Roger Roger
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Not everywhere has cell phone towers.Ok you're right. If you can scud run to the ocean and not hit a cell phone tower, you're golden. Who cares how risky it is?
Not everywhere has cell phone towers.Ok you're right. If you can scud run to the ocean and not hit a cell phone tower, you're golden. Who cares how risky it is?
Not everywhere has cell phone towers.
No. I don't. Under no interpretation of the rules that I have ever heard is it legal to go VFR to an airport calling 1/2 sm in blowing snow (hagelands badami accident), or 300' overcast (at night no less![the saint Mary's accident]). That's guys out on their own doing stupid, illegal stuff that they've gotten away with a lot of times before. The latest accident, who knows, latest rumor I've heard is they stall/spun from 3400 feet which would have nothing to do with interpreting the regulations.Do you think there's a causal relationship between the way 135 operators interpret their regs and the higher accident rate in comparison to part 121?
No. I don't. Under no interpretation of the rules that I have ever heard is it legal to go VFR to an airport calling 1/2 sm in blowing snow (hagelands badami accident), or 300' overcast (at night no less![the saint Mary's accident]). That's guys out on their own doing stupid, illegal stuff that they've gotten away with a lot of times before. The latest accident, who knows, latest rumor I've heard is they stall/spun from 3400 feet which would have nothing to do with interpreting the regulations.
Less capable equipment, almost exclusively single pilot operations, shorter and less rigorous training programs, and management that doesn't encourage a culture of following rules and company policy are some things that spring to mind as factors in recent 135 accidents that I am familiar with.So...why do you think 135 has over quadruple the accident rate of 121?
Do you think there's a causal relationship between the way 135 operators interpret their regs and the higher accident rate in comparison to part 121?
Will they do a better job?This is all irrelevant. The FAA will have no jurisdiction. Aeroflot will be taking over all service just as soon as Russia is done with the Ukraine...
So...why do you think 135 has over quadruple the accident rate of 121?
That is crazy. If we have problems with anything and write it up it gets looked at or fixed. It sucks that it was that way over there. The variety in safety cultures is amazing. I like to think ours is pretty good. Then you look at a place like Bering which is probably the best out west.Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.
Tighter oversight, more in the eye of the public, and self preservation on the part of tbe FAA. There are plenty of "cowboys" in the 121 world too. It's just a lot harder to get away with stuff when someone is always watching. So people tend to try to get away with less. You know, like knowing you're not speeding, but still slowing down when you see the cop anyways.
That is crazy. If we have problems with anything and write it up it gets looked at or fixed. It sucks that it was that way over there. The variety in safety cultures is amazing. I like to think ours is pretty good. Then you look at a place like Bering which is probably the best out west.
That sounds similar to an experience I had flying out of Big Bear airport this past winter. 4am departure, pitch black with broken clouds obscuring the peaks, colder than a witches tit. On rotation our AI began tumbling and we immediately started picking up ice (ice fog). Put the gear up, gear power pack won't stop cycling and we start to smell a burning smell. Picking up more ice and the stall warning starts going off at like 90kts. Put the gear in the down position and pull the circuit breaker. Climbing out at 110 kts now so as not to stall (mind you we are trying to climb out of a valley). Do emergency gear extension procedure. Emergency gear pump handle snaps off about 50 pumps into the procedure. I end up having to attach a wrench to the now stub of a handle and finish the procedure. One of the worst aviation experiences I've ever had. And did I mention it was pitch black in the mountains? Not even a moon. Sometimes airplanes don't seem to like below freezing temperatures.Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.
Big differences...in mindset..training....culture...and the equipment is far better in 121. I remember many days getting stuck flying partial panel in horrible weather because the maintenance was viewed as a "hassle". I certainly never enjoyed rotating out of chevak in pitch black darkness while watching my attitude indicator remain level..or start tumbling over....not just once..but several times in a 15 day shift.
They were a VFR only carrier, so as long as they could remain clear of clouds below 700 feet they would depart. So they remained "VFR" in class G, and I guess were technically legal, but certainly not in line with the intent of the rule.
I suppose it's not exactly the same, but it's definitely getting "creative." We all know that pilots die in one of two ways, getting creative or getting ambitious.
Did their ops spec allow en-route ops in uncontrolled airspace?
When I do something dumb/wrong in an airplane, it bothers me--I self-police pretty harshly. You have to be your own FOQA, regardless of whether or not your operation has such a program. A Captain made a call I questioned but went along with once (maintenance wise), and we wound up going back to the gate. The worst part for me was the knowledge that Captain Dad wouldn't have done even that much--he wouldn't have left. (For example)The panopticon principle.