Calling A319/320/321 pilots

There are to many combinations and permutations of system issues that arise that the old adage of “count to ten, slew a piece of paper of the printer, write down the ECAM message” because chance are, the message cleared itself (done! don’t even wonder why it happened) or if it’s still there, follow prescribed procedure and read all the considerations. But when a person with self-ascribed “high systems knowledge” starts going off script, they’ll sometimes find themselves in a variant where none of that applies and then he’s compounded a minor annoyance into “why the deuce are we in alternate law?” with catlike swiftness.

This is interesting. So is there a "CTL ALT DEL" type procedure? I know in the FA-18, cycling both gens, or cycling both mission computers is often step one during mx assisted troubleshooting of any number of nuisance failures of systems. Everything is very interrelated, and momentary surges of trons during startup can cause stuff to happen that can be cleared this simply. The counterpoint to that, and the reason I frequently rolled my eyes at this "procedure" when I started to get more experienced in the jet, was that many times it would mess up other things that previously were fine. So that (generally safe for flight) TACAN problem you were working for example, suddenly becomes like 6 other unrelated failures and a flight control computer/functional degrade that are now downing gripes, and you spend the next hour trying to clear everything.
 
We’ve got a number of control-alt-deletes and a hard-reset/power-cycle as well. Breakers, resets and other MCDU-based options.
 
This is interesting. So is there a "CTL ALT DEL" type procedure? I know in the FA-18, cycling both gens, or cycling both mission computers is often step one during mx assisted troubleshooting of any number of nuisance failures of systems. Everything is very interrelated, and momentary surges of trons during startup can cause stuff to happen that can be cleared this simply. The counterpoint to that, and the reason I frequently rolled my eyes at this "procedure" when I started to get more experienced in the jet, was that many times it would mess up other things that previously were fine. So that (generally safe for flight) TACAN problem you were working for example, suddenly becomes like 6 other unrelated failures and a flight control computer/functional degrade that are now downing gripes, and you spend the next hour trying to clear everything.
You don’t do anything unless told to by the airplane or have a written procedure to do so.
 
You don’t do anything unless told to by the airplane or have a written procedure to do so.

Sure, I was talking on deck, more to the types of things (if there are any for the 'bus) where the PCL (our name for QRH) just defers to maintenance without a cockpit procedure, or maybe only a very minimal one, since with many systems, there is not a lot you can do in the jet to fix it. Something like "ON DECK: If INOP, see maintenance"......etc. They obviously have their own troubleshooting manual, procedures, etc, but for our guys, a good deal of that is also techniques that have been developed over time. The CTL ALT DEL technique I described is one of the more common ones in the electric jet. Just curious
 
Naturally.

On the 330, two LGICUs one does one thing, the other is a backup, each gear cycle the primary and the secondary “flip flop”, blah blah blah.

But in all actuality, either ‘computer‘ may be nothing more than a subroutine on another computer with related and unrelated functions, so when the ‘comptuer’ goes out, depending on which one, there are other cascading errors and operational challenges with lower bunk rest facilities, cargo heating functions, hydraulic system restrictions and the list goes on for a bit. I keep bringing this up because this is what happened during IOE and I see newbies trying to use system knowledge to out-think the ECAM procedures and QRH all the damned time potentially making a bad situation worse.

For a pilot to have to understand all of this is doofus. Especially when you run the ECAM to stabilize the situation, then look at the QRH to see what other systems are effected. “Ah ah ah! From memory, what specifically does LGICU2 affect?” Is Riddle-esque.

This is one of f the lessons I end up having to teach a lot about the Airbus because we’ll be sittinng there, before start, with a status message like “Air Bleed”. The newbie presumption is that “Well, it’ll clear up after engine start” or “Mah, it’s probably something minor” and it ends. The Air Bleed status message is either a minor nuisance or you’re going to be sitting at the gate for two hours until a bunch of tests are run.

There are to many combinations and permutations of system issues that arise that the old adage of “count to ten, slew a piece of paper of the printer, write down the ECAM message” because chance are, the message cleared itself (done! don’t even wonder why it happened) or if it’s still there, follow prescribed procedure and read all the considerations. But when a person with self-ascribed “high systems knowledge” starts going off script, they’ll sometimes find themselves in a variant where none of that applies and then he’s compounded a minor annoyance into “why the deuce are we in alternate law?” with catlike swiftness.
You mean to tell me the ECAM basically says “hey, do this and this is what you lost” and people want to go and make more work for themselves to show off the big brain on Brad?
Pilots, man.
 
Sure, I was talking on deck, more to the types of things (if there are any for the 'bus) where the PCL (our name for QRH) just defers to maintenance without a cockpit procedure, or maybe only a very minimal one, since with many systems, there is not a lot you can do in the jet to fix it. Something like "ON DECK: If INOP, see maintenance"......etc. They obviously have their own troubleshooting manual, procedures, etc, but for our guys, a good deal of that is also techniques that have been developed over time. The CTL ALT DEL technique I described is one of the more common ones in the electric jet. Just curious
Don’t worry about an CB tricks or resets really in 121 especially the airbus. There’s really no allowance for going resetting breakers on your own even if you know the ones mx is going to pull for you. In some cases if it is allowed,
It’ll be written out step by step and totally legal. They’ve got this all dumbed down enough a pilot could do it.
 
Oh, I agree with knowing, if you really can. A 727 you had to be (and could be) a systems expert because the engineer was the automation and the systems were built for human intervention. Turn off a hydraulic pump, there was a cause and effect. Fluid temperature went down, you lose ”X PSI, it affects certain systems that use that hydraulic system and you know what options you have if you need more pressure to actuate something. A 727 is basically a 727.

I think the challenge on the bus is that we have some of the earliest 320’s, some fairly middle-aged 319’s and factory fresh 321s so most of the 319’s are consistent, there are probably two or three soft variants on the 320s and even the 321 fleet, even with the newness of the fleet, are slightly divided into Hamburg-built and Bama-built system variances. What may apply on an low ship number 320 probably doesn’t apply on a middle-aged 319 and may have entirely different circumstances on a 321.

Don’t get me wrong, I think it would be great for a fully omniscient approach to knowing an airplane, but the math when you start blending ages, fleet types and variances coupled with bussed subroutines and computers means that the probability of having all the permutations in your head, as they French say, “C’est impossibUHHHHH” :)

And here we are with second/third hand planes from all kinds of operators. They’ve made it better lately, but trying to work through effectivities on an MEL was a pain in the ass.

Then there’s me theory that no two -400s in our fleet have he same transponder.
 
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Oh, I agree with knowing, if you really can. A 727 you had to be (and could be) a systems expert because the engineer was the automation and the systems were built for human intervention. Turn off a hydraulic pump, there was a cause and effect. Fluid temperature went down, you lose ”X PSI, it affects certain systems that use that hydraulic system and you know what options you have if you need more pressure to actuate something. A 727 is basically a 727.

I think the challenge on the bus is that we have some of the earliest 320’s, some fairly middle-aged 319’s and factory fresh 321s so most of the 319’s are consistent, there are probably two or three soft variants on the 320s and even the 321 fleet, even with the newness of the fleet, are slightly divided into Hamburg-built and Bama-built system variances. What may apply on an low ship number 320 probably doesn’t apply on a middle-aged 319 and may have entirely different circumstances on a 321.

Don’t get me wrong, I think it would be great for a fully omniscient approach to knowing an airplane, but the math when you start blending ages, fleet types and variances coupled with bussed subroutines and computers means that the probability of having all the permutations in your head, as they French say, “C’est impossibUHHHHH” :)
bUt BoEiNg NeEdS dIfFeReNt TrAiNiNg FoR tHe MaX!
 
You mean to tell me the ECAM basically says “hey, do this and this is what you lost” and people want to go and make more work for themselves to show off the big brain on Brad?
Pilots, man.

Oh god yes, all the time.

"Where did the message go?"

"It's gone. Trust me, don't worry about it."

"Yeah, but why did it happen?"

"BECAUSE IT HAPPENS, ROLL THE BONES! "

geddy.gif


@DPApilot
 
Yeah, but did you run the QRH?

After you "clear the ECAM", yes.

If you get an ECAM message and it appears to self correct before you actually start the ECAM procedures, no.
 
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