Boeing Lounge Boeing 737 LRD

Here's how I look at it. There are two numbers to be concerned with.

5 seconds
39 seconds

5 seconds: This is how long our crew said it took for the flight deck to fill with smoke after an engine #1 LRD activation. Visibility was so restricted that they couldn't see the instrument panel. Thankfully the HGS was down and the projection distance short enough that it was still visible through the smoke.

39 seconds: According to the Mentour pilot video, the combination of chemicals in the smoke could cause death in as little as 39 seconds.

So put yourself in Reno, Nevada at night. At rotation you strike a turkey vulture in #1 and LRD activates.

Now you have to somehow fly this overly complex single engine procedure, get the O2 mask on and establish communications, all while the cockpit is filling with smoke and you can't see the panel. (Could you see the iPad to find the relevant turns on the procedure?)

So let's assume you prioritize aircraft control over all else and you don't get the masks on right away. I would assume there's some mental degradation the further you get into that 39 seconds.

You see where I'm getting at here. Boeing's procedure is inadequate because in this case you will probably fly about 2 minutes or more before you get to the QRC items on the engine fire severe damage or separation checklist and get the fire handle pulled - provided your flying partner can even identify the correct handle in zero visibility.

Boeing's procedure is inadequate for the circumstance, whereas shutting off the bleed valves would stop the smoke at its source much quicker.

I would never advocate for making up a procedure on the fly but Boeing has dropped the ball here and, other than APA, I don't see any airlines or unions picking it up and running with it.

Boeing says an EEC update is coming that would automatically shut the bleed valves following an LRD activation. But who knows how long that'll take. Until then, we have the benefit of thinking and talking about how we would tackle this problem in advance.

5 seconds and 39 seconds.
 
ZapBrannigan said:
Here's how I look at it. There are two numbers to be concerned with.

5 seconds
39 seconds

5 seconds: This is how long our crew said it took for the flight deck to fill with smoke after an engine #1 LRD activation. Visibility was so restricted that they couldn't see the instrument panel. Thankfully the HGS was down and the projection distance short enough that it was still visible through the smoke.

39 seconds: According to the Mentour pilot video, the combination of chemicals in the smoke could cause death in as little as 39 seconds.

So put yourself in Reno, Nevada at night. At rotation you strike a turkey vulture in #1 and LRD activates.

Now you have to somehow fly this overly complex single engine procedure, get the O2 mask on and establish communications, all while the cockpit is filling with smoke and you can't see the panel. (Could you see the iPad to find the relevant turns on the procedure?)

So let's assume you prioritize aircraft control over all else and you don't get the masks on right away. I would assume there's some mental degradation the further you get into that 39 seconds.

You see where I'm getting at here. Boeing's procedure is inadequate because in this case you will probably fly about 2 minutes or more before you get to the QRC items on the engine fire severe damage or separation checklist and get the fire handle pulled - provided your flying partner can even identify the correct handle in zero visibility.

Boeing's procedure is inadequate for the circumstance, whereas shutting off the bleed valves would stop the smoke at its source much quicker.

I would never advocate for making up a procedure on the fly but Boeing has dropped the ball here and, other than APA, I don't see any airlines or unions picking it up and running with it.

Boeing says an EEC update is coming that would automatically shut the bleed valves following an LRD activation. But who knows how long that'll take. Until then, we have the benefit of thinking and talking about how we would tackle this problem in advance.

5 seconds and 39 seconds.
Click to expand...

Agree with the numbers.

APA is running with and and continues to reinforce the best corrective action is to accomplish the Engine Fire Severe Damage Checklist in the event of severe damage that includes LRD activation in the #1 engine.

Not sure about your shop, but our AOM directs that in the event of severe damage, accomplish the Quick Reference portion of that checklist at 400’. We can also activate and navigate using our Engine Out procedures that auto populate in the FMC prior to 400’.

Again, not sure how other operators train, but at my shop, everyone is trained on the Engine Out procedures, Engine Fire/Severe Damage checklists, and how to don the O2 mask. We just don’t combine them into one scenario. I wanted to do this during my recurrent last year, but we got wrapped up in some nuances of a particular scenario and how best to instruct/evaluate said scenario and didn’t have any time remaining.

Another thing that is soon to come out is the data about these activations. I feel that one time is one time to many, but according to Boeing, they are standing on it has happened twice over so many MAX flights and the chances of activation are super rare.
 
"We can also activate and navigate using our Engine Out procedures that auto populate in the FMC prior to 400’."

We do not have that feature. Wish we did. It sounds impressive!
 
derg said:
Man, Alaska is WILD!

We have 19K+ pilots at SouthernJets and we don't have this level of acrimony between pilots in the same fleet.

Someone says something crazy, a LCP pops in, drama over in about an hour... tops.
Click to expand...
Our outrage/acrimony is generally unrelated to Volume 1.
 
ZapBrannigan said:
"We can also activate and navigate using our Engine Out procedures that auto populate in the FMC prior to 400’."

We do not have that feature. Wish we did. It sounds impressive!
Click to expand...
There’s a joke about your employer just now getting autothrottle approval here somewhere, but I guess that’s actually a bit of an old joke.
 
ZapBrannigan said:
Here's how I look at it. There are two numbers to be concerned with.

5 seconds
39 seconds

5 seconds: This is how long our crew said it took for the flight deck to fill with smoke after an engine #1 LRD activation. Visibility was so restricted that they couldn't see the instrument panel. Thankfully the HGS was down and the projection distance short enough that it was still visible through the smoke.

39 seconds: According to the Mentour pilot video, the combination of chemicals in the smoke could cause death in as little as 39 seconds.

So put yourself in Reno, Nevada at night. At rotation you strike a turkey vulture in #1 and LRD activates.

Now you have to somehow fly this overly complex single engine procedure, get the O2 mask on and establish communications, all while the cockpit is filling with smoke and you can't see the panel. (Could you see the iPad to find the relevant turns on the procedure?)

So let's assume you prioritize aircraft control over all else and you don't get the masks on right away. I would assume there's some mental degradation the further you get into that 39 seconds.

You see where I'm getting at here. Boeing's procedure is inadequate because in this case you will probably fly about 2 minutes or more before you get to the QRC items on the engine fire severe damage or separation checklist and get the fire handle pulled - provided your flying partner can even identify the correct handle in zero visibility.

Boeing's procedure is inadequate for the circumstance, whereas shutting off the bleed valves would stop the smoke at its source much quicker.

I would never advocate for making up a procedure on the fly but Boeing has dropped the ball here and, other than APA, I don't see any airlines or unions picking it up and running with it.

Boeing says an EEC update is coming that would automatically shut the bleed valves following an LRD activation. But who knows how long that'll take. Until then, we have the benefit of thinking and talking about how we would tackle this problem in advance.

5 seconds and 39 seconds.
Click to expand...
And add in X seconds for startle factor as well.
 
ZapBrannigan said:
"We can also activate and navigate using our Engine Out procedures that auto populate in the FMC prior to 400’."

We do not have that feature. Wish we did. It sounds impressive!
Click to expand...

Had it on the 787. It truly wonderful.
 
ZapBrannigan said:
"We can also activate and navigate using our Engine Out procedures that auto populate in the FMC prior to 400’."

We do not have that feature. Wish we did. It sounds impressive!
Click to expand...
Oh buddy, when I was back for leadership upgrade training the subject of OPS day and setting missed approach altitude came up. I asked the technical pilot doing the brief about using IAN and paraphrasing he told me it doesn’t exist and in 30 years of flying the airplane he had never heard of such a thing.

I went back to sodoku and spaced out the rest…
 
derg said:
Man, Alaska is WILD!

We have 19K+ pilots at SouthernJets and we don't have this level of acrimony between pilots in the same fleet.

Someone says something crazy, a LCP pops in, drama over in about an hour... tops.
Click to expand...

The only drama is Beefy. Apologies for how he paints this airline.
 
At our shop, an EO SID will auto populate when an engine fails. Still have to execute it. And if it’s a curving turn, bring up the next fix ahead of you, and click the R6 button for turning arc, then execute.

Of course, it auto populates when an engine fails. So if it’s a fire and the engine is still technically going, it won’t auto load because the engine hasn’t failed yet. We have a manual way of getting the EOSID inserted if we need that for a fire scenario where engine is still running, but won’t be soon.
 
derg said:
You’re not dramatic? Did I read this right?
Click to expand...

For AS and how I treat AS folks?

It’s almost a full time job correcting Beefy on his fake news stuff. :)


Seriously, we are a decent good bunch of folks. It just takes one guy who hates CAs, can’t read or comprehend his manuals, and make up stuff on his own / micromanage to ruin it for the rest.
 
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