Cirrus Statistics (CAPS & Accidents)

[jhugz]

I have just recently been reading through the COPA magazine, Yeah...Yeah... I know many of you feel as this is propaganda but I feel that they do a great job of compiling statistics. I feel as if this board has an unwarranted hatred of the aircraft especially from people who have never flown it. I'm nowhere near an expert but I'm getting up to about 100 hrs in the aircraft and along w/ my personal experience and some statistics I wouldn't mind talking about it.

CAPS System

Since 1999 there has been 20 CAPS activations of which 17 were saves with a total of 35 survivors. The list is as follows:

CAPS pull #1, Oct 2002, Lewisville, TX, 1 uninjured
Factors: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error Activation: low altitude, 1,500 feet VFR after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane Landing: bushes near golf course

CAPS pull #2, April 2004, Lethbridge, AB, Canada, 4 uninjured
Factors: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, SR20 performance Activation: high altitude, deployment upon loss of control Landing: landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers

CAPS pull #3, April 2004, Fort Lauderdale, FL, 1 uninjured
Factors: confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system Activation: low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation Landing: landed in trees

CAPS pull #4, Sept 2004, Peters, CA, 2 uninjured
Factors: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery Activation: high altitude, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet Landing: landed in walnut grove

CAPS pull #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA, 1 fatality
Factors: IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots Activation: uncertain if intentional activation or due to airframe stress in high speed descent, CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site Landing: high speed impact in mountainous area

CAPS pull #6, June 2005, Haverstraw, NY, 1 serious injury (compression fracture of vertabrae)
Factors: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs Activation: low altitude, last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots) Landing: water, bay of Hudson River

CAPS pull #7, Jan 2006, Childersburg, AL, 3 uninjured
Factors: IMC, severe icing, loss of control Activation: high altitude, icing report at 9,000 feet IMC Landing: flat terrain

CAPS pull #8, Feb 2006, Wagner, SD, 2 uninjured
Factors: IMC, shortly after takeoff, pilot disorientation Activation: low altitude Landing: flat terrain

CAPS pull #9, Aug 2006, Indianapolis, IN, 1 fatality, 3 serious injuries (spinal surgery)
Factors: IMC, pilot incapacitation, 2.5 miles from departure airport Activation: low altitude, possibly first activation of CAPS by non-pilot, possibly not fully deployed Landing: water, pond among residential housing

CAPS pull #10, Sept 2006, Bull Bay, Jamaica, 4 uninjured
Factors: VMC cruise, passenger activated when fuel streaming from tank filler openings Activation: low altitude Landing: trees

CAPS pull #11, Feb 2007, Sydney, Australia, 2 injuries
Factors: VMC cruise, engine problems, rocket took unusual trajectory, parachute failed to open, successful emergency off-airport landing Activation: low altitude Landing: trees

CAPS pull #12, Apr 2007, Luna, NM, 1 injured
Factors: IMC cruise, climb to avoid weather, confusing instruments, terrain waring in IMC Activation: low altitude, IMC Landing: trees, mountainous terrain

CAPS pull #13, Aug 2007, Nantucket, MA, 2 injured
Factors: VFR in IMC during approach, parachute tangled with tower wires, 1 serious injury, 1 minor injury, 1 unborn child saved Activation: low altitude, IMC Landing: tower, flat open terrain

CAPS pull #14, Oct 2008, Spain, 3 uninjured
Factors: IFR in IMC during approach, pilot reported turbulence and loss of control, parachute tangled with power line wires, Activation: low altitude, IMC Landing: power line

CAPS pull #15, Nov 2008, Turriaco, Italy, 1 seriously injured, 3 uninjured Factors: fuel exhaustion and loss of engine power, parachute deployed at low altitude and late in the power-off glide scenario, approximately 400 feet above ground; Activation: low altitude, VMC; Landing: trees and grass

CAPS pull #16, Dec 2008, Gouvy, Belgium, 1 minor injured
Factors: icing, pilot attempted several outs but was unable to maintain altitude, Activation: low altitude, IMC Landing: trees

CAPS pull #17, Dec 2008, Patterson, LA, 1 uninjured
Factors: pilot reported mechanical difficulties late at night over coastal marshes, Activation: high altitude, VMC, night Landing: canal (water)

CAPS pull #18, Feb 2009, Deltona, FL, 2 fatal
Factors: instructional flight practicing low-speed maneuvers, witnesses report spinning aircraft with CAPS activation about 200 feet above ground; Activation: low altitude, VMC Landing: trees

CAPS pull #19, Mar 2009, Gaithersburg, MC, 1 uninjured
Factors: door popped open upon takeoff, pilot reported rain in the cockpit and attempted to manage door but became disoriented, Activation: low altitude, IMC Landing: residential street

CAPS pull #20, Jun 2009, Mount Airy, NC, 1 uninjured
Factors: catastrophic engine failure with oil obscuring windscreen, Activation: high altitude, 6,000 feet, VMC Landing: level field

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As you can see if you actual read these statistics that if used properly the chute saves lives. Two out of the three fatalities were due to low chute pulls and the other due to a chute pull past the max chute speed. #11 was the only exception to the statistics where the CAPS system failed and was AD'ed.

Some facts about CAPs & the aircraft:

-Cirrus aircraft will float for at least a while.
-Time under canopy will be about 35 secs per 1k feet lost.
-Back injuries occurred in two of the three water landings.
-Descent under canopy is 1,700 fpm or about 20 knots. (Compared to 60 on a full stall landing) (3 times greater velocity / 9 times greater energy)

Pilot Training

They also talk about pilot training contributing a major role in Cirri accidents. A total of 55 accidents have taken place and out of these, 36 have been due to pilot factors, 1 mechanical, and 18 TBD. Yes I'm sure some of these facts are a little bias however it does bring up an excellent point. I see it everyday where people with more money then brains want to do ridiculous things w/ these airplanes. Flight into minimum weather conditions which could not be completed by this pilot w/out the use of AP, relying on the chute for situations they wouldn't feel comfortable w/ in other airplanes, and relying way to much on the bells and whistles and forgetting their roots. It's really amazing how pilots can get so far behind an airplane that doesn't have retractable landing gear, cowl flaps, and a prop lever. It is partially Cirrus' fault because they market the airplane as an easy airplane to fly with not a lot going on. However you are dropping someone into an airplane that is turbocharged, can go up into the flight levels, you now have to deal w/ 02, it can fly in known ice and is just a speed machine compared to the Cessna they probably flew before this.

-------------------------------------------------

Observations

1.) Cirrus needs to train better on more advance systems that pilots haven't seen before. FIKI & non-FIKI TKS systems, 02, High Alt Ops (TC), and severe weather decision making.

2.) There needs to be a better level a standardization from the top down. From my understanding you can go to MINy and do your actual CSIP and depending on what instructor you get it can be a night/day difference on how they want you to teach in the aircraft. Different ways to run checklists, procedures, etc etc etc.

3.) ADM, ADM, ADM, ADM, and some more ADM. This is the absolute, 100% most important training piece in flying this airplane. I like to ask students would you do this flight in a ratty old 172? If the answer is no then they shouldn't be doing it in a Cirrus either.

4.) Drop the Read & Do Checklists and Start Doing then Verifying. Use flows and get ahead of the airplane. Simple.

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I may add more onto this thread later but for now I'm off to finish some HW. Hope this thread helped clear the air for some of you.

Source: COPA's Cirrus Pilot Magazine Volume 4 Number 6

 

[wjmiller3]

I read a story about #9. A father that flew often with his young son(can't remember the exact age), always told his son that if anything ever happened to him that he is supposed to pull the two red levers in the plane (mixture and CAPS). The father had a heart attack, which is the fatality in this accident, but the son did what his dad had always told him to do and saved the other people in the plane. An owner of one of the -22's I fly emailed this to me. Pretty amazing...

 

[Fly_Unity]

Im getting close to 1000 hours in the SR22 as a Corporate pilot and also feel there is an unwarranted hatred on this forum towards the Cirrus Aircraft and the "chute."

I also found it interesting that most of the fatal accidents in the Cirrus's from engine failures were experienced pilots who did NOT use chute because of their Macho attitude about they can handle their engine out without a parachute. Statistics show that most cases pulling the parachute has a 4 time better success rate.

All my flying is in the Rocky Mountains and even at night with one engine having a chute is more comfortable then having another engine in a light twin at the altitudes I have to fly to get over the mountains.

 

[Fly_Unity]

I like to ask students would you do this flight in a ratty old 172? If the answer is no then they shouldn't be doing it in a Cirrus either.

I dont entirely agree with this statement. A 172 is not Turbo-ed, approved into Known Ice and cant just climb 1000 feet a minute to FL250

 

[jhugz]

I dont entirely agree with this statement. A 172 is not Turbo-ed, approved into Known Ice and cant just climb 1000 feet a minute to FL250

Not really the point I was trying to get across. I fly only the non-FIKI, non-TC'ed airplane as an instructor right now. Mostly I'm talking about people taking off in low IFR that without synthetic vision and AP they wouldn't be able to handle. Point taken though.

 

[TFaudree_ERAU]

I also found it interesting that most of the fatal accidents in the Cirrus's from engine failures were experienced pilots who did NOT use chute because of their Macho attitude about they can handle their engine out without a parachute.

And for every "macho" experienced pilot that did NOT pull the chute, there was a "macho" low time pilot that launched into weather conditions that were beyond their or the aircraft's capabilities. More than a few of them did it ONLY because they had a safety net; the chute.

 

[jhugz]

And for every "macho" experienced pilot that did NOT pull the chute, there was a "macho" low time pilot that launched into weather conditions that were beyond their or the aircraft's capabilities. More than a few of them did it ONLY because they had a safety net; the chute.

That is not being debated. The magazine also had a good article w/ an interview with the SATS Air check airman. They touched on the incident where one of their aircrafts tanked an engine in IMC at night and instead of pulling the chute tried to put it down in a road. He caught power lines w/ his mains yet somehow all survived even though the plane was totaled. They discussed the entry of CAPS pulls into SOP's after this incident even though they decided to still leave it up to the pilots. I have said this before and will say it again but if I can't limb a Cirri back to an airport it is a CAPS pull for me. I'm just not going to try and stick it into a field.

 

[TFaudree_ERAU]

There are plenty of nice open fields in your neck of the woods. I think your employer would be quite upset with you if you had already vowed to pull the chute with all those options under you. You pull the chute and you total the airplane. You plop it down in a field, crack a wheel fairing, and you put it on a flat bed and fly it again some day.

I know I'm constantly evaluating the fields between Norfolk and DC every time I do that run. There's no reason to not at least give it a shot. If I get down to 1000' AGL and things aren't looking so good, then I'll make a judgment call. I'm not committing myself one way or the other before I take off in day VMC. Night flying, totally different story...

 

[jhugz]

There are plenty of nice open fields in your neck of the woods.

Plenty of hidden power lines, fences, hills, ditches, dips, etc. etc. etc.

I think your employer would be quite upset with you if you had already vowed to pull the chute with all those options under you.

Don't care about the employer. In an emergency situation these are my priorities:

1.) Save the lives of my pax and myself.
2.) Everything else is secondary.

The highest probability of me surviving is pulling the chute so thats what I'm going to do regardless. If it costs me my job so be it.

You pull the chute and you total the airplane. You plop it down in a field, crack a wheel fairing, and you put it on a flat bed and fly it again some day.

Your talking best case scenario. What happens when that field at 400 AGL doesn't look the same as it did at 1000 AGL. Then your hosed or you pull the chute down low and risk a partial deployment.

There's no reason to not at least give it a shot. If I get down to 1000' AGL...

I would rather be spending my time under canopy making calls prepping for impact and securing the airplane. Different strokes for different folks.

Night flying, totally different story...

Agreed

Totally off topic but you should not pop the doors before impact on a CAPS pull. Something about them flying off the hinges and w/ the egress hammer you get to break some glass too!

 

[jrh]

I read an interesting article in this month's issue of Parachutist magazine. It was an examination of risk taking behavior among skydivers. Over the years, technology has made skydiving safer and safer...automatic deployment devices, steerable canopies, etc....yet fatal accidents have remained the same, or even increased in recent times.

One of the theories brought up could also be applied to pilots--the idea of "risk homeostasis."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_homeostasis

Basically, it suggests that everyone has a certain level of risk they are willing to assume. If something comes in to effect that changes the "riskiness" of a situation, such as technology, the person will modify their behavior to bring their perceived risk level back to the original level....this is demonstrated by the Cirrus CAPS system leading pilots in to more potentially hazardous situations.

Then, the question becomes, how do we train pilots to actually become safer, instead of pushing a new limit? I don't know. But it all comes down to changing what the pilot perceives as "too risky." I'd say the instructor being a good role model would go a long way, as well as having some frank discussions with the Cirrus owner about what their plane can and can't do would be a step in the right direction.

 

[jhugz]

I read an interesting article in this month's issue of Parachutist magazine. It was an examination of risk taking behavior among skydivers. Over the years, technology has made skydiving safer and safer...automatic deployment devices, steerable canopies, etc....yet fatal accidents have remained the same, or even increased in recent times.

One of the theories brought up could also be applied to pilots--the idea of "risk homeostasis."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_homeostasis

Basically, it suggests that everyone has a certain level of risk they are willing to assume. If something comes in to effect that changes the "riskiness" of a situation, such as technology, the person will modify their behavior to bring their perceived risk level back to the original level....this is demonstrated by the Cirrus CAPS system leading pilots in to more potentially hazardous situations.

Then, the question becomes, how do we train pilots to actually become safer, instead of pushing a new limit? I don't know. But it all comes down to changing what the pilot perceives as "too risky." I'd say the instructor being a good role model would go a long way, as well as having some frank discussions with the Cirrus owner about what their plane can and can't do would be a step in the right direction.

Agreed 110%...good stuff.

 

[jynxyjoe]

That is not being debated.

Well of course, why would you want to talk about some of the facts the other side brings to the discussion.

Anyhow, took some digging but here it is .

Prior to the start of my flight training, I was clueless about general aviation safety. When I began researching the SR22, I was extremely surprised that in the short lifespan of the Cirrus planes, they have already been involved in 26 fatal accidents (with 52 deaths). That number still runs chills through my body. To put things in perspective, there are only about 3,400 Cirrus planes ever made. With 26 fatal accidents, that means 1 in approximately every 130 Cirrus planes have crashed killing at least 1 person on board. That’s a sobering statistic. 1 in 130.

Up until this point, I had operated under the assumption that “flying is safer than driving.” This is true when comparing Commercial Airliners against the general driving population, but it’s far from it when comparing General Aviation to car accidents. That was all news to me. I decided I needed to do a lot more research on General Aviation Safety and Cirrus planes before becoming an owner.

Hehe, that was from Oct of '07


Anyhow, if you read through the article you'll find those stats back then (I haven't had a dog in this fight for a while now) show the Cirrus to be a slightly higher fatality rate as all other SE aircraft. *shrug*

Pull early Pull often. That's what she said.

Read the guy's conclusion, it's worth your time.

Cheers, and remember, if you say it enough times, everyone else will eventually give up talking to you and you can finally have the place to yourself.

 

[jhugz]

Well of course, why would you want to talk about some of the facts the other side brings to the discussion.

I agree w/ him on that point. I feel as if Cirri Pilots will do stuff they normally would not do in other airplanes because they have this chute.

you'll find those stats back then (I haven't had a dog in this fight for a while now) show the Cirrus to be a slightly higher fatality rate as all other SE aircraft. *shrug*

Agreed but I strongly believe that the problems lie w/ the pilots not the aircraft. More standardized training would help this problem IMHO.

Pull early Pull often. That's what she said.

I agree w/ this statement and believe more Cirri Pilots would still be here today if they did also.

Cheers, and remember, if you say it enough times, everyone else will eventually give up talking to you and you can finally have the place to yourself.

OK

 

[OldTownPilot]

More training does't fix stupid. All that it will do is make them "feel safer" then risk homeostasis takes over. You tell them "dont do stupid stuff", "this is how to be safer", then they go out and take more risks then they would before.

 

[moxiepilot]

sorry, but statistics aren't woth the paper they're printed on if they're exclusive of certain information. Put into the equation the number of accidents and fatalities in the same plane and you have a whole new picture.

The chute may save lives, as your published article indicates, but it excludes all other incidents, accidents and fatalities.

Of the past 5 years, that would increase the number to:

96 fatalities out of 118 incidents.

going back to 1999 there would be an additional 17 fatalities, totaling 113 fatalities out of 139 incidents

 

[Seggy]

What is the bread and butter of the Cirrus marketing plan again?

 

[Boris Badenov]

I'm agnostic on the parachute, but until the boys at Cirrus discover the rotating anti-collision beacon and stop blinding me with their strobes, they will continue to be recipients of my most earnest hatred and loathing.

 

[jhugz]

I'm agnostic on the parachute, but until the boys at Cirrus discover the rotating anti-collision beacon and stop blinding me with their strobes, they will continue to be recipients of my most earnest hatred and loathing.

IDK what's more annoying the strobes at night or your Garrett's on the ramp.

 

[Boris Badenov]

IDK what's more annoying the strobes at night or your Garrett's on the ramp.

Well now that I've downgraded to Pratts, I am blameless. Seriously, though, some guy with his strobes on at ohmygodoclock is not only irritating beyond belief, it's also borderline dangerous, IMHO. Can't believe they certified the thing that way. And for those of you who have an anti-collision beacon, TURN YOUR STROBES OFF UNTIL YOU'RE ON THE RUNWAY. Please. We can see you just fine.

 

[jhugz]

sorry, but statistics aren't woth the paper they're printed on if they're exclusive of certain information. Put into the equation the number of accidents and fatalities in the same plane and you have a whole new picture.

The chute may save lives, as your published article indicates, but it excludes all other incidents, accidents and fatalities.

Of the past 5 years, that would increase the number to:

96 fatalities out of 118 incidents.

going back to 1999 there would be an additional 17 fatalities, totaling 113 fatalities out of 139 incidents

I have more statistics I will put in the thread at a later date (probably tomorrow) more along these lines. Accidents during different weather conditions, amount of time in type, etc... Just thought I would put some stuff in here us talk about it and then put more in later. Really I'm just to lazy to type that stuff up now. There fatality rate is pretty high, not going to deny that however I find it interesting to analyze it and try to spitball solutions. I'm trying to prevent any logbooks I sign to become a number.