CRJ Crash in Katmandu


Reports say Captain is sole survivor. Plane was some kind of maintenance flight. 18 or 19 fatalities. A Dash 8 crashed at Katmandu under weird circumstances a few years ago too
"I'm sure they know it's TRUE.
Katmandu,
Really, really where I'm going to..."


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CaSKczNuFhg


And some of you youngun's thought ALL the BOOMERS were ALL tranquil and rich ALL their lives...

Lol, Nope.
 
You know how I know your story is made up?

There isn't enough room in the back of a CRJ to swing an ax to get up enough speed to cut a piece of pasta, let alone somebody's arms... even while on meth.

I was expecting this retort, and boy do I love to prove people wrong on the internet. How about the fact that the meth head hacked open the fuselage with the axe first, so he had more room? Duh

Boom, mic drop
 
I was expecting this retort, and boy do I love to prove people wrong on the internet. How about the fact that the meth head hacked open the fuselage with the axe first, so he had more room? Duh

Boom, mic drop

This is slightly more plausible. The CRJ 200 (if full and it was summer time) can't really climb high enough that the pressure differential due to a giant ax cut in the aft fuselage would really effect things that much.

I'll believe it.
 

The contributory factors to the accident are:

- Incorrect speeds calculated based on erroneous speedcard. The interpolated speedcard of the operator for 18,500 kg TOW mentions incorrect V-speeds for take-off. This error in the speedcard went unnoticed since its development. There was no acceptance/approval of the speedcard booklet.

- Failure to identify and address multiple previous events of high pitch rate during take-off by the operator.

- The operator showed gross negligence in complying with the prevailing practices of ferry flight planning, preparation and execution. There is a lack of consistent definition of ferry flights.

- Gross negligence and non-compliances by the operator during the entire process of cargo and baggage handling (weighing, loading, distribution and latching), while violating the provisions of operational manual and ground handling manual. The load was not adequately secured with straps, tie-downs, or nets, while the flight preparation was rushed.
 
Interesting that there was no mention of FDR data.
The report indicates that the FDR & CVR were readout by the Singapore TSIB.

It notes that indications for some flight control inputs were inop on the accident aircraft. Although the airline had acquired software for a flight data analysis function, they did not have an operating program, nor a program manager. However they did seem to have an archive of data back to 2021 which was included in the investigation's review(!).

 
The report indicates that the FDR & CVR were readout by the Singapore TSIB.

It notes that indications for some flight control inputs were inop on the accident aircraft. Although the airline had acquired software for a flight data analysis function, they did not have an operating program, nor a program manager. However they did seem to have an archive of data back to 2021 which was included in the investigation's review(!).


The previous article mentioned the FDR. I often read threads backwards.
 
Damn, shut it down everyone. Cherokee Cruiser has it figured out YET AGAIN.

Be sure to share your findings with the Nepalese authorities. You’ll save them so much time and effort I’m sure.

I’m not sure you read/understood my post?


Read again. They’re on the low side for the weight anyway.

The main problem is the 17.5kg and the 18.5 kg cards had the same data, that is obviously bad and shouldn’t happen.


But the actual VR used in the accident flight was 118 knots, when based on their actual weight VR should have been 122 knots. From having flown this plane before, 4 knots slower on VR should not result in a crash. Which is why I said it SOUNDS like the excessive pitch up and rate was the main problem for this crew.


And somehow your took that as I have figured out some black magic and should share with the Nepalese?

The investigators did their job. They found some speed cards had incorrect data. The main problem was their excessive pitch up and rate of doing so:






Specifically, investigators observed that flight crews consistently exceeded the standard pitch rate of 3 degrees per second during rotation.

One notable example was recorded on March 19, 2024, when the pilot-in-command of the accident flight had executed a takeoff with a peak pitch rate of 5.5 degrees per second.

In total, investigators identified 18 such instances on aircraft 9N-AME between 2023 and 2024, with pitch rates exceeding 4 degrees per second in all cases. The most extreme case occurred in January 2024, with a peak pitch rate of 5.8 degrees per second.

The March 2024 event involving the accident pilot-in-command represented the second-highest recorded pitch rate.

Excessive pitch rates during takeoff can result in a deep stall—a condition where the airflow over the wing is severely disrupted, leading to a loss of lift. This was consistent with the data observed during the accident flight.
 
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