Re: Buffalo Crash Sparks Debate Over Use of Cockpit Recordin
Good point MM.
We'll start out in me as the camp firmly against CVR "sampling", because that's really what it is.
While I've never walked through debris fields of an investigation, I have been involved in the "trial period" of the ASAP program at the previous shop. That's not to say I haven't seem the left over carnage first hand, as I have, but it was 3 different GA wrecks. So while my eyes have never been jaded by the horrific sights seen by some, I also have sat in the environment that is tantamount to what is being proposed.
First, there are no defined goals of this. The "improve safety" is too ambiguous.
What, specifically, are you going to do to improve safety?
Sterile cockpit under 10,000 is a great guidline, and as a rule, it must be followed. We've all done the flights out of the northeast corridor and out of south Florida where it's best to maintain "sterile" in attitude until you're well through 10k. We've also all flown out of Tulsa OK, where as soon as the flaps are up, and there's no terrain (yeah, I know, Oral Robert's tower...blah blah blah) to speak of, and should it be relaxed, you could talk about the ramper, or what you're going to eat.
Let's say the CVR is being listened to, the FDR data is correlated and out of 10, they start talking about all manner of things. The environment is task saturated, but the crew complies with all the instructions. Perhaps the crew should have been more focused on work, according to the "evaluator". Does the crew get punished?
Do you take the man-hours to listen to the entire cockpit set up, and as some poster pointed out, call out the briefing because someone said "forty, fifty two, eighty four" instead of "V1 140, VR 152, V2 184"? What is said to the crew?
All of us that have given linechecks have seen what goes on. Some pilots just run their crap right. Some try to sneak a cheatsheet where we can't see it (Yes, if you do that, we KNOW) to make sure they do all of the things they are supposed to. Some just get a good "standardization" briefing. And on the rarest of occasions, some fail.
So let's say that the linecheck system is considered a failure, which really what evaluating CVRs would assume. Is every flight going to be evaluated? If it is, what is going to be the outcome? Are memos going to be put out to redress the issues? Are pilots going to recieve additional training?
I don't know about where you work, but both companies I have worked for in the 121 world put out alot of memos, bulletins and revisions, in addition to all the FAR/AIM changes and whatnot. Right now, just gathering, processing and retaining the info is a pretty busy job.
Add to that a list of "nitpicks" from the company because I didn't transmit my radio calls in ICAO standard, or was sitting in line for 2 hours in LGA and talked about whatever with my flying partner but still had the uptodate ATIS and resumed sterile when we started actually doing stuff.
Which one takes precedence? At what point does a pilot just say "F*** it...I'm getting my ass chewed one way or another, I'll just do what I want...less stress that way." Or even a more consientious pilot...when do they just say "Man, I must suck"
And how much information found on a CVR, which I'd guess 90% of the stuff is habit patterns and call outs, can diagnose a short term fix (like just a bit of retraining in some rough steep turns)? If someone has serious issues, it probably results from deep behavioral issues. Like sluffing off checklists, not paying attention to anything in the sterile environment, or not during levels of high task saturation.
Oh well, my $.02...back to the "Safety Stand Down":laff:
anic:
Also working with the larger NTSB/FAA issues at hand with this accident.
It's nice to hear some voices of experience on the issue.
