Fun morning

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Not only the official version, but also worked closely with the folks that did the performance analysis on it.

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Still won't answer that question.

I have to correct myself (it's been a long time since I looked at this accident much). The NTSB did add the "known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice" as a contributing factor.

My argument would be classifying this as contributing or causal. Consider that other 737 pilots had described incidents where the airplane was practically uncontrollable in pitch and where they felt they narrowly avoided crashing, and this was at normal power. This information had not been disseminated to the US domestic 737 community. In Europe some operators had taken their own steps (after harrowing incidents) to ensure their crews treated the 737 differently in snowy conditions than other aircraft. They reported that Boeing had been unresponsive to their urgent warnings about these incidents.

So we get the CVR:

16:00:31 CAM-1 Vee-one. Easy , vee-two.

16:00:39 [SOUND OF STICKSHAKER STARTS AND CONTINUES UNTIL IMPACT]

16:00:41 TWR Palm 90 contact departure control.

16:00:45 CAM-1 Forward, forward, easy. We only want five hundred.

16:00:48 CAM-1 Come on forward....forward, just barely climb.

16:00:59 CAM-1 Stalling, we're falling!

16:01:00 CAM-2 Larry, we're going down, Larry....

16:01:01 CAM-1 I know it.
END

One debate in the investigation was what the captain was referring to with his comments such as "easy" and "forward, forward" etc.

But the aircraft achieved V2 and it was eight seconds later that the stick shaker activated. In that 8 seconds the aircraft had pitched up and climbed sharply away from the runway.

Just about everybody today will tell you that the crew forced the airplane off the runway and staggered in a stalled condition, trying to climb, until it hit the bridge. That makes sense in the context of our collective experience. The idea of the aircraft being uncontrollably pitched up is just not considered. But that would make sense when you consider what the aircraft actually did which was accelerate to V2 (at about 70% of normal power), pitch up abruptly into a steep climb, stall and then descend into the Potomac river.

Now consider the original question. I give you enough thrust to achieve all V speeds and lift off of a 6,000 foot runway. Would this be enough thrust to continue to climb if your airplane was otherwise controllable? Of course it would be.
 
Ok, so the decision to De ice is totatly upto the Captain? Do they request it or does ground ask if they want it or what? Heck if your getting paid by the hour, let'em de-ice the plane, few more bucks in your pocket in the name of safety.
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Ok, so the decision to De ice is totatly upto the Captain? Do they request it or does ground ask if they want it or what? Heck if your getting paid by the hour, let'em de-ice the plane, few more bucks in your pocket in the name of safety.

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Yes, it's the captain's call. As Seagull noted it is very expensive for your company and causes delays that can disrupt your customer's travel. So it's something you do when necessary not to pad your trip pay. And you usually are paid by the minute.
 
Well, never having flown a jet smaller than a 727, I am not going to spend more time debating the 737, except to note that its wing doesn't have much sweep. What I do know is that jets have safey departed with a LOT of snow and ice in the past, during the 60s and 70s, and the accident rate simply does not demonstrate a need for what we spend economically in countering the "threat". We could save a lot more lives by targeting those items that have been shown to be leading causes of fatal accidents, which has been well researched by the CAST-JIMDAT.
 
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Yes, it's the captain's call. As Seagull noted it is very expensive for your company and causes delays that can disrupt your customer's travel. So it's something you do when necessary not to pad your trip pay. And you usually are paid by the minute.

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Especially when you're at an out station, and the de-icing is handled by another airline (*cough* Northwest *cough*). We push a flight 20 minutes early (supposed to be "out" at 6:45 AM, we had him brakes off/beacon on at 6:20 AM) so he could de-ice. He wound up sitting in the penalty box for over an hour since none of NWA's guys came in before 8 AM. By that time, I'm pretty sure the ice would've melted on it's own since the temp was like 42.
 
[ QUOTE ]
Ok, so the decision to De ice is totatly upto the Captain? Do they request it or does ground ask if they want it or what? Heck if your getting paid by the hour, let'em de-ice the plane, few more bucks in your pocket in the name of safety.
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Legally, yes, but most guys I've flown with are usually oblivious to the condition of the aircraft until the FO says something. Whenever I've said, "Hey, we need to de-ice the aircraft", I haven't had to make much of a case about it.

A couple of days ago in Denver, we were just doing the preflight checks of the aircraft and I hadn't done my walk around yet. Operations calls and asks if we're going to need de-ice and if we did let him know so they could get the trucks warmed up.

It was fairly low visibility outside and cold, but what's a little fog?

I finished my interior preflight stuff, headed outside and the aircraft was absolutely frosted with ice from the freezing fog. It wasn't anything like you'd see in the midwest during winter, but certainly a obviously discernable amount of ice over all of the surfaces to the point where the aircraft looked like "Mr. Freeze" from Batman, or whatever show that was.

And the aircraft had only been sitting about an hour or so which is why I was so interested how the other aircraft was able to depart without at least some type-I.

Schedule or no schedule, it's not worth risking ending up in a burning heap of aircraft grade aluminum and making my bride a widow over machismo. Besides, fodding an engine out costs a heck of a lot more than some warm type-I and a layver of protective type-IV.

Even after de-icing, we only had a 20 minute holdover time considering the environmental conditions.

A little extra note about rear-engined aircraft. When the sheet of ice you thought was hunky-dory detaches from your wing, just guess where that sheet of ice goes?
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Well, never having flown a jet smaller than a 727, I am not going to spend more time debating the 737, except to note that its wing doesn't have much sweep.

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That's cool. Pick any jet you want. If I give you enough thrust to achieve V2 and lift off of a 6,000 foot runway, do you think you could safely climb out with that same thrust?
 
Actually, now that you have made me think more about it, I will disagree with you. Accelerating to lift off a 6000' runway is really somewhat meaningless. So what if an aircraft designed to depart shorter field than that (and I am very sure that the 737 CAN operate to shorter airports) could reach V2 in time? Were they past the point at V1 where they were actually inside where they could have stopped the jet? I bet so, as I imagine that under those conditions they were pushing balanced field. Also, a twin will accelerate better, and climb better, with both running in general. Doesn't mean that it had enough power to climb out of ground effect. How much runway was remaining at lift off? Do you know?

I never stated that the snow did not affect climb performance. I am quite sure it did, and it is possible that it would have climbed absent that. However, I am very sure that it would have climbed fine with the contamination if the thrust had been applied. That is easy to calculate, and it was calculated.

I stand by my original reply to this. You are suggesting the 737 has some problems, and that may be true (certainly did with the rudder) but if the information you outlined is correct, why have other operators in the U.S. not implemented similar procedures, and why have there not been more accidents over the years?
 
Maybe I'm missing something here guys, but won't ice on a wing affect the speed at which an aircraft stalls? I.E. The V speeds don't mean jack if the airfoil is not in the shape in which the V speed was calculated at. Angle of attack seems a lot more important here. They could have well had enough thrust to reach V2 only to rotate, climb out of ground affect and find yourself at the critical angle of attack with a bridge real close to you.

So dosen't that mean that they had enough thrust to get to what *should* have made the aircraft fly even though it wouldn't given shape of the airfoil?
 
John

While ice can have the effect you mention, the record shows that the impact on swept soft-wing transport jets is not all that great, relatively speaking.
 
Record being empirical data from a lab doing tests on the affects of ice on an airfoil or the number of crashes? Just because you don't crash does not mean things are hunky dory.
 
John

Perhaps, but we have very limited resources for safety improvements and, while I would agree that the current procedures do marginally improve safety, my contention remains that the money is being mis-spent, and that there are a LOT of other areas where that capital could achieve a lot more safety return for the investment.

To recap:
1. Yes, current procedures likely do increase the safety margin for swept soft-wing transport jets, but;

2. the cost of this marginal increase could save a lot more lives spent in areas that result in higher accident rates historically.
 
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Well, never having flown a jet smaller than a 727, I am not going to spend more time debating the 737, except to note that its wing doesn't have much sweep. What I do know is that jets have safey departed with a LOT of snow and ice in the past, during the 60s and 70s, and the accident rate simply does not demonstrate a need for what we spend economically in countering the "threat". We could save a lot more lives by targeting those items that have been shown to be leading causes of fatal accidents, which has been well researched by the CAST-JIMDAT.

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Doug Taylor" said:
A little extra note about rear-engined aircraft. When the sheet of ice you thought was hunky-dory detaches from your wing, just guess where that sheet of ice goes?

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Having only flown jets smaller than the 727, we run into two big problems: engines; as Doug alludes to; and Regs.

Engines-wise, it varies from aircraft to aircraft, but fighter-type aircraft engines can FOD-out pretty easily. F-16 with single engine is pretty susceptible. One of the most restrictive jets I saw was the T-38 engines.....the 7th or 8th stage compressor blades on the J85-GE-5 engine were razor thin. Hence, regs-wise, the Dash-1 restricted flight into (jf I remember correctly) forecast light, or observed trace icing.

With no deice capability, and little anti-ice capability beside the pitot heat, fighters don't generally tackle icing.

The other major problem with icing is the underwing stores. If you have anything that has a seeker head on it, such as a IR missile with a glass dome, icing will tend to shatter the domes, seriously damaging expensive munitions. Same goes with FLIR pods and other similar sensors if the pilot fails to stow them.

Of course, the A-10 was no big problem with it's engines and icing, but it did have the underwing ordnane problem with the AGM-65 missiles.

It's real bad in the 117. The "grid" that covers the engine inlets is known as the "ice cube tray", since freezing rain/drizzle tends to form inside the grids just like the tray in your freezer (if you have one), resulting in all sorts of bad karma, since when it comes off, the engine begins ingesting the stuff. Unlike the old A-10 engine, where you could drop bolts down the thing as it's running, and it grinds them up and spits the shards out the back end and keeps on running, the GE F404s we've got can't do the same.

Regards the hard wing/soft wing issue, I don't know how that would've affected fighters. Some might remember the F-4. The E models were soft wing with LE slats, while the older C/Ds were hard wing. Would be interesting to research this when I get a little time.
 
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Actually, now that you have made me think more about it, I will disagree with you. Accelerating to lift off a 6000' runway is really somewhat meaningless. So what if an aircraft designed to depart shorter field than that (and I am very sure that the 737 CAN operate to shorter airports) could reach V2 in time? Were they past the point at V1 where they were actually inside where they could have stopped the jet?

Doesn't mean that it had enough power to climb out of ground effect. How much runway was remaining at lift off? Do you know?

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They used most of the runway. Their takeoff distance would have been about 3500' if they had normal power. The report said they used 2,000' and 15 seconds more than would have been required under normal power. But it was a cold day and it was calculated that they used about 70% power. That was enough to hit their V speeds all the way to V2 and lift off of the short runway. At this point they were in much better shape than if they had lost an engine. They had more than 50% thrust and no drag from a displaced rudder.

Palm 90 climbed pretty well after lift off from the runway. It was at least a couple of hundred feet AGL, I think it was more than that. I found an account on line that is a synposis of what happened at liftoff. The author of this gets it wrong to one extent. The stickshaker did not activate immediately at liftoff. The airplane climbed quite aggessively for 8 seconds before the stick shaker activated. It was some time after that before it started descending to the river. I'll give you credit though, you're the first guy I've had this debate with that thought an airplane that could achieve V2 on a short runway wouldn't be able to climb out.

At rotation speed, the aircraft pitched up sharply, causing Wheaton to reply "easy." It was a known fact that ice buildup on the wings of a 737 can cause a tendancy to pitch up. Pettit's correction of the nose-up attitude, however, failed to resolve the problem and the stickshaker immediately began to sound. note: this is incorrect, the stickshaker didn't activate for 8 seconds Wheaton called "Forward, forward, easy. We only want 500," refering to the altitude at which the airplane had to be to make the 40 degree turn to the left around the Washington Monument and the restricted airspace over the Capitol.

"Come on. Forward, forward. Just barely climb," exclaimed Wheaton as the aircraft continued to stall. Moments later the aircraft was no longer climbing, but falling back to earth.

The Palm 90 crew didn't have to try to make the airplane climb. Their problem was getting the nose down. In fact the copilot was probably pushing forward as the nose lifted off the runway. The captain had called "V1" then exclaimed "easy", then "V2". He was obviously concerned about the rapid rate the nose was lifting. Even at that the airplane climbed for 8 seconds before decelerating to stickshaker speed. It continued to climb from that point until it actually entered the stall and began the descent to the river

It is in this context that the captain's exhortations make sense. Obviously confused at the aggressive pitchup he was saying "easy, we just need 500'' He was trying to coach the first officer to get the nose down, but not too aggessively so they could continue to climb.

There were forces in this investigation determined to hang this crew from the start. (That doesn't mean all investigators were involved). Boeing is obvious. But also ALPA was a party to this investigation. Usually they were anxious to come to any pilot's defense, union member or not. But this crash coincided with a campaign ALPA had started to convince the public that only ALPA pilot's were safe.

The one member of the investigation fighting for the crew was the Air Florida chief pilot. Some other chief pilots from European operations had called him and alerted him to their incidents involving the 737. He started pressing this to other parties to the investigation. For his efforts he did get it listed as a contributing factor and, he says, he got a late night phone call from a powerful Washington state senator urging him to back off of that particular angle, citing the risk to the jobs of hard working Boeing people.

My reference on that is John Nance's book Blind Trust .

The Palm 90 crew made some serious mistakes. The primary one was the engine anti-ice. Secondary was failure to abort when they got suspect indications. Down the list would be de-icing. In that aspect they didn't do anything differently than anyone else that day at DCA.

The final nail in their coffin was the inability to control their airplane in pitch. Absent that, I think, they had plenty of power to climb out of DCA that day. But that is obviously just a firmly held opinion.

The thing that stands out the most to me was the fairly rapid approach that Boeing took to modifying the entire fleet of 737s. Boeing has historically been pretty indifferent to ice. Their airplanes have minimal airfoil anti-ice compared to other jets. But the problem on the 737 was not ice on the upper surface, but small traces of ice on the inboard leading edge devices. The ability to operate anti-ice on the ground along with Boeing's admonitions to do so seems to have been the solution the European operators were looking for when they first approached Boeing about the issue.

And you ask about the accident rate of the 737. Keep in mind the airplane was still a relatively new and small fleet. But in that time some cold-weather operators had reported serious problems and some had initiated their own special procedures to compensate for it. It is very likely that the difference in these operator's abilities to recover during their pitchup incidents were much enhanced by already being at normal power. Another factor was that the Palm 90 FO likely rotated a little more aggressively than usual given the rapidly approaching runway end, which probably gave him an even more rapid pitchup than the other operators had experienced. As usual, the old three strikes and you're out deal.

The Palm 90 crew was also much criticised for failing to push the power up when faced with a stall. Of course it was after this accident that this became a standard part of transport training.

BTW. One of the reasons I studied this accident and advocate for the crew is because I think they got a raw deal. Yes they made mistakes that directly caused the crash. But they didn't have all the information about their airplane. They didn't have the use of airfoil anti-ice on the ground. They were inexperienced but they handled the de-icing like all the other operators that day. They didn't have all the guidance and holdover tables which were a direct result of accidents like theirs. And they commited the ultimate sin of crashing a Boeing airplane. That's one of the reasons I always preferred Douglas. They just didn't seem as proficient at hanging pilots as Boeing.
 
I have never been someone that particularly defended Boeing, as you can see in my others posts, but I think there are some prolems with what you wrote:

1. Are you sure ALPA was party? NTSB does not allow party status to ALPA if it was not an ALPA carrier.

2. John Nance. No credibility in my book, put him just above Mary Schiavo.

3. Ground effect would explain the amount of climb you describe.

4. The 737 was not all that new by the time of this accident. Airplane had been around for what, 20 years?

5. Not sure that anti-ice was not advocated on the ground prior to this accident, seems to me it was. In fact, fairly sure it was, from what I recall. Sure was on the 727, what would make the 737 different? Sure, they re-emphasized it after the accident. Doesn't tell me much.
 
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1. Are you sure ALPA was party? NTSB does not allow party status to ALPA if it was not an ALPA carrier.

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Pretty sure on that one. ALPA has been a party and contributed investigators on non-ALPA accidents and I believe they did so on this one. But my main point is that, as they have on other accidents, they would have been a forceful advocate for the pilots if they had been ALPA members. I believe they would have pushed very hard for the controllability issue to be given more weight. As it was there were a number of entities that had an interest in this crew taking the full blame.

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2. John Nance. No credibility in my book, put him just above Mary Schiavo.

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Wow, that's pretty low. Just curious if you ever read Blind Trust? On the other hand my skepticism of the NTSB puts me in a small minority of pilots of which I am well aware.

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3. Ground effect would explain the amount of climb you describe.

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Here I think you've got to be kidding. I wish I could easily find my NTSB report. I gave 200 AGL as a conservative estimate. I'm pretty sure it was higher. I guess we have a different concept of ground effect. I don't think even the NTSB report tried to claim that.

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5. Not sure that anti-ice was not advocated on the ground prior to this accident, seems to me it was. In fact, fairly sure it was, from what I recall. Sure was on the 727, what would make the 737 different? Sure, they re-emphasized it after the accident. Doesn't tell me much.

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Airfoil anti-ice not only isn't advocated, it isn't available on any transport airplane except the 737. It's now available on the 737 due to a modification that Boeing did on the entire fleet after the accident. To allow it they had to put in more overheat protection, since obviously airfoil anti-ice wasn't meant to be used with no airflow over the wing. Very hot gasses and all that. Also they added a shutoff in case the pilots pushed the power up for takeoff without turning it off. It is then available again at 400' AGL. I'll take your bet that you used airfoil anti-ice on the ground on a 727.
 
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They used most of the runway. Their takeoff distance would have been about 3500' if they had normal power. The report said they used 2,000' and 15 seconds more than would have been required under normal power. But it was a cold day and it was calculated that they used about 70% power.

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Trying to dust the cobwebs off the old memory, but wasn't there an issue about just how much power they actually had versus what they thought they were using?. Seem to remember something about the Pt2 probe. The fact that if it had ice on the "P" portion, i.e. dynamic pressure, then it read only static pressure and hence the EPR would read higher than the actual thrust. In short they thought they had a lot more power than they really did.

Reason I remember this is that the KC135 had exactly the same problem, even to the point there was a -1 (for the non military types the -1 is the operating manual) WARNING about this problem. One of the things different in the KC135 was an acceleration check time between 80 knots and 120 or V1 whichever was lower. If this time wasn't made you aborted.

Another crosscheck is the N1 RPM. Remember this from the MadDog as we used EPR also.

Personally I like the N1 RPM for power settings like we did on the KC10 due to the GE Engines.

Anyhow, back to Palm 90. As I remember they were really short on power due to the Pt2 probe icing, which they didn't recognize, hence I don't think there was any attempt by the crew to advance the throttles.

Again I’m relying memory, one my wife reminds me is fading, regarding this.

This accident just further illuminates the "chain of events" that is a part of virtually every one of them.
 
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This accident just further illuminates the "chain of events" that is a part of virtually every one of them.

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True. I'm just trying to point out that one event wasn't very clearly "illuminated" and most pilots don't remember it as a factor at all, laying all the blame on the crew. That event was the abrupt and uncontollable pitchup into an eventual stall that took place as the FO rotated the airplane.

As you say, take any one event that day and everybody probably lives. The fact that the airplane was able to accelerate to V2 and lift off of a short runway demonstrated they had enough power to cimb out that day. An abrupt, uncontrollable pitchup with normal power set and they have a chance of making it, as other crews had. Put the two together and they are done.

I wonder what would have happened if they had shoved the power up? As all fluf pilots know, when you shove the power in a stall situation you have to shove the yoke forward to counteract the pitchup. This crew was already dealing with a pitchup. It's possible, if not likely, that shoving the power up would have deepend the stall altering only the point of impact.
 
ALPA would have been a pilot advocate whether or not the particular pilots are represented. Accident investigation at ALPA is separate than the side that defends pilots, and we always represent the pilots position, as that is the very reason NTSB allows ALPA to be party to the investigation in the first place. ALPA volunteers and staff scrutinized every part of the investigation, which makes it hard for any other party (such as Boeing) to bury something.

As for anti ice, I misunderstood you, interesting to be able to select airfoil anti ice on the ground and have it actually operate.

Ground effect. Much more pronounced a lot farther from the ground than is generally understood by most pilots, but is most pronounced at the half wingspan point and below, obviously.

Not sure on your evidence of the pitch up, appears to be an assumption. Does the performance track or FDR bear it out?

Nance=dingbat in my book. Good at self promoting, though. Not read that book, but have read portions and other stuff by him.
 
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Not sure on your evidence of the pitch up, appears to be an assumption. Does the performance track or FDR bear it out?

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One of the big problems on this accident was the FDR. This was one of the accidents that lead to the call for improved flight data recorders. Because the pitot static instruments initially showed a pretty decent rate of climb the conclusion was they were unreliable. One of the reasons they thought they were getting unreliable readings was that the airplane pitched up so rapidly it effected the static source somehow. I forget the logic, but that's what I remember. Of course a big problem was how much performance deterioration to attribute to ice on the wings. Since this was an unknown it left conclusions in doubt.

I have had this report in my possession but a few years ago I lost a lot of things in a flood and this looks like one of them. So no access to the numbers. Just my memory of my own conclusions.

But no doubt there was a pitchup as it made the final report as a contributing factor. I think Boeing got off light there, especially given that it was a known problem to them but a complete secret to US 737 operators, much to the frustration of operators who had alerted Boeing to it.

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Nance=dingbat in my book. Good at self promoting, though. Not read that book, but have read portions and other stuff by him.

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That's interesting. I'd never heard that before. John flew for Braniff and is a captain for Alaska now. His first book was Spash of Colors about Braniff, very good reading imo. He was a consultant for national news networks on air safety. I was always glad when they called him in on a story because you got the kind of reasonable, unembellished commentary you'd expect from a line pilot. Very different than from the likes of Shiavo. In fact he was kind of the anti-Shiavo. But to each his own.
 
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