD TO EXTINGUISH INTERIOR FIRE OR SUCCESSFUL RESCUE OPS. LTD EXTERIOR ARFF PERFORMED

What is going on at Luke? Widespread double dragon passed from the dependas passed from the kids passed from school?
 
Can’t say I’ve ever heard that term either. Maybe it’s a non-radar thing I’ve forgotten about

I haven't either. And I started out my flying life in a lot of non radar. But Mike is really old, probably something you old guys used :)
 
What is going on at Luke? Widespread double dragon passed from the dependas passed from the kids passed from school?

Reduced vehicles and ARFF personnel, just enough to support full fire/rescue capability for fighter-sized aircraft. But barely enough for any kind of transport category aircraft to perform limited exterior firefighting only, with no guarantee of rescue ability. A few fighter bases with this issue.
 
I feel like I’ve either noticed an uptick in controllers calling me the wrong airline or the wrong number frequently too, so that doesn’t help. I’ve had guys get snippy when I didn’t respond because they called me American or something. Similarly had a guy in FLL get snippy with me because I asked him to verify the landing clearance three times, because he messed the numbers up every time.
That that one lady that works Kennedy Ground that continually messes up call signs, or give taxi instructions that could be multiple different ways without clarifying and then gets mad when you verify? She’s a fun one, especially during the international push.
 
Reduced vehicles and ARFF personnel, just enough to support full fire/rescue capability for fighter-sized aircraft. But barely enough for any kind of transport category aircraft to perform limited exterior firefighting only, with no guarantee of rescue ability. A few fighter bases with this issue.
New contract opportunity for you? :bounce:
 
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