Who here is old enough to remember when KSAN had two active runways.....the main 9/27, and the secondary 13/31?
Comair 5191: Sole Survivor tonight 1/8 on CNN
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Who here is old enough to remember when KSAN had two active runways.....the main 9/27, and the secondary 13/31?
zmiller4
Well-Known Member
I'll also say: don't compare SFO and ORD to LEX or Concord or Sonoma. SFO's layout exists for a reason--limited space and a lot of jet traffic. It would be awesome if they could spread out the runways a little, but even with four surfaces it still turns into a crapshow with a 1000' layer. ORD may look like a mess, but there's logic in it--getting as many airplanes in and out as quickly as possible given the variable weather.
Just for the record, I never said you were advocating anything like that. in fact I put in brackets that I'm not referring to you in my comments, I was referring to others I've heard who have been saying that. Your comments, I agreed with for the most part.
I wouldn't necessarily label 26/27 as a hazard without there being some kind of measurable trend that clearly demonstrated that. Might it be a challenge, or take a little extra attention? Sure. But that doesn't cross the threshold of a hazard or dangerous. Remember, it was one of these "skilled experienced" crews you refer to who crashed at LEX, not a GA/part 91 crew that you believe would be "highly challenged". And I agree that LEX is no ORD in the least.
My point being that it wasn't the airport or ATC that was the problem here in this accident, it was the flightcrew. Squarely. They had the ultimate responsibility to taxi a perfectly good aircraft from the terminal to the correct runway. The clues and directions to make that happen were there and operating. They failed to do that and missed critical opportunities to do so, such as lineup and runway lighting. Tragic? Of course. An accident? Indeed. But remember.....the airport is nothing but a lifeless piece of concrete sitting there. It doesn't conspire against pilots or do anything on it's own. If pilots misuse the airport, assuming it's correctly marked, that's on them. It's like saying a particular curve in a roadway is dangerous, because people speed around it, far faster than the posted speed limit and many crash. That's not the fault of that curved piece of asphalt, it's the fault of drivers not following signage or paying attention to the roadway.
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ChasenSFO
hen teaser
I've read the "Hot spots" on the SFO diagram, I'm wondering if these were isolated events that happened a few times. Since February I've spent 30-60 hours a week monitoring SFO tower/ground at work and have yet to see an incursion at any of the "hot spots". Biggest problem here is international flights like to stop short of taxiway Bravo on 28L and cause the plane behind them to go around when all of ATC's prodding can't get them to taxi at more than 4 knots.
zmiller4
Well-Known Member
There's a major flaw with having a requirement for there to be a measurable trend, though: you don't want to wait until there's safety issues to identify problem areas on airports. I could see that working if you had a 100% reporting rate for ASAP and ASRS, but we both know that doesn't happen.
This is 100% true. And there were a *lot* of procedural changes for flight crews at pretty much every airline after that crash, because it was an experienced crew that ultimately made the mistake and we wanted to fix that. Learning happened, and even though it was a pain in the ass to confirm the runway and heading as you turn onto a runway, it's overall a good thing. But:
There is *zero* reason not to try to make airport layouts safer. As convenient as it is to lay *all* the blame for the Lexington crash on the crew, you'd be crazy not to acknowledge that the layout was a hazard. You'd be hard pressed to find someone who has flown in there to say otherwise...and there's nothing wrong with trying to make an airport safer. It happens with roads all the time. They get changed, signage gets altered--all to make things safer. If we just say "the crew screwed up" and leave it, we miss some serious opportunities to make things safer.
Agree with this.
Agree too. Learning did come out of the accident, just like any accident; which is the only positive that comes from these things. I guess it would've been nicer had it been some kind of new lesson rather than a back-to-basic that had to be relearned; but sometimes we all need to be reminded of the basics again, unfortunately.
Nothing wrong at all with trying to make anything, airport or otherwise, more safe; I fully agree. The crew did screw up, we all agree, and they made mistakes. Definitely tragic. In terms of the airport though, how do we adequately measure what's safe and what's not, when there hasn't been an issue? Take LEX. People have indeed said it's challenging. In the case of LEX during the accident....were all the signs in place and operating? Were applicable NOTAMS in place for anything unusual? So far as I know, yes. Could there be improvements? Sure there could......more specific signage maybe, or more detailed? Perhaps. But a complete change to the layout of the airport due to one accident? I personally don't think that necessary such as has been done; but I guess if the money was there.
My point being, had this been a trend accident, with accidents or incidents preceding it, then I could see a potential design flaw possibility. That to me is different than merely changing or adding/upgrading some signage or or more lighting or whatever, to the existing airport.......improvments, as you mentioned. I'm tracking with you.[/quote]
DE727UPS
Well-Known Member
After looking at the airport diagram at LEX prior to the crash I'm seeing a big red flag that could have broken the chain. Ground said "taxi to 22", NOT, "taxi to 22, cross 26" 26 was closed with no runway lights, so perhaps no duty for ATC to mention 26. But, if the controller had put cross 26 in the clearance it would have clued them that they needed to see a runway go by during their taxi before they reached the assigned runway. They would have had to read back the clearance and that might have helped clue in their SA on the taxi. I've flown out of BFI and SDF during times when the alternate runway was not being used. 13L at BFI and 29 at SDF. It's standard for them to clear you to cross those runways that are not in use on your way to the active runway. This didn't happen in LEX. Might have broke the chain.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
In hindsight, clearing to 22 via one of two taxiways [that terminated at 22] would have [also] been a standard [and lifesaving] clearance.
[Edits in brackets.]
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ATC RET 2003
No More Vectors
Can't say I'm old enough to recall that... but I DO remember hearing some folks not much older than me talk about when Taxiway Dixie at ATL was a runway... and I damn sure remember when Griffis AFB was nowhere near Omaha.
zmiller4
Well-Known Member
It would not have been prior to the accident. That was a major--and important--change that came out of that crash.
After 2006, I wasted a lot of time getting controllers to verify I was cleared to cross something. "Taxi to" without specific clearance to cross anything in betwee? Give me a clearance. Approach sign? Give me a clearance.
🦈💜
Well-Known Member
They changed the phraseology to include explicit crossing instructions at some point far after this accident... At the time, 'taxi to' was the correct instruction to 'taxi to, crossing any taxiways or runways enroute unless told to hold short', unless my memory is failing me. (Not wholly impossible)
-Fox
zmiller4
Well-Known Member
Nope, that's absolutely what "taxi to" meant.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
You misunderstood me. 26 was closed, so nothing was improper, no crossing existed, no instruction required. I was noting that clearance via a specific taxiway COULD have been given - controller discretion.
zmiller4
Well-Known Member
True, I apologize.
sweeps
Undercarriage Actuator
Which airport in Iraq? I did a search and couldn't find what you're referring to.
BobDDuck
Island Bus Driver
I'm pretty certain that at the time of the accident, even if 26 was open, no clearance to cross it would have been needed. The clearance "taxi to runway 22" with no qualifiers would have included the clearance to cross runway 26. That changed about 3 years later, in theory to match up with ICAO, but I'd guess also as a result of this crash.
Correct. At that time, a taxi clearance to a runway allowed one to cross all taxiways and all runways except for the active runway during your taxi.
The problem this caused was airfields with multiple active runways. In this case, ground should give a "taxi to RW X, hold short of X" clearance, but you as a pilot never really knew if they'd forgotten about you or not.
Case in point was KHMN where I used to be based. Our parking ramp was on the west side of the airfield. Standard operations for HMN for fighters, winds allowing, was departure RW 25, landing RW 16/34. (see airport diagram link below)
I think I saw RW 7 used once in my 3 years there for anything, and I landed on RW 25 only once. RW 4 I did a low approach to once, but RW 22 was available for landings if wind required. 4/22 was the primary departure and landing runway for any large aircraft.
Anyhow standard taxi for departure was from our ramp, Taxiway H across 16/34 to Taxiway A to arming on Taxiway B, to RW 25. Numerous times, I'd be given "Ghost 7, taxi RW 25", which implies the aforementioned route, and a clearance to cross 16/34. Problem was, as I was taxiing down Taxiway H approaching 16/34, looking up the final for RW16, I'd see landing lights illuminated from an aircraft on maybe a 7+ mile final. So 16/34 is also an active runway.
Now, maybe ground already coordinated with the local controller to allow me to cross there at the departure end of RW16 because there was time before the landing traffic arrived, but it would be nice to know that just so I could have a warm fuzzy. A better clearance would be "Ghost 7, taxi to RW 25, cross RW16". Rather than assuming anything, especially in the above described example, the latter taxi clearance would be far more clear as to what I'm truly cleared to do, and take few words to say; especially when I'm watching aircraft on final and knowing I'm crossing an active runway.
http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1401/00007AD.PDF
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Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
I agree. I didn't mean to suggest that a clearance couldn't include a crossing at this time. I was making the point that it wouldn't have been unusual for the controller to issue a clearance via a specific route and this would not have been unusual at all, then or now. It would have removed any taxi options for the crew and forced then to take a taxiway ending at 22. It know it wasn't required. That's why I precluded my statement with "in hindsight".
BobDDuck
Island Bus Driver
Got ya. I've found that in general, especially at early hours and places where a ground control is issuing the exact same instructions over and over again, they tend to say the least amount possible.