Landing Incident @ SFO

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Inverted said:
I found it to be nothing like training for the Lear. The Korean FO sitting in the right seat at AMF has no responsibility, therefore, cannot really be depended upon to alleviate the captains duties. Sure they can operate the radios, but they aren't held to any crew, or legal responsibility. Hell they can't even preflight the airplane...

At FSI or CAE there is really no emphasis on single pilot operations in an aircraft that requires 2 crew. At AMF you did like 1 or 2 sim sessions as two crew, the rest were single pilot. Plus you are literally teaching these guys how to fly, where as at the airlines, or any other operation similar, the pilots have much more experience.
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So the FO is being treated as we suspect they are doing once in the heavy iron? Look who assisted in that learning model.
 
Inverted said:
I found it to be nothing like training for the Lear. The Korean FO sitting in the right seat at AMF has no responsibility, therefore, cannot really be depended upon to alleviate the captains duties. Sure they can operate the radios, but they aren't held to any crew, or legal responsibility. Hell they can't even preflight the airplane...

At FSI or CAE there is really no emphasis on single pilot operations in an aircraft that requires 2 crew. At AMF you did like 1 or 2 sim sessions as two crew, the rest were single pilot. Plus you are literally teaching these guys how to fly, where as at the airlines, or any other operation similar, the pilots have much more experience.
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Wha?
Almost every flow was broken in two either single pilot or two crew.
Callouts were two crew call and response and if you were single pilot you are talking to yourself out loud.
Did you not fly with many Koreans? Where were you based?
 
SeanD said:
More info from the briefing.

She said the pilots reported setting airspeed for 137 knots, the target approach speed, and the instructor pilot "assumed the auto throttles were maintaining that speed.'' By 200 feet above ground they realized they were still low and "He recognized the autho throttles were not maintaining speed.''
She said the pilot went to push the throttle forward to apply more power and found the left-seat pilot had already done so.'' The plane struck the seawall seconds later.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/09/pilots-of-asiana-flight-interviewed/2502979/
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So if he realized they were low at 500' (she didn't say slow though) and they were doing 1500 fpm descent, that would give them about 20 seconds before impact, still plenty of time to go around. Why did they wait so long to try to correct?
 
I think everyone is going a little too far with the speculation. At first, most of it was within the bounds of not pissing on the crew. Not so much now. Perhaps everyone should wait for the NTSB to actually do their investigation before blaming anyone for this.
 
ATN_Pilot said:
I think everyone is going a little too far with the speculation. At first, most of it was within the bounds of not pissing on the crew. Not so much now. Perhaps everyone should wait for the NTSB to actually do their investigation before blaming anyone for this.
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At this point, I agree. We know factual data about the aircraft, the crew data will take time to wade through.
 
ComplexHiAv8r said:
So the FO is being treated as we suspect they are doing once in the heavy iron? Look who assisted in that learning model.
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I didn't, that "learning model" comes from the company. How can I allow the FO to have any level of responsibility if it is MY ticket, and MY ass on the line? My FO's still flew every other leg, I gave them the choice of which legs they wanted to fly at the start of the day, I also coached, and helped them where they needed. That being said, I never left them as PF during an emergency, and I never was able to dictate to them any responsibilities that would alleviate my workload because they really weren't allowed to.

Keep in mind the "Korean culture" was alive and well with every FO I flew with. I am fully confident I could tell them I was going to smack into that mountain ahead,and none of them would have done a damn thing. We had an FO we nicknamed "Mr. Talkative" because he never said a word, ever. He was very close to causing a runway incursion because the pilot couldnt see the CRJ approaching (in the Metro), the CRJ driver for some reason wasn't paying attention, all the while Mr. Talkative was watching it unfold. This stuff is real, the culture is real, the mentality is real, and it ain't going away.
 
Interesting perspective from a former UAL standards captain on the -400 who was brought into Korea to help change their culture/training program. He points out a lot of things that were said early but has some interesting notes. Worked at Alteon as a sim instructor for 5 years from 03-08. Bolded words are the start of a new paragraph..wall of texts suck!
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.
Tom
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ATN_Pilot said:
Why? What does that have to do with the present discussion?

By the way, you do realize that you're responding to one of his posts outside the lav, right?
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He doesn't contribute much except in attempting to bust my balls.
 
eightballfreight said:
Wha?
Almost every flow was broken in two either single pilot or two crew.
Callouts were two crew call and response and if you were single pilot you are talking to yourself out loud.
Did you not fly with many Koreans? Where were you based?
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I flew out of OAK, I flew with several Koreans, and the callouts were split you are correct. But flying a BE99 or any other single pilot plane with a PTP FO is about as cute as sticking an FO on a Caravan. The FOs at AMF pay to be there, they are not employed as first officers, therefore they have real no official duty to be there. Between the language barrier, lack of flying skills, lack of real CRM training because there is none, and the fact the the CA doesn't just carry ultimate responsibility, they carry all the responsibility, that is evidenced by the fact they aren't allowed to do much more than operate the radios, make some callouts, and fly whenever the captain sees fit.
 
I'd like Cherokee_Cruiser to counter what the first hand account states in post 911 about the culture. That is consistent with other first hand accounts and not what Patrick Smith states.
 
Seggy said:
He doesn't contribute much except in attempting to bust my balls.
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Mmmhmm, mmmhmmm. Do you have proof of my lack of contribution? You do know that a ton goes on behind the scene around here, correct? As far as busting your balls (which is obviously what happens when someone asks you questions or to elaborate your position)...


Crying-Baby-001.jpg
 
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