NTSB - Colgan 3407 Follow-Up

Re: Pilots' low pay, long commutes probed in air crash

You really think that?

Ask your chief pilot about me going to law school, he actually knows me, unlike you. It has little do to with crappy QOL (we could have moved back to Michigan and had better, which is exactly what we're doing), and lots more to do with me wanting to do something with my life more than fly airplanes.

Really? People are leaving this place 1 family every 12 minutes. :nana2:

RD

But I'm from Ohio, so what do I know, right? :crazy:
 
This accident is almost a perfect storm and is the reason so many people are wound up about it I think. I don't recall this much discussion about the Lexington crash when taking off from the wrong runway - and that was every bit as much pilot error as this. I have wondered why that is.

Seems to me, this accident has something for everyone. Low pay at the regionals, long commute/poor QOL, relative inexperience from the pilots, the fact that regionals fly airplanes that can kill more than 19 people at a time, and if you really are wound up - PFJ because of the CA's Gulfstream history. I am fairly certain someones blood pressure shot up when reading the transcript on how the pilot got hired with 600 or so TT, but "250 of that was 121, multi-turbine". This accident has it all - something for almost everyone to get worked up about.

I continue to return to the CA's kids and how bad I feel for them. Nobody wants to think badly of a parent, and to hear the media talking about the crew has to be painful. Not only have they lost a father, but they are also watching his every action be crutinized on CNN/MSNBC/FOX and some talking head who doesn't know anything saying how unprepared and unqualified they were. I hope that Colgan, or some of the pilots at Colgan, explain to his kids (I believe he had a teen aged son) that sometimes mistakes are made and happen. Doesn't make the person any less of a man or a father.

Sorry for the thread hijack - just my stream of thought this morning.
 
Re: Update on 3407

Sorry but when I see 'pilot error' that is just like 'connect the dots' for me. That is a very simplistic, unrealistic and narrow look at what happened and avoids the fact that an accident is a complex series of events. It has to do with more than just one flight and one crew.

Tossed out is the obvious fact that these pilot had successfully completed hundreds if not thousands of legs without an accident. But this combination of factors created a situation they were unprepared to deal with. The environment exceeded their capabilities.

The fact is we train for the center and why? Because there is only so much time and money and were we to try and train for every possible event, no one would ever leave the sim. Does this grant carte blanche to the crews? No. This crew obviously had concerns about the ice however the concern didn't translate into action. So the question becomes WHY? That question may not be asked and indeed, there may be no answer.

Fair enough...
 
Arrogant. You bet'cha.
Why be arrogant? The close cousin to arrogance is ignorance.
Doing a couple of 16 hour days a week if even that many is whats called working in this country . . . I don't think any of us truly appreciate what a "hard days work" is.
and really you're only "working" a maximum of 8 hours, right? what's the problem?
...if you can't hand fly it down let the autopilot.
Here's where the ignorance really shows up. In moderate icing we are (by FOM) to hand fly in order to feel the controls.
Remember boys and girls, you put the gear down with flaps-add power.
Speaking in absolutes is inaccurate, if you want to maintain airspeed in level flight you would add power, if you want to descend and/or slow down maybe you wouldn't add power. You might just add a little power.

I'm not trying to come at you bro, but I am trying to get some of the less experienced people here to slow down and take what the senior guys are saying. ATL has been through it and is a passionate pilot advocate, and he gets riled sometimes and it shows. I have had long debates with the guy formerly known as PCL about his tone in the past, but he is way more knowledgable than I (about some stuff:) )and most of you who have a problem with him. So try to see through his gruff (online) demeanor and hear the experience he offers.


Speaking of distractions, here is just one possibility for the distraction scenario:

He was a relatively inexperienced captain with an FO who apparently has becomed quite concerned about icing and has done the right thing by letting her captain know. So now he becomes more focused on her concerns and is watching the icing more during a deteriorating scan (fatigue or otherwise induced). Suddenly, he feel a shudder in the yoke and it snaps away from him (remember they are overfocused on icing) and he thinks oh crap tail stall. . .

I don't know if this is what was happening or not, but nobody ever will, so chill out and be nice to one another!
 
Re: Update on 3407

As an aside, the only thing I don't like about "error chain....break one link" is that it assumes a single-point failure in the situation; the one link. I like Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (James Reason, 1990) of system safety. Basically, you have slices of swiss cheese which can each represent nearly anything. These slices of cheese constantly rotate, with the holes in teh slices representing weaknesses in the system. These weaknesses can be anything, and will vary both in size and number on each slice...as represented by the individual hole. An accident progression attempts to proceed through a hole in the cheese, but will get stopped by a slice of cheese where no hole is present. Until such time in the rotation that all slices of cheese are aligned, thus allowing the accident sequence to proceed unimpeded, there will always be something that prevents the accident from occurring.
Exactly what I was thinking Mike. Our T-26 mishap was a similar chain of events.
 
Speaking of distractions, here is just one possibility for the distraction scenario:

He was a relatively inexperienced captain with an FO who apparently has becomed quite concerned about icing and has done the right thing by letting her captain know. So now he becomes more focused on her concerns and is watching the icing more during a deteriorating scan (fatigue or otherwise induced). Suddenly, he feel a shudder in the yoke and it snaps away from him (remember they are overfocused on icing) and he thinks oh crap tail stall. . .
Cool to see someone else has the same thoughts on this, just like I posted 4 pages prior.
 
How does it make him look small? Brotha J's experience allows him to make that statement considering who he was talking to.
While it may be true, talking down to someone rarely achieves a gain in credibility, especially when the other person knows nothing about him. A lot people need to stop the ego-toned talk. (Not referring to anyone in specific, just the overall tone in these threads, sometimes.)
 
While it may be true, talking down to someone rarely achieves a gain in credibility, especially when the other person knows nothing about him. A lot people need to stop the ego-toned talk. (Not referring to anyone in specific, just the overall tone in these threads, sometimes.)
you got it!:)
 
While it may be true, talking down to someone rarely achieves a gain in credibility, especially when the other person knows nothing about him. A lot people need to stop the ego-toned talk. (Not referring to anyone in specific, just the overall tone in these threads, sometimes.)

I didn't see it like that and that is very valid. Thanks;)
 
Re: Update on 3407

As an aside, the only thing I don't like about "error chain....break one link" is that it assumes a single-point failure in the situation; the one link. I like Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (James Reason, 1990) of system safety. .

There was for a while another theory about the inertia of the events. Like water drops on your windshield, they begin moving, bump into another and another and before long, there is enough mass and inertia that they blow through barriers.
 
Lexington was discussed at some length during CRM.

A CRM course that was taught by another person here on JC, who I think would love to chime in on this but hasn't found a computer to do it from as of yet (he doesn't bring a laptop on trips with him). As far as I'm concerned, he's one of the few go to guys around here for accurate analysis on this kinda stuff.

This accident is almost a perfect storm and is the reason so many people are wound up about it I think. I don't recall this much discussion about the Lexington crash when taking off from the wrong runway - and that was every bit as much pilot error as this. I have wondered why that is.

Seems to me, this accident has something for everyone. Low pay at the regionals, long commute/poor QOL, relative inexperience from the pilots, the fact that regionals fly airplanes that can kill more than 19 people at a time, and if you really are wound up - PFJ because of the CA's Gulfstream history. I am fairly certain someones blood pressure shot up when reading the transcript on how the pilot got hired with 600 or so TT, but "250 of that was 121, multi-turbine". This accident has it all - something for almost everyone to get worked up about.

I continue to return to the CA's kids and how bad I feel for them. Nobody wants to think badly of a parent, and to hear the media talking about the crew has to be painful. Not only have they lost a father, but they are also watching his every action be crutinized on CNN/MSNBC/FOX and some talking head who doesn't know anything saying how unprepared and unqualified they were. I hope that Colgan, or some of the pilots at Colgan, explain to his kids (I believe he had a teen aged son) that sometimes mistakes are made and happen. Doesn't make the person any less of a man or a father.

Sorry for the thread hijack - just my stream of thought this morning.
 
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