dasleben
That's just, like, your opinion, man
Isn't it main wheel spin-up and alternately TR deployment?
That sounds right. Of course, if it disarms itself and you can't get the TLs into idle reverse....
Isn't it main wheel spin-up and alternately TR deployment?
This particular detail wasn't in Volume 2 when last I read it.How about autobrakes?
Is it s certain truck tilt on the 75 but something else on the 76?
This is all probably cracking up our neophytes watching the heavy guys try to remember how the systems work!![]()
Nope. Sorry.I bet Autothrust Blue knows.![]()
This is all probably cracking up our neophytes watching the heavy guys try to remember how the systems work!![]()
We used to have to "build the airplane" but after some non-flying consultants ran thru the training department, not so much.
We used to have to "build the airplane" but after some non-flying consultants ran thru the training department, not so much.
I feel the latter way about a few EICAS messages. Granted that I have a manual that at least provides a procedure for each one, but knowing a little more information would be nice.I don't want to necessarily build the aircraft, but it's a pain in the rump getting something on the EICAS and wondering "What in the world is that?"![]()
It seems like the NTSB agenda is to always blame the pilots. I'm sure the NTSB could find a way to cite pilot error in an accident resulting from say, a bomb going off in flight.
Maybe, but in this case it was really pilot error....
Now, in his defense, I've had the ground life dumping system fail on the CRJ several times before.
I've noticed how our training dept has dumbed things down over the years. 727 F/E school 20 years ago was tough. Now, you don't even get a real live oral anymore (no snide remarks). It's a just a written test from the published question bank like an FAA written. The complexity and number of recall items and memorized limitations is way down too. I think, with us, we have so many differences that they just want us to know the very basics and be able to get in the book if we need to go deeper. We have two different 757 engines, two different FMC's, and old and new 767's with differences. It's a lot to keep separated. I think it's good they keep it simple, though, cause in the heat of battle who's gonna remember half that stuff anyway.
Nothing placarded in the cockpit is memorized.
As it ought to be. I've long wondered why we need to remember stuff that's in plain sight.
Q: What's the max oil temperature?
A: I don't know, but seeing that the gauge only has one number written on it, right beside a little red line, I reckon I'll know when I get to that temperature.
Cruise will also probably want to chime in, but if I can help explain why it seems like that allow me.
The charter of the NTSB has wording in there (don't remember the exact verbage and to lazy to look up, but trust me on this) saying that it is to find the 'SOLE probable cause for the accident' and then the contributing factors. Notice the emphasis on SOLE. We obviously all know that accidents have many factors that occur prior to the point the event occurs and those are listed in the contributing factors. However, 9/10 times the last step in the process and the cause of the event is the human interaction with the chain of factors (notice I said interaction not mistake). Hence, why in current state it always seems like the blame is put on the human.
Under my experience (hopefully the only one in my career) with the NTSB, I came away with the impression that they are under NO agenda, but to find the cause of the accident. In all honesty I think they do an excellent job given the circumstances they work under. If a regional airline has an accident in upstate New York and the management side lies to the NTSB, withholds information, stalls giving them information, paints a rosy picture of how great their safety culture is, tells the NTSB 'they don't have the records', etc..... the NTSB sees right through that bullcrap. They have publically called out those that don't behave and are willing to go back if need be to get it right.
Also, the Chair, Deborah Hersman, is really intune with the aviation industry and gets it.
I have to be honest with both of you, I was a little surprised to read the cause of the accident. In the way I read it they placed blame with the mechanical failure of the brakes/TRs and then the pilots failure to notice them. Basically, they said that if things worked mechanically, the aircraft would have stopped, it didn't and the pilot should have caught it. It could have said, 'the pilots failure to notice the spoilers deployed cause the overrun' which would have placed more of the blame on the pilots. My opinion the way I read it from this brief article. Was not there in person to hear the hearing FWIW.
Finally there are some organizations looking to change the wording of the NTSB charter to list the probable causes because as we all know, many interactions cause an accident.
Hope it helps. Hopefully, Cruise chimes in with his thoughts as well.
The NTSB is interested in one thing: finding THE probable cause of the accident without prejudice, and they do a very good job at it. Unfortunately, this is where they fall just a bit short. There is seldom a singular event in the accident chain; and as such, the focus should be on the 'causes' to properly illustrate where the breakdowns occurred. I do believe we will see the NTSB's charter change within our lifetime....as we should.....to a macro focus of causes/ contributing factors. Ms. Hersman does a very good job as the Chairperson and she 'gets it!'
I'll mention as a SEL nobody that the Air Force accident investigation reports are available online, and it is truly astonishing how ruthlessly they go after pilots despite cascading multiple failures on short final or any other time critical situation. Take that F22 report as evidence regarding the guy who died in AK because his airplane wouldnt let him breath. And they still blamed the pilot in one of the most blatant whitewash jobs I have ever read about in my own lifetime! It seems like there are many examples of 'the aircraft cleary broke in these three ways but the pilot didnt recognize and react to these things in the 3.4 seconds that he could have, so it is the pilot's fault.' .