Landing Incident @ SFO

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If a culture issue, how are they passing training here is the states? I know all training isn't done but what is the pass rate here?

That's really easy. If they don't make the cherokee/172 fall out of the sky and kill themselves then the DPE passed them. Because if he doesn't, they don't call him to do checkrides anymore, and the Asian pilot factory he is working with supplies him with a bunch of checkrides. They're rubber stamping them. The guy I did my ATP ride with is banned from given checkrides at a certain flight school in Hillsboro because he wouldn't play ball. In the Korean case, I think most of them would come to AMF in the right seat of something. Most, when they left, I would not be comfortable putting my family in an airplane with them.
 
I flew out of OAK, I flew with several Koreans, and the callouts were split you are correct. But flying a BE99 or any other single pilot plane with a PTP FO is about as cute as sticking an FO on a Caravan. The FOs at AMF pay to be there, they are not employed as first officers, therefore they have real no official duty to be there. Between the language barrier, lack of flying skills, lack of real CRM training because there is none, and the fact the the CA doesn't just carry ultimate responsibility, they carry all the responsibility, that is evidenced by the fact they aren't allowed to do much more than operate the radios, make some callouts, and fly whenever the captain sees fit.
That's unfortunate. I see all of this you've mentioned as a failure of the Captain. The Captain has a responsibility to be a leader, to mentor these FOs, regardless of the aircraft type or why they're there.

One thing I always did at Cape, even with the 250 hour guys, is swap legs and involve them in the decision making process. Some guys were rough around the edges, mostly from being low-time, but also because a lot of guys saw them as an unwelcome guest in the cockpit. What these FOs needed was someone to show them the ropes and help them build a foundation as a professional.
 
deadpixel - very interesting write-up. I have no experience with Korean pilots, but his experience with the culture is very similar to what I experience in Indonesia.
 
Whatever, pullup. Glad you can contribute to this discussion of the actual accident :sarcasm:

Whoa whoa whoa. Now it's ok to discuss an accident? Shall I pull up a couple threads where you were adamant that no one talk about them until the NTSB report came out?

I'm all for discussion, hence my questions to you earlier, which were obviously only to bust your balls anyway.

Culture may or may not have played a role, this is one aspect that won't be know until the pilots are all interviewed.
 
That's unfortunate. I see all of this you've mentioned as a failure of the Captain. The Captain has a responsibility to be a leader, to mentor these FOs, regardless of the aircraft type or why they're there.

One thing I always did at Cape, even with the 250 hour guys, is swap legs and involve them in the decision making process. Some guys were rough around the edges, mostly from being low-time, but also because a lot of guys saw them as an unwelcome guest in the cockpit. What these FOs needed was someone to show them the ropes and help them build a foundation as a professional.


Couldn't agree more.
 
Whoa whoa whoa. Now it's ok to discuss an accident? Shall I pull up a couple threads where you were adamant that no one talk about them until the NTSB report came out?

From what I recall, it was the needless speculation.
 
We "need to try". Try what? Like what program do you propose that will be more effective at making sure pilots stop somehow forgetting that when you go too slowly, plane no worky? Maybe we should focus on not hiring fools. And while yes, many careless mistakes have been made and will be made by me in the future, no, it "can't happen to me". I will never crash an airplane because woopsie I forgot the power! If I do, you can totally repost this and make me look bad.

Let me ask you this. Do you think the guy in the left seat, you know, the one who had previously been a training captain on the A320 with 10,000 hours thought he would ever crash an aircraft by getting too slow on approach?

The day you stop being a human is the day you can say you are immune to human error.
 
Seggy I think your question was answered. PNF last aircraft prior to this was the A320.


I thought the question was about the PF and whether there was a negative habit transfer from his last airframe.

This is what I undertand as far as the line-up on the flight deck:
-PF was in the left seat on an IOE flght. He has 10k hrs TT and <40 in type. He had prior experience on the 747 landing at SFO.
-PM/PNF was the CKA in the right seat and evaluating the PF on this IOE trip. He had 12k TT and >3k in the 777.
-The jump seat was occupied by an IRO (IRO #2 was in the cabin)

Possible "cultural" issues:
-PF joined the company before the PM/CKA
-PF graduated from the same university as the PM/CKA, but earlier
-PF was senior to the PM/CKA in age, schooling, and time with the company.

I think the info provided by canadian_atc (#864) is interesting. Whether it was the clutch or AT/FLCH issue, (depending on his last aircraft) I can see him relying on AT to hold airspeed, getting confused/frustrated/fixated with the sink rate, altitude, and airspeed ("Why is this not working?") in those final seconds. The PF's frustration could be from the possible culture issue: PF loses face for not figuring it out and the PM/CKA and IRO could cause the PF to lose face by pointing out the problem to him.

The way things are going, the NTSB will have a final out by the weekend. I'll be very interested to see how this pans out.

On another note: NTSB's flow of information. Does anybody think they are doing this to clear Boeing ASAP because of all the 787 issues? Just curious.
 
That's really easy. If they don't make the cherokee/172 fall out of the sky and kill themselves then the DPE passed them. Because if he doesn't, they don't call him to do checkrides anymore, and the Asian pilot factory he is working with supplies him with a bunch of checkrides. They're rubber stamping them. The guy I did my ATP ride with is banned from given checkrides at a certain flight school in Hillsboro because he wouldn't play ball. In the Korean case, I think most of them would come to AMF in the right seat of something. Most, when they left, I would not be comfortable putting my family in an airplane with them.

Did you go to LS?
 
On another note: NTSB's flow of information. Does anybody think they are doing this to clear Boeing ASAP because of all the 787 issues? Just curious.

Most definitely the NTSB is releasing this info to appease Boeing (I talked about this in post 747). I think it is separate from the 787 issues, but give credit were credit is due. The plane in SFO took a massive impact and most everyone walked away from it.
 
Exactly right. People have some objection to the word 'Negligence'. A careless mistake is negligence. It's practically the definition of negligence. I've made careless mistakes. I was negligent. I fixed my mistakes with the correct actions, and no one has been endangered. The day I put someone in danger through a careless mistake, don't defend me. Learn form it, but don't defend me.

The problem is, this wasn't careless. At least, it doesn't appear to be. For something to be careless, the person must understand that they are doing something dangerous. I doubt they realized they were in danger until they started to apply power and pitch for the go around.

You guys really need to read up on just culture and culpability. Read "Whack a Mole." It's a good start.
 
I thought the question was about the PF and whether there was a negative habit transfer from his last airframe.

This is what I undertand as far as the line-up on the flight deck:
-PF was in the left seat on an IOE flght. He has 10k hrs TT and <40 in type. He had prior experience on the 747 landing at SFO.
-PM/PNF was the CKA in the right seat and evaluating the PF on this IOE trip. He had 12k TT and >3k in the 777.
-The jump seat was occupied by an IRO (IRO #2 was in the cabin)

Possible "cultural" issues:
-PF joined the company before the PM/CKA
-PF graduated from the same university as the PM/CKA, but earlier
-PF was senior to the PM/CKA in age, schooling, and time with the company.

I think the info provided by canadian_atc (#864) is interesting. Whether it was the clutch or AT/FLCH issue, (depending on his last aircraft) I can see him relying on AT to hold airspeed, getting confused/frustrated/fixated with the sink rate, altitude, and airspeed ("Why is this not working?") in those final seconds. The PF's frustration could be from the possible culture issue: PF loses face for not figuring it out and the PM/CKA and IRO could cause the PF to lose face by pointing out the problem to him.

The way things are going, the NTSB will have a final out by the weekend. I'll be very interested to see how this pans out.

On another note: NTSB's flow of information. Does anybody think they are doing this to clear Boeing ASAP because of all the 787 issues? Just curious.

Yup that's what I meant. PF prior aircraft was the Airbus.
 
The problem is, this wasn't careless. At least, it doesn't appear to be. For something to be careless, the person must understand that they are doing something dangerous. I doubt they realized they were in danger until they started to apply power and pitch for the go around.

You guys really need to read up on just culture and culpability. Read "Whack a Mole." It's a good start.

Not quite. Careless is simply not giving enough attention or thought to avoiding errors.
 
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