MCAS F/A-18 crash update.

Sounds pretty harsh for the squadron commander. I guess it's his responsibility for his squadron, but still. 146 flights after a problem was detected is a little excessive.
 
I figured this would come out. Even when this first happened, when I'd heard that he was coming from the boat, my own personal first thought was "what about KNZY or even KNUC..both standard diverts from the boat." Just a thought, as I wasn't there. But even so; if one of those can't be made from a blue-water divert, then the plane goes into the drink as opposed to on land; ATC offered the visual to 36 at NZY. Don't know why the different call was made in this case. Again, I wasn't there.

However there is precedence for this type of situation. In October 1987, a USAF A-7D Corsair had an engine failure, with a divert into a populated area for an ASR letdown into Indianapolis. The jet ended up too high over the field upon breaking out and the pilot attempted to circle to land on another runway. Out of speed, altitude, and options, he pointed the plane as best he could out of populated area (not much available) and ejected. The jet went into the lobby of the airport Ramada Inn killing 9 people.

Conversely, another USAF A-7D accident in July 1978 occurred after another engine failure while on approach to DMAFB, Tucson over the center of the city on a straight-in. Pilot glided the plane down to a line up with a street in between a elementary school and the University of Arizona campus and punched out at the last minute. The jet impacted the street right where he pointed it, missing the schools, but hitting a car that had pulled out in front of the jet while trying to turn onto that street, killing the two women inside.

Two separate incidents, one avoidable, one not.

The USMC had already avoided the bullet once when they put an AV-8B Harrier with an engine emergency and 4 Mk-82 live heavyweights into a house short of RW 21L at Yuma MCAS in June 2005, luckily resulting in no fatalities.

It's a dangerous business.
 
Just goes to show how long the "safety chain" can get. I mean damn, 146 flights with a known fuel transfer problem? I'm sure the mx forms all said, "Could not duplicate" but if this plane had multiple write-ups for the same problem by different pilots, that should've been a clue. Not saying that's what happened, that's just how the story makes it sound to me.

Now to really get the debate going...hypothetically speaking of course....

If you were the pilot and you had the option of punching out with the possiblity of hitting a residential area or buying the farm if you may possibly get to an open area, which would you have done?
 
mhcasey said:
Still not sure what to think about this one. Here's another link:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090303/ap_on_re_us/military_jet_crash
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I wonder what those could've been. Sure, it would've required maneuvering to the south some around Pt Loma to make a straight-in to 36, but from roughly where he was coming inbound from, if it was felt he could make Miramar, then he definately could've made North Island....since it's on the coast. What factors dealt with not being able to use North Island, esp in light of the publicity and loss of civilian life, isn't something I'd recommend be kept non-released; purely from a PR perspective, unless its some sort of National Security reasoning. But thats just my own 2 cents.
 
The part of this situation that isn't being talked about is the role of those outside the cockpit vice the guy actually sitting in the cockpit -- part of the reason these officers have been relieved of their jobs.

This Hornet student pilot was influenced to make the decision to overfly a perfectly good piece of pavement.

As a military student, you don't come up with such ideas on your own.

So, herein lies the problem. Ultimately, that student was the PIC of his jet and responsible for landing safely. At the same time, the guys outside the cockpit who were monitoring and supervising that flight (and responsible for it) made the decision to risk overflying good pavement in favor of landing at a base with appropriate maintenance.
 
Remember, the guys on the ground are on the ground in a comfortable seat without ultimate consequence.
 
Hacker15e said:
The part of this situation that isn't being talked about is the role of those outside the cockpit vice the guy actually sitting in the cockpit -- part of the reason these officers have been relieved of their jobs.

This Hornet student pilot was influenced to make the decision to overfly a perfectly good piece of pavement.

As a military student, you don't come up with such ideas on your own.

So, herein lies the problem. Ultimately, that student was the PIC of his jet and responsible for landing safely. At the same time, the guys outside the cockpit who were monitoring and supervising that flight (and responsible for it) made the decision to risk overflying good pavement in favor of landing at a base with appropriate maintenance.
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Precisely. Appropriate maintenance being a key issue. That reasoning could figure in as well as wanting to get back to home station from simply a comfort factor, especially as a stud. Saw the same kind of situations sitting SOF, where the OG would always seemingly want every reason why a plane wasn't coming back to home station for an IFE (wouldn't question the decision, just was seemingly wanting all reasons why at that moment; rather than just wait until I have the time to deal with him). I'm sure you've seen similar kind of thought process in your experience or similar situations, esp with maintenance concerns/availability.

In the 117, a divert to a mil field was a pain for aircraft storage reasons (can't be left outside), probable security needs reasons (depending on which service's installation was recovered to); a civil field divert would be complete ass-pain. Went into Travis one time IFE divert after not being able to get the main tank to feed post-AR on the way across the pond. Even that was painful (just different), being an AMC base. Not being used to our ops, tower/airfield management got upset that my flight had to kick our drag chutes off on the runway, effectively blocking their runway (even after we told them the plan on final, and that we couldn't taxi off with our chutes attached vis-a-vis F-4 style). You would've thought that it was a major emergency having a chute on the runway (just have crash rescue pick it up), but ONLY airfield management could do that, and they had to do a FOD check too. Didnt think it a big deal since at homeplate, chutes are kicked off on the runway all day, and you land with them on the runway, deploy yours, slow down and taxi to where the rest are on the runway and kick yours off; airfield management picks them up between goes. Granted that's homestation ops, kind of like reduced runway separation being certain MAJCOM ops. But it was still a pain.
 
Back to the subject, just was able to listen to the recording portion that was available. ATC asks if he wants the straight-in for 36 at NZY, but he pilot requests to continue to NKX. ATC then says "okay....heading 010 for now for both fields". That if that's a snap vector, that places him south/southwest of both fields, from where North Island is not only closer, but is also conveniently aligned for 36 at that field.

Again, I don't have the fully story or the background of why NI wasn't an option (undisclosed still), so I don't have the "why" answers.
 
While I understand the student pilot is the PIC for that particular aircraft, is there any obligation that he/she has to comply with instructions from the ground? I ask from a civilian perspective, as I have no formal military experience in this arena.

I haven't been able to locate any of the audio files mentioned before. Was the pilot ever given explicit instruction to land at any particular field? While I agree with the concept that the guy whose meat is in the seat is the one with the hammer, I don't understand why a student pilot wasn't at least strongly advised to recover at an airfield with sufficient safety precautions. Single engine with problems on that engine puts me in "nearest suitable field" mode, security/AGE requirements be damned. Better to save the pilot and aircraft than choose one or the other or make a smoking hole in a neighborhood.

I'm not trying to be the Monday morning quarterback here, I'm just trying to gather some input from some military aviators who know the game from personal perspective.
 
The Fez said:
While I understand the student pilot is the PIC for that particular aircraft, is there any obligation that he/she has to comply with instructions from the ground? I ask from a civilian perspective, as I have no formal military experience in this arena.
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Don't know the particular command arrangement the USN/USMC has, but even as a student pilot, to be solo, he'd have to have been qualed in the jet (Form 8, or whatever the NATOPS equivilent is). That said, he should be qualified enough to make the decision on where to go simply from that fact and the fact he's wearing wings. Now, squadron supervision could've suggested or possibly instructed a return to Miramar, but I'm not sure since I haven't heard that portion; though from the ATC tape it's implicit that he's conferring with the squadron supervision on his aux.

I haven't been able to locate any of the audio files mentioned before. Was the pilot ever given explicit instruction to land at any particular field? While I agree with the concept that the guy whose meat is in the seat is the one with the hammer, I don't understand why a student pilot wasn't at least strongly advised to recover at an airfield with sufficient safety precautions. Single engine with problems on that engine puts me in "nearest suitable field" mode, security/AGE requirements be damned. Better to save the pilot and aircraft than choose one or the other or make a smoking hole in a neighborhood.

I'm not trying to be the Monday morning quarterback here, I'm just trying to gather some input from some military aviators who know the game from personal perspective.
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Again, didn't hear the interflight or aux radio recording (if there is a CVR or HUD tape it'd be captured on), only the released ATC tape excerpt. ATC-wise, they're job is to only offer alternatives, it's the pilots job to make the decision; and ATC did just that. From the recording, it almost appears that the controller is somewhat momentarily surprised by the request to go to Miramar (the "...oookay....then heading 010 to..."). Again, don't know the reasoning behind it as that hasn't been released.
 
The worst part of this story is that poor family. Way too many bad decisions were made in this case and I wonder if the pilot had stayed with the plane if the house could have been missed.

I know he waited to the last second to punch out but I'm sure when you eject the aircraft doesn't stay on a true course, thats a big weight and C/G change. I hate to sound harsh but I hope he is held just as accountable as everyone else.
 
Champcar said:
I wonder if the pilot had stayed with the plane if the house could have been missed.

I know he waited to the last second to punch out but I'm sure when you eject the aircraft doesn't stay on a true course, thats a big weight and C/G change. I hate to sound harsh but I hope he is held just as accountable as everyone else.
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1) Generally when both engines are not running, you don't have much in the way of options. He was at a pretty low altitude, so the jet was going to go where it was going to go either way. There is nothing to be gained by the pilot riding it in, other than a chivrous idea of "the captain going down with the ship".

2) The "Technical Order" that the pilot uses is a direct order; if you want to think of it this way, it is a legal order from the Secretary of Defense on how to fly the jet. When the checklist says "Eject"....you do it. Note that the report FAULTED the pilot for WAITING TOO LONG to eject.
 
Without knowing the full extent of everything, from a maintenance perspecitve, if the gripe wasn't a downer then there's nothing wrong with flying with that gripe. Even if it was 146 times. I don't nor never have worked on -18s so I don't knwo what is and isn't a downer. On the Osprey which is similar in the fact that it's fly by wire and multi hyd systems and tells you way too much info, a lot of times you get gripes that you can never seem to track down. And alot of times we would go out and replace a component anyway and it wouldn't solve the issue.

As for the Squadron commander, sucks but I guess that's the downside to being CO. I wonder if the AMO and QAO got in trouble as well?
 
vheissu said:
When your in the military, and get canned, where do you go?
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Adak, Alaska.

Johnson Atoll, Pacific

Wake Island, Pacific

Cape Newenham Air Force Station, AK

Shemya, AK.


No seriously.....generally removed from position and sent to a desk job somewhere

Or sometimes promoted.....I kid you not. Proof that you can drop bombs off range in TX, hit a mobile home, and still make full Colonel and do Air War College in residence.
 
Now here is another factor. At the specific point in time when ATC asked him if he wanted NZY for a divert; he was single engine? From what I'm getting, he didn't have prblems with the second engine till he was feet dry and entering the down wind. Was that a major factor as to the squardon telling him to return to to Miramar versus a divert?
 
MikeD said:
Adak, Alaska.

Johnson Atoll, Pacific

Wake Island, Pacific

Cape Newenham Air Force Station, AK

Shemya, AK.


No seriously.....generally removed from position and sent to a desk job somewhere

Or sometimes promoted.....I kid you not. Proof that you can drop bombs off range in TX, hit a mobile home, and still make full Colonel and do Air War College in residence.
Click to expand...
Oh you forgot Diego Garcia!:D
 
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