Captain guards the yoke...

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typhoonpilot said:
Uh, okay, whatever :rolleyes:


TP
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TP, it's not worth the time or effort with him. You and @Capt Bill I have the utmost respect for. I have met both of you, and you both are the ideal professionals, and humble, personable people. You have both been around for a long time in this insane industry.

ATNPilot is argumentative about what color the sky is because he has nothing better to do. He's a national officer that spends more time on here than the actual webmaster. I have stopped wasting time trying to have a discussion with him since it's impossible.

Best of luck in your new endeavor. Joe
 
typhoonpilot said:
Just some examples of American's that came to EK and the result:

DAL 737NG captain - came as first officer, failed upgrade (good friend of mine, now works in China)
DAL 767 F.O. - came as first officer, failed upgrade, bad attitude, finally the light came on and passed upgrade on second try two years after first attempt
DAL B777 captain - Came as B777 DEC. Major approach mistake (800 feet over the water 8 miles from the airport), demoted to F.O.. Unable to re-upgrade, quit, whereabouts unknown.
NWA first officer - came as first officer, failed two upgrade attempts, now permanent F.O.
NWA A330 captain - Came as B777 DEC. Demoted to F.O. for major approach mistake. Never able to re-upgrade, still an F.O.
USAir A320 captain - Came as A330 DEC, failed initial training and terminated.
USAir B737 captain - came as F.O., failed upgrade on first attempt, passed on second try two years later.
AA (TWA) B767 F.O. - came as F.O., major approach mistake into Damascus on last flight before upgrade. Upgrade delayed two years. Captain of that flight was terminated.
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Can you give some examples of what a major mistake on a approach is to EK? Because I think we have all made mistakes, but there is a fine line between wow that sucked we need to fill out a ASAP so that doesn't happen to other people and wow our career is over.

Also why are guys failing upgrade training?
 
Gonzo said:
Can you give some examples of what a major mistake on a approach is to EK? Because I think we have all made mistakes, but there is a fine line between wow that sucked we need to fill out a ASAP so that doesn't happen to other people and wow our career is over.

Also why are guys failing upgrade training?
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The specifics of the Damascus approach were that it was so unstable they received both GPWS, "too low gear" and "too low flaps", yet continued to a landing. This happened on a clear day so weather was not a factor. So it wasn't just a mistake, it was a violation of stabilization criteria to a very dangerous level. It was the last straw ( more like 2X4 ) for the captain, he had many previous issues. The F.O., fortunately, has recovered and been a captain at EK for quite few years now.

That incident is actually one of the reasons that I argue so strongly for 1000 feet AAL to be the stabilization cut-off point on approaches, whether IMC or VMC. They were VMC, and at that time the cut-off was 500 feet at EK. I do not believe they actually heard the 500 foot auto callout or the GPWS "too low flaps". What happens when you are that far behind the airplane and so task saturated is that you start to lose your senses, one of which is hearing. I think if they would have heard the 500 foot auto callout or the GPWS "too low flaps" they would have gone around. That incident is also one of the reasons EK changed their policy to 1000 feet, even in VMC.

Upgrade failures happen for numerous reasons. The process at EK is challenging and probably a little beyond the scope of this thread to get into. The majority of guys who do not pass on their first attempt are given extra training over the next 1 to 2 years and then allowed a second attempt. Most are successful on their second attempt.


TP
 
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typhoonpilot said:
The specifics of the Damascus approach were that it was so unstable they received both GPWS, "too low gear" and "too low flaps", yet continued to a landing. This happened on a clear day so weather was not a factor. So it wasn't just a mistake, it was a violation of stabilization criteria to a very dangerous level. It was the last straw ( more like 2X4 ) for the captain, he had many previous issues. The F.O., fortunately, has recovered and been a captain at EK for quite few years now.

That incident is actually one of the reasons that I argue so strongly for 1000 feet AAL to be the stabilization cut-off point on approaches, whether IMC or VMC. They were VMC, and at that time the cut-off was 500 feet at EK. I do not believe they actually heard the 500 foot auto callout or the GPWS "too low flaps". What happens when you are that far behind the airplane and so task saturated is that you start to lose you senses, one of which is hearing. I think if they would have heard the 500 foot auto callout or the GPWS "too low flaps" they would have gone around. That incident is also one of the reasons EK changed their policy to 1000 feet, even in VMC.
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Post interview did they say why they didn't go around?
I think one of the down sides to the amount of hand flying we do in the US vs the rest of the world, is we think we can save a bad approach. I have done it, I should have gone around before the FAF but tried to save it, got down to 500 ft and it still didn't look good so I ended up going around but I can see guys wanting to keep trying to save it.

typhoonpilot said:
Upgrade failures happen for numerous reasons. The process at EK is challenging and probably a little beyond the scope of this thread to get into. The majority of guys who do not pass on their first attempt are given extra training over the next 1 to 2 years and then allowed a second attempt. Most are successful on their second attempt.
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Can you give some examples? Because something is wrong with either EK or mainline US airlines if guys that have been sitting in the left seat here for years can't pass upgrade or DEC training on planes they have been flying.
 
Gonzo said:
Post interview did they say why they didn't go around?
I think one of the down sides to the amount of hand flying we do in the US vs the rest of the world, is we think we can save a bad approach. I have done it, I should have gone around before the FAF but tried to save it, got down to 500 ft and it still didn't look good so I ended up going around but I can see guys wanting to keep trying to save it.
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It has been a long time ago, but I seem to recall that they said they had not heard the GPWS "too low flap" callout, That would occur at 245 feet or below, or is it 225? Anyway, pretty low.

Can you give some examples? Because something is wrong with either EK or mainline US airlines if guys that have been sitting in the left seat here for years can't pass upgrade or DEC training on planes they have been flying.
[\QUOTE]
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I would not put it in those words. EK is different. They have a higher standard than what I experienced at U.S. carriers, except for WestAir, which also had a very high standard which I believed carried over to Atlantic Coast. The failure rate at WestAir and Atlantic Coast was probably close to, if not higher than EK. Seagull might be able to confirm that. 4 out of 11 in my new hire class at WestAir did not pass training and were let go.

The interview pass rate at EK always hovered around 50% for F.O.s and less than 30% for DECs. The failure rate for F.O.s in new hire training was infinitesimal. Not to say that some didn't struggle, but the number who were let go in the 11 years I was there was probably less than a ten out of 3000 new hires. So certainly no "problem" there. Would you not agree?

The DECs on the other hand had much higher failure rate. Imagine though, going to a new airline to fly a new airplane in a new operating environment as captain. The guys who struggle the most were domestic only pilots from North America and Europe ( i.e. RyanAir ). Those tend to be insulated environments for flying.

I would not want to have tried going to EK as a DEC with my experience level when I joined ( which qualified for DEC by the way ). I honestly do not think I would have been successful so the guys who do go as DECs and are successful are to be commended.

In regards to upgrade failures, the main difference ( again from my experience ) is that EK puts a lot of emphasis on "soft skills" like management, CRM, decision making. The upgrade program is not about flying an engine failure on takeoff or a raw data ILS, although those have to be demonstrated. It is more about managing the aircraft and crew during emergency and non-normal operations. So the old time U.S. captains who went through the old style upgrade process which put much less emphasis on soft skills and more on stick and rudder skills are not necessarily going to be successful in an EK environment. The DAL 777 captain and NWA A330 captain were probably the best cases in point to that. They could fly, but their ability to manage the airplane during an emergency or non-normal, or even under a little bit of stress in a busy foreign environment was not acceptable. In large part that was due to not putting enough effort into learning the procedures and not being able to recall important operational information without significant help. If they flew with a "switched on" F.O. they were okay, if they flew with a marginal F.O. the mistakes and "intentional non-compliance" multiplied to a point that safety was reduced to unacceptable levels. I flew with both of them during their line training and saw the issues. I tried what I could do in two sectors to help and they both initially passed, but their weaknesses manifested themselves and became apparent by the number of mistakes they made on the line and in their later checking and training events.

TP
 
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typhoonpilot said:
It has been a long time ago, but I seem to recall that they said they had not heard the GPWS "too low flap" callout, That would occur at 245 feet or below, or is it 225? Anyway, pretty low.


I would not put it in those words. EK is different. They have a higher standard than what I experienced at U.S. carriers, except for WestAir, which also had a very high standard which I believed carried over to Atlantic Coast. The failure rate at WestAir and Atlantic Coast was probably close to, if not higher than EK. Seagull might be able to confirm that. 4 out of 11 in my new hire class at WestAir did not pass training and were let go.

The interview pass rate at EK always hovered around 50% for F.O.s and less than 30% for DECs. The failure rate for F.O.s in new hire training was infinitesimal. Not to say that some didn't struggle, but the number who were let go in the 11 years I was there was probably less than a ten out of 3000 new hires. So certainly no "problem" there. Would you not agree?

The DECs on the other hand had much higher failure rate. Imagine though, going to a new airline to fly a new airplane in a new operating environment as captain. The guys who struggle the most were domestic only pilots from North America and Europe ( i.e. RyanAir ). Those tend to be insulated environments for flying.

I would not want to have tried going to EK as a DEC with my experience level when I joined ( which qualified for DEC by the way ). I honestly do not think I would have been successful so the guys who do go as DECs and are successful are to be commended.

In regards to upgrade failures, the main difference ( again from my experience ) is that EK puts a lot of emphasis on "soft skills" like management, CRM, decision making. The upgrade program is not about flying an engine failure on takeoff or a raw data ILS, although those have to be demonstrated. It is more about managing the aircraft and crew during emergency and non-normal operations. So the old time U.S. captains who went through the old style upgrade process which put much less emphasis on soft skills and more on stick and rudder skills are not necessarily going to be successful in an EK environment. The DAL 777 captain and NWA A330 captain were probably the best cases in point to that. They could fly, but their ability to manage the airplane during an emergency or non-normal, or even under a little bit of stress in a busy foreign environment was not acceptable. In large part that was due to not putting enough effort into learning the procedures and not being able to recall important operational information without significant help. If they flew with a "switched on" F.O. they were okay, if they flew with a marginal F.O. the mistakes and "intentional non-compliance" multiplied to a point that safety was reduced to unacceptable levels. I flew with both of them during their line training and saw the issues. I tried what I could do in two sectors to help and they both initially passed, but their weaknesses manifested themselves and became apparent by the number of mistakes they made on the line and in their later checking and training events.
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Thanks, that is a great write up and gives a better picture of what you are saying.
 
typhoonpilot said:
Actually statistics would say that only about 70-80% of US airline pilots can hold their own against the standards of some foreign carriers. After you've operated with South Africans, Zimbabweans, Brits, Swedes, Germans, Aussies, Kiwis, and others for over a decade then you might change your thinking. It isn't good believing that you are the best because I can assure you the average American pilot does not reach the standard set at some of the others carriers in the world.
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TP,

Is there a way to explain how the South African pilots (just as an example) reached the status you mention above vs some other pilot group ? That wouldn't have happened overnight but must be a rather long process attributable to a number of factors. I wonder what those factors might be that produced the group's characteristics: primary flight training, societal characteristics, education, influences from another country on SA's way of doing things, maybe a smaller total number of pilots in the country creating more peer influence on attitude/behavior/values, other things I'd never think of ?

There must be an explanation for what you've observed.
 
bafanguy said:
TP,

Is there a way to explain how the South African pilots (just as an example) reached the status you mention above vs some other pilot group ? That wouldn't have happened overnight but must be a rather long process attributable to a number of factors. I wonder what those factors might be that produced the group's characteristics: primary flight training, societal characteristics, education, influences from another country on SA's way of doing things, maybe a smaller total number of pilots in the country creating more peer influence on attitude/behavior/values, other things I'd never think of ?

There must be an explanation for what you've observed.
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You're trying to get me in trouble ;)

Remember everything I say is just my opinion based on what I have witnessed or experienced. Having flown with, trained, and checked pilots from all over the world I would think it has some validity.

The short answer is they, on average, tend to have a really good balance of airmanship skills, procedural adherence, discipline, knowledge, and CRM.

As to what produces that I could only guess. It tends to run pretty well through the Commonwealth countries though with only slight variations in certain characteristics.


TP
 
bafanguy said:
No, no !! Wouldn't do that. :biggrin:

Just soliciting your opinion. :cool:

"...tends to run pretty well through the Commonwealth countries...". Just wonder what's common amongst the Commonwealth countries. :biggrin:
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An attitude of snootiness and looking down their noses at those American upstarts.
 
I had a captain who mostly flies a desk accidentally hit the locbc button instead of the app button on the loc intercept, then start freakin out when the airplane started turning the wrong way and I had to reach up and and disconnect the ap and turn us the right way. Also had a captain hit the trim switch with his coffee cup about 200' before altitude intercept, when the autopilot disconnected I had to reach up and push the nose down so we didn't blow through. He still to this day claims the autopilot "randomly" disconnects in that airplane. That being said, I've had instructors save my ass when I was learning to fly, and I've done my share of saving ass when I was an instructor. As a matter of fact, on my initial instructor ride (MEI), the first take off was a V1 cut, and the examiner, Pete Balestieri from the Daytona ATP location (may he RIP), taught me a very valuable lesson. He added power and when I failed the right mixture he kept his fat mitt locked to full power and jammed on full right rudder. As the Seminole started to spin towards the grass I failed both mixtures and jammed on the brakes. We sat with both engines dead and a regional jet on short final while I scrambled to get the engines restarted and he berated me with extremely loud obscenities about how much of an idiot I was. For the next ten minutes on the climb out I listened to how I would most likely be killed I my first year of instructing because I was too stupid to guard the controls. That lesson has saved my life several times over. Even in the jet world I've seen FOs get captains violated by up without the captain catching it. Although it may be annoying and disrespectful, it is ultimately the captains ass if the FO screws up.
 
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