King Air Gotchas

[Roger Roger]

But it’s those single engine Pilatupuses that are dangerous and scary...

 

[jynxyjoe]

But it’s those single engine Pilatupuses that are dangerous and scary...

YOU'RE dangerous.

 

[Roger Roger]

YOU'RE dangerous.

You must have been watching my legs as PF in the jet last week.

 

[jynxyjoe]

You must have been watching my legs as PF in the jet last week.

You can be my wingman anytime.

 

[ppragman]

The problem with the 350 is the first step in the Emergency Procedure. Unlike the 90/200-series, the first step (or any step...it’s not there) isn’t “Power- Maximum Allowable.” Again, light twin training for “light twins” and that’s what saved my bacon save the lives of me and my medcrew when I first experienced it in the 90. Heck, that was our procedure in the 1900 as a crew. “Engine Failure. Set max power. Props full forward. Positive rate. Gear up — Verify....” That script and procedure was burned into the brain 13 years ago. Primacy, intensity, effect— it’s all true. Why it isn’t it in the 350? Because you are trained to move your right hand from the PLs to the yoke at V1 as a single pilot. You’re never trained to verify the PLs are where they’re supposed to be. As for the ICT crash, that pilot had gotten his 350 type a week prior. Recency.

We can also go into the rudder boost system and how it goes against the dead-foot-dead engine mantra from light twin training. FWIW, the NTSB cited this as an issue in the ICT crash.

Well, also, a lot (an alarming amount) of guys don't actually think about what the emergency procedures are trying to accomplish and often follow a rote memory item instead of thinking a bit.

The manufacturers are fallible, procedures are written by men, and implemented by men, just because someone wrote it down that way does not mean that it's the right or even the best way to do something. There's a lot of faith put into the manufacturer or the training house, and it has been my experience that some of this is misplaced.

Personally, my recommendation to everyone when they learn a new airplane is to go through each emergency procedure one step at a time and ask yourself "why do they do this here?" Then think about the ramifications of that choice. Also, "what else should I be thinking about?" Write this all down in a notebook and keep it stashed in your flight bag. I can't speak to big airplanes, but this has this far kept me out of trouble in small ones for the last decade and a half.

You're spot on with the power lever off at V1 - which I think is good technique, to be clear - but if you have an engine out you need to push the power back up. That needs to be practiced, this happened to a guy I worked with a week out of school.

 

[T/O w/FSII]

Well, also, a lot (an alarming amount) of guys don't actually think about what the emergency procedures are trying to accomplish and often follow a rote memory item instead of thinking a bit.

The manufacturers are fallible, procedures are written by men, and implemented by men, just because someone wrote it down that way does not mean that it's the right or even the best way to do something. There's a lot of faith put into the manufacturer or the training house, and it has been my experience that some of this is misplaced.

Personally, my recommendation to everyone when they learn a new airplane is to go through each emergency procedure one step at a time and ask yourself "why do they do this here?" Then think about the ramifications of that choice. Also, "what else should I be thinking about?" Write this all down in a notebook and keep it stashed in your flight bag. I can't speak to big airplanes, but this has this far kept me out of trouble in small ones for the last decade and a half.

You're spot on with the power lever off at V1 - which I think is good technique, to be clear - but if you have an engine out you need to push the power back up. That needs to be practiced, this happened to a guy I worked with a week out of school.

Pushing a single engine up to the stop will kill you in a 350. Pushing both up to the stops in a stall will flip the airplane on its back.

The ICT crash wasn’t a 350, it was a new 250.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[deadstick]

The pilot has been identified. He was a founder of the King Air Academy in Phoenix. My initial thought was along the lines of “If it can happen to him...” because this is one place that trains PLM.

Edit: for timing

 

[ppragman]

Pushing a single engine up to the stop will kill you in a 350.

You don't push it to the top, "set max power" is not the same as "firewall power"

 

[Roger Roger]

The pilot has been identified. He was a founder of the King Air Academy in Phoenix. My initial thought was along the lines of “If it can happen to him...” because this is one place that trains PLM.

View attachment 55187

I mean, picking up an airplane out of maintenance power lever migration is only one of a gazillion things that could go wrong and many of them would kill even the most experienced KA pilot.

You don't push it to the top, "set max power" is not the same as "firewall power"

....which is dumb AF.

 

[deadstick]

You don't push it to the top, "set max power" is not the same as "firewall power"

That’s another thing I’ve seen jet pilots do when going to the KA — slamming the PLs to the stops. Luckily it was in the sim, their habits were corrected prior to touchinging the plane.

I’ve been trying to find the investigation on this accident, but it’s in India. This is what this PLM would look like when the pilot releases the PLs to raise the gear. The FCU spring snaps the power back to idle.

This accident in Brazil is also an example. The pilot was not trained in the KA (understand afx system) and the investigation determined the right friction lock was at the min (ccw) position.

 

[deadstick]

Pushing a single engine up to the stop will kill you in a 350. Pushing both up to the stops in a stall will flip the airplane on its back.

The ICT crash wasn’t a 350, it was a new 250.

It was a newly-sold MY2000 B200. I believe HBC had just done HSIs, and it was heading to MEZ for P/I.

 

[ahw01]

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

I remember the DO telling me something about the friction lock when I flew the KA200. I don't remember what it was but I always did it and I always did the autofeather test.

So far my 3 years as a KA captain were some of the best years of my aviation career.

 

[T/O w/FSII]

I mean, picking up an airplane out of maintenance power lever migration is only one of a gazillion things that could go wrong and many of them would kill even the most experienced KA pilot.

....which is dumb AF.

Yup and every time I got a 350 out of MX the frictions were backed off to nothing because the mechanics were in the engines and needed to easily move cables, apparently.

 

[A150K]

There needs to be a whole thread about how to stay alive and employed at a 135 operator.

As someone who's done both 135 and 121, I second this

 

[trafficinsight]

I mean, picking up an airplane out of maintenance power lever migration is only one of a gazillion things that could go wrong and many of them would kill even the most experienced KA pilot.

....which is dumb AF.

There was a 200 crash out of Hayward a few years ago that looked exactly like an engine failure but it ended up being the rudder trim pegged to one side by mx and the pilot didn't catch it. He escaped the wreckage, to this day i dont know how, there were tire tracks on the side of a bulding.

 

[N519AT]

I too had a power level roll back on takeoff after V1 in a King Air. The guy I was flying with was supposed to be guarding the power levers and didn't catch it. It's a real gotcha if you're not paying attention. Fortunately I had enough thought to look at the gauges after realizing how much rudder I was pushing to keep us going straight.

3000 hours in turboprops...THE best time in my career no doubt, but it does require a different airmanship approach than flying jets. Picking up ice faster than the boots can cycle was always one of my favorites.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

There's a lot of faith put into the manufacturer or the training house, and it has been my experience that some of this is misplaced.

Mmm, thoughts offline on all of that, too.

There was a 200 crash out of Hayward a few years ago that looked exactly like an engine failure but it ended up being the rudder trim pegged to one side by mx and the pilot didn't catch it. He escaped the wreckage, to this day i dont know how, there were tire tracks on the side of a bulding.

There was a similar accident down in Australia.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

There was a 200 crash out of Hayward a few years ago that looked exactly like an engine failure but it ended up being the rudder trim pegged to one side by mx and the pilot didn't catch it. He escaped the wreckage, to this day i dont know how, there were tire tracks on the side of a bulding.

Parkour!

 

[deadstick]

The one thing that I keep trying to wrap my head around is the rudder trim deal. I’ve never thought about it when I had the opportunity, but in the sim — 200 and 350 — the instructors have told me to take out the rudder trim before landing OEI because it’s a bear on the ground. I’ve got to try this in the plane because there’s a disconnect somewhere. If it’s an issue, how can the pilots not know?