Now before anyone calls troll or anything like that, just read this ASRS that was just put up when i checked the database just now. What do you think about this direct route system? The way I read it was as a system that really only took wx and traffic into account but didn't alert flt ops with anything except for a printer notice. Kinda freaky when you think about it. For all you know, the system could have sent that plane into a mountain range without you even knowing it beforehand.
Narrative: 1
[My airline] is conducting a trial of a Boeing system to identify enroute opportunities for more direct routing. The system, called Boeing Direct Routes, claims to use dynamic weather, traffic, and airspace configuration to generate a real-time ACARS text notification to flight crews while enroute without dispatcher's prior knowledge, for a savings opportunity. This system claims to monitor weather and traffic in real time to further optimize routings and provide additional savings, however the sources of their information is not disclosed.
The system identifies and "then notifies" the aircraft when an opportunity for a wind-optimal direct routing exists. The flight crew will be notified via ACARS text that a savings opportunity exists with an automated advisory message. Dispatch will also be notified of the advisory via screen printer, but will not have any advance notice of a proposed reroute to properly evaluate for safety and regulatory compliance.
[My airline] is testing a program that will intentionally violate the aircraft dispatchers responsibility to comply with FAR 121.533, 121.535 and 121.601 by issuing instructions to flight crews while enroute, which will not allow the dispatcher to ensure safety because of the lack of advance notice.
[My airline] needs to cease any addition testing of this program until it can prove it will allow the dispatcher to ensure safety while enroute.
Synopsis
Air carrier Dispatcher reported concern about a proposed new procedure that would generate suggested route changes directly to flight crews without Dispatcher review in the interest of cost savings..
ALSO be sure to watch out to make sure that TAFs on private software, like sabre, match with FAA TAFs, there was a report posted as well about a discrepancy with that.
Narrative: 1
Government TAF for MIA was showing in Sabre. WSI (private weather service) TAF for MIA was not showing in sabre, but was issued. Government TAF did not require an alternate. WSI TAF did require an alternate. WSI TAF is controlling. Some flights into MIA were not holding alternates when they were required to.
Synopsis
Air carrier Dispatcher reported some shortcomings with their software tool.
EDIT: OK last new one i promise, sorry just read this one after resubmitting for the sabre issue.
Narrative: 1
Flight sends an ACARS to dispatch, "PIECE FELL OFF ON TAKEOFF CAN U FIND OUT WHICH AND ADVISE." Then two more ACARS were sent to Dispatch: "HOLDING 1000 FT.... FOB 162K --- CALL ME ON SAT PLS." The only replies that the Dispatcher had to the crew were the canned ACARS replies: "ACKNOWLEDGED, PLEASE STANDBY." Here we have a flight in a possible emergency situation, holding at 10000 FT with possible parts missing and in all of this time never any pertinent replies to the aircraft. The Dispatcher was also unable to call the aircraft on SATCOM. In all of this time, never was Management or the Duty Officer ever advised of this situation. I could not tell if ATC or Tower was ever called. Ramp finally called and advised that inboard slat piece was missing. The crew called Dispatch, and amazingly, the Dispatcher offered a re-analysis with an over burn accounting for missing inboard slat pieces and continue to [destination]. ALL OF THIS WITH MISSING PARTS OF THE WING! And the flight was holding at 10000 FT. I advised Maintenance and the Duty Officer and they went over to the Dispatcher. The crew finally advised Dispatch that they were returning to [departure airport].
There was a serious lack of competency, urgency, and operational control displayed. Dispatcher couldn't dial the aircraft on SATCOM in such an urgent situation. Dispatcher never advised anyone on the situation. Dispatcher relays to the crew over burns to continue to [destination] with aircraft pieces missing, possibly putting the crew and the flight in further danger.
Narrative: 2
Inboard slat broke away from the aircraft on takeoff. Dumped fuel. Air return.
Synopsis
MD11 flight had a loss of a an inboard slat on takeoff which results in a return to departure Airport. Miscommunication issues between Dispatch and the flight crew made the situation worse.
Im wondering WHY the DX didnt even consider alerting a DM or sup about the situation. More amazing is WHY they then did a recalc and suggested continuing to their destination? If anything I would have told them ok, turn back and land we can deal with it on the ground. Yes mgmt might get mad but thats better than possibly endangering 100s of lives.
Narrative: 1
[My airline] is conducting a trial of a Boeing system to identify enroute opportunities for more direct routing. The system, called Boeing Direct Routes, claims to use dynamic weather, traffic, and airspace configuration to generate a real-time ACARS text notification to flight crews while enroute without dispatcher's prior knowledge, for a savings opportunity. This system claims to monitor weather and traffic in real time to further optimize routings and provide additional savings, however the sources of their information is not disclosed.
The system identifies and "then notifies" the aircraft when an opportunity for a wind-optimal direct routing exists. The flight crew will be notified via ACARS text that a savings opportunity exists with an automated advisory message. Dispatch will also be notified of the advisory via screen printer, but will not have any advance notice of a proposed reroute to properly evaluate for safety and regulatory compliance.
[My airline] is testing a program that will intentionally violate the aircraft dispatchers responsibility to comply with FAR 121.533, 121.535 and 121.601 by issuing instructions to flight crews while enroute, which will not allow the dispatcher to ensure safety because of the lack of advance notice.
[My airline] needs to cease any addition testing of this program until it can prove it will allow the dispatcher to ensure safety while enroute.
Synopsis
Air carrier Dispatcher reported concern about a proposed new procedure that would generate suggested route changes directly to flight crews without Dispatcher review in the interest of cost savings..
ALSO be sure to watch out to make sure that TAFs on private software, like sabre, match with FAA TAFs, there was a report posted as well about a discrepancy with that.
Narrative: 1
Government TAF for MIA was showing in Sabre. WSI (private weather service) TAF for MIA was not showing in sabre, but was issued. Government TAF did not require an alternate. WSI TAF did require an alternate. WSI TAF is controlling. Some flights into MIA were not holding alternates when they were required to.
Synopsis
Air carrier Dispatcher reported some shortcomings with their software tool.
EDIT: OK last new one i promise, sorry just read this one after resubmitting for the sabre issue.
Narrative: 1
Flight sends an ACARS to dispatch, "PIECE FELL OFF ON TAKEOFF CAN U FIND OUT WHICH AND ADVISE." Then two more ACARS were sent to Dispatch: "HOLDING 1000 FT.... FOB 162K --- CALL ME ON SAT PLS." The only replies that the Dispatcher had to the crew were the canned ACARS replies: "ACKNOWLEDGED, PLEASE STANDBY." Here we have a flight in a possible emergency situation, holding at 10000 FT with possible parts missing and in all of this time never any pertinent replies to the aircraft. The Dispatcher was also unable to call the aircraft on SATCOM. In all of this time, never was Management or the Duty Officer ever advised of this situation. I could not tell if ATC or Tower was ever called. Ramp finally called and advised that inboard slat piece was missing. The crew called Dispatch, and amazingly, the Dispatcher offered a re-analysis with an over burn accounting for missing inboard slat pieces and continue to [destination]. ALL OF THIS WITH MISSING PARTS OF THE WING! And the flight was holding at 10000 FT. I advised Maintenance and the Duty Officer and they went over to the Dispatcher. The crew finally advised Dispatch that they were returning to [departure airport].
There was a serious lack of competency, urgency, and operational control displayed. Dispatcher couldn't dial the aircraft on SATCOM in such an urgent situation. Dispatcher never advised anyone on the situation. Dispatcher relays to the crew over burns to continue to [destination] with aircraft pieces missing, possibly putting the crew and the flight in further danger.
Narrative: 2
Inboard slat broke away from the aircraft on takeoff. Dumped fuel. Air return.
Synopsis
MD11 flight had a loss of a an inboard slat on takeoff which results in a return to departure Airport. Miscommunication issues between Dispatch and the flight crew made the situation worse.
Im wondering WHY the DX didnt even consider alerting a DM or sup about the situation. More amazing is WHY they then did a recalc and suggested continuing to their destination? If anything I would have told them ok, turn back and land we can deal with it on the ground. Yes mgmt might get mad but thats better than possibly endangering 100s of lives.
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