Era/Ravn/Corvus Safety and the NTSB

Do you think there's a causal relationship between the way 135 operators interpret their regs and the higher accident rate in comparison to part 121?
No. I don't. Under no interpretation of the rules that I have ever heard is it legal to go VFR to an airport calling 1/2 sm in blowing snow (hagelands badami accident), or 300' overcast (at night no less![the saint Mary's accident]). That's guys out on their own doing stupid, illegal stuff that they've gotten away with a lot of times before. The latest accident, who knows, latest rumor I've heard is they stall/spun from 3400 feet which would have nothing to do with interpreting the regulations.
 
No. I don't. Under no interpretation of the rules that I have ever heard is it legal to go VFR to an airport calling 1/2 sm in blowing snow (hagelands badami accident), or 300' overcast (at night no less![the saint Mary's accident]). That's guys out on their own doing stupid, illegal stuff that they've gotten away with a lot of times before. The latest accident, who knows, latest rumor I've heard is they stall/spun from 3400 feet which would have nothing to do with interpreting the regulations.

So...why do you think 135 has over quadruple the accident rate of 121?
 
So...why do you think 135 has over quadruple the accident rate of 121?
Less capable equipment, almost exclusively single pilot operations, shorter and less rigorous training programs, and management that doesn't encourage a culture of following rules and company policy are some things that spring to mind as factors in recent 135 accidents that I am familiar with.
 
I only flew at Hageland for 2 years.....but what do i know............that document only explains the "cowboy" crap that resulted in an accident or incident.........but its not a "culture" problem as i was told......give me a break.......ya know....i used to do that stuff.....when i was a 500 hour guy flying around up there.....and its wrong. I don't...wont...and now as a 121 guy....totally disagree with that behavior. Ive almost killed myself up there scud running or flying "vfr" at night. It needs to change...but doubt it will.
 
This is all irrelevant. The FAA will have no jurisdiction. Aeroflot will be taking over all service just as soon as Russia is done with the Ukraine...
 
Do you think there's a causal relationship between the way 135 operators interpret their regs and the higher accident rate in comparison to part 121?

Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.
 
So...why do you think 135 has over quadruple the accident rate of 121?

Tighter oversight, more in the eye of the public, and self preservation on the part of tbe FAA. There are plenty of "cowboys" in the 121 world too. It's just a lot harder to get away with stuff when someone is always watching. So people tend to try to get away with less. You know, like knowing you're not speeding, but still slowing down when you see the cop anyways.
 
Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.
That is crazy. If we have problems with anything and write it up it gets looked at or fixed. It sucks that it was that way over there. The variety in safety cultures is amazing. I like to think ours is pretty good. Then you look at a place like Bering which is probably the best out west.
 
Tighter oversight, more in the eye of the public, and self preservation on the part of tbe FAA. There are plenty of "cowboys" in the 121 world too. It's just a lot harder to get away with stuff when someone is always watching. So people tend to try to get away with less. You know, like knowing you're not speeding, but still slowing down when you see the cop anyways.

The panopticon principle.
 
That is crazy. If we have problems with anything and write it up it gets looked at or fixed. It sucks that it was that way over there. The variety in safety cultures is amazing. I like to think ours is pretty good. Then you look at a place like Bering which is probably the best out west.

Yeah.....it was a difficult environment to deal with....the mechanics were always copping an attitude and as an example.......the phrase a lead mechanic used alot..." How do you know its not working.....are you an AP?" I eventually just gave up on it. Some guys were ok...but it was hit and miss. It reminded me of a beat dog....after a while it may approach you but cower waiting to get hit again. Thats what it was like when you tried to write something up.
 
As someone who should be an A&P in about 5 weeks, it doesn't take a genius to know when something isn't working or is unairworthy. From other members, and my limited experience, it sounds like this is not the norm accross the industry.
 
Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.
That sounds similar to an experience I had flying out of Big Bear airport this past winter. 4am departure, pitch black with broken clouds obscuring the peaks, colder than a witches tit. On rotation our AI began tumbling and we immediately started picking up ice (ice fog). Put the gear up, gear power pack won't stop cycling and we start to smell a burning smell. Picking up more ice and the stall warning starts going off at like 90kts. Put the gear in the down position and pull the circuit breaker. Climbing out at 110 kts now so as not to stall (mind you we are trying to climb out of a valley). Do emergency gear extension procedure. Emergency gear pump handle snaps off about 50 pumps into the procedure. I end up having to attach a wrench to the now stub of a handle and finish the procedure. One of the worst aviation experiences I've ever had. And did I mention it was pitch black in the mountains? Not even a moon. Sometimes airplanes don't seem to like below freezing temperatures.
 
Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.

That is insane. And 6 accidents, including two fatal, plus one very serious incident, in a 19 month period? I'm amazed they still have any kind of certificate at all. I don't buy that "it's just how it is in Alaska" either. Although I haven't flown in Alaska I fly in similarly challenging conditions (well, different challenges but still very different from CONUS flying) and it's nothing like this. Single pilot, single engine ops over inhospitable terrain carries with it increased risk, but it is not inherently unsafe. I feel bad for you guys who had to put up with this!
 
They were a VFR only carrier, so as long as they could remain clear of clouds below 700 feet they would depart. So they remained "VFR" in class G, and I guess were technically legal, but certainly not in line with the intent of the rule.

I suppose it's not exactly the same, but it's definitely getting "creative." We all know that pilots die in one of two ways, getting creative or getting ambitious.

Did their ops spec allow en-route ops in uncontrolled airspace?
 
The panopticon principle.
When I do something dumb/wrong in an airplane, it bothers me--I self-police pretty harshly. You have to be your own FOQA, regardless of whether or not your operation has such a program. A Captain made a call I questioned but went along with once (maintenance wise), and we wound up going back to the gate. The worst part for me was the knowledge that Captain Dad wouldn't have done even that much--he wouldn't have left. (For example)

But not everyone is going to be that way.
 
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