Live Webcast of 3407 sunshine hearing

But he wants that amber warning tape! Because clearly, if the 70lbs of stick pusher you are fighting didn't tip you off, 1cm of amber tape will...

His point was if there was a tape, someone to glance at the speed would be alarmed. Chairwoman Hersman noted that an aural warning would have prevented this accident. I for one agree.
 
His point was if there was a tape, someone to glance at the speed would be alarmed.

You mean more alarmed than it being in the red tape? I think auto-throttles would have helped more.... But even then, what will a Dash-8 do at Vso with full aft-stick and aft-trim, 400 AGL, putting in full power? My guess is a terrain impact just the engines spool up.

Getting into that configuration to begin with is what alarms me. And after listening to this stuff all day, I'm kind of disgusted by it. It is really no different than flying a 172 @ 90kts on AP, retarding the throttle, getting to Vso, and then pulling the stick aft when you hear the stall horn.

Even worse, I can't remember ever being below Vref on an approach. Ever. I think that was instrument lesson number one - speed is your friend.
 
You mean more alarmed than it being in the red tape? I think auto-throttles would have helped more.... But even then, what will a Dash-8 do at Vso with full aft-stick and aft-trim, 400 AGL, putting in full power? My guess is a terrain impact just the engines spool up.

Getting into that configuration to begin with is what alarms me. And after listening to this stuff all day, I'm kind of disgusted by it. It is really no different than flying a 172 @ 90kts on AP, retarding the throttle, getting to Vso, and then pulling the stick aft when you hear the stall horn.

Even worse, I can't remember ever being below Vref on an approach. Ever. I think that was instrument lesson number one - speed is your friend.

I think you're right on the money. Early on in the hearing they made mention of the fact that the aircraft was recoverable from the stall and that ice accretion was not to blame etc etc. So basically he let it get to a point that it should never have got to. As for Sumwalt's comments the young lady sitting in the right seat should have caught it thus becoming the aural warning to the CA. She came from an instructing background after all.
Just my 0.002c worth.

Bp244
 
I was listening to a local radio talk show this afternoon when they brought this up. Keep in mind they are mild shock jocks and not NPR type radio guys...however they were pretty good with their assessment and understanding of everything that happened. They tried not to lambaste the pilots, but to also place blame on fatigue rules, pay, etc. I was pleasantly surprised.
 
I was listening to a local radio talk show this afternoon when they brought this up. Keep in mind they are mild shock jocks and not NPR type radio guys...however they were pretty good with their assessment and understanding of everything that happened. They tried not to lambaste the pilots, but to also place blame on fatigue rules, pay, etc. I was pleasantly surprised.

You must not talking about Shredd and Regan. I had to restrain myself from calling in and lambasting them. Their discussion was, in a nutshell, "Renslow is an idiot who didn't know what this and that button did, and should have known better than to fly airplanes, since he must have known how bad a pilot he was." I found it most disrespectful... no attempt not to hang the pilots, no mention of fatigue. Mind you I did not hear the entire show, but I have a hard time beleiving those two could formulate an educated discussion about most things, let alone pilot pay and fatigue.

Local "rock" radio. Sheeesh...
 
The stick shacker isn't exactly quiet and it gets your attention.

Oh I know.... but an extra "level" with a voice could help. Something that tells me airspeed before the shaker. We're used to hearing callouts... but if the shaker goes off you know something is seriously wrong. If there could be a callout prior to the shaker to "alert" you, why not take the extra help?

If you're not in favor of "airspeed airspeed".... how do you justify "traffic traffic" or "too low flaps,gear,terrain"....?
 
Oh I know.... but an extra "level" with a voice could help. Something that tells me airspeed before the shaker. We're used to hearing callouts... but if the shaker goes off you know something is seriously wrong. If there could be a callout prior to the shaker to "alert" you, why not take the extra help?


Shouldn't that be the PM saying "Airspeed" though? We shouldn't have to install a robo-voice to do something a live pilot was supposed to have done several knots ago. Even at approach speed, fully configured in the CRJ, you're a pretty long way from the shaker. The PM should be verbally smacking you once you're below the bug or at the most lax times, 5 kt below the bug (10 kts below target speed). Should give you plenty of warning before you get the shaker.


drunkenbeagle said:
It is a recommendation though.

Unfortunately, it's been a recommendation for both 121 AND 135 for a LOOOOONG time. We see how fast things have changed. Hopefully, the push will actually get some momentum, and fatigue being left off the list doesn't hurt the efforts thus far.
 
Unfortunately, it's been a recommendation for both 121 AND 135 for a LOOOOONG time. We see how fast things have changed. Hopefully, the push will actually get some momentum, and fatigue being left off the list doesn't hurt the efforts thus far.


This.

I'm quite frankly getting tired of hearing that Renslow legitimately did not know how to recover from a stall or fly airplanes in general. Chalking it up to "bad pilot" is very counterproductive.
 
One of the problems is that they had bugged 'normal speeds', but had the increase ref speeds switch on, which if I remember correctly in the configuration that they were in was a 20 knot increase. Now that 20 knot increase in the shaker activating, will eat up a ton of that difference between the shaker and what they were using as their ref speed.

How normal is it for a crew to slow to ref at the marker like they did? In the cirrus doing approaches, I'm around 140 kts (1.3 Vso is 80 kts) with the flaps still up at the marker, I know there is a big difference between GA flying and 121, but a straight wing turboprop is the closest to how GA airplanes behave.
 
This.

I'm quite frankly getting tired of hearing that Renslow legitimately did not know how to recover from a stall or fly airplanes in general. Chalking it up to "bad pilot" is very counterproductive.

I'm sure if you sat down next to him and asked how to recover from a stall, he wouldn't say to put the yoke in your lap, and set the power to 80%, but in the end that is what he did, and was the sword through the heart of this accident. That night he did not properly recover from a low speed warning (stick shaker), and then did not recover from the stall that was a result of the improper low speed warning recovery.

I have never seen an airplane where the stall recovery did not include max power. No matter what airplane, for what airline or little piston pounder he flew or trained in the recovery was ALWAYS full power. That to me is the most baffling thing to me. They also did NOT do a proper tailplane stall recovery either. So that argument goes out the window.
 
How normal is it for a crew to slow to ref at the marker like they did?


Well, if you actually fly our profile, you make the final configuration changes a dot before GS intercept, so you're pretty much at Vref, gear down, flaps 45 and all checklists done at the marker. Now, how often do we actually fly the profile? Maybe three times every 6 months......in the sim.
 
Shouldn't that be the PM saying "Airspeed" though? We shouldn't have to install a robo-voice to do something a live pilot was supposed to have done several knots ago. Even at approach speed, fully configured in the CRJ, you're a pretty long way from the shaker. The PM should be verbally smacking you once you're below the bug or at the most lax times, 5 kt below the bug (10 kts below target speed). Should give you plenty of warning before you get the shaker.

Mayyyyybe.....
But regardless, what's the harm of an EGPWS call. We're also supposed to call altitudes on a precision approach if the EGPWS isn't doin' it for us....

As an aside, not that I *PERSONALLY* care about Captains' feelings, but I have been told by senior, old hat folks that they find it annoying when someone corrects them on stuff. If you're not on the bug, I begin considering verbalizing it....
 
I know that you never know how different people fly things differently, so thats why I asked. I had to slow the 172 once for a Cirrus that was doing 80 from the marker.:banghead:
 
How normal is it for a crew to slow to ref at the marker like they did? In the cirrus doing approaches, I'm around 140 kts (1.3 Vso is 80 kts) with the flaps still up at the marker, I know there is a big difference between GA flying and 121, but a straight wing turboprop is the closest to how GA airplanes behave.

We have ref speeds that can be greater than 154, and can cross 1000 agl at ref +20/-0. Flap speed in those conditions is 172... Normally we are configured at the marker, profile says no checklists inside the final, in this case gs intercept at the lowest published alt. Visual is stabil app. Concept by 500 agl.

If you hit the gs at 235kts in the q, and start to follow it down, you will be at flight idle for a significant amount of time, then bribing it up to 13-20% tq on speed, flap setting dependent.
 
As an aside, not that I *PERSONALLY* care about Captains' feelings, but I have been told by senior, old hat folks that they find it annoying when someone corrects them on stuff. If you're not on the bug, I begin considering verbalizing it....

this is what standards are for, if your going to do something to the contrary, you should be briefing it up... 500 agl isn't the time to be telling the other guy you're keeping it 20 fast for windshear. Crm
 
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